PDAs And Living Together Does Not Show Cohabitation

In Wood v. Wood, Alan Wood sought to terminate his alimony obligation to Wendy Wood, pursuant to the terms of their property settlement agreement (PSA), based on her cohabitation with another man. The parties were married from 1993 until 2016 and two daughters were born of the marriage. Under the terms of the PSA, the Defendant, Alan Wood, was to pay the Plaintiff alimony of $525 weekly for a term of 10 years following the date of the parties’ divorce but could be modified or terminated, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-25, in the event that the wife cohabited. The Defendant hired a private investigator to confirm that the Plaintiff was cohabiting with her boyfriend, K.C. The private investigator claimed that the boyfriend was at the Plaintiff’s residence 14 out of 15 non-consecutive dates at varying times of the day. Additionally, K.C.’s name was associated with both the marital residence, foreclosed upon following the parties’ divorce, and the Plaintiff’s current residence. K.C. used the Plaintiff’s address on his driver’s license and voter registration. On the various visits, K.C. was observed using keys to the residence, keys to the locked mailbox and kissing the Plaintiff. The private investigator opined the K.C. and the Plaintiff were permanently cohabiting together in a romantic relationship. In addition to a cross-motion, Plaintiff responded that K.C. was a roommate necessitated by her multiple disabilities which prevented her from working and for which she had not yet received any disability benefits. Plaintiff indicated that she could not qualify for a rental on her own as she did not have sufficient income. Plaintiff testified that she and K.C. each paid for their own expenses including groceries, rent and utilities and that they had separate rooms and baths. To further her position, the Plaintiff testified that, when she had brain surgery, her family and friends cared for her, not K.C., and that she and K.C. did not socialize together. Plaintiff also offered certifications from family members, a copy of the condominium lease and a letter from her doctor corroborating her position. The Defendant offered the private investigator’s report of K.C. and Plaintiff kissing, K.C. accompanying Plaintiff to Robert Wood Johnson Hospital and the fact that the parties’ children have advised him of the longtime romantic relationship between K.C. and Plaintiff and the fact that, as long ago as his final walk through at the marital residence preceding foreclosure, the Defendant observed men’s clothing that did not belong to him comingled with the Plaintiff’s clothing. Defendant further contended that the Plaintiff and K.C. were in fact co-lessees per the evidence Plaintiff provided. Plaintiff’s response was to deny kissing K.C., admit he drove her to the hospital on a single occasion, deny the presence of men’s clothing with her own and to acknowledge that she did rent a room to K.C. in the marital residence, prior to foreclosure thereupon, in order to obtain money for utility payments. The judge below denied Defendant’s motion finding that, absent a prima facie showing of changed circumstances, the court could order further discovery under Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139 (1980) and Crews v. Crews, 164 N.J. 11 (2000) but, absent a prima facie showing of changed circumstances, it was inappropriate for the court to order additional discovery of a parties’ financial status. The judge included that a finding of cohabitation required a finding that the cohabitation include the kind of mutual support and intimacy commonly associated with a marital relationship, pursuant to Konzelman v. Konzelman, 158 N.J. 185, (1999), and concluded that the proof offered by the Defendant was not enough to substantiate such a belief. Defendant appealed arguing that the Plaintiff’s living with someone else was enough that he should have opportunity to obtain her basic financial information and also argued that genuine issues of material fact existed. The N.J. Appellate Division affirmed based on the record below and also cited to Gayet v. Gayet, 92 N.J. 149 (1983) and Ozolins v. Ozolins, 308 N.J. Super. 243 (App. Div, 1998) collectively holding that a prima facie case of cohabitation in a relationship equivalent to that of a marriage is required in order to obtain mutual discovery and only after such prime facie showing is made will the dependent spouse be required to defend the continuing need for alimony. If you are seeking to stop paying alimony based on cohabitation or to defend your alimony when cohabitation has been falsely alleged, call The Darling Law Firm, LLC now at 973-584-6200. For more information about alimony, cohabitation, divorce or other family law matters, visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of counsel.

Contributing to Your Children's Education

In Fanelli v. Hnatowski, Plaintiff Daria Fanelli filed a post-judgment motion seeking contribution from her former husband, Kenneth Hnatowski, for 50% of their two children’s private school tuition as was agreed upon in the parties’ property settlement agreement. Fanelli paid the tuition for both children for 9 years without contribution by the Defendant. The parties divorced in 2005 and Plaintiff was the primary caregiver to the children, ages 15 and 16 at the time of the post-judgment motion. At the time of their divorce, the parties entered into a property settlement agreement containing, among other things, that each would pay 50% of the children’s school costs. The children have attended private school since kindergarten. In 2016, the Plaintiff sought a contribution from the Defendant in the amount of 50% of the children’s tuition or a contribution in proportion to the parties’ respective incomes. The Union County Family Part judge hearing the matter ordered the Defendant to pay 50% of the children’s tuition and Defendant appealed on the grounds that the Plaintiff’s failure to seek contribution for 9 years barred her from doing so and that the term “school costs” does not mean tuition. The Defendant directed the court to Hoefers v. Jones, 288 N.J. Super. 590, 611-12 (Ch. Div. 1994), aff’d, 288 N.J. Super. 478 (App. Div. 1996) which sets forth 14 enumerated factors which the court must evaluate when ordering payment. The factors include the ability of parents to pay, the continuity of the children’s education, the contemplation that they would participate in the program for which contribution is sought, whether enrollment was reasonable, the benefit to the child of the program, whether the party enrolling the child had the right to do so, the child’s best interests and other factors. The NJ Appellate Division held that the term “school costs” was not ambiguous and that the Defendant was required to contribute to the children’s tuition under the parties’ agreement. Thereafter, the appellate division stressed the importance of upholding resolutions negotiated by the parties in citing to Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34, 44 (2016), Konzelman v. Konzelman, 158 N.J. 185, 193-94 (1999). The trial court determined that Defendant’s failure to object to the children’s attendance in private school for 9 years operated as implied consent. On appeal, the court found the issue of consent to be of no consequence as the Plaintiff was not seeking contribution for the 9 prior years of private school tuition and the Defendant did not seek relief compelling the children to attend public school. If you need post-judgment relief to enforce litigant’s rights in a family law case, please visit DarlingFirm.com for more information or call us now at 973-584-6200 to schedule a consultation. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of counsel.

Alimony Not Terminated In Spite Of Cohabitation

In Coshland v. Coshland, the Defendant appealed from a Family Court Order that denied his Motion to terminate his alimony payments because he claimed that the Plaintiff was cohabitating with her boyfriend. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the Family Court finding that the Plaintiff's boyfriend did not cohabitate but was a frequent visitor who did not economically benefit the Plaintiff. Following a twenty-seven (27) year marriage that yielded two (2) children, the parties divorced in 2011 pursuant to a Property Settlement and Support Agreement (PSSA). The agreement directed that the Defendant would pay $230 a week in alimony but stated that the obligation would terminate if the Plaintiff were to begin "residing with an unrelated person, or vice versa, where [the Plaintiff] is receiving and economic benefit, for a period of not less than 30 consecutive days." After the divorce the Plaintiff moved to a townhouse that was recently vacated by two of the Plaintiff's friends, K.C. and her brother J.C. The townhouse was individually owned by K.C. After the Plaintiff moved in, J.C. began to spend two to five nights a week at the townhouse. The Plaintiff and J.C. "attempted" a romantic relationship but both claimed at the time of the hearing that the relationship was platonic. When the Defendant suspected the Plaintiff of cohabitating with J.C. he hired a private investigator to gather information about the relationship. Between March and April 2013, the investigator observed the Plaintiff and J.C. arriving home from work together (they both worked at Shop-Rite) and the Plaintiff visited the residence seventeen (17) times in that time frame. The Defendant filed a Motion to terminate his alimony. The Family Court Judge denied the Motion and scheduled a plenary hearing to take place. At the hearing, the judge heard testimony from the private investigator, a real-estate expert, and the Plaintiff. After hearing the testimony, the judge issued an oral opinion denying the Defendant's Motion to terminate alimony finding that J.C. did not live at the townhouse and that the Plaintiff was not receiving economic benefit from his visits. The Defendant appealed. According to the Appellate Division, alimony can be modified if a party demonstrates a significant financial change since the alimony was first awarded. Reese v. Weis, 430 N.J. Super. 552, 572, 66 A.3d 157 (App. Div. 2013). One type of changed circumstance is cohabitation by a former spouse. Gayet v. Gayet, 92 N.J. 149, 155, 456 A.2d 102 (1983). Cohabitation is typified by a showing of a relationship "shown to have stability, permanency, and mutual interdependence." Konzelman v. Konzelman, 158 N.J. 185, 202, 729 A.2d 7 (1999). Therefore, a former spouse residing with a significant other is not, by itself, enough to terminate alimony, further, there must be additional proof that the cohabitating spouse received some form of economic benefit from the cohabitation or the supported cohabitant "supports or subsidizes the other under circumstances sufficient to entitle the supporting spouse to relief. Reese, supra, 430 N.J. Super. at 557-58, 576; Gayet, supra, 92 N.J. at 153-54. Proving cohabitation creates a rebuttable presumption of changed circumstances. Ozolins v. Ozolins, 308 N.J. Super. 243, 248, 705 A.2d 1230 (App. Div. 1998). Accordingly, the burden of proof which is ordinarily on the party seeking modification, shifts to the dependant spouse to prove the lack of economic benefit and continued need for support. Id. at 248-49. In this case, the Appellate Division found that apart from proving J.C.'s frequent overnight stays at the Plaintiff's residence, the Defendant failed to present any evidence in support of an intimate relationship or economic benefit. Therefore, the Family Court's denial of the Defendant's Motion was affirmed. Being that the laws governing the issues involving alimony and cohabitation have recently been changed, it is very important that you seek out the advice of an attorney to protect your rights an entitlements. If you think that it may be beneficial for you to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your alimony obligation based upon your ex-spouse's cohabitation with another person or for any other reason it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about alimony, divorce, post-judgment modification, child support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Mediated Agreement Without Party Signatures Was Held To Be Binding

In Campbell v. Campbell, the Defendant appealed from the incorporation unsigned parenting time agreement into the parties' final divorce judgment after a failed attempt at mediation. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the Family Court. The parties in this case have two (2) sons who were aged six and ten at the time of the agreement. The younger son has special needs and has suffered from epilepsy. The terms of the agreement in question were reached during a mediation which was held in 2012. The agreement was written down by the mediator. The resulting Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was unsigned, but the case was reported to the court as settled concerning all parenting time issues. The Defendant filed an Answer to the divorce Complaint, before the mediation, containing a parenting time plan that gave him the same schedule with the children that was reached in the MOU except rather than two week night dinner visits, he would have had one weekly dinner and one weekly overnight visit. In the MOU the parties agreed to joint legal custody along with the parenting time designation for each parent including summer vacations and holidays. The reasons for the delay in signing the MOU were disputed, but in the interim, the Defendant rejected the terms of the MOU unless the Plaintiff agreed to modify it to include two (2) weekly overnights with his children along with some other changes. The Plaintiff agreed to make some of the changes but not all. Two months after the mediation session and after the continued negotiation the Defendant rejected the MOU. In 2013, the Plaintiff filed a Motion seeking to incorporate the MOU into the parties' divorce decree. The Family Court judge granted the Plaintiff's Motion after observing that the children substantially benefited from the parties' agreement and that the MOU could be modified slightly for the best interests of the children. According to the Appellate Division, it is well established that our judicial system encourages and supports negotiated agreements between divorcing parties. Weishaus v. Weishaus, 180 N.J. 131, 143 (2004); Konzelman v. Konzelman, 158 N.J. 185, 193 (1999). Mediation is an alternative means of resolving parenting conflicts and is also available to "resolve aspects of family law matters." Court Rule 1:405(b)(2). The statutory source for mediation is the Mediation Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:23C-1 to -13. The court found that in this case, after the parties reached an agreement, the Defendant had a gradual change of heart and that triggered a new round of litigation . Under the circumstances, the Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the Family Court holding that the Family Court judge's ultimate decision to incorporate the MOU into the divorce decree was based upon weighty equitable considerations that warrant the enforcement of the document. If you believe that mediation is possible in your divorce or family law matter be sure to contact an attorney experienced in mediation and proper drafting and execution of Memorandums of Understanding. For more information about mediation, post-judgment modification, parenting time, equitable distribution, divorce, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit the DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice if an attorney.

Cohabitation Criteria For Alimony Termination

In Wachtell v. Wachtell, a Morris County case, the Family Court terminated alimony based upon a finding of cohabitation. The Appellate Court vacated the alimony termination order and remanded the case back to the Family Court for a plenary hearing to focus on the disputed facts with regard to the alleged cohabitation. The legal threshold to prove cohabitation for the purposes of terminating alimony has been established through case law. In Konzelman v. Konzelman, 158 N.J. 185 (1999), cohabitation was defined by the existence of a relationship shown "to have stability, permanency, and mutual interdependence." See also Reese v. Weis, 430 N.J. Super. 552, 570 (App. Div. 2013). Although, "living together, intertwined finances such as joint bank accounts, shared living expenses and household chores" may support a determination of cohabitation, such examples should not be considered in a vacuum. Konzelman, supra, 158 N.J. at 202. With regard to procedure, a party who pays alimony and who alleges cohabitation must first present prima facie evidence that his or her ex-spouse is in such a relationship that is tantamount to marriage. Gayet v. Gayet, 92 N.J. 149, 154-55 (1983). If this initial threshold is met then the parties may engage in a discovery process. Further, it is customary for factual disputes involving alleged cohabitation to be resolved at a plenary hearing where a Family Court judge can determine the credibility of competing witnesses. Winegarden v. Winegarden, 316 N.J. Super. 52, 56 n.1 (App. Div. 1998). A hearing may be avoided if there are no disputed issues of material fact and the matter is otherwise suited for disposition on the papers. Segal v. Lynch, 417 N.J. Super. 627, 642-43 (App. Div. 2011). In this case, the Appellate Division agreed with the ex-husband that his Motion papers set forth a prima facie case of cohabitation. The Appellate Court disagreed with the findings of the Family Court, terminating alimony based upon cohabitation, because a key factual dispute was raised by the ex-wife regarding the amount of overnights that her paramour spend with her during the week. The Appellate Court reasoned that although not completely dispositive, an important factor in any cohabitation analysis is that people must cohabit to a substantial agree in order for a determination of cohabitation to be made. Therefore, because the parties disagreed over the number of nights that the ex-wife's paramour was spending with her, the Appellate Court vacated the termination of alimony Court Order and remanded the case back to the Family Court for a plenary hearing on the issue. The laws governing the issues involving alimony and cohabitation have recently been changed and it is very important that you seek out the advice of an attorney to protect your rights and entitlements. If you are considering post-judgment modification of your alimony obligation based upon your ex-spouse's cohabitation with another person or for any other reason it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about alimony, divorce, post-judgment modification , emancipation, child support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Alimony Termination Motion Upon Wife's Cohabitation

G.M. v. A.M. is a case out of Sussex County, in which the Plaintiff appealed from a Court Order that denied his motion to terminate his alimony obligation to support the Defendant based upon her cohabitation with another man. The parties in this case separated in 2008 and formally divorced in 2009 after a twenty (20) year marriage. The Defendant vacated the marital home and the Plaintiff maintained physical custody of their three (3) sons. According to the parties' divorce judgment the Plaintiff was to pay the Defendant alimony in the amount of $1,154.00 per month, which was to be taxable to the Defendant and deductible to the Plaintiff . The alimony was to be permanent alimony to terminate upon the Defendant's death, Plaintiff's death, the Defendant's re-marriage, Defendant's cohabitation with an unrelated adult in a relationship similar to a marriage or any other circumstance that would constitute a change of circumstances warranting a modification or termination of spousal support based upon the laws of New Jersey. Further, the Defendant was to pay child support to the Plaintiff in the amount of $650.00 per month for the children. Therefore, the Plaintiff was to pay $504.00 a month to the Defendant which reflected the alimony minus the child support amount. About eight (8) months after the parties' were issued their divorce judgment, the Plaintiff filed a Motion to terminate his alimony obligation to Defendant and increase her child support obligation by $200 per month to address the special needs of their middle son. The Defendant responded with a Cross-Motion seeking alimony arrears and for the emancipation of the parties' youngest son. In July of 2010, the Family Court entered an Order indicating that the Plaintiff had "shown a prima facie case" with respect to his request to terminate his alimony and allowed "discovery to demonstrate cohabitation," and the parties were to exchange Interrogatories and Notice to Produce. Three (3) years later, in 2013, the court conducted a plenary hearing to adjudicate the Plaintiff's Motion to terminate alimony based upon the Defendant's cohabitation with another man. The trial court denied the Defendant's application to rely on a document purporting to contain a legally binding definition of "cohabitation" that was materially different from the definition reflected in the parties' divorce judgment. The court agreed with the Plaintiff's argument that the "eleventh hour insertion of that issue into the mix denied him due process." Therefore, the judge accepted the Plaintiff's argument to review the Motion to terminate his alimony based upon the standards set forth in Konzelman v. Konzelman, 158 N.J. 185 (1999). A mere romantic, casual or social relationship is not sufficient to justify the enforcement of a settlement agreement provision terminating alimony. A relationship of cohabitation that can be shown to have stability, permanency, and mutual interdependence must be displayed. Based upon evidence presented at the hearing, the judge found that the Plaintiff failed to establish that the Defendant was cohabitating according to the aforementioned standard. The Plaintiff appealed. On appeal, the Appellate Division found that it had no legal basis to question the Motion judge's factual findings or interfere with the legal conclusions he reached in his decision. The Plaintiff was not able to present sufficient, competent evidence to satisfy the standard to terminate his alimony obligation under Konzelman. Therefore, the Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the Family Court. The laws governing alimony and cohabitation have recently been changed. It is very important that you seek out the advice of an attorney to protect your rights an entitlements. If you think that it may be beneficial for you to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your alimony obligation based upon your ex-spouse's cohabitation with another person or for any other reason it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about alimony, divorce, post-judgment modification , emancipation, child support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Cohabitation Under New Alimony Changes

On September 10, 2014, following years of legal and legislative debate, the laws regarding alimony were amended in the state of New Jersey. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. Although the lion's share of the attention was directed at the changes to the durational aspect of alimony, there were considerable changes made that affect the modification of an existing or future alimony obligation in the event of an ex-spouse's retirement or cohabitation. An issue may arise regarding what law to apply when an existing property settlement agreement (PSA) provides that the issue of cohabitation be decided using the established case law. The language in a PSA is most commonly bargained for and negotiated amongst the parties and if it contravenes the status of the law such language could preclude the application of the amended alimony statute. To determine whether spousal support should be modified based upon cohabitation the case of Konzelman v. Konzelman, 158 N.J. 185, 202 (1999) and Gayet v. Gayet, 92 N.J. 149, 155 (1983) are most often cited and define cohabitation as an intimate, close, and enduring relationship that requires more than simply a common residence. An evaluation must look to whether or not two people were in a long term romantic relationship, shared finances, shared living expenses, and held themselves out to friends and families as a romantic couple. The amended statute's definition of cohabitation is similar but not as clearly defined. Most significant, the law requires that a trial judge consider the length of the relationship and address prior inconsistencies in the law. Being that the language of the statute is not as detailed as the case law, a question arises as to the status of the economic-based standard that was established in the Gayet case for modifying support in the event of cohabitation (whether the third-party cohabitant contributes to the dependent spouse's support or whether the third party cohabitant resides in the dependent spouse's home without contributing anything toward the expenses). A question remains as to whether or not this economic benefit test is part of the current law. The Gayet case and the cases that followed it clearly established that modification during cohabitation may mean more than simply the termination of the support obligation. Reese v. Weis, 430 N.J. Super. 552, 572-73 (2013). If there is no longer an economic benefit test, any modification that is not a suspension or termination to support is unnecessary. The new alimony statute directs that "alimony may be suspended or terminated if the payee cohabitates with another person." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. Further, the statute does not explicitly provide what facts would be necessary to warrant a suspension of support in contrast to a termination. These issues are all fact based issues that are most often decided at the discretion of the trier of fact, which is the court in these cases. Therefore, the interpretation of the new statute will be developed through future case law created by Family Court judges adjudicating these issues and remain unclear at the present time. Recent changes have been made to alimony laws making it very important that you seek the advice of an attorney to protect your rights and entitlements. If you are considering a post-judgment modification of your alimony obligation it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about alimony, child support, post-judgment modification , or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Cohabitation Ends Alimony In Post-Judgment Modification Matter

In a recent post-judgment modification case, Syslo v. Syslo, the Plaintiff, Ann Marie Syslo, lost her appeal from a 2013 Family Court decision which granted the Defendant, Raymond Syslo's request to terminate his alimony obligation because she cohabitated with another person. The facts of the case are as follows. The Plaintiff and Defendant were married in 1990 and subsequently the couple were divorced in 2004. Three children were born of the marriage, the youngest of which still resides with the Plaintiff. Currently, the Defendant is obligated to pay $210 a week in child support. When the parties' decided to obtain a divorce, the Defendant agreed to pay to the Plaintiff $70 a week in alimony. That obligation was increased to $225 a week in 2007. Around 2010, the Defendant began trying to gather proof that the Plaintiff was co-habitating with another person. To do this, he hired a private investigator and began to film the cohabitant staying at the Plaintiff's residence overnight. He accumulated documentary evidence for about thirty-five days taking place in October of 2010, September of 2011, and March and April of 2012. These videos also revealed that the cohabitant possessed a key to the Plaintiff's residence, which he used to enter the home both when the Plaintiff was in the home and when she was not there. The cohabitant also drove the Plaintiff's car from time to time and transported the Plaintiff's child to different places and had opened joint bank accounts with the Plaintiff. Further, the Defendant was able to obtain evidence that the cohabitant received mail at the Plaintiff's home. As a result of this information and the testimony of the parties' emancipated children as well as that of the alleged cohabitant and Plaintiff, a Family Court judge found that the Defendant was able to establish that there was cohabitation. Konzelman v. Konzelman, 307 N.J. Super. 150 (App. Div. 1998). According to the judge, the Plaintiff and cohabitant acted like a "relatively permanen[t]" family unit, with the assumption of the duties and obligations "associated with marriage." Pursuant to this finding, the judge terminated the Defendant's alimony obligation effective on the date of the entry of the Order. The Plaintiff appealed this decision and argued that the trial court erred by finding that she had cohabitated within the legal understanding of the word. The Appellate Court affirmed the findings of the Family Court. According to the Appellate Division, it is well established that the cohabitation of a spouse who is receiving alimony constitutes a change in circumstances that may relieve the payor spouse from his or her alimony obligation. Gayet v. Gayet, 92 N.J. 149, 155 (1983). The cohabitation relationship must be more than simply an intimate relationship, it must also include that the parties engage in "duties and privileges that are commonly associated with marriage." Konzelman, 158 N.J. at 202. Some factors for consideration include if the parties share living expenses and household chores, intertwined finances, and recognition of the relationship in the couple's social and family circle. In the current case, the court found that the evidence on the record amply supported the Family Court judge's determination that cohabitation was established. If you anticipate that you may want to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your alimony award based upon cohabitation or any other relief that was awarded in a final judgment of divorce it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modification, divorce, alimony, child support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.