No Reasonable Fear Means No FRO

K.M. v. M.D. involved a Final Restraining Order (“FRO”) sought by the Plaintiff after the Defendant, Plaintiff’s estranged Wife placed a GPS tracking device on his vehicle and showed up at his residence several times without his knowledge. The matter was heard in the Superior Curt of New Jersey, Essex County. After testimony was presented, the trial judge determined that the placing of a GPS device on the Plaintiff’s vehicle did constitute the predicate criminal act of stalking N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10. Under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Ace (“PVDA”), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a), in order to establish a claim under the act, the alleged actor must have committed one of certain enumerated acts, stalking being one of said qualifying acts. Additionally, in order to give rise to a final restraining order, the Plaintiff must demonstrate an actual fear and that the order is necessary to prevent harm to the Plaintiff at the hands of the Defendant. Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112 (App. Div. 2006). The parties had a 10 year marriage, during which one child was born and which ended in a contentious divorce. The Defendant admitted placing the GPS device on the husband’s vehicle but indicated that it was only for the purpose of knowing her daughter’s whereabouts during parenting time with the Plaintiff. However, Plaintiff recounted multiple specific incidents in which the Wife would send photos of his car in specific locations minutes after he left the locations, would call others asking what the Plaintiff and child had been doing there, send text messages admonishing him regarding his whereabouts and the like. Plaintiff indicated that the messages were alarming and he went to his wireless provider and phone manufacturer to determine whether there was something in his phone that was enabling the Defendant to track him. Plaintiff testified that the Wife’s behavior was impacting his life, relationship with his children and his sleep and he also testified to prior acts of physical violence by the Defendant. The Defendant indicated that a hurricane force wind cause the Plaintiff’s truck door to slam on his foot and that she had no involvement in the incident. Defendant further indicated that the Plaintiff had previously driven his vehicle, with their daughter as a passenger, after he had consumed alcoholic beverages. The trial judge held that significant evidence was missing including any of the alleged alarming texts from the Defendant to Plaintiff and any medical testimony indicating his sleep was impacted by the Defendant’s behavior. After hearing testimony from both parties, the trial judge determined that although the Defendant had clearly been stalking the Plaintiff, there was no history of domestic violence between the parties and a final restraining order was not needed for the Plaintiff’s safety. The trial judge dismissed the Plaintiff’s request for a final restraining order and the underlying temporary restraining order (“TRO”) was dissolved. The Plaintiff appealed and the Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the court below. If you are facing or seeking a final restraining order, call The Darling Law Firm, LLC at 973-584-6200 to obtain the results you seek. For more information about restraining orders, divorce or other family law matters, visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Child’s Need For Safety Trumps Parental Rights

Parents living in a hotel room with their children were charged with abuse and neglect for allowing the father, a Megan’s Law offender, unsupervised contact with the children, failure to immunize the children and failing to provide appropriate sleeping arrangements for the children. In New Jersey Div. of Child Prot. And Permanency v. J.B., the division learned that the mother, J.B., left the children alone with the father, C.R., who was prohibited from staying in a location where a minor was present without approval and subject to community supervision for life for Megan’s Law offenses involving the father’s 7 year old child and the mother’s older children from a prior relationship. The division filed for custody, care and supervision of the children under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21 and N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12. The referrant advised the division that the mother had recently given birth to a son after she had carried with no prenatal care and that the parents did not want to leave the infant at the hospital for a 48 hour monitoring period after birth, which the doctors believed prudent in light of the fact that the mother had no prenatal care. Also included in the complaint was the fact that the children did not have adequate sleeping accommodations and seeking to provide immunizations to the children. The daughter was 2 years and 9 months old and had been sharing a bed with the parents. The Defendants ultimately stipulated to abuse and neglect after the Superior Court judge granted the division custody but the parents denied the division approval to immunize the children. Once the parents stipulated to abuse, the division moved again to immunize the children over the parents’ objections on religious grounds and the trial court found in favor of the division over the parents. The parents appealed the decision of the Superior Court judge to permit the division to immunize the children in spite of the Defendants’ objections on religious grounds. Although the parents objections to immunization fit squarely into one of two permissible objections, religious or medical, the N.J. Appellate Division cited In re Guardianship of J.C., 129 N.J. 1, 9-10 (1992), acknowledging a parent’s constitutionally protected rights to raise their children, even if those children are in foster care. The N.J. Appellate Division then cited In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 347 (1999) in holding that the parents rights are superseded by the children’s safety and that the court has the ultimate authority to protect children in the event that they are in danger. The decision below was affirmed. For more information about parenting time, custody or other matters pertaining to parental rights visit DarlingFirm.com or call 973-584-6200 now to schedule a consultation. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Emancipation Abides The Jurisdiction At The Time Of Application

Lawson Scott Glassergreen sought to have his oldest child emancipated. Although Amy Glasser and Glassergreen were married in New Jersey, they divorced in Colorado. Plaintiff, Glasser, resides in New Jersey and the Defendant resides in Kentucky. Their oldest child attends an out-of-state Ivy League university and the youngest attends vocational school in Arizona and both reside with the Plaintiff when they are not in school. Defendant moved, in the New Jersey Superior Court, to have the parties’ oldest child emancipated. The parties Colorado Order which established the Defendant’s support obligations was registered in New Jersey. The Defendant argued that Colorado law requires emancipation at the age of 19 but the Superior Court of New Jersey obtained modification and enforcement jurisdiction over the matter in 2007 and, therefore, the age of emancipation is dictated by the laws of New Jersey. The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of the Defendant’s Motion. If you are seeking the emancipation of a child, or trying to prevent the premature emancipation of a child, you should seek an experienced family law attorney to assist you in your matter. The laws are subject to change and there are many nuances easily overlooked when researching the matter. For more information on emancipation or other family law matters, visit DarlingFirm.com or call 973-584-6200 now to learn your rights. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Alimony Suspended While Wife is Ward of The State

In M.J. v. K.J., Plaintiff with significant mental health issues sought to reinstate alimony retroactively while still under state supervision after commitment to a state mental health facility. Plaintiff and Defendant married in 1989 and had three children. Over time, Plaintiff became increasingly non-compliant with prescription medication for mental health issues. In 2009, Plaintiff attempted suicide and was admitted to a mental health facility and diagnosed as having bipolar disorder. Plaintiff’s failure to take her medication resulted in increasingly inappropriate behavior including stalking her chiropractor, for which she was ultimately incarcerated and an order of protection was issued against her. In 2009, Plaintiff filed for divorce and the parties entered into a consent order giving Defendant and the children exclusive possession of the marital home. Plaintiff broke in and, upon arrest, was admitted to a mental health facility. Plaintiff violated a TRP the Defendant obtained and continued to harass the Defendant throughout the divorce proceedings. The divorce called for the Plaintiff to have supervised parenting time with the parties’ youngest child and the two older children would make their own decisions with regard to visitation. Defendant was required to pay Plaintiff $2,000 monthly until either party’s death, Plaintiff’s remarriage or co-habitation with an unrelated adult or Defendant’s retirement. The Plaintiff continued to violate the FRO and was sentenced to 180 days incarceration during which Defendant’s alimony obligation was suspended for as long as Plaintiff was incarcerated or institutionalized. Plaintiff was released and reoffended by violating the restraining order multiple times with the last event occurring when Plaintiff appeared at Defendant’s workplace and pointed what appeared to be a semi-automatic handgun at him. He ran off calling the police as he fled and police found Plaintiff with what turned out to be an unloaded BB gun made to look real. Plaintiff was taken to the hospital and then incarcerated. The court ordered alimony suspended for the duration of the incarceration stemming from the fake handgun incident. Plaintiff was ultimately acquitted by reason of insanity and placed in Greystone Park Psychiatric Hospital. Per State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236 (1975), the court found that it was a matter of fundamental fairness to suspend the alimony payments of Defendant indefinitely, without accrual of arrears, as the Plaintiff was a ward of the State. In light of the egregious effect that Plaintiff’s actions had on the Defendant, the court did indicate that, upon the Plaintiff’s release from Greystone, the Defendant could petition the court for termination of alimony obligation. Further, the court denied the Plaintiff’s motion to modify the FRO permitting her to communicate with her children. Upon Plaintiff’s release from Greystone, she remained under the court’s jurisdiction with the requirements that she attend treatment and take her medication. Plaintiff again sought modification of the FRO to allow for parenting time and to reinstate the alimony obligation. The court held that, as the State was meeting her needs, it would be inequitable for the Defendant to pay alimony. On Plaintiff’s appeal, the appellate division affirmed indicating that the FRO was not properly placed before them and the Plaintiff had no need for alimony as the State continued to meet her financial needs. If you have a family law matter or are looking to modify an existing alimony order, you should seek an experienced family law attorney. To learn about your rights in a particular situation, visit DarlingFirm.com or call 973-584-6200 now to schedule a consultaion. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

FRO Issues After Terroristic Threats In Courthouse

A.M.C. v. A.M.A. involved a Final Restraining Order (FRO) between unmarried parties with a 13 year old son in common. As the parties had a relationship at one time, the matter fell within the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PVDA) (N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35). There was a substantial amount of litigation between the parties and a court proceeding in that matter took place wherein it was decided that the parties would participate in reunification therapy for the child and Defendant to rebuild their relationship. Immediately thereafter, the Defendant is reported to have shouted vindictive statements at the Plaintiff and threatened that he would kill her. The Plaintiff sought a temporary restraining order (TRO) which was granted that day. The TRO complaint alleged harassment (N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4) and terroristic threats (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3). On March 15, 2018, a FRO was entered by the Family Part judge after testimony was presented by both parties including testimony about past physical abuse and verbal abuse by Defendant against Plaintiff. The Family Part judge found the Plaintiff to be credible in her testimony and refused to accept the Defendant’s proffer that the Plaintiff only filed the domestic violence complaint to gain an advantage in the ongoing custody battle. The Defendant also included that the parties live an hour apart and the Plaintiff has sole custody of the child as a reason that a FRO was unnecessary but the court felt that the Plaintiff had a reasonable fear of the Defendant. It was on the grounds of distance and the fact that the parties have no ongoing relationship that the Defendant appealed. The Appellate Division looked to the two-part analysis required under the PVDA pursuant to Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112 (App. Div. 2006). First, the Plaintiff must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that at least one of the predicate acts set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a) has occurred. In this case, the act was harassment. Second, the court must find that a restraining order is necessary to protect the victim based on the factors included in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1) to – 29(a)(6). The Appellate Division determined that, although the parties were separated by some distance, they would be interacting as a result of the reunification therapy and protection was reasonable. The Appellate Division affirmed. If you are in fear and seeking a restraining order or defending against one, you should speak to an experienced attorney to determine what your rights are under the PVDA and whether you are likely to succeed in your case. To learn more about restraining orders visit DarlingFirm.com or for representation now, call us at 973-584-6200 to schedule a consultation. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

The Parties' Own Knowing Agreement, Absent Fraud, Prevails In Emancipation

In Longer v. Nace, Robert Nace sought to emancipate the parties’ daughter, as the parties’ separation agreement entered at the time of their divorce, defined emancipation as attaining the age of 18 years or completing college. Plaintiff, Nina Longer, opposed the motion based on N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.67 providing for child support until the age of 23 years. The daughter was enrolled full-time in a master’s degree program and living at home at the time. Plaintiff was not seeking contribution to the daughter’s tuition, only that child support continue. Under Newburgh v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529 (1982) the court denied the motion for emancipation. Robert Nace and Nina Longer divorced in 2002 with a property settlement agreement after eleven years of marriage. The children were ten and seven at the time of the divorce. The parties agreed to share equally the cost of all post-secondary education for the children. The parties further agreed that child support would terminate upon each child’s attaining the age of 18 years or completing college, the last of which occurs. The parties shared the costs of college for the children and the Defendant moved to emancipate the daughter upon her completing college, in accordance with the property settlement agreement. On appeal, the appellate division determined that the court below failed to properly apply Newburgh, which is to be applied only when tuition for the child is being sought and that the court should have enforced the property settlement agreement that the parties knowingly and voluntarily entered into which, on its face did not have any appearance of impropriety and therefore reversed the decision of the trial court with regard to the motion. If you are interested in emancipating a minor or preventing a minor from being emancipated early, visit DarlingFirm.com or call 973-584-6200 now to schedule a consultation. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of counsel.

Final Restraining Order Issues Upon Multiple Acts of Harassment

C.L.H. v. T.F.H. is about Defendant’s appeal of a final restraining order (FRO) entered against him upon his estranged wife’s request that the Court enter and order for same under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. Defendant appealed on four points: (1) Ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) allegations of trial court error in allowing “authentication” of a perceived no contact order; (3) a conflict between testimony and the checked “No previous acts of Domestic Violence” section; and (4) lack of evidence regarding intent or predicate acts. Under the PDVA, Plaintiff was entitled to protections, as long as the other criteria were met, based on her marriage to the Defendant. The remaining criteria, set forth in Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112 (App. Div. 2006), were also satisfied. First, the evidence demonstrated, by the requisite preponderance of the evidence standard, three acts that constituted harassment, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c), a predicate act under N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a). Specifically, (1) the Defendant entered Plaintiff’s car while she was in church and removed an item; (2) the Defendant sent Plaintiff a text asking when she would return from a trip that he had never been notified she was taking; and (3) discovered and drove to the location Plaintiff was staying to see whether she was there. During questioning in this regard, the trial judge found the Defendant’s explanations to amount to admissions of guilt committed with the clear intent to harass the Plaintiff. With regard to the second prong of Silver, the trial judge determined that, in light of confrontations between the parties, the Plaintiff’s fear of the Defendant was reasonable and a FRO was required to protect the Plaintiff from the Defendant. The Appellate Division determined the trial judge exercised sound discretion in rendering the opinion below and affirmed, also noting that ineffective assistance of counsel is inapplicable to the matter at hand. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.