Post-Judgment Relief Repeatedly Denied

In Walsh v. Walsh, a post-judgment modification case out of Morris County, the Defendant appealed from three (3) prior Court Orders that directed him to (1) liquidate his assets to pay a money judgment and finding that he failed to fully disclose financial information; (2) denied his relief to pay alimony and other fees; (3) granting the Plaintiff's Motion for enforcement of prior Orders. The parties in this case were married in 1976 and formally divorced in 2003. Their final divorce judgment has been the subject of multiple Motions and appeals. In 2008, the Defendant appealed an Order that modified his alimony obligation and denied his request to recuse the Family Court judge. The Appellate Division reversed and remanded the alimony Order but denied the recusal request. In 2011, the Defendant submitted an application for a reconsideration of the previous Order because he disagreed with the retroactive date that the alimony modification was set to. The court denied all of the relief sought. In 2013, the Defendant filed another Motion for relief from the prior three (3) Orders and the court denied the Defendant's Motion. In 2012, the Plaintiff filed a Motion in aid of litigant's rights to enforce outstanding judgments against the Defendant. In 2013, the court directed the Defendant to liquidate some of his assets to satisfy the money judgments against him. The Defendant filed a Motion for reconsideration which was denied. A subsequent Motion to reconsider the reconsideration was also denied. The Defendant appealed and argued that the court abused its discretion by denying him relief from all of his previous Motions under N.J. Court Rule 4:50-1(f) and N.J. Court Rule 1:7-4(a). The Appellate Division affirmed all of the prior Family Court decisions holding that the Defendant was barred from relief under res judicata. The doctrine of res judicata prevents the repeated litigation of an issue that has been fully and fairly litigated provided that there is 1) a final judgment by a court or competent jurisdiction, 2) identity of issues, 3) identity of parties and 4) identity of the cause of action. Selective Ins. v. McAllister, 327 N.J. Super. 168, 172-73 (App. Div), certif. denied, 164 N.J. 188 (2000). In this case, the Defendant clearly sought to re-litigate issues from previous Court Orders which were affirmed or dismissed on appeal. The repetitiveness of the Defendant's Motions were underscored by his continued reassertion of issues and allegations after the court had ruled on them. The court cannot permit frivolous matters which are fueled by personal revenge to deplete judicial resources. Kozak v. Kozak, 280 N.J. Super. 272, 278 (Ch. Div. 1994), certif. denied, 151 N.J. 73 (1997). Therefore, the Appellate court affirmed the decisions of Family Court. If you anticipate that you may want to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your divorce judgment it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modification, alimony, child support, parenting time, divorce, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Hiding Assets From Equitable Distribution Voids Divorce

In Zuba v. Zuba, the Plaintiff appealed the Family Court's denial of her Motion to re-open her final judgment of divorce (FJOD) based upon information that she received afterward that indicated that the Defendant had concealed property that was subject to equitable distribution. The Appellate Court vacated the Family Court's judgment and remanded the case for further discovery proceedings. In this case, the parties were married in 1980 and divorced in 2011. According to the property settlement agreement (PSA) that was incorporated into their divorce judgment: "The parties represent[ed] that each of them ha[d] candidly and fully disclosed to the other all of their income, assets and liabilities as of the execution of th[e] Agreement." Following the parties' divorce the Defendant lived with a third party and allegedly disclosed to the party and other members of her family that he owed property in Costa Rica and had a bank account in Belize that he did not include in his Case Information Statement (CIS) that was filed during his divorce. After the Defendant left her house, the third party contacted the Plaintiff and told her about the concealed property that the Defendant had hidden during their marriage. In 2013, the Plaintiff filed a Motion to set aside the parties' PSA based upon the Defendant's oral and written assertions that the marital property listed in the PSA and his CIS was the entire marital estate. The Family Court judge denied the Motion holding that the Plaintiff did not establish a prima facie case for fraud. The Plaintiff appealed arguing that at the very least she was entitled to post-judgment discovery and a potential plenary hearing following the discovery period based upon her petition to have her divorce judgment vacated under Rule 4:50-1. According to the Appellate Division, New Jersey has a strong public policy that favors the settlement of litigation. Gere v. Louis, 209 N.J. 486, 500 (2012). "[T]he settlement of litigation ranks high in our public policy." Brundage v. Estate of Carambio, 195 N.J. 575, 601 (2008). The court also recognized that Motions to set aside final divorce judgments under N.J. Court Rule 4:50-1 are only to be granted sparingly, but the Rule does permit relief when the facts and equities compel, specifically in the context involving equitable distribution marital assets. The court held that "where there is a showing of fraud of misconduct by a spouse in failing to disclose the true worth of his or her assets, relief may be granted under Rule 4:50-1(f) if the motion is made within a reasonable time. Rosen v. Rosen, 225 N.J. Super. 33, 36, (App Div.) certif. denied 111 N.J. 649 (1988). The equitable distribution of assets is of the most emotional and complex aspects of a divorce. If you are involved in a battle over the division of marital property, assets, or debts it is extremely important that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about equitable distribution, post-judgment modification, contested divorce, spousal support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

No Modifaction Of Alimony Or Child Support For Party Failing To Appear In Divorce

In the recent Appellate Division case, Vaish v. Vaish, the Plaintiff, Rajiv Vaish, appealed from a 2012 Family Court Order that denied his Motion to vacate parts of his Judgment of Divorce as with regard to issues of equitable distribution, alimony and child support. The parties in this case were married 1986 and two (2) children were born of the marriage. The first child was born in 1990 and the second in 1994. In 2010, the Defendant, Sanmati Vaish, filed for divorce. For reasons that were unclear the court initially dismissed her Complaint and then later reinstated it, and before the reinstatement, the Plaintiff filed a Complaint for Divorce which the parties decided to proceed under. Before a scheduled Early Settlement Panel (ESP) at the court problems arose between the Plaintiff and his attorney which lead the attorney to withdraw from representation and the Plaintiff to fail to attend the ESP. The court then dismissed the Plaintiff's Complaint for failure to appear at the ESP meeting. In 2011, the Defendant filed a request for a Default Judgment to be entered against the Plaintiff followed by an application for equitable distribution of the parties' assets and property. Copies of these documents were provided to the Plaintiff's new attorneys at that time. In October of 2011, the Family Court held a hearing on the Defendant's application for equitable distribution and the Plaintiff failed to appear. Upon hearing the Defendant's testimony and considering her expert's report the court entered a Final Divorce Judgment and accepted the Defendant's uncontested submission for equitable distribution, child support, and alimony. In October of 2012, 364 days after this judgment was entered, the Plaintiff filed a Motion with the court to vacate parts of the divorce judgment with regard to child support and alimony. The judge denied the Plaintiff's Motion finding that he did not demonstrate good cause to vacate the judgment and he did not prove that there had been changed circumstances that would warrant a modification. The Plaintiff then appealed arguing that the judgment of divorce should be vacated under N.J. court Rule 4:50-1(a). According the Appellate Division, the portion of N.J. Court Rule 4:50-1(a) that was relevant to this appeal is subsection (a) which allows relief from a judgment due to "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." These categories include instances where a party "through no fault of its own, has [made] . . . a mistaken judgment on a material point at issue in the litigation. DEG, LLC v. Twp. of Fairfield, 198 N.J. 242 262 (2009). The Plaintiff's claim for relief based upon excusable neglect is based upon his argument that he did not know that a default hearing was scheduled in 2011. The Plaintiff's own attorney admitted that the Plaintiff had notice of the hearing. Therefore, the decision of the Family Court was affirmed. The equitable distribution of assets is of the most emotional and complex aspects of a divorce. If you are involved in a battle over the division of marital property, assets, or debts it is extremely important that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about equitable distribution, post-judgment modification, contested divorce, spousal support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Child Relocation - Agreement Under Duress?

The NJ Appellate Division case, Briseno v. Burton, focuses on the issue of child relocation during a child custody dispute and whether or not a litigant signed a consent order under duress. In this unopposed appeal from the New Jersey Superior Court, the Defendant appeals a court order that confirmed a consent order that allowed the Plaintiff to relocate to Florida with the parties' children. The Defendant seeks to invalidate the consent order because he claims to have signed the order while under duress, threats, and coercion. Further, the appeal alleges that the Defendant was not represented by counsel and that under N.J. Court Rule 4:50-1(f), if the agreement was upheld, the result would be unjust, oppressive, and inequitable. The parties in this action were never married and had known each other for about six years. Together they had two children. In 2010, after their relationship had ended, the parties began to have discussions about the possibility of the Plaintiff relocating with the children to California. In October of 2011, the Plaintiff gave the Defendant a consent agreement that detailed this relocation. The Defendant, upon receiving advice from counsel, declined to the sign the agreement because he disagreed with the proposed child support provisions contained in the agreement. In April of 2012, the Plaintiff provided the Defendant with yet another consent agreement which, if signed by him, would allow her to relocate with the children to Coral Springs, Florida. Again, the Defendant refused to sign the agreement. Finally, on June 8, 2012, the Plaintiff once again gave the Defendant another draft of the consent order to which the parties spent weeks negotiating the terms. On June 28, 2012, the Defendant signed the consent agreement on the condition that the Plaintiff stop pursing the restraining order against him that she had instituted. The New Jersey Appellate Division found the Defendant's appeal to be unpersuasive. According to the Court, the Defendant was well aware of the Plaintiff's intentions to relocate to Florida, as he was in possession of the proposed agreement for weeks and he even participated in modifying the language of the agreement. In addition, the Court reasoned that the Defendant had plenty of time to seek out the advice of an attorney. Therefore, the Court held that the Defendant's decision to sign the proposed consent agreement was of his own free will and was not done under duress. Furthermore, the Court noted that this case did not represent a case of exceptional circumstances and the fact that the Defendant felt, afterwards, that the terms of the agreement were not in his favor does not give rise to a reason to invalidate the order. If you anticipate that you will become involved in a custody dispute or a dispute concerning child relocation it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about child custody, parenting time, alimony or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way intended to replace the advice of an attorney.