Post Judgment Salary Jump for Wife

K.S. v D.J.S. is a post-judgment family matter. In November 2012, the parties divorced with a Marital Settlement Agreement (MSA). The Defendant acknowledged that after twenty-one years of marriage, the Plaintiff would need financial support and agreed to pay the amount of $3,400 monthly as support for the Plaintiff. The Defendant also agreed to pay one-third of any additional income over and above $139,000 to Plaintiff, to a maximum of $12,000 annually. The parties left the MSA open to modification by agreement of the parties or as permitted under the laws of the state of New Jersey. Plaintiff filed a motion to enforce litigant’s rights when the Defendant failed to comply with the terms of the MSA and the Plaintiff cross-moved for a reduction in alimony based upon “materially changed circumstances” which included the Plaintiff’s significantly changed earning capacity wherein she was making well over $100,000 and also more than Defendant made after his alimony was taken out of his income. The Defendant blamed the arrearages on the fact that his earning potential with his law firm had decreased and he was unable to meet his financial obligations without an alimony reduction. The court found nothing warranting a downward modification in alimony from the documents submitted by the Defendant. The court refused to grant the alimony modification and ordered the Defendant to pay all sums outstanding to Plaintiff. On appeal, the court found that the Defendant was a partner in the same law firm he had been with at the time of the divorce and his base salary had increased. The appellate division cited Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139 (1980) and its progeny which dictate that alimony is based largely on the parties’ standard of living during the marriage and the fact that alimony modification may occur, under the factors of N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, upon the demonstration of “changed circumstances.” The appellate division further cited to Crews v. Crews, 164 N.J. 11 (2000) regarding the changed circumstances significantly impairing the ability of the supporting spouse to maintain a reasonably comparable standard of living during the marriage and Stamberg v. Stamberg, 302 N.J. Super. 35 (App. Div. 1997) which sets forth the consideration of the significant improvement in the supported spouse’s economic situation. The appellate division also found that the court below made no findings as to the Plaintiff’s improved earning capacity and remanded for findings as to the Plaintiff’s independent financial circumstances. If you are considering filing a post-judgment motion, or your former spouse has done so, you should consult with an experienced family law attorney to learn your rights. For more information about divorce, alimony or post-judgment motions, visit DarlingFirm.com or, to schedule a consultation, call us now at 973-584-6200. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Pre-Marital Assets Comingled Become Joint Property

Andrew Flockhart v. Karen Flockhart was a divorce ending in a twelve day trial relating to alimony, custody, child support and equitable distribution. The parties married in 1995, had three children born in 1998, 2000 and 2004 and separated in 2012. The Plaintiff had a successful landscaping business that predated the marriage and owned his own home as well. The Defendant was employed and also helped the Plaintiff with his landscaping business prior to the birth of their first child. Thereafter, the Plaintiff stopped working until 2014 when she began working part-time. During the marriage, the Plaintiff sold his home and the parties upgraded through multiple residences and, in 1998, the Plaintiff sold his business and the parties formed an entity including property purchased with the proceeds of Plaintiff’s landscaping business in which they owned equal interests. The parties branched into other equally held businesses and real estate holding companies. Plaintiff also formed a business with his mother, in which she was a majority shareholder and to which she contributed $200,000. In 2012, the Plaintiff filed for divorce and the parties’ holdings were evaluated with valuations in the millions, although they were offset by significant outstanding mortgage balances. Plaintiff was granted sole legal custody of the sons with the Plaintiff having physical custody of the older son. The parties’ daughter was emancipated. The parties’ combined net income during the marriage exceeded $187,200 which would trigger certain child support guideline limits. Plaintiff was ordered to pay$224 weekly child support for the younger son and defendant was ordered to pay $380 per week in child support for the older son – a net weekly payment to Plaintiff from Defendant of $156 in child support. The court imputed Plaintiff income of $300,000 annually and Defendant was imputed income of $27,040 annually. Plaintiff was ordered to pay $2,500 weekly in alimony until the parties’ older son was emancipated and $1950 weekly thereafter for a total alimony period of seventeen years and five months, a duration equal to that of the marriage. In spite of the $275,000 disparity in their annual incomes, the alimony calculation left both Plaintiff and Defendant in the very similar position of falling slightly short of their post-marital monthly budgets of over $10,000 each. The court determined that the parties’ assets should be divided equally as they were amassed through joint efforts. The parties appealed as to several issues including alimony and equitable distribution. The result of the appeal was remand of the matter for a review of child support and some adjustments with regard to equitable distribution. There were no credits to the Plaintiff for the contribution of his premarital business for the growth of the marital enterprise, nor for the contribution of his premarital residence to the purchase of the successive marital residences. If you are considering divorce, it is imperative that you obtain the advice of an experienced family law attorney in order to insure that your rights are protected. For more information about divorce, alimony, child support or other family law matters, visit DarlingFirm.com or call 973-584-6200 today if you wish to consult with an experienced divorce lawyer. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of counsel.

PDAs And Living Together Does Not Show Cohabitation

In Wood v. Wood, Alan Wood sought to terminate his alimony obligation to Wendy Wood, pursuant to the terms of their property settlement agreement (PSA), based on her cohabitation with another man. The parties were married from 1993 until 2016 and two daughters were born of the marriage. Under the terms of the PSA, the Defendant, Alan Wood, was to pay the Plaintiff alimony of $525 weekly for a term of 10 years following the date of the parties’ divorce but could be modified or terminated, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-25, in the event that the wife cohabited. The Defendant hired a private investigator to confirm that the Plaintiff was cohabiting with her boyfriend, K.C. The private investigator claimed that the boyfriend was at the Plaintiff’s residence 14 out of 15 non-consecutive dates at varying times of the day. Additionally, K.C.’s name was associated with both the marital residence, foreclosed upon following the parties’ divorce, and the Plaintiff’s current residence. K.C. used the Plaintiff’s address on his driver’s license and voter registration. On the various visits, K.C. was observed using keys to the residence, keys to the locked mailbox and kissing the Plaintiff. The private investigator opined the K.C. and the Plaintiff were permanently cohabiting together in a romantic relationship. In addition to a cross-motion, Plaintiff responded that K.C. was a roommate necessitated by her multiple disabilities which prevented her from working and for which she had not yet received any disability benefits. Plaintiff indicated that she could not qualify for a rental on her own as she did not have sufficient income. Plaintiff testified that she and K.C. each paid for their own expenses including groceries, rent and utilities and that they had separate rooms and baths. To further her position, the Plaintiff testified that, when she had brain surgery, her family and friends cared for her, not K.C., and that she and K.C. did not socialize together. Plaintiff also offered certifications from family members, a copy of the condominium lease and a letter from her doctor corroborating her position. The Defendant offered the private investigator’s report of K.C. and Plaintiff kissing, K.C. accompanying Plaintiff to Robert Wood Johnson Hospital and the fact that the parties’ children have advised him of the longtime romantic relationship between K.C. and Plaintiff and the fact that, as long ago as his final walk through at the marital residence preceding foreclosure, the Defendant observed men’s clothing that did not belong to him comingled with the Plaintiff’s clothing. Defendant further contended that the Plaintiff and K.C. were in fact co-lessees per the evidence Plaintiff provided. Plaintiff’s response was to deny kissing K.C., admit he drove her to the hospital on a single occasion, deny the presence of men’s clothing with her own and to acknowledge that she did rent a room to K.C. in the marital residence, prior to foreclosure thereupon, in order to obtain money for utility payments. The judge below denied Defendant’s motion finding that, absent a prima facie showing of changed circumstances, the court could order further discovery under Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139 (1980) and Crews v. Crews, 164 N.J. 11 (2000) but, absent a prima facie showing of changed circumstances, it was inappropriate for the court to order additional discovery of a parties’ financial status. The judge included that a finding of cohabitation required a finding that the cohabitation include the kind of mutual support and intimacy commonly associated with a marital relationship, pursuant to Konzelman v. Konzelman, 158 N.J. 185, (1999), and concluded that the proof offered by the Defendant was not enough to substantiate such a belief. Defendant appealed arguing that the Plaintiff’s living with someone else was enough that he should have opportunity to obtain her basic financial information and also argued that genuine issues of material fact existed. The N.J. Appellate Division affirmed based on the record below and also cited to Gayet v. Gayet, 92 N.J. 149 (1983) and Ozolins v. Ozolins, 308 N.J. Super. 243 (App. Div, 1998) collectively holding that a prima facie case of cohabitation in a relationship equivalent to that of a marriage is required in order to obtain mutual discovery and only after such prime facie showing is made will the dependent spouse be required to defend the continuing need for alimony. If you are seeking to stop paying alimony based on cohabitation or to defend your alimony when cohabitation has been falsely alleged, call The Darling Law Firm, LLC now at 973-584-6200. For more information about alimony, cohabitation, divorce or other family law matters, visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of counsel.

Alimony Suspended While Wife is Ward of The State

In M.J. v. K.J., Plaintiff with significant mental health issues sought to reinstate alimony retroactively while still under state supervision after commitment to a state mental health facility. Plaintiff and Defendant married in 1989 and had three children. Over time, Plaintiff became increasingly non-compliant with prescription medication for mental health issues. In 2009, Plaintiff attempted suicide and was admitted to a mental health facility and diagnosed as having bipolar disorder. Plaintiff’s failure to take her medication resulted in increasingly inappropriate behavior including stalking her chiropractor, for which she was ultimately incarcerated and an order of protection was issued against her. In 2009, Plaintiff filed for divorce and the parties entered into a consent order giving Defendant and the children exclusive possession of the marital home. Plaintiff broke in and, upon arrest, was admitted to a mental health facility. Plaintiff violated a TRP the Defendant obtained and continued to harass the Defendant throughout the divorce proceedings. The divorce called for the Plaintiff to have supervised parenting time with the parties’ youngest child and the two older children would make their own decisions with regard to visitation. Defendant was required to pay Plaintiff $2,000 monthly until either party’s death, Plaintiff’s remarriage or co-habitation with an unrelated adult or Defendant’s retirement. The Plaintiff continued to violate the FRO and was sentenced to 180 days incarceration during which Defendant’s alimony obligation was suspended for as long as Plaintiff was incarcerated or institutionalized. Plaintiff was released and reoffended by violating the restraining order multiple times with the last event occurring when Plaintiff appeared at Defendant’s workplace and pointed what appeared to be a semi-automatic handgun at him. He ran off calling the police as he fled and police found Plaintiff with what turned out to be an unloaded BB gun made to look real. Plaintiff was taken to the hospital and then incarcerated. The court ordered alimony suspended for the duration of the incarceration stemming from the fake handgun incident. Plaintiff was ultimately acquitted by reason of insanity and placed in Greystone Park Psychiatric Hospital. Per State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236 (1975), the court found that it was a matter of fundamental fairness to suspend the alimony payments of Defendant indefinitely, without accrual of arrears, as the Plaintiff was a ward of the State. In light of the egregious effect that Plaintiff’s actions had on the Defendant, the court did indicate that, upon the Plaintiff’s release from Greystone, the Defendant could petition the court for termination of alimony obligation. Further, the court denied the Plaintiff’s motion to modify the FRO permitting her to communicate with her children. Upon Plaintiff’s release from Greystone, she remained under the court’s jurisdiction with the requirements that she attend treatment and take her medication. Plaintiff again sought modification of the FRO to allow for parenting time and to reinstate the alimony obligation. The court held that, as the State was meeting her needs, it would be inequitable for the Defendant to pay alimony. On Plaintiff’s appeal, the appellate division affirmed indicating that the FRO was not properly placed before them and the Plaintiff had no need for alimony as the State continued to meet her financial needs. If you have a family law matter or are looking to modify an existing alimony order, you should seek an experienced family law attorney. To learn about your rights in a particular situation, visit DarlingFirm.com or call 973-584-6200 now to schedule a consultaion. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Fleeing the Country to Avoid Alimony and Child Support

In Jonas v. Jonas, defendant Edwin Jonas, III appealed, for the eleventh time, the court’s decision in favor of Linda Jonas. Edwin Jonas, III was a prominent attorney who willfully refused to pay child support and alimony for decades, since his 1990 divorce, to the demise of his reputation and business. In his efforts to avoid payment, Edwin Jonas has removed his children from the country, lied to the court, fled jurisdiction and dissipated assets. The Defendant's appeal centers around the theme that he cannot receive a fair trial in Camden County Superior Court due to judicial prejudice against him. The Defendant's belief stems from the fact that he represented to the court that he had no intention of liquidating assets or leaving the country with the parties' children. Thereafter, Edwin Jonas, III left the country with the children, purchased a residence in the Cayman Islands and took steps to sell a convenience store he owned, causing title of several assets owned by the Defendant to be transferred into Plaintiff's name by Court Order. The idea was to create a constructive trust to ensure payment of alimony and child support. Rather than paying the sums due for support for a full twenty-eight years, the Defendant, is willing to file appeals and appear in court to try to seek an accounting from the Plaintiff. As a result of the Defendant's ongoing failure to acknowledge any wrongdoing and continue with his onslaught of appeals, the court denied the Defendant's motion. If your earnings, or those of your spouse, include commissions, bonus, expense accounts, profit sharing or other items which are irregular, it may make a substantial difference in what you pay or receive at the conclusion of your divorce. It is imperative that you consult an experienced divorce attorney to discuss your rights and obligations prior to filing for divorce. For more information about divorce, child support, alimony, property distribution or other family law matters visit DarlingFirm.com.

Disability Claims in Alimony and Child Support Matters

Assembly Bill 1551 would serve to amend the New Jersey support statute, N.J.S. 2A:34-23 insofar as it would make a social security disability determination inadmissible in the calculation of a party’s alimony or child support receipt or obligation. The Bill, introduced by Morris County Assemblyman Michael Patrick Carroll, would affect actions in which earning capacity was in question due to a disability claim by a party in an action for child support or alimony. In making a determination of earning capacity, “a record or oral testimony on a determination of a federal social security disability benefit award or the receipt of past or on-going social security benefits shall be inadmissible for purposes of establishing the cause, or the extent or duration of the party’s disability in its impact on the earning capacity of that party.” The Bill would require genuine medical records and testimony of treating physicians in order to prove a party’s earnign capacity as it relates to need or ability to pay alimony or child support. Further, the Bill would provide for reasonable costs and attorney fees for the production of proofs by a party victorious in proving a disability limiting earning capacity and costs to a party successfully refuting the other party’s disability claim. The basis for the Bill is the lack of a meaningful adversarial process in the determination of whether an individual is afflicted with a disability in the confines of a social security administration hearing. The language in the bill would add a layer of proof serving to protect the interests of the other party in a family law matter whose interests were not represented in the social security disability matter. If you are considering divorce or post-judgment modification of alimony, you should consult an experienced divorce attorney to protect your rights. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice on an attorney. If you wish to consult with a divorce attorney, please visit DarlingFirm.com to learn more about our services and how to contact us.

High Income Divorce With Extra Complications

In the high income divorce of Jennifer Maynard and Chad Michna, the parties disputed child support. The parties each had a prior marriage and in each marriage a child with special needs was born. One child was born of the marriage and the parties’ relationship ended approximately 4 months thereafter. Maynard filed a Divorce Complaint seeking sole residential custody and legal custody, child support and payment of the child’s expenses. During their divorce hearing, the parties reached an agreement with regard to custody and parenting time. The plaintiff was a medical sales representative with a base salary, commission, and bonus. She also had investment income from outside business affiliations, rental property and child support. The plaintiff included her prior son’s expenses, as well as mortgage and costs of her investment properties, as expenses on her Case Information Statement. She also included the costs of a nanny at is employed 12 hours each day, and weekends. During cross-examination, plaintiff provided more accurate versions of her expenses. Michna was a director of government accounts with a base salary, commissions and a company stock appreciation rights plan and passive interest income. The defendant showed approximately $2,500 per month in expenses related to his son from a prior marriage. Michna sought to have the time period for income calculations to extend back to 2009 when he earned substantially less and Maynard made substantially more. Additionally, as the parties’ maintained a long-distance relationship during most of their marriage, Michna indicated that Maynard’s lifestyle was attributable to her family’s wealth and he could neither afford nor match such a lifestyle. The trial judge’s written opinion included income calculations from 2010 through 2012 and included child support differing from the Guidelines amount. Michna appealed and Maynard cross-appealed in Maynard v. Michna. The Appellate Division first looked to Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583 (1995) for the basic premise that child support is to ensure the child’s basic needs are met. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:2-3 and Caplan v. Caplan, 182 N.J. 250 (2005), child support is paid by the non-residential parent to assist the residential parent in raising the child with the economic means he or she would have been raised had the family remained intact. Child support may not be waived by a parent as it is the right of the child. Pascale, 140 N.J. at 591. Under Jacoby v. Jacoby, 427 N.J. Super. 109 (App. Div. 2012) and N.J.C.R. 5:6A, the Guidelines are to be followed in establishing child support. Under Harte v. Hand, 438 N.J. Super. 545 (Ch. Div. 2014), if an award in line with the Guidelines would cause injustice, the trial judge could use discretion to modify the award. Reviewing the facts of the case through binding precedent, the N.J. Appellate Division remanded the matter for recalculation of the parties’ incomes and a clear statement on the record as to whether the Guidelines were utilized, why the child support award differed from the Guidelines including adjustments to account for the fact that Maynard included her child from another marriage in the expenses utilized to calculate child support for the parties’ child and the deduction of non-work related child care. If your earnings, or those of your spouse, include commissions, bonus, expense accounts, profit sharing or other items which are irregular, it may make a substantial difference in what you pay or receive at the conclusion of your divorce. It is imperative that you consult an experienced divorce attorney to discuss your rights and obligations prior to filing for divorce. For more information about divorce, child support, alimony, property distribution or other family law matters visit DarlingFirm.com.

Small Business Divorce Results in Imputed Income

In this divorce matter involving a small business, Avraham Arbely appealed the decision of the judge as to imputation of income to Arbely, thereby increasing his alimony payment, bias by trial judges and other matters. Lea Brandspiegel-Arbely and Avraham Arbely were married in 1989, 2 children were born of the marriage and a final judgement of divorce was entered in 2013 with economic issues reserved for trial which began in November 2013. During the trial of Brandspiegel-Arbely v. Arbely, the plaintiff’s expert, Martin Abo, a certified public accountant (CPA) provided testimony indicating that the defendant’s proofs with regard to income from his business were designed to frustrate the CPA’s efforts at ascertaining the defendant’s actual income and that the defendant apparently underreported a significant amount of cash sales to the IRS. Arbely, who chose to represent himself rather than hire an attorney, challenged the figures and methods of Abo but provided no countervailing evidence. Following trial, the judge found Abo to be credible and further found that Arbely sold the business after the divorce complaint was filed in order to divest himself of his “cash cow” prior to equitable distribution and drew a negative inference against Arbely for refusing to provide Abo with adequate information and found Arbely to be less than credible when testifying. Plaintiff was awarded alimony of $23,000 per year for 14 years based on defendant’s imputed income of $95,000 per year. Plaintiff was also awarded the marital residence, and investment and business properties. The NJ Appellate Division looked to Stenken v. Stenken, 183 N.J. 290 (2005) with regard to the established principle that alimony is designed to assist the supported spouse in enjoying a standard of living after the marriage which is reasonably comparable to that enjoyed during the marriage. Additionally, the Appellate judges looked to Tannen v. Tannen, 416 N.J. Super. 248 (App. Div. 2010) which reaffirmed the long held principle providing for imputation of income in the process of establishing an alimony award. Elrom v. Elrom, 439 N.J. Super. 424 (App. Div. 2015) was used by the Appellate Division in support of the premise that imputation of income is discretionary wherein the trial court must consider the party’s actual earning capacity. Finding no basis to disturb the trial judge’s findings with regard to expert credibility, the N.J. Appellate Division upheld the decision of the court below with regard to alimony, imputed income and all other issues. If you are considering filing for divorce and own a business, or portion thereof, you are facing considerations outside the scope of a typical divorce. Depending upon their own ownership interest in the business, your spouse may fight to obtain increased alimony or funds by disputing the net worth of your business, annual profits and your personal income. Not only can the valuations be tedious and expensive but the results of the court’s findings can have permanent and financially devastating consequences. It is critical that you obtain an experienced divorce attorney familiar with small business divorces. For more information about small business divorce, alimony, child custody, equitable distribution and other family law matters visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Cohabitation Excluded From Property Settlement Agreement Fails To End Alimony

Frick v. Frick was a post-judgment application to terminate alimony based on co-habitation. The parties divorced in 2009 with the court making no findings with regard to alimony, equitable distribution or other matters. The terms of the divorce were set forth within a Property Settlement Agreement (PSA) which both parties testified they entered into freely and voluntarily. Beginning in 2013, Shari Frick began co-habitating with another man and Glen Frick sought termination of his 10-year alimony obligation. The New Jersey Superior Court judge hearing the case terminated alimony, with certain exceptions. The NJ Appellate Division reversed the decision of the trial court finding that co-habitation is a forseeable occurrence after divorce and the parties failed to include it as a reason to terminate alimony under their Agreement. In light of the fact that the parties included death and remarriage as events which would serve to terminate alimony, the NJ Appellate Division found that, had they intended it to be a trigger for termination of alimony, the parties would have included co-habitation in their PSA. When divorcing, by way of agreement or trial, it is critical that the agreement or judgment be as detailed as possible in order to avoid misunderstandings or misinterpretations. If you are seeking a reduction of alimony based on co-habitation of your former spouse, it is critical that you obtain an experienced divorce attorney to assist you with your matter. For more information about alimony termination, co-habitation, divorce, property settlement agreements or other family law matters visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Alimony Modification Denied For Lack Of Changed Circumstances

Jill Bier was seeking an increase in the monthly alimony of $25,000 she was receiving from her former husband Robert Bier. Ms. Bier appealed the denial of her application for upward modification of alimony payments by Robert Bier. The couple's final judgment of divorce, which occurred in 2003, made it clear that Jill Bier's monthly medical expenses would increase. The New Jersey Superior Court, Somerset County, Family Part judge hearing the motion for reconsideration noted the substantial discrepancy between Jill Bier's Case Information Statement (CIS), indicating $17,194 monthly in medical expenses and the certification she submitted in support of her motion which indicated $6,000 per month in medical expenses. Jill Bier provided no documentation of her claimed expenses, her condition or any change therein since the divorce. The judge found Jill Bier's credibility to be questionable in light of conflicting claims of being nearly bed ridden yet purchasing a Mercedes E550 and incurring commuting expenses of $5,500 monthly. In Bier v. Bier, the New Jersey Appellate Division determined that no as there was no prima facie showing of changed circumstances, as required under Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139 (1980), no evidentiary hearing was required. The Appellate Division followed Larbig v. Larbig, 384 N.J. Super. 17 (App. Div. 2006) in holding that the decision to modify an alimony obligation based on claims of changed circumstances rests with the family part judge. Finding no reason to disturb the decision, the N.J. Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the trial judge. If you are facing divorce, alimony can have lasting and substantial consequences upon your future whether you are the obligee or the obligor. It is imperative that you obtain an experienced divorce attorney for your divorce or motion for modification in order to ensure that your rights are protected. For more information about divorce, alimony, child support and other family law matters visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Alimony Motion Dismissed For Discovery Violations

Null v. Null involved an alimony matter on appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Morris County. The parties married in 1978, had two children in 1982 and 1984 respectively, and were divorce in 2005. They entered into a negotiated property settlement agreement (PSA) at the time of divorce including permanent alimony from the Defendant to the Plaintiff in the amount of $6,000 per month based on his annual income of $175,000 with a formula for calculating increases and caps in alimony as Defendant's income fluctuated. In 2007, the Defendant unilaterally reduced his alimony payment to $5,000 monthly. Thereafter, a series of motions were filed resulting in the establishment of arrearages and discovery orders which the Defendant continuously ignored with the result of sanctions in the form of counsel fees to the Plaintiff, Lynn Null. The Defendant, William Null appealed portions of the family part order dismissing with prejudice his motion to terminate alimony, or reduce his obligation; vacating orders granting a plenary hearing and appointing a forensic accountant; ordering him to resume alimony payments, including arrears and counsel fees to Plaintiff; and denying his motion for reconsideration. Defendant cited abuse of discretion by the judge in the dismissal of his motion with prejudice. Plaintiff cross-appealed for a recalculation of the alimony arrearage. Although the "absolute sanction" of dismissal is to be utilized sparingly under Abtrax Pharm., Inc. v. Elkins-Sinn, Inc., 139 N.J. 499 (1995). The N.J. Appellate Division looked to Zaccardi v. Becker, 88 N.J. 245 (1982) which held that discovery rules are designed to facilitate and provide uniformity to litigation. Additionally, under Summit Tr. Co. v. Baxt, 333 N.J. Super. 439, 450 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 165 N.J. 678 (2000), courts have the authority to impose sanctions for violations that fly in the face of the rules. Rule 4:23-5 and Rule 4:23-2 permit dismissal with prejudice only after permitting a party opportunity to remedy the discovery violations. Casinelli v. Manglapus, 181 N.J. 354, 365 (2004) defined that the court must assess the "willfulness of the violation, the ability of [the party] to produce [discovery]," prejudice to the party not in violation and the length of time before trial. The Appellate Division reviewed the fact that in cases where a party persistently violated discovery obligations they found dismissal with prejudice to be appropriate. They found that the motion judge still did not know the Defendant's actual earnings after years of ongoing litigation and that the Defendant's actions were deliberately designed to cause that result. In light of the Defendant's willful and repeated violations, the N.J. Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal with prejudice. If you are facing divorce, alimony can have lasting and substantial consequences upon your future whether you are the obligee or the obligor. It is imperative that you obtain an experienced divorce attorney for your divorce or motion for modification in order to ensure that your rights are protected. For more information about divorce, alimony, child support and other family law matters visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Modify Your Alimony Obligation Before Retirement

In Mueller v. Mueller, a judge interpreted the legislative intent of modifications to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 to allow for pre-retirement anticipatory alimony modification. Ocean County Superior Court Judge Lawrence Jones held that the legislative intent was to allow for modification or termination of alimony obligations in the event that retirement is to occur in the near future and a detailed plan for actual retirement exists. Judge Jones found that there is a benefit in allowing a party contemplating retirement to understand fully what their actual alimony obligation will be prior to fully exiting the workforce. The judge set forth no specific time limits but suggested a 12 to 18 month timeframe for such motions. Judge Jones determined that Gordon Mueller's retirement, planned for 5 years following the post-judgment motion hearing, was too uncertain to warrant a reduction at the present time. If you are considering retirement but have an existing alimony obligation you now have an opportunity to determine what type of obligation you will face after retirement and whether you will be able to live the lifestyle you wish during retirement. For more information about post-judgment modification of alimony, child support, parenting time and other family law matters, visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

High Net-Worth Divorce Leads To Successive Post-Judgment Motions

In a high net-worth divorce, Robin Baskin, the defendant, filed a motion to enforce litigant's rights seeking child support and alimony arrears as well as medical expenses for the children. The parties entered into a negotiated property settlement agreement (PSA) at the time of their divorce which provided, among other relief, alimony to the defendant in the amount of $17,000 per month for 78 months and child support in the amount of $3,300 per month for the parties' 3 children until such time as the children were emancipated. The children often changed residence between the parties and 2 of the parties children had great difficulties in school, which the Plaintiff cited as being due to family conflict, and were enrolled in alternate educational settings at costs of up to $80,000 annually. The Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Morris County ordered the plaintiff to satisfy all child support and alimony arrears as well as reimburse the defendant for the children's medical expenses but allowed the plaintiff a $20,000 credit for the plaintiff's expenses resulting from the children's difficult circumstances. The Honorable Thomas J. Critchley also awarded the defendant $12,000 in counsel fees associated with her motion. In Baskin v. Baskin, the NJ Appellate Division upheld the denial of the plaintiff's request for a retroactive modification in child support, which is barred by N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.23(a), to the date that the children returned to his residence rather than the date of the filing of his cross-motion. Ohlhoff v. Ohlhoff, 246 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 1991). The Appellate Division did determine that child support should be modified to reflect the change in custody wherein the plaintiff became the parent of primary residence and found the credit awarded by the motion judge to be unsupported by reasons as required under Heinl v. Heinl, 287 N.J. Super. 337 (App. Div. 1996). Without reasons set forth fully on the record, the Appellate Division has no basis on which to conduct a review. Finally, with regard to the defendant's counsel fees, N.J.C.R. 5:3-5(c) permits attorney fees in matters of child custody, support and motions to enforce litigant's rights. The motion judge determined that, as there were no substantial changes made in his decision, the plaintiff's motions were in bad faith but made no specific findings with regard to counsel fees. The N.J. Appellate Division found that the plaintiff was reasonable in seeking relief and vacated the counsel fee award to the defendant. The decisions made in divorce, by either the parties or the court in the event of trial, are long lasting and have significant consequences to both parties' and their children. When considering a modification, timing is crucial as you cannot obtain modification retroactively beyond the date of your application. If you have significant income or assets and are considering divorce or seeking a modification of your present child support, it is critical that you discuss your situation with an experienced divorce attorney. For more information about child support, custody, divorce, parenting time, visitation, alimony or other family law matters in NJ visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Proving Cohabitation Without Access To Necessary Evidence

Using Facebook posts by his ex-wife’s significant other to support his claims, Steven Robitzski claimed cohabitation of his ex-wife with another as a reason for reduction in his alimony obligation under the 2014 revisions to the alimony statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. Robitzski sought additional discovery from the plaintiff with regard to her finances and the court held that the defendant failed to make a prima facie showing of cohabitation that would be required prior to their compelling discovery from Lorraine Robitzski. The property settlement agreement (PSA) which the parties agreed to at the time of their divorce contemplated alimony of $2,500 monthly from husband to wife and contemplated certain circumstances, including the wife’s future cohabitation, as a reason for termination of alimony. Cohabitation, as defined in Gayet v. Gayet, 92 N.J. 149 (1983), and Konzelman v. Konzelman, 158 N.J. 185 (1999), contemplates a marriage-like relationship including “stability, permanency and mutual interdependence.” The plaintiff denied that she cohabitated with her significant other claiming he spends approximately 100 nights per year at her residence and that they maintain separate finances and residences. The plaintiff provided the defendant with bank accounts showing she paid her own bills for 2013 and 2014 without deposits from unknown sources. The judge found the Facebook postings to be inadmissible and of limited probative value in any event. The judge did however order the significant other to provide certain certification with regard to his living arrangements and finances as well as ordering the plaintiff ex-wife to provide proof of her own expenses and how they are met. On appeal, in Robitzski v. Robitzski, there was consideration of Konzelman with regard to whether the cohabitation criteria existing at the time of the divorce or the amended criteria would apply. In 2014, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 was modified to reflect the following criteria for a court to use when assessing whether cohabitation exists: (1) Intertwined finances such as joint bank accounts and other joint holdings or liabilities; (2) Sharing or joint responsibilities for living expenses; (3) Recognition of the relationship in the couple's social and family circle; (4) Living together, the frequency of contact, the duration of the relationship, and other indicia of a mutually supportive intimate personal relationship; (5) Sharing household chores; (6) Whether the recipient of alimony has received an enforceable promise of support from another person within the meaning of subsection h. of [N.J.S.A.] 25:1-5; and (7) All other relevant evidence. Also to be considered is the duration of the relationship. The 2014 amendments include a provision indicating they are effective from 2014 and do not modify prior agreements or orders. The N.J. Appellate Division looked to Landers v. Landers, ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2016) and Spangenberg v. Kolakowski, 442 N.J. Super. 529 (App. Div. 2015) with regard to whether the 2014 amendments would be applied retroactively. The Appellate Division determined that it no matter which version of the statue was applied, the defendant failed to make a prima facie case for cohabitation and opined that even if the trial judge had allowed the Facebook postings regarding vacations and events the parties enjoyed together, there would not be a prima facie showing of cohabitation. The decision of the trial court was affirmed. In light of changes to the laws governing alimony and cohabitation, it is critical that you seek out the advice of an attorney to protect your rights an entitlements. If you think that it may be beneficial for you to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your alimony obligation based upon your ex-spouse's cohabitation with another person or for any other reason it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about alimony, divorce, post-judgment modification, child support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and is in no way intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

As Man's Salary Plummets, Alimony Reduction is Awarded

William Bischoff sought to reduce his alimony obligation and terminate his obligation to maintain a life insurance policy for the benefit of his ex-wife, Diane Bischoff, or, in the alternative, to reduce the amount of insurance he was required to maintain. The result of the post-judgment motion was that Bischoff’s alimony obligation was reduced based on significantly changed financial circumstances, although the life insurance policy was kept in place in light of the judge’s finding that it was part of equitable distribution, rather than alimony, and that a change in William Bischoff’s circumstances did not justify a modification of equitable distribution decided long ago. However, Diane Bischoff was required to contribute more to the policy’s premium. In 2006, when the parties divorced, William Bischoff was making approximately $900,000 per year and their Property Settlement Agreement called for alimony in the amount of $153,900 on the first $600,000 of his earnings and one-third of the next $650,000. In 2009 a woman with whom William Bischoff had become romantically involved was arrested for insider trading and William Bischoff was later terminated from his employment. In 2012, the parties consented to a post-judgment modification of the alimony obligation to $2,500 per month with Plaintiff’s income imputed at $125,000 annually and Defendant’s at $20,000 annually. When Plaintiff’s income continued to fall, the within motion for reduction in alimony and termination of insurance was filed. In Bischoff v. Bischoff, the N.J. Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the court below on appeal finding no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge and lack of merit in Plaintiff’s claims on appeal. In light of recent changes in the way alimony is determined, it is very important that you seek out the advice of an attorney to protect your rights an entitlements. If you think that it may be beneficial for you to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your alimony obligation based upon a significant reduction in your income or for any other reason it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about alimony, divorce, post-judgment modification, child support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Equitable Distribution Under MOU Affected By Bad Faith

In Justich v. Justich, a post-judgment equitable distribution challenge, the defendant, Robert Justich, sought the full 50% he had bargained for under the negotiated memorandum of understanding (MOU) incorporated into his divorce judgment. Under the agreement, Robert and Diana Justich were to share the carrying costs of the marital residence until it could be sold and then each would receive 50% of the sale proceeds. However, the defendant failed to pay the carrying costs of the marital home leading up to the sale. The defendant claimed to have paid the costs, but the court questioned the assertions. As a result of an ongoing pattern of bad faith on the part of the defendant, the NJ Superior Court judge determined that the defendant was entitled to only 43% of the proceeds from the sale of the marital residence. The NJ Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the court below. If you are considering or seeking a divorce, it is critical that you have a full understanding of the impact it will have on your living situation, parenting time, finances and even your future lifestyle before you make any decisions. If you are contemplating divorce or are divorced and seeking post-judgment relief, you should consult with an experienced family law attorney immediately. For more information about equitable distribution, divorce, alimony, memorandum of understanding or other family law issues visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Post Divorce Challenge To Alimony And Child Support Findings

In Wicker v. Wicker, James Wicker challenged the method in which his alimony and child support obligation was calculated. Specifically, Wicker challenges the court's determination of his monthly expenses and income in arriving at his available funds from which child support for the parties' 3 daughters may be paid. Wicker contended to the NJ Appellate Division that the court did not adequately consider his expenses in commuting from Virginia to New Jersey every other weekend in order to exercise his parenting time and failed to properly include his rental expenses and was inequitable in creating the need for him to remain employed in Washington, D.C. which necessitated the retention of two separate residences. Tara and James Wicker entered into a voluntary and negotiate, but not complete, property settlement agreement (PSA) leaving some remaining issues for the court to decide. From 1996, the date of the parties' marriage, until 2010, the defendant earned under $100,000. In 2010, the defendant secured an income of approximately $190,000 per year leading up to the parties' divorce in 2013. Two of the parties' 3 daughters had significant medical issues and Tara Wicker was the primary caretaker. An employability expert determined that Tara Wicker's long-term absence from the job market and need to care for the children limited her earning capacity to $35,000 per year. Both parties challenged the figures which should be used in determining income. There was also substantial question as to how the defendant arrived at his monthly expenses, including his claim of $9,000 monthly in pendente lite support. The NJ Appellate Division began the analysis with Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394 (1998), which dictates that decisions of the court below will remain undisturbed if supported by the weight of credible evidence and law, and Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414 (2015), dictating that decisions of the court below will be disturbed if the court below abused its discretion or the findings are not consistent with the credible evidence and legal principles. The Appellate Division reasoned that N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b) empowers judges with the authority to fashion individual solutions best suited to meet the needs of both parties. Randazzo v. Randazzo, 184 N.J. 101 (2005). In affirming the decision of the court below, the court found that the trial judge gave full review to the facts, including the defendant's income and expenses, and the findings were supported by the weight of credible evidence under the guiding principles of law. A divorce will likely have a considerable impact on your life, including determinations about support, custody and parenting that affect where and how you and your family will live. If you are considering divorce or modification of a prior judgment, you should first consult with an experienced family law attorney to determine the likely outcome. For more information about divorce, alimony, child support, relocation with a child and other family law matters visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Divorce Follows Rape Conviction

In Watley v. Watley, Louis Watley appealed the court's decision in a divorce case centered largely on witness credibility. In 1998, Louis Watley, then age 55, married a 19 year-old woman he met in the Philippines. In question was whether the young woman was advised before the marriage that Louis Watley was under indictment for rape and facing jail. After the parties were married for 2 years and had a child together, the defendant was sentenced to 10 years in prison for rape. Upon his release the plaintiff, then 35 years old, file for divorce. After evaluating the credibility of both parties, the trial judge found that the plaintiff had not been apprised of Watley's indictment nor had the plaintiff signed any prenuptial agreement, as the defendant contested, which would bar her from acquisition of assets under the divorce judgment. The NJ Appellate Division affirmed. If you entered into marriage under fraud or duress, as long as you can prove fraud or duress existed, the court will likely take equitable action to protect your rights in addition to granting the divorce you seek. For more information about divorce, annulment, alimony, equitable distribution or other family law matters in NJ visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Divorce Complaint Dismissed For Lack Of Jurisdiction

Although divorce can seem like a simple proceeding at first, not only can problems arise between the parties but also in bringing the case itself. In Appelbaum v. Huff, the court granted a motion to dismiss the divorce claim on the basis that the plaintiff was not a bona fide resident of New Jersey for the statutorily required one year immediately preceding the filing of the divorce complaint. In order to the courts of NJ to have what is called subject matter jurisdiction over an individual, said individual must have been a resident for the statutory one year period. Subject matter jurisdiction is not waivable and can be raised at any time during a matter. This is but one example of the pitfalls that can cause substantial delay or even dismissal of your case. There are a multitude of similar court rules which are hard to know without substantial experience in such matters. In the event you are considering divorce, it is always important to seek the advice of an experienced family law attorney before filing an action in court. For more information about divorce, child custody, child support, alimony or other family law matters visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Child Support Arrears Effect Income Tax Deductions

Although child support arrears are do not result in a prohibition of a parent enjoying visitation or parenting time with their child, child support arrears can result in suspension of a parent's right to claim a child as a child support deduction. In Zeitlin v. Zeitlin, the New Jersey Family part refused to modify the property settlement agreement to the extent that each parent was entitled to claim one child as an exemption on their income tax returns. However, on appeal, the N.J. Appellate Division held that a parent's failure to pay child support breached their duty of good faith and fair dealing and could result in the suspension of that parent's right to claim a child as an income tax deduction. Based on the notion of good faith and fair dealing, the court suspended the father's right, under the property settlement agreement, to claim one of the children as a tax exemption. The decisions made in divorce, by either the parties or the court in the event of trial, are long lasting and have significant consequences to both parties' and their children. If you are considering divorce or seeking a modification of your present child support, it is critical that you discuss your situation with an experienced divorce attorney before taking action. For more information about child support, custody, divorce, parenting time, visitation, alimony or other family law matters in NJ visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.