Post Judgment Salary Jump for Wife

K.S. v D.J.S. is a post-judgment family matter. In November 2012, the parties divorced with a Marital Settlement Agreement (MSA). The Defendant acknowledged that after twenty-one years of marriage, the Plaintiff would need financial support and agreed to pay the amount of $3,400 monthly as support for the Plaintiff. The Defendant also agreed to pay one-third of any additional income over and above $139,000 to Plaintiff, to a maximum of $12,000 annually. The parties left the MSA open to modification by agreement of the parties or as permitted under the laws of the state of New Jersey. Plaintiff filed a motion to enforce litigant’s rights when the Defendant failed to comply with the terms of the MSA and the Plaintiff cross-moved for a reduction in alimony based upon “materially changed circumstances” which included the Plaintiff’s significantly changed earning capacity wherein she was making well over $100,000 and also more than Defendant made after his alimony was taken out of his income. The Defendant blamed the arrearages on the fact that his earning potential with his law firm had decreased and he was unable to meet his financial obligations without an alimony reduction. The court found nothing warranting a downward modification in alimony from the documents submitted by the Defendant. The court refused to grant the alimony modification and ordered the Defendant to pay all sums outstanding to Plaintiff. On appeal, the court found that the Defendant was a partner in the same law firm he had been with at the time of the divorce and his base salary had increased. The appellate division cited Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139 (1980) and its progeny which dictate that alimony is based largely on the parties’ standard of living during the marriage and the fact that alimony modification may occur, under the factors of N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, upon the demonstration of “changed circumstances.” The appellate division further cited to Crews v. Crews, 164 N.J. 11 (2000) regarding the changed circumstances significantly impairing the ability of the supporting spouse to maintain a reasonably comparable standard of living during the marriage and Stamberg v. Stamberg, 302 N.J. Super. 35 (App. Div. 1997) which sets forth the consideration of the significant improvement in the supported spouse’s economic situation. The appellate division also found that the court below made no findings as to the Plaintiff’s improved earning capacity and remanded for findings as to the Plaintiff’s independent financial circumstances. If you are considering filing a post-judgment motion, or your former spouse has done so, you should consult with an experienced family law attorney to learn your rights. For more information about divorce, alimony or post-judgment motions, visit DarlingFirm.com or, to schedule a consultation, call us now at 973-584-6200. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Cohabitation Excluded From Property Settlement Agreement Fails To End Alimony

Frick v. Frick was a post-judgment application to terminate alimony based on co-habitation. The parties divorced in 2009 with the court making no findings with regard to alimony, equitable distribution or other matters. The terms of the divorce were set forth within a Property Settlement Agreement (PSA) which both parties testified they entered into freely and voluntarily. Beginning in 2013, Shari Frick began co-habitating with another man and Glen Frick sought termination of his 10-year alimony obligation. The New Jersey Superior Court judge hearing the case terminated alimony, with certain exceptions. The NJ Appellate Division reversed the decision of the trial court finding that co-habitation is a forseeable occurrence after divorce and the parties failed to include it as a reason to terminate alimony under their Agreement. In light of the fact that the parties included death and remarriage as events which would serve to terminate alimony, the NJ Appellate Division found that, had they intended it to be a trigger for termination of alimony, the parties would have included co-habitation in their PSA. When divorcing, by way of agreement or trial, it is critical that the agreement or judgment be as detailed as possible in order to avoid misunderstandings or misinterpretations. If you are seeking a reduction of alimony based on co-habitation of your former spouse, it is critical that you obtain an experienced divorce attorney to assist you with your matter. For more information about alimony termination, co-habitation, divorce, property settlement agreements or other family law matters visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Party To Small Business Divorce Seeks Post-Judgment Modification

In Fiorenza v. Fiorenza, the Defendant appealed from the denial of a post-judgment Motion to modify his alimony obligation following a divorce including a small business. The Family Court judge initially ruled that alimony is not modifiable based upon anti-Lepis language in a negotiated Consent Order which set an amount below which the Defendant's alimony obligation could not be reduced. The parties in this case were married in 1986 and divorced in 2010. Three (3) children were born of the marriage. Only one child still remained at home at the time of the proceedings. During the marriage, the Defendant owned an MRI facility in addition to holding an interest in an accounting practice. The Defendant sold his interest in the MRI facility during the divorce because the business was failing. The marital settlement agreement (MSA) which was incorporated into the judgment of divorce directed that "the husband is self-employed and has average earnings of $250,000 per year" and the Plaintiff can reasonably earn "$25,000 per year." The parties agreed that in 2011 the Defendant would pay to the Plaintiff permanent alimony of $100,000 per year in monthly installments of $8,333. Within a few months the Defendant stopped paying support based upon his business suffering some financial hardships. The Plaintiff then petitioned the court to enforce the parties' agreement, resulting in Orders reducing the Defendant's six months' arrears and sending the parties to mediation. Mediation proved to be unsuccessful and the Defendant subsequently filed a Motion to reduce his support and the Plaintiff submitted a Cross-Motion to enforce litigant's rights. These Motions were resolved by the Consent Order that was at issue in the appeal. The exact provision at issue stated that "No matter defendant's annual gross income, at no time shall monthly support be lower than $5,000, except after the emancipation of [the parties' youngest child] when the child support component may be reduced . . . ." The Defendant then made $5,000 monthly payments to the Plaintiff for one year until he unilaterally reduced his payment to $2,000 and then the following month he paid nothing. The Plaintiff immediately moved to enforce the Consent Order to reinstate the support to $8,333, the amount negotiated in the MSA. The Defendant cross moved to reduce his alimony in accordance with Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139 (1980) or Morris v. Morris, 263 N.J. Super 237 (App. Div. 1993). After hearing oral argument, the Family Court judge enforced the Consent Order holding the critical clause to operate as an anti-Lepis provision in accordance with the Morris decision. The judge noted that the Defendant did not dispute that both parties bargained for the agreement and each party got the expected benefit and burden of the contract. Although enforcing the Consent Order the judge ordered a plenary hearing to determine his ability to pay both alimony and arrears. After the hearing, the judge ordered the Defendant to pay $2,500 in alimony and child support with the difference between that sum and the required $8,333 under the agreement to accrue. Then the court ordered a nominal arrears payment of $100 per month. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the Family Court finding that the trial court was correct in holding that the parties had anticipated the decline in the Defendant's income when they negotiated the Consent Order and agreed that notwithstanding any such decline, his alimony obligation to the Plaintiff would never drop below $5,000 except upon the child's emancipation. Crespo v. Crespo, 395 N.J. Super. 190, 194 (App. Div. 2007). No explicit reference to Lepis was required. Savarese v. Corcoran, 311 N.J. Super. 240, 243 (Ch. Div. 1997). Being that the laws governing alimony have recently been changed, it is very important that you seek out the advice of an attorney to protect your rights an entitlements. If you think that it may be beneficial for you to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your alimony obligation or for any other reason it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about alimony, divorce, post-judgment modification, child support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit the DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Post-Judgment Alimony Dispute Leads To Appeals

In Dondona v. Dondona, a case appealed out of Morris County, the Defendant appealed from a 2014 Court Order that denied her post-judgment cross-motion to increase the alimony payments being made to her by the Plaintiff. The Appellate Court reversed the decision of the lower court. The parties in this case were married in 1984 and obtained a divorce in 2008. One child was born during the marriage. The parties executed a property settlement agreement (PSA) that was incorporated into their final divorce judgment which required the Plaintiff to pay $600 a month in alimony to the Defendant until their child was emancipated, and then the alimony was to increase to $950 a month. The PSA also specified that if the circumstances between the parties changed, they would come to an agreement with respect to the change or make an application to the court to resolve the dispute. In 2009, the Defendant began living with another man and the Plaintiff stopped making his alimony payments. In 2010, the Plaintiff filed a motion to terminate his alimony obligation altogether. In 2012, the parties executed a Consent Order in which the Plaintiff agreed to pay $375 a month for alimony until further Order of the court or consent of the parties. In 2014, the Plaintiff filed a Motion to emancipate the parties' daughter and for the termination of his alimony obligation due to the Defendant's six (6) years of cohabitation. The Defendant filed a cross-motion for alimony payments of $950 as was originally set forth in the PSA. The Plaintiff also claimed that his financial circumstances had changed and he was making much less than money than when the parties divorced. The Family Court judge granted the request to emancipate the parties' daughter but denied the motion to terminate alimony. Further, the Defendant's motion for an increase in alimony to $950 was also denied, and the Plaintiff was required to continue paying $375 a month. According to the Appellate Division, it needed to determine if each party presented a prima facie case of changed circumstances to warrant a termination or modification of alimony. Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 146 (1980). Both parties were seeking a change in alimony. The PSA provided that if the circumstances between the parties were to change, they could come to an agreement or request that the court make a determination. The Consent Order was an agreement between the parties to change the alimony amount at that specific time until they either came to a new agreement or a Court Order modified the amount. The Appellate Division held that both parties had provided sufficient financial information for the Family Court to order appropriate discovery and make detailed findings of fact as to a new alimony determination. Therefore, it reversed the decision of the Family Court and remanded the case back there for further proceedings to determine an appropriate alimony obligation. Being that the laws governing alimony have recently been changed, it is very important that you seek out the advice of an attorney to protect your rights an entitlements. If you think that it may be beneficial for you to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your alimony obligation or for any other reason it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about alimony, divorce, post-judgment modification, child support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit the DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Emancipation And Alimony Termination Application Results in Child Support Modification

In Jackson v. Jackson, the Plaintiff appealed from a 2013 post-judgment matrimonial Order regarding the emancipation of the parties' daughter and the termination of alimony payments to the Defendant. The Family Court judge denied the emancipation request after finding that the Defendant's documentation showed the child was enrolled as a full-time college student and recalculated the child support obligation. N.J.S.A. 9:17B-3; Newburgh v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529, 543, 443 A.2d 1031 (1982); Gac v. Gac, 186 N.J. 535, 543, 897 A.2d 1018 (2006); Moehring v. Maute, 268 N.J. Super. 447, 480-81, 633 A.2d 1055 (Ch. Div. 1993). The judge also denied the Plaintiff's request to terminate alimony. On appeal, the Plaintiff challenged the income that was used to compute his child support obligation. Upon review, the Appellate Division discovered that the documentation that was relied upon by the Family Court judge to fix the Plaintiff's child support obligations revealed a gross weekly income of $1,219, which is the same amount that the Plaintiff reported on his case information statement submitted to the court. The Plaintiff's 2012 W-2 showed a gross annual income of $63,280 which is $1,217 a week. Therefore, the Appellate Court did not find any error on the N.J. Child Support Guidelines worksheet that was used to calculate the support obligation. The calculation did neglect to include the alimony paid by Plaintiff of $125 a week. According to the Appellate Court, the calculation should have deducted the alimony payment from the Plaintiff's income and included it within the Defendant's income. The child support calculation also failed to include the allocation of payments made for the child's health insurance. Therefore, the child support obligation of $183 a week was wrong and was vacated and recalculated. The Appellate Court affirmed the Family Court's Order using the Plaintiff's weekly income of $1,217 and reversed the Order that directed that the child support obligation was $183 a week and remanded the case back to the Family Court to recalculate the support accounting for alimony and the cost of health insurance. If you anticipate that it may be beneficial to you to seek a post-judgment modification of your child support obligation it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modification, child support, emancipation, divorce, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Business Asset Distribution Under Property Settlement Agreement Upheld

In Ramirez v. Ramirez, the Plaintiff appealed from trial court Orders that granted the Defendant's Motion to enforce provisions of the parties' property settlement agreement (PSA) regarding the equitable distribution of a business that was operated by the Plaintiff during the marriage. The parties in this case were married in 1995 and had two (2) daughters. They obtained a divorce in 2007 and executed a PSA that was incorporated into their final divorce judgment. According to a provision contained in the PSA the parties acknowledged that they owned a note for the sale of a laundry business that each agreed to monthly payments of $1,743 which was to be divided into three (3) equal parts between the Plaintiff, the Defendant , and the Plaintiff's brother. The Plaintiff also agreed to pay one third of this amount or $581 to the Defendant on a monthly basis for the duration of the life of the note. The business had been sold before the divorce and payments had been made on a note for over two (2) years by the purchaser of the business. The Defendant was unable to vacate the marital property at the time she had agreed to leave therefore the Plaintiff kept the first three (3) $581 payments to compensate him for rent charged to the Defendant. Then he made two (2) payments to her. During this time, the buyer of the business defaulted on his purchase and stopped paying on the note held by the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff demanded that the Defendant return his last two (2) payments because he was not being paid by the defaulting purchaser. The Defendant did not return the money. The Plaintiff responded by offering the Plaintiff one third of the business if she agreed to contribute to the debts and repairs of the business. The Defendant responded that she would simply sell her share of the business. Neither party ever made an attempt to modify or enforce their PSA for seven (7) years. According to the Plaintiff, during that time, he and his brother fixed and operated the business and then leased it to a tenant. Then the Defendant moved to enforce the provisions of the PSA demanding payment of her $581 monthly payments. The Plaintiff never offered her any portion of the rent he was receiving from the new tenant. In response to the Defendant's Motion, the Plaintiff claimed that the agreement only required him to pay the Defendant if he received payments from the purchaser on the note. According to the Appellate Division, a settlement is essentially a contract which is to be enforced as written, absent a demonstration of fraud or other compelling circumstances. Honeywell v. Bubb, 130 N.J. Super. 130, 136, 325 A.2d 832 (App. Div. 1974). Further, New Jersey has a strong public policy favoring settlement of litigation. Borough of Haledon v. Borough of N. Haledon, 358 N.J. Super. 289, 305 817 A.2d 965 (App. Div. 2003). This policy is especially strong in family disputes. Puder v. Buechel, 362 N.J. Super. 479, 488, 828 A.2d 957 (App. Div. 2003). The Family Court judge who ruled on the Motion found the Plaintiff's argument to be weak and held that the PSA was an integrated document that reflected the negotiations of the parties, where each had given up rights and compromised claims in return for other benefits and therefore its provisions should be enforced against the Plaintiff. The Appellate Court found nothing in the record to contradict the Family Court judge's ruling and it affirmed the lower court's decision. If you believe that a post-judgment modification to your settlement agreement regarding the equitable distribution of a business that you and your spouse owned it may be beneficial to you to seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modification, equitable distribution, alimony, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit the DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice if an attorney.

Mother Appeals Downward Modification Of Child Support

In Litvinenko v. Ter-Saakov, the Plaintiff appealed from a Court Order with regard to adjustments that were made to the Defendant's child support obligation, as well as, an award of attorney's fees that was granted in the Defendant's favor. The Plaintiff and Defendant have one (1) child together, a son born in 2008. The Defendant relocated to the Ukraine in 2012, when the parties' son was four (4) years old. Subsequently, a Family Court judge issued an Order granting sole custody of the child to the Plaintiff and requiring the Defendant to pay child support in the amount of $463 a week. A few months later the Defendant returned from the Ukraine to attend a Motion hearing with his attorney at which the Plaintiff represented herself. Halfway through the hearing the Plaintiff requested an adjournment to seek counsel, the judge denied her request during the hearing. The Plaintiff then stated, in the courtroom, that she was going to walk out of courtroom and not participate in the proceeding. The judge warned her that doing so would result in her requested relief being denied. She walked out of the courtroom anyway. The judge proceeded with the hearing and entered an Order granting the parties shared custody of their child. The Defendant was provided with Skype parenting time three (3) times a week and one (1) week overnight vacation per year. Further, the Defendant's child support obligation was reduced to $268 a week and he was awarded $11,805 in counsel fees. The Plaintiff appealed. On appeal the Plaintiff argued that the judge abused her discretion by awarding counsel fees to the Defendant because the Defendant was a successful businessman earning a seven (7) figure salary and she further claimed that the judge erred in reducing the Defendant's child support obligation. According to the Appellate Court, a judge in a matrimonial action may award reasonable attorney's fees and shall "consider the factors set forth in the court rule on counsel fees, the financial circumstances of the parties, and the good or bad faith of either party." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23; N.J. Court Rule 5:3-5(c). The decision to award counsel fees "in a matrimonial action rests in the discretion of the trial court[,]" Addesa v. Addesa, 392 N.J. Super. 58, 78, 919 A.2d 885 (App. Div. 2007), and will be disturbed "only on the 'rarest occasion,' and then only because of [a] clear abuse of discretion." Strahan v. Strahan, 402 N.J. Super. 298, 317, 953 A.2d 1219 (App. Div. 2008). In this case, the judge based the attorney fee award on the Plaintiff's bad faith in leaving the proceeding against the direct order of the judge. The Appellate Court held that the trial judge aptly explained her reasons for the award and the decision was well within her discretion, therefore, the award of attorney fees was affirmed. However, the Appellate Court found that the trial judge's modification of the Defendant's child support obligation was in error because the judge did not attach a copy a NJ Child Support Guidelines Worksheet or explain her reasoning for the downward modification, which is required. Capaccio v. Capaccio, 321 N.J. Super. 46, 54 n.11, 729 A.2d 253 (App. Div. 1999); N.J. Court Rule 5:6A. Therefore, the decision of the lower court was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded back to the Family Court. If you believe that it may be beneficial to you to seek a post-judgment modification of your child support obligation it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modification, child support, parenting time, child relocation, divorce, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Child Support Award Affirmed In Deference To Trial Court

Kummarapurugo v. Thota, is a post-judgment matrimonial action wherein the Plaintiff appealed from a Family Court Order, issued in 2014 that recalculated his child support obligation to $272 per week, arguing that the court was mistaken in its calculation. The Family Court is afforded substantial discretion to determine child support awards and other support obligations. Foust v. Glaser, 340 N.J. Super. 312, 315 (App. Div. 2001). A child support order is always "subject to review and modification on a showing of changed circumstances." Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 146 (1980). "If consistent with the law, such an award will not be disturbed unless it is manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary, or clearly contrary to reason or to other evidence, or the result of whim or caprice." Foust, supra, 340 N.J. Super. at 315-16. "When reviewing decisions granting or denying applications to modify child support, we examine whether, given the facts, the trial judge abused his or her discretion." J.B. v. W.B., 215 N.J. 305, 325-26 (2013). The Plaintiff argued that the Family Court's determination of his child support obligation was unfair as modified because the court failed to consider the appropriate child support guidelines factors. The Defendant claimed that the judge made sufficient findings of fact to justify the support award. The Appellate Court agreed with the Defendant and affirmed the decision of the Family Court. In this case, the Appellate Court found that although the Family Court judge's findings were not a "paradigm of the findings required by N.J.C.R. 1:7-4," the facts on the record were sufficient to support the child support award. Further, the Family Court judge appropriately addressed the recalculation of child support through the application of the statutory factors. If you believe that a post-judgment modification to your child support obligation may be beneficial to you it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modification, child support, child relocation, child custody, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice if an attorney.

Motion To Enforce Equitable Distribution Of Tax Liability

In Lewis v. Lewis, a post-judgment case to enforce of litigant's rights, the Plaintiff appealed from a Court Order that required her to pay debt owed to the IRS when it was unclear whether the court was provided with the IRS's determination that granted her innocent spouse relief. The Appellate Court remanded the case back to the Family Court for reconsideration. The parties were married in 1996 and divorced in 2006. Their property settlement agreement (PSA) submitted with their final divorce judgment included the following language: "With respect to certain outstanding Internal Revenue Service debt, on account of 2004 income, the parties agree . . . each shall be responsible and pay, when as due, fifty (50% of this debt . . . ." In 2014, the Family Court held that the Plaintiff was in violation of litigants' rights for failure to pay her portion, including interest and penalties. The Plaintiff filed an appeal. A ruling on enforcement Motions in matrimonial actions must be "reviewed for abuse of discretion, with deference to the expertise of Family Part judges." Costa v. Costa, 440 N.J. Super. 1, 4, 111 A.3d 97 (App. Div. 2015). According to the Appellate Court, spouses who file joint federal income tax returns are held jointly and severally liable for any amounts due. 26 U.S.C.A. § 6013(d)(3). "Innocent Spouse" relief provisions in the IRS Code offer a narrow exception to this, under 26 U.S.C.A. § 6015(b), a spouse may seek relief if the spouse establishes that in signing the tax return the spouse did not know, and had no reason to know, there was an understatement of tax attributable to erroneous items of the other spouse, and that it would be inequitable to hold the spouse liable. On appeal, the Plaintiff attached IRS documents that indicate that she was granted innocent spouse relief by the IRS. She claims that the Defendant filed his Motion to enforce the PSA even though he knew she had been granted innocent spouse relief. The Appellate Division remanded the case back to the Family court solely to allow the Plaintiff the opportunity to file a Motion for reconsideration in the court consistent with Court Rule 4:49-2, and holding that such a Motion shall be considered timely if it is filed within twenty (20) days after service of the opinion on the Defendant. If you believe that a post-judgment modification to settlement agreement regarding equitable distribution, alimony, or any other issue may be beneficial to you it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modification, equitable distribution, child relocation, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice if an attorney.

Fiance's Drinking Does Not Affect Father's Parenting Time

In Santos v. Yanez, the Defendant appealed from a post-judgment Family Court Order that denied her Motion for Reconsideration with regard to the custody of her daughter and the Plaintiff's parenting time. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the Family Court. The parties in this case were divorced in 2011. They only have one (1) child, a daughter, who was nine years old at the time of the appeal. In 2012, the parties entered into a Consent Order that directed that they share joint legal custody of their daughter but specified that the Defendant was to be the parent of primary residence. A year and a half later, the Plaintiff's fiancé picked up the parties' child from school because he was unable to. Upon leaving the school, the fiancé's car lost control and struck a tree. She was charged with careless driving, driving while intoxicated, and refusal to provide a breath sample. The parties' daughter was severely injured. A month following the accident, the Defendant filed an Order to Show Cause (OTSC) seeking temporary sole custody of the child and a drastic restriction on the Plaintiff's parenting time. The Defendant also sought to have the Plaintiff's fiancé barred from ever being in the presence of the child again. The Family Court denied the Defendant's application for emergent relief but barred the Plaintiff's fiancé from having any contact with the child. The OTSC was converted to a Motion and scheduled for a return date. The court found that the Defendant failed to establish a prima facie case that their daughter was suffering from a genuine and substantial harm from remaining in the Plaintiff's custody as none of the injuries suffered by the child could be attributed to the Plaintiff's conduct. The Defendant filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The court denied the Motion and the Defendant appealed. The Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the lower court finding that motion reconsideration is appropriate when a court's previous decision was "based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis," or failed to consider or appreciate "probative, competent evidence [,]" or where a "litigant wishes to bring new or additional information to the [c]ourt's attention which it could not have provided on the first application [.]" D'Atria v. D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401 (Ch. Div. 1990). In this case, the Appellate Court held that the record fully supported the Family Court's decision based upon the facts presented and upon the observation "that [d]efendant's motion [was] almost identical" to a prior motion that she submitted and therefore there was no abuse of discretion in the court denial of her request. Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 384-85 (App. Div. 1996). If you believe that a post-judgment modification to your child custody or parenting time arrangement may be beneficial to you it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modification, child custody, parenting time, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice if an attorney.

Post-Judgment Relief Repeatedly Denied

In Walsh v. Walsh, a post-judgment modification case out of Morris County, the Defendant appealed from three (3) prior Court Orders that directed him to (1) liquidate his assets to pay a money judgment and finding that he failed to fully disclose financial information; (2) denied his relief to pay alimony and other fees; (3) granting the Plaintiff's Motion for enforcement of prior Orders. The parties in this case were married in 1976 and formally divorced in 2003. Their final divorce judgment has been the subject of multiple Motions and appeals. In 2008, the Defendant appealed an Order that modified his alimony obligation and denied his request to recuse the Family Court judge. The Appellate Division reversed and remanded the alimony Order but denied the recusal request. In 2011, the Defendant submitted an application for a reconsideration of the previous Order because he disagreed with the retroactive date that the alimony modification was set to. The court denied all of the relief sought. In 2013, the Defendant filed another Motion for relief from the prior three (3) Orders and the court denied the Defendant's Motion. In 2012, the Plaintiff filed a Motion in aid of litigant's rights to enforce outstanding judgments against the Defendant. In 2013, the court directed the Defendant to liquidate some of his assets to satisfy the money judgments against him. The Defendant filed a Motion for reconsideration which was denied. A subsequent Motion to reconsider the reconsideration was also denied. The Defendant appealed and argued that the court abused its discretion by denying him relief from all of his previous Motions under N.J. Court Rule 4:50-1(f) and N.J. Court Rule 1:7-4(a). The Appellate Division affirmed all of the prior Family Court decisions holding that the Defendant was barred from relief under res judicata. The doctrine of res judicata prevents the repeated litigation of an issue that has been fully and fairly litigated provided that there is 1) a final judgment by a court or competent jurisdiction, 2) identity of issues, 3) identity of parties and 4) identity of the cause of action. Selective Ins. v. McAllister, 327 N.J. Super. 168, 172-73 (App. Div), certif. denied, 164 N.J. 188 (2000). In this case, the Defendant clearly sought to re-litigate issues from previous Court Orders which were affirmed or dismissed on appeal. The repetitiveness of the Defendant's Motions were underscored by his continued reassertion of issues and allegations after the court had ruled on them. The court cannot permit frivolous matters which are fueled by personal revenge to deplete judicial resources. Kozak v. Kozak, 280 N.J. Super. 272, 278 (Ch. Div. 1994), certif. denied, 151 N.J. 73 (1997). Therefore, the Appellate court affirmed the decisions of Family Court. If you anticipate that you may want to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your divorce judgment it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modification, alimony, child support, parenting time, divorce, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Denial Of Husband's Alimony Modification Reversed

In Galante v. Galante, the Defendant appealed from a court order that denied his Motion for a modification of his alimony obligation. The New Jersey Appellate Court reversed the decision of the Family Court and remanded the case back for reconsideration. The parties executed a marital settlement agreement (MSA) in 2011 upon getting divorced. According to the MSA, with regard to equitable distribution, the Plaintiff was to receive the parties' marital residence, the 401k account from one of the Defendant's businesses, and the parties' 2010 tax refund. The Defendant received the parties' 2009 tax refund, and his 50% interest in three businesses that were acquired during the marriage. Further, the MSA provided for a two-step alimony payment schedule because the Defendant was unable to pay off the mortgage that was securing their former marital home. Before the marital home was sold, the Defendant was to pay all of the house expenses and $400 a week in alimony to the Plaintiff. Once the home was sold, he was to pay $1,500 a week in alimony to the Plaintiff. In 2013, the Defendant filed a Motion with the court to modify his alimony obligation, amongst other things. He claimed that his financial circumstances had dramatically declined which resulted in a significant change in circumstances, which justified the modification of the MSA. Specifically, he noted that his businesses had permanently lost their client base after the economic collapse of 2008 and his annual earnings dropped from $400,000 a year to $130,000 constituting a significant change in circumstances. The Family Court denied his application citing that he had failed to establish a prima facie showing of changed circumstances because he failed to provide the court with documentation that proved his claims. The Defendant filed a Motion for reconsideration in which he included his tax returns. The court denied this Motion as well holding that the Defendant was simply trying to cure his deficient documentation with information that was readily available to him when he filed his first Motion. The Defendant appealed. On Appeal the Defendant claimed that he established a prima facie case for a change in circumstances according to Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139 (1980). According to the Appellate Court, alimony "may be revised and altered by the court from time to time as circumstances may require." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. To win on such an application, a showing of "changed circumstances" is required. Weishaus v. Weishaus, 180 N.J. 131, 140-41 (2004). The Appellate Court found that in this case the Defendant did not make broad generalizations and bare assertions that his businesses were suffering, but rather, he provided specific details about his businesses failures and his efforts to rectify his situation. Thus, at the very least, the Defendant presented a prima facie case of changed circumstances and if the Plaintiff materially disputed the Defendant's claims, a plenary hearing should have been held to consider those facts, which was not done. Therefore, the decision of the Family Court was reversed. If you believe that a post-judgment modification to your alimony obligation may be beneficial to you it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modification, alimony, equitable distribution, divorce, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice if an attorney.

Post-Judgment Custody Modification Denied

In the recent Appellate Division case, C.T. v. M.L., the Defendant, M.L., appealed from a 2013 Family Court Order that denied her post judgment Motion that sought to restore joint custody of the parties' children and other forms of relief. The Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the Family Court. The parties in this case were married in 1999. Three (3) children were born of their marriage in 2000, 2002, and 2004. The parties obtained a legal divorce in 2006. When the parties separated in 2005 the Defendant had residential custody of all three (3) children. In January of 2006, residential custody was transferred to the Plaintiff, C.T., because the Defendant's boyfriend, F.L., inflicted serious injuries to Lila, one of the parties' children. In addition, the Defendant's parenting time with the children was suspended. The Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS), conducted several risk assessments and following these, the Defendant was allowed limited parenting time with her children conditioned upon the fact that she not have any contact with F.L. In September of that year, the parties executed a property settlement agreement (PSA) that provided that the parties share joint legal custody of the children but that the Plaintiff would have sole residential custody of them. The agreement specified that the Defendant have liberal and reasonable parenting time with the children and included a schedule as part of the provisions. Finally, a provision was entered into the agreement wherein the Defendant was prohibited from having any contact with her former boyfriend, F.L. or his family members, and if such contact was resumed the Defendant would forfeit her future parenting time with the children. Following the divorce the Defendant subsequently married F.L. and when the Plaintiff learned of the marriage he implemented the provision of the PSA that suspended the Defendant's parenting time. The Defendant moved before the court to reinstate her parenting time but in 2007 her Motion was denied and she was only allowed limited telephone contact with the children. Extensive Motion practice on this issue followed and in 2010 a Family Court judge awarded full legal custody to the parties' children to the Plaintiff and suspended the Defendant's right to telephone contact with the children. The judge based his opinion on psychological evaluations of the children that concluded that contact with the Defendant should cease. In 2012, the Defendant filed another Motion seeking the restoration of joint legal custody of her children and the establishment of a supervised parenting time schedule for her to have restored contact with them. The judge denied her request and she appealed from that decision. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the Family Court was mistaken in finding that she did not present a prima facie case of a change in circumstances that would warrant a change in custody. According to the Appellate Court, a party who seeks modification of a judgment or Order regarding custody and visitation "must meet the burden of showing changed circumstances and that the agreement is [no longer] in the best interests of the child." Abouzahr v. Matera-Abouzahr, 361 N.J. Super. 135, 152 (App. Div.). The Appellate Division found that the prior rulings on this issue were correct because the Defendant's repeated filing of the same Motion and hoping for a different result did not rise to the level of a changed circumstance and did not solve the underlying problems that were preventing her from having contact with her children. Therefore, the Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the Family Court. If you anticipate that you may want to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your child custody arrangement it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modification , parenting time, child custody, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlinglawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Equitable Distribution Of Home Is Open For Argument After Ambiguous PSA

In the recent Appellate Division case, Paintsil v. Oppong-manu, a post-judgment matrimonial case, the Defendant ex-husband appealed from a 2012 Family Court Order which enforced a property settlement agreement (PSA) with regard to the Plaintiff ex-wife's right to receive $22,672.50 as a share of the equitable distribution of their former marital home because he argued the provisions of their PSA were ambiguous and open to multiple interpretations. The parties in this case were marred in 1991 and obtained a divorce in 2008. They had two (2) children born in 1993 and 1997 respectively. On the date that their judgment of divorce was issued they entered into a PSA which designated the Defendant as the parent of primary residence and upon which the Defendant waived child support in exchange for the Plaintiff's waiver of alimony. Further, a provision of the PSA specifically directed that both parties are entitled to 50% of the equity of the marital residence and the "Husband agrees to [buy out] Wife's portion of the residence" if this was not possible then the house was to be sold and the proceeds to be split evenly. Specifically, the parties agreed that the fair market value of the marital home was $435,000 with a principal mortgage of $339,655 and an equity line of credit of $80,000. Therefore, at the time the equity in the home totaled $15,345 and subsequently the Plaintiff was entitled to $7,672.50. From the $80,000 home equity line of credit the parties used $30,000 on improvements and the Plaintiff received $10,000 which resulted in $40,000 that remained. According to the PSA, the Plaintiff was entitled to 50% less the $10,000 advance that she received and should have received another $15,000 additionally from the home equity line of credit. In total, the Plaintiff then was entitled to $22,672.50 from the marital home. In 2012, the Plaintiff filed a Motion to enforce litigant's rights to force the Defendant to pay her the money she was owed under the PSA. The Defendant argued that he could not refinance the home and the value of the home had dropped significantly since the divorce and that the PSA contemplated such an event allowing for modifications to the payouts. The judge found the Defendant was in violation of litigant's rights and ordered him to pay the Plaintiff $22,672.50 plus interest within thirty (30) days of the Order without holding a plenary hearing to evaluate the language of the PSA. The Defendant appealed. According to the Appellate Court, "[I]t is a basic rule of contractual interpretation that a court must discern and implement the common intention of the parties.: Pacifico v. Pacifico, 190 N.J. 258, 266 (2007). If the meaning of a contract such as a PSA is in dispute the court role is to consider "what is written in the context of the circumstances at the time of drafting and to apply a rational meaning in keeping with the 'expressed general purpose'." Atl. N. Airlines, Inc. v. Schwimmer, 12 N.J. 293, 302 (1953). In applying these principals the Appellate Division found that the trial court mistakenly exercised its discretion by finding that the Plaintiff was entitled to the enforcement of the PSA because more than one reasonable interpretation of the provisions was presented to the court, requiring a further plenary hearing that did not occur. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded the case back for further findings. The equitable distribution of assets is of the most emotional and complex aspects of a divorce. If you are involved in a battle over the division of marital property, assets, or debts it is extremely important that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about equitable distribution, post-judgment modification, contested divorce, spousal support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Denial Of Petition To Relocate Child Out Of United States Is Appealed

In a recent Appellate Division child relocation case, Gertseva v. Stamper, the Plaintiff, Lidia Gertseva appealed from part of a Family Court Order from 2012 that prohibited either party from removing their daughter from the United States without the express consent of the other party or a Court Order permitting such a removal. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the lower court. The parties in this matter obtained a divorce in 2008. During their marriage, the Plaintiff gave birth to a daughter who was eight years old at the time of this litigation. In 2008, the Family Court granted the Plaintiff's Motion which sought permission to relocate with the parties' daughter to Russia and specified that the Plaintiff and the Defendant, James R. Stamper, would share joint legal custody over the child, New Jersey would retain jurisdiction over the child, and the that the Plaintiff would have to follow the parenting time schedule established in the Court Order. The Plaintiff and her daughter relocated to Russia for about one year before returning to the United States to live in Virginia. In 2012, the Plaintiff filed another Motion seeking to modify the Court ordered parenting time schedule and to name her as the custodian of her daughter's passport. In the judge's Order it was specified that the Plaintiff could take the child to Russia for the Christmas holiday and that the child's passport "shall be provided upon request for travel when necessary to the parting travelling" with their daughter. Finally, the judge included that neither the Plaintiff nor the Defendant is allowed to remove the child from the United States without the written consent of the other parent or by Order of the court. The Plaintiff appealed from this decision. According to the Appellate Division, "More than financial contests, custody and parenting time disputes trigger the need for a family judge, acting as parens patriae, to prevent harm and protect the best interests of children." Parish v. Parish, 412 N.J. Super. 39, 52-53 (App. Div. 2010). In its holding, the Appellate Court found that upon its review of the record, the Family Court judge did not exceed or abuse his parens patriae authority to act in the best interest of the child. The record reflected that there were recurrent disputes between the parties about their daughter's travel out of the country and her absence from school. The Family Court judge's Order reflected his concern with this, in that he narrowed the time the daughter could be out of the country and ordered when she would return to school. The Appellate Court noted that since the Plaintiff had returned to America for an extended duration of time and because she no longer resided in Russia, it found that there was no reason to revisit the issue of child relocation either by consent or by application to the court. If the Plaintiff desired to relocate to relocate with the child to Russia in the future, the Family Court would be capable of rendering a decision on the facts as they exist at that time. Disputes regarding child relocation can be of the most important in family law because of the substantial impact that decisions regarding these issues will have upon the lives of the parties and their children. If you are involved in a child relocation dispute it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before proceeding. For more information on child relocation, child support, post judgment modification, divorce, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit Darlingfirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and is in no way intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Sole Custody After Child Endangerment Allegations?

In the recent NJ Appellate Division case, Hernandez v. Fermin, the Plaintiff sought sole custody of the parties' daughter alleging violations of his rights following accusations by the Defendant that he endangered their daughter's safety. The Plaintiff appealed from a 2012 Family Court Order that upheld a previous parenting time and custody order. In this case, the Plaintiff and Defendant started dating around 2008, and although the parties never married, they had a daughter together who was born in 2009. One month after, Sara, their daughter, was born they dissolved their relationship and the Defendant assumed custody of her. In 2010, the Defendant formally filed a Complaint for custody of Sara and the Family Court granted her temporary custody and a Parenting Time Order. The court also granted the Defendant temporary legal and residential custody and assigned a parenting time schedule for the Plaintiff. Subsequently, the parties went to mediation where they agreed to joint legal custody and signed a Consent Order granting the Defendant residential custody of their daughter and continuing the existing parenting time schedule. In 2012, the Plaintiff filed another Motion with the court arguing that the Defendant engaged in multiple parenting time violations and seeking sole legal custody over Sara. The Plaintiff's concerns were based upon the safety of Sara, who had recently suffered second or third degree burns while in the Defendant's custody. The Plaintiff also asserted that when Sara was younger she noticed that she had an unexplained cut on her leg while in the Defendant's care and that the Defendant had failed to care for a dental cavity that Sara had. The Family Court judge denied the Motion, holding that in order to determine the issue of sole custody of a child, he would need to hear the testimony from professionals like psychologists or other doctors regarding either parents' fitness. The judge held that in order to modify a custody arrangement "you've got to prove a substantial change of circumstances. The fact that the [child] got injured is not in or itself grounds to take a child away . . ." Therefore, the Family Court found that the Plaintiff's arguments were insufficient to warrant a change in custody. The Plaintiff then appealed from this decision. The NJ Appellate Court held that the resolution of a request to change custody requires the court to consider the custodial parent's fitness and the presence of a changed circumstance. Sheehan v. Sheehan, 51 N.J. Super. 276, 295 (App. Div. 1958); N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. Z.P.R., 351 N.J. Super. 427, 434 (App. Div. 2002). Following these principals, the Appellate Court found no error in the Family Court's determinations and held that the Plaintiff's assertions were without merit and affirmed the decision of the lower court. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). Child custody cases are of the most emotional and difficult cases in all of family law. If you anticipate that you may want to petition the court for to establish custody or for a post-judgment modification of your current child custody arrangement it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about child custody, post-judgment modification, parenting time, divorce, child support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

In Child Relocation Case, Appeal Is Only Possible After An Adjudication

In the recent post-judgment matrimonial case, Russitano v. Russitano, John Russitano appealed from a 2012 Court Order that directed action based upon his ex-wife's Motion to relocate the parties' children to Alabama and recalculate his child support obligation. The Appellate Court could not rule on appeal because the Family Court Order did not issue a final disposition on issues involved with the case. The parties in this case were married in 2000 and three (3) children were born of the marriage. On June 27, 2011, they were divorced pursuant to a Final Judgment of Divorce with their own negotiated Property Settlement Agreement (PSA) incorporated. In 2012, the Defendant, Melissa Russitano, filed a Motion with the court to relocate with the children to Alabama and to modify the parties' PSA to increase John's child support obligation. John filed a cross-motion seeking a recalculation of his child support obligation and to enforce the parenting time provisions contained in the PSA. After hearing oral argument, the Family Court judge issued an order directing that the parties engage mediation to attempt to resolve the relocation issues and the custody and parenting time issues. The judge also ordered that John's child support obligation be re-evaluated based upon his three most recent pay stubs. John appealed from this Order. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the lower court holding that, although John disagrees with his ex-wife's request to relocate to Alabama with their children, he failed to challenge the lower court's order referring the parties to mediation or the determination to hold a plenary hearing on the removal of the children if the parties are unable to reach a decision. The Appellate Court concluded that the Family Court judge's order on this issue was not a final disposition of the issue at the time that the appeal was filed because the court had never ruled on Melissa's Motion requesting permission to relocate with the parties' children. As such, a party is required to seek leave to appeal according to Rule 2:5-6(a), and neither party did so. As required under Rule 2:2-3(a)(1), the Appellate Court has jurisdiction to consider appeals from "final judgments of the Superior Court trial divisions." In all other cases, jurisdiction to consider an interlocutory matter is only granted upon leave of the court. Rule. 2:2-4. Therefore, this claim was dismissed. Next, regarding the child support issue, the Family Court is given substantial discretion to determine child support awards and other support obligations based upon the ruling in Foust v. Glaser, 340 N.J. Super., 312, 315 (App. Div. 2001). In this case, the Appellate Division found no reason to disturb the ruling of the Family Court as there was no basis to do so as the lower court's decision to order a recalculation of the obligation was appropriate. Disputes regarding child relocation and child support can be of the most important in family law because of the substantial impact that decisions regarding these issues will have upon the lives of the parties and their children. If you are involved in a child relocation or child support dispute it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before proceeding. For more information on child relocation, child support, post judgment modification, divorce, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Cohabitation Ends Alimony In Post-Judgment Modification Matter

In a recent post-judgment modification case, Syslo v. Syslo, the Plaintiff, Ann Marie Syslo, lost her appeal from a 2013 Family Court decision which granted the Defendant, Raymond Syslo's request to terminate his alimony obligation because she cohabitated with another person. The facts of the case are as follows. The Plaintiff and Defendant were married in 1990 and subsequently the couple were divorced in 2004. Three children were born of the marriage, the youngest of which still resides with the Plaintiff. Currently, the Defendant is obligated to pay $210 a week in child support. When the parties' decided to obtain a divorce, the Defendant agreed to pay to the Plaintiff $70 a week in alimony. That obligation was increased to $225 a week in 2007. Around 2010, the Defendant began trying to gather proof that the Plaintiff was co-habitating with another person. To do this, he hired a private investigator and began to film the cohabitant staying at the Plaintiff's residence overnight. He accumulated documentary evidence for about thirty-five days taking place in October of 2010, September of 2011, and March and April of 2012. These videos also revealed that the cohabitant possessed a key to the Plaintiff's residence, which he used to enter the home both when the Plaintiff was in the home and when she was not there. The cohabitant also drove the Plaintiff's car from time to time and transported the Plaintiff's child to different places and had opened joint bank accounts with the Plaintiff. Further, the Defendant was able to obtain evidence that the cohabitant received mail at the Plaintiff's home. As a result of this information and the testimony of the parties' emancipated children as well as that of the alleged cohabitant and Plaintiff, a Family Court judge found that the Defendant was able to establish that there was cohabitation. Konzelman v. Konzelman, 307 N.J. Super. 150 (App. Div. 1998). According to the judge, the Plaintiff and cohabitant acted like a "relatively permanen[t]" family unit, with the assumption of the duties and obligations "associated with marriage." Pursuant to this finding, the judge terminated the Defendant's alimony obligation effective on the date of the entry of the Order. The Plaintiff appealed this decision and argued that the trial court erred by finding that she had cohabitated within the legal understanding of the word. The Appellate Court affirmed the findings of the Family Court. According to the Appellate Division, it is well established that the cohabitation of a spouse who is receiving alimony constitutes a change in circumstances that may relieve the payor spouse from his or her alimony obligation. Gayet v. Gayet, 92 N.J. 149, 155 (1983). The cohabitation relationship must be more than simply an intimate relationship, it must also include that the parties engage in "duties and privileges that are commonly associated with marriage." Konzelman, 158 N.J. at 202. Some factors for consideration include if the parties share living expenses and household chores, intertwined finances, and recognition of the relationship in the couple's social and family circle. In the current case, the court found that the evidence on the record amply supported the Family Court judge's determination that cohabitation was established. If you anticipate that you may want to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your alimony award based upon cohabitation or any other relief that was awarded in a final judgment of divorce it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modification, divorce, alimony, child support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Post-Judgment Appeal Is Rejected By the Court Because Too Much time Had Elapsed

In the post-judgment Appellate Division case, Bansal v. Bansal, the Plaintiff, Jane Bansal appealed from a Family Court Order denying her request for a default judgment against the Defendant, Ashwani Bansal, in which she requested that he be held in contempt for filing a fraudulent Case Information Statement (CIS) with the court and for seeking numerous enforcement requests of previous Court Orders regarding equitable distribution of their property - most of which were nine years old. The Appellate Court affirmed the lower court's decision because the Plaintiff's challenges were not made in a timely manner and because it found that her arguments lacked sufficient merit to warrant extended discussion pursuant to Rule 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). In its decision, the Appellate Court notes that a motion to vacate or modify a judgment should be "granted sparingly." Fineberg v. Fineberg, 309 N.J. Super. 205, 215 (App. Div. 1998). Further, the trial court's "determination under the rule warrants substantial deference, and should not be reversed unless it results in a clear abuse of discretion." US Bank Nat. Ass'n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467 (2012). According to the court, an abuse of discretion arises when the court's decision is made without a rational explanation or rests on an impermissible basis. Iliadis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 191 N.J. 88, 123 (2007). In this case, the court held that the Plaintiff had ample time and opportunity to appeal the decisions that she believed were factually or legally incorrect and she failed to do so therefore the court's consideration of these issues is precluded. If he Plaintiff believed that she would make new claims in an attempt to set aside previously judicial decisions the time to do so had long expired and she failed to offer any exceptional circumstances to justify the court's review under Rule 2:4-2, which requires that an appeal as of right be filed within forty-five (45) days of the entry of a final judgment. Therefore, the Plaintiff's attempt to "correct" provisions of a Judgment of Divorce that was issued nine years ago is legally unsustainable. If you anticipate that you may want to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your divorce judgment, alimony award, or child support obligation it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modifications, divorce, equitable distribution, alimony, child support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit the DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Child Support Arrears PLUS Interest for Essex County Man

In recent Essex County case, Harrison v. Gordon, on appeal the Defendant, Anthony Gordon, argued that the Family Court judge erred in making him pay child support arrears and interest upon them because Probation has made a miscalculation on the amount. The parties in this case were married in 1989 and had a child one year later. In 1995, they decided to obtain a divorce. A property settlement agreement (PSA) was incorporated into their final judgment of divorce which included a provision that specified that the Defendant would pay $4,500 a month in child support which was to be reduced to $2,500 a month when the parties' marital residence was sold. This home was sold in 1997. The Defendant failed to pay his full child support obligation for many years afterward. In 2003, the Defendant submitted a motion to reduce his obligation and a court order was issued reducing his obligation to $1,250 which equaled $750 in continuing child support and $500 toward his overall arrearage, but the judge at that time did not set forth the full amount of child support arrears that was due. In 2004, the judge determined, by court order, that $264,000 was the arrearage amount. The Defendant appealed the 2003 and 2004 court orders. The Appellate Court at that time reversed and remanded the case back to the Family Court for "reconsideration of the current child support obligation." Harrison v. Gordon, No. A-2193-03 (App. Div. 2005). In 2005, the Family Court judge issued another order which reallocated the $1,250 a month child support obligation to reflect $500 for continuing child support and $750 toward the Defendant's arrears. Once again, the Defendant argued that he was not credited for $55,000 in unaccounted payments toward his arrearage. The judge gave the Defendant 90 days to provide proof of his claim and directed that in the event that the proof was not forthcoming, the judgment of $209,000 set forth in that order shall be increased automatically to $264,000. The Defendant failed to provide such proof. The matter came before the court again in 2008 upon the Plaintiff's application to accelerate the Defendant's child support obligation by doubling his monthly amount so that she and he could meet their daughter's college education expenses. The parties agreed that the obligation would be increased but that the Defendant would receive an additional credit against his total arrears for doing so - he would get $6,000 a year off of his arrearage for agreeing to the double payments. An order to this affect was issued and things proceeded well for the next four years. In 2012, when the parties' daughter graduated college the Defendant quickly moved to establish her emancipation and the Plaintiff cross moved to establish the Defendants total arrearage amount. A new judge heard the case and ordered that the Defendant owed $81,810.17 in arrears and discovered that the Probation Department never added the $55,000 required by the 2005 order and therefore the judge ordered that the Defendant pay $1,500 a month against the arrears. The Defendant appealed this order arguing that the court improperly upheld the parties' agreement for arrears as ordered in 2008 and the court erred by ordering the Defendant to pay $55,000 additional arrears because of Probation's mistake. Further, he argued that the court erred in ordering him to pay interest on the outstanding judgment for child support because collection on any outstanding judgment was denied and its enforcement denied in a 2004 court order. The Appellate Court found insufficient merit to warrant a lengthy discussion in a written opinion on the Defendant's first argument, except for citing that as revealed by the history of the case, a long dispute existed regarding the $55,000 for which the Family Court judge gave the Defendant two chances to prove, and both times he failed to do so and therefore the Defendant should not receive the benefit of a Probation error. N.J.C.R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). Further, the Appellate Division dismissed the Defendant's second argument as there was no equitable reason why interest should not have begun to accrue on the arrears that existed at the time of the child's emancipation. Disputes regarding child support can be of the most important in family law because child support money is critical for the welfare of the children of divorced parents. If you are involved in a child support dispute it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before proceeding. For more information on child support, post judgment modification, alimony, divorce, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way intended to replace the advice of an attorney.