Equitable Distribution of Stock Options in Divorce

M.G. v. S.M. is a post-judgment divorce matter where the marital coverture share of a stock award vesting after the filing of the divorce complaint was sought by the Defendant. The parties married in 1998. Every August, from 2003 through 2010, the Plaintiff received a stock award from his employer which would vest in stages thereafter, beginning in 2011. On July 28, 2014, Plaintiff filed the divorce complaint. By that time, M.G. had been granted eight stock awards but only three had fully vested with the remainder to vest annually thereafter, each August. The company’s policy was reviewed and specifically stated that employees were granted stock to compensate them for long-term contributions to the company’s success and that the stock awards “represent the future right to receive shares…when a vesting requirement is satisfied.” According to the Plaintiff, the stock awards are a way for the employer to retain employees and give them reason to drive the stock higher through personal performance. Plaintiff did agree to share the vested stocks with the Defendant but maintained that any non-vested stock would vest only if he continued to perform at higher levels following the filing of the divorce complaint. The trial judge found that S.M. was entitled to one-half of all stocks awarded before or near the date of the complaint. In his opinion, the trial judge found Plaintiff to be credible and Defendant non-credible. In his written opinion, the judge went on to include that the stock awards of 2014 were based on the Plaintiff’s past performance, which was rendered during the marriage. The Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration with which he submitted documents from his employer spelling out the fact that post-award changes in employment status, hours, leaves, disability, and otherwise “shall” affect the employee’s rights in stock awards in support of his argument that the non-vested options did not belong, in part, to the Defendant. The motion was denied. Plaintiff appealed to the New Jersey Appellate Division. In Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583 (1995) and Reinbold v. Reinbold, 311 N.J. Super. 460 (App. Div. 1998), the court held that options and other incentives earned during the marriage, even if distributed later, are subject to equitable distribution. The trial judge misapplied these cases to stock awards that would be earned after the marriage. In Slutsky v. Slutsky, 451 N.J. Super. 332, 344 (App. Div. 2017), the court held that “reversal is warranted when the trial court’s factual findings are ‘so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice.” In Clark v. Clark, 429 N.J. Super. 61, 71 (App. Div. 2012), the court determined that a family judge has wide discretion in the distribution of assets which are subject to equitable distribution, however, in the within case, the trial judge’s findings were not supported by credible evidence and controlling legal principles pursuant to the terms of Gonzalez-Posse v. Ricciardulli, 410 N.J. Super. 340, 354 (App. Div. 2009). In Pascale, the Supreme Court upheld its earlier decision from Landwehr v. Landwehr, 111 N.J. 491, 504 (1988), wherein the court held that when equitable distribution is sought for assets received post complaint, the touchstone becomes whether the asset was acquired as a result of efforts during the marriage, in which case the asset is subject to equitable distribution, or post-complaint in which case it belongs to the spouse who still must earn the asset. The N.J. Appellate Division panel determined that the trial judge was incorrect in his decision. The matter was reversed and remanded to the trial judge for findings pursuant to applicable case law and N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.1. If you are considering divorce or have been served with divorce papers, you should consult with an experienced family law attorney in order to insure that your rights are protected. For more information about divorce, post-judgment motions, equitable distribution or other family law matters, visit DarlingFirm.com. To schedule a consultation, call us today at 973-584-6200. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Contributing to Your Children's Education

In Fanelli v. Hnatowski, Plaintiff Daria Fanelli filed a post-judgment motion seeking contribution from her former husband, Kenneth Hnatowski, for 50% of their two children’s private school tuition as was agreed upon in the parties’ property settlement agreement. Fanelli paid the tuition for both children for 9 years without contribution by the Defendant. The parties divorced in 2005 and Plaintiff was the primary caregiver to the children, ages 15 and 16 at the time of the post-judgment motion. At the time of their divorce, the parties entered into a property settlement agreement containing, among other things, that each would pay 50% of the children’s school costs. The children have attended private school since kindergarten. In 2016, the Plaintiff sought a contribution from the Defendant in the amount of 50% of the children’s tuition or a contribution in proportion to the parties’ respective incomes. The Union County Family Part judge hearing the matter ordered the Defendant to pay 50% of the children’s tuition and Defendant appealed on the grounds that the Plaintiff’s failure to seek contribution for 9 years barred her from doing so and that the term “school costs” does not mean tuition. The Defendant directed the court to Hoefers v. Jones, 288 N.J. Super. 590, 611-12 (Ch. Div. 1994), aff’d, 288 N.J. Super. 478 (App. Div. 1996) which sets forth 14 enumerated factors which the court must evaluate when ordering payment. The factors include the ability of parents to pay, the continuity of the children’s education, the contemplation that they would participate in the program for which contribution is sought, whether enrollment was reasonable, the benefit to the child of the program, whether the party enrolling the child had the right to do so, the child’s best interests and other factors. The NJ Appellate Division held that the term “school costs” was not ambiguous and that the Defendant was required to contribute to the children’s tuition under the parties’ agreement. Thereafter, the appellate division stressed the importance of upholding resolutions negotiated by the parties in citing to Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34, 44 (2016), Konzelman v. Konzelman, 158 N.J. 185, 193-94 (1999). The trial court determined that Defendant’s failure to object to the children’s attendance in private school for 9 years operated as implied consent. On appeal, the court found the issue of consent to be of no consequence as the Plaintiff was not seeking contribution for the 9 prior years of private school tuition and the Defendant did not seek relief compelling the children to attend public school. If you need post-judgment relief to enforce litigant’s rights in a family law case, please visit DarlingFirm.com for more information or call us now at 973-584-6200 to schedule a consultation. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of counsel.

Modify Your Alimony Obligation Before Retirement

In Mueller v. Mueller, a judge interpreted the legislative intent of modifications to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 to allow for pre-retirement anticipatory alimony modification. Ocean County Superior Court Judge Lawrence Jones held that the legislative intent was to allow for modification or termination of alimony obligations in the event that retirement is to occur in the near future and a detailed plan for actual retirement exists. Judge Jones found that there is a benefit in allowing a party contemplating retirement to understand fully what their actual alimony obligation will be prior to fully exiting the workforce. The judge set forth no specific time limits but suggested a 12 to 18 month timeframe for such motions. Judge Jones determined that Gordon Mueller's retirement, planned for 5 years following the post-judgment motion hearing, was too uncertain to warrant a reduction at the present time. If you are considering retirement but have an existing alimony obligation you now have an opportunity to determine what type of obligation you will face after retirement and whether you will be able to live the lifestyle you wish during retirement. For more information about post-judgment modification of alimony, child support, parenting time and other family law matters, visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Proving Cohabitation Without Access To Necessary Evidence

Using Facebook posts by his ex-wife’s significant other to support his claims, Steven Robitzski claimed cohabitation of his ex-wife with another as a reason for reduction in his alimony obligation under the 2014 revisions to the alimony statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. Robitzski sought additional discovery from the plaintiff with regard to her finances and the court held that the defendant failed to make a prima facie showing of cohabitation that would be required prior to their compelling discovery from Lorraine Robitzski. The property settlement agreement (PSA) which the parties agreed to at the time of their divorce contemplated alimony of $2,500 monthly from husband to wife and contemplated certain circumstances, including the wife’s future cohabitation, as a reason for termination of alimony. Cohabitation, as defined in Gayet v. Gayet, 92 N.J. 149 (1983), and Konzelman v. Konzelman, 158 N.J. 185 (1999), contemplates a marriage-like relationship including “stability, permanency and mutual interdependence.” The plaintiff denied that she cohabitated with her significant other claiming he spends approximately 100 nights per year at her residence and that they maintain separate finances and residences. The plaintiff provided the defendant with bank accounts showing she paid her own bills for 2013 and 2014 without deposits from unknown sources. The judge found the Facebook postings to be inadmissible and of limited probative value in any event. The judge did however order the significant other to provide certain certification with regard to his living arrangements and finances as well as ordering the plaintiff ex-wife to provide proof of her own expenses and how they are met. On appeal, in Robitzski v. Robitzski, there was consideration of Konzelman with regard to whether the cohabitation criteria existing at the time of the divorce or the amended criteria would apply. In 2014, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 was modified to reflect the following criteria for a court to use when assessing whether cohabitation exists: (1) Intertwined finances such as joint bank accounts and other joint holdings or liabilities; (2) Sharing or joint responsibilities for living expenses; (3) Recognition of the relationship in the couple's social and family circle; (4) Living together, the frequency of contact, the duration of the relationship, and other indicia of a mutually supportive intimate personal relationship; (5) Sharing household chores; (6) Whether the recipient of alimony has received an enforceable promise of support from another person within the meaning of subsection h. of [N.J.S.A.] 25:1-5; and (7) All other relevant evidence. Also to be considered is the duration of the relationship. The 2014 amendments include a provision indicating they are effective from 2014 and do not modify prior agreements or orders. The N.J. Appellate Division looked to Landers v. Landers, ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2016) and Spangenberg v. Kolakowski, 442 N.J. Super. 529 (App. Div. 2015) with regard to whether the 2014 amendments would be applied retroactively. The Appellate Division determined that it no matter which version of the statue was applied, the defendant failed to make a prima facie case for cohabitation and opined that even if the trial judge had allowed the Facebook postings regarding vacations and events the parties enjoyed together, there would not be a prima facie showing of cohabitation. The decision of the trial court was affirmed. In light of changes to the laws governing alimony and cohabitation, it is critical that you seek out the advice of an attorney to protect your rights an entitlements. If you think that it may be beneficial for you to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your alimony obligation based upon your ex-spouse's cohabitation with another person or for any other reason it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about alimony, divorce, post-judgment modification, child support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and is in no way intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

As Man's Salary Plummets, Alimony Reduction is Awarded

William Bischoff sought to reduce his alimony obligation and terminate his obligation to maintain a life insurance policy for the benefit of his ex-wife, Diane Bischoff, or, in the alternative, to reduce the amount of insurance he was required to maintain. The result of the post-judgment motion was that Bischoff’s alimony obligation was reduced based on significantly changed financial circumstances, although the life insurance policy was kept in place in light of the judge’s finding that it was part of equitable distribution, rather than alimony, and that a change in William Bischoff’s circumstances did not justify a modification of equitable distribution decided long ago. However, Diane Bischoff was required to contribute more to the policy’s premium. In 2006, when the parties divorced, William Bischoff was making approximately $900,000 per year and their Property Settlement Agreement called for alimony in the amount of $153,900 on the first $600,000 of his earnings and one-third of the next $650,000. In 2009 a woman with whom William Bischoff had become romantically involved was arrested for insider trading and William Bischoff was later terminated from his employment. In 2012, the parties consented to a post-judgment modification of the alimony obligation to $2,500 per month with Plaintiff’s income imputed at $125,000 annually and Defendant’s at $20,000 annually. When Plaintiff’s income continued to fall, the within motion for reduction in alimony and termination of insurance was filed. In Bischoff v. Bischoff, the N.J. Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the court below on appeal finding no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge and lack of merit in Plaintiff’s claims on appeal. In light of recent changes in the way alimony is determined, it is very important that you seek out the advice of an attorney to protect your rights an entitlements. If you think that it may be beneficial for you to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your alimony obligation based upon a significant reduction in your income or for any other reason it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about alimony, divorce, post-judgment modification, child support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Will Your Spouse Pay Your Divorce Costs?

Friedrich v. Friedrich was a post-judgment divorce action, wherein Defendant wife’s attorney sought counsel fees against the Plaintiff for outstanding legal fees over and above the $20,000 in counsel fees the Plaintiff had been ordered to pay pendente lite. In spite of substantial disparity in the parties’ incomes, the court held that pursuant to all factors to be considered under N.J.C.R. 5:3-5(c), an additional counsel fee award was not warranted. Pursuant to Rule 5:3-5(c), the court has discretion to award counsel fees to either party in a family law action, both pendente lite and upon Final Judgment if the court finds the award to be in the interest of justice. Specifically, Rule 5:3-5(c) includes fees for “any claim for divorce, dissolution of civil union, termination of domestic partnership, nullity, support, alimony, custody, parenting time, equitable distribution, separate maintenance, enforcement of agreements between spouses, domestic partners, or civil union partners and claims relating to family type matters.” The criteria for an award of attorney’s fees include the legal services performed, or likely to be performed, and the financial circumstances of each party. In setting the amount of any award, Rule 5:3-5(c) directs the trial judge to consider: “(1) the financial circumstances of the parties; (2) the ability of the parties to pay their own fees or to contribute to the fees of the other party; (3) the reasonableness and good faith of the positions advanced by the parties both during and prior to trial; (4) the extent of the fees incurred by both parties; (5) any fees previously awarded; (6) the amount of fees previously paid to counsel by each party; (7) the results obtained; (8) the degree to which fees were incurred to enforce existing orders or to compel discovery; and (9) any other factor bearing on the fairness of an award.” In addition, the court has discretion to direct one or both parties to liquidate assets in order to pay counsel fees. In affirming the denial of counsel fees to the Defendant, the N.J. Appellate Division held that the trial judge gave proper review to the factors set forth and found that the Plaintiff was not able to contribute to the Defendant’s attorney’s fees. A major consideration in any divorce is the impact on one’s financial future. Although the financial issues of divorce are not to be taken lightly, if you are miserable and feel that the only thing standing between you and your happiness is the ability to finance your divorce, you should speak with an experienced divorce attorney about the possibility of receiving some of your counsel fees from your spouse. For more information about divorce, child custody, parenting time, post-judgment issues and other family law matters visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Post-Judgment Divorce Decision To Call Step-Parent "Mom" Or "Dad" Belongs To Child

In B.S. v. T.S., Superior Court Judge Lawrence Jones ruled that, in a post-judgment divorce matter, the decision whether to call a step-parent "mom" or "dad" rests solely with the child. B.S. and T.S. were divorced with a judgment calling for joint legal custody of their son, Daniel, and both parents actively participated in their child's life. B.S. ultimately began sharing a residence with his fiancee', Lori and Daniel developed a emotional bond such that Daniel opted, without encouragement, to begin calling Lori "mom". Daniel and T.S. maintained a strong bond as well which was not impacted by Daniel's interactions with Lori. In hearing the motion by T.S. to prevent Daniel from calling Lori "mom", Judge Jones noted that children of divorce often have few rights but one of those rights is certainly the choice of what to call a step-parent. In his ruling, Judge Jones did include that, in cases where the biological parent remains an active participant in the child's life, the biological parent shall always be responsible for decisions regarding the child's upbringing and that the step-parent's marriage to a child's biological parent does not, without more, confer parental rights on the step-parent. For more information regarding post-judgment modification, parental rights, custody, child support, divorce or other family law matters, visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Post-Judgment Action To Enforce PSA Over College Expenses

Daley v. Daley, is a post-judgment matrimonial matter in which the Defendant appealed from a 2013 Family Court Order that granted the Plaintiff's Motion to enforce and amended a provision of the parties' Property Settlement Agreement (PSA) dealing with the funding of their children's college education. The parties in this case were married in 1995 and got divorced in 2007. Two (2) children were born during their marriage and a PSA was incorporated into their divorce judgment in 2007. In 2013, the Plaintiff filed a Motion to enforce and amend a provision of the PSA that required the Defendant to provide her with annual fund balances and make required monthly payments to the children's college savings accounts for their education. In response to the Plaintiff's Motion the Defendant admitted that between 2009 and 2013 he had withdrawn $33,000 from the college accounts but he had repaid the sum prior to the 2013 filing of the Plaintiff's Motion. The Defendant also admitted that in 2008 he withdrew $29,100 from the accounts to pay his federal and state taxes and he had not yet repaid that amount and he claimed that although the accounts should remain an asset for the children's benefit, he was not prevented from making necessary withdrawals from this accounts under the PSA. The Family Court judge ordered that the Plaintiff be named the custodian of the children's college savings accounts and that the defendant repay the $29,100 within thirty (30) days. The Defendant appealed claiming that the Family Court judge erred in making the Plaintiff the custodian of the college accounts, amending the PSA concerning the use of the account funds, amongst other prayers for relief. According to the Appellate Division, with regard to the enforcement of the PSA, New Jersey Court Rule 1:10-3 "provide[s] a mechanism, coercive in nature, to afford relief to a litigant who has not received what a Court Order or Judgment entitles that litigant to receive." D'Atria v. D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 407 (Ch. Div. 1990). "The particular manner in which compliance may be sought is left to the court's sound discretion." Bd. of Educ. of Middletown v. Middletown Twp. Educ. Ass'n., 352 N.J. Super. 501, 509 (Ch. Div. 2001). According to these standards, the Appellate Division found no basis to disturb the Family Court judge's decision to place the Plaintiff in control of the children's college savings accounts. Although the Defendant was an "owner" of the account, the PSA required him to make regular monthly payments into the accounts. Nothing in the PSA indicated that the parties ever intended that the Defendant would or could periodically withdraw funds from the accounts to pay his personal expenses. If you believe that a post-judgment modification to your settlement agreement regarding the provisions of the agreement may be beneficial to you to you should seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modification, equitable distribution, alimony, child support or other family law matters in New Jersey visit the DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice if an attorney.

Reduction In Child Support After Incarceration For Arrears

In Solomon v. Solomon, the Defendant appealed from a 2013 Family Court post-judgment Order that granted the Plaintiff's Motion for reconsideration to compel the Defendant to pay substantial child support arrears from his 50% share of his 401(k) or IRA and the proceeds from the sale of a timeshare property. The parties in this case were married in 1996 and had three (3) children. They executed a property settlement agreement (PSA) in 2006 which was incorporated into their final dual judgment of divorce on the same day. The PSA required the Defendant 1) to pay the Plaintiff $300 a week in child support, and $325 per week in alimony for five (5) years; 2) divide the Defendant's 401(k) equally between the parties; and (3) divide the parties' ownership and usage of their timeshare property equally. In 2007, the court assigned to the Plaintiff an amount equal to 50% of the value of the Defendant's IRA and found that the Defendant violated the Plaintiff's rights by willfully failing to turn over to her half of the 401(k) in accordance with the provisions of their PSA. In 2009, the Defendant was sentenced to seven (7) years in prison. Subsequent to his entering into the PSA but before his incarceration, he was required to pay $35 per week toward support arrears. While he was incarcerated, the Defendant submitted an application to reduce his child support payments to $5 a week, to terminate his alimony, and to terminate his payment towards arrears. He argued that his incarceration amounted to a change in circumstances. In 2011, a Family Court judge denied the Defendant's request to decrease his child support payments, but suspended the enforcement of his support obligations pending his release. By consent, the Defendant's alimony obligation was terminated retroactive to 2008. In 2011, the Defendant was released to a work house. In 2013, the Family Court issued an Order pertaining to his child support obligation to which the Defendant moved for reconsideration. The judge who heard the Motion arguments, granted the Defendant's Motion for reconsideration and ordered that 1) the Defendant maintain his 50% interest in the 401(k); 2) the parties continue to share ownership of the timeshare, 3) the parties submit current case information statements, and 4) denied the Defendant's request to stay his existing child support obligation. In the interim, the Defendant's child support obligation was increased due to a cost of living increase and another judge ordered that the Defendant pay $35 a week towards his $90,358.64 arrears. In response, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for reconsideration which was granted and the Defendant was ordered to pay half of his 401(k) or IRA toward his child support arrears and to convey his interest in the parties' time share to the Plaintiff to put towards his arrears. This Order also reduced the Defendant's child support from $366 week to $66 and ordered that he pay an additional $100 per week ward his arrears. The Defendant appealed arguing for a strict enforcement of the terms of the PSA. According to the Appellate Division, "Marital agreements are essentially consensual and voluntary and as a result, they are approached with a predisposition in favor of their validity and enforceability." Massar v. Massar, 279 N.J. Super. 89, 93 (App. Div. 1995). Yet, in this case, the court was guided by its long-standing view that the " . . . obligation to provide child support 'is engrained in our common law, statutory, and rule-based jurisprudence.'" Colca v. Anson, 413 N.J. Super. 405, 414 (App. Div. 2010). "Child support is the right of the child and responsibility of both parents, not a child won or lost by the custodial parent from the non-custodial parent." Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583, 591 (1995). When considering all guiding principles that inform child support decisions and its standard of review, the court was satisfied that the lower court enforced the parties' PSA to the children's best interests and therefore affirmed the decision of the Family Court. If you anticipate that it may be beneficial to you to seek a post-judgment modification of your child support obligation it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modification, child support, alimony, divorce, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Equitable Distribution Of A Residence 'Underwater'

In Grella v. Rumer, the Defendant appealed from a provision in a 2014 Family Court Order that denied his Motion to modify the parties' property settlement agreement (PSA) regarding the equitable distribution of the parties' marital home. The Plaintiff moved out of the marital residence in 2007. According to a provision in the parties' PSA which was incorporated into their divorce judgment in 2009 the husband was to have exclusive possession of the home, and the home was to be listed for sale or the husband was to buy out the Plaintiff's portion within five (5) years of their divorce. Further, it was stated that the wife was not entitled to any equity the Defendant paid into the home after the parties separated. Five (5) years after the parties were divorced the home was appraised at $190,000 and the outstanding mortgage indebtedness at that time was $231,561 therefore the parties' mortgage was $41,000 more than the home's value. The Defendant argued that the parties were mutually mistaken in believing the home had equity when they divorced. The Plaintiff claimed that the Defendant unilaterally increased the debt on the home. Further, the fact that a particular value was not agreed upon when the parties' divorced did not mean that the parties were mistaken with regard to any equity the home may have had. According to the Appellate Court, "the doctrine of mutual mistake applies when a 'mistake was mutual in that both parties were laboring under the same misapprehension as to [a] particular, essential fact.'" Bonnco Petrol, Inc. v. Epstein, 115 N.J. 599, 608, 560 A.2d 655 (1989); Beachcomber Coins, Inc. v. Boskett, 166 N.J. Super. 442, 446, 400 A.2d 78 (App. Div. 1979). In this case, the Defendant had fallen woefully short of demonstrating the clear and convincing evidence necessary to demonstrate that the parties were mistaken. Although he may have had evidence of a current lack of equity, he had not demonstrated any lack of equity in the residence in 2009 when the PSA was executed. Therefore, the Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the lower court. If you believe that a post-judgment modification to your settlement agreement regarding the equitable distribution of your property may be beneficial to you it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modification, equitable distribution, alimony, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit the DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice if an attorney.

Equitable Distribution Dictates Payment Of Mortgage

In Murphy v. Murphy, a New Jersey Appellate Division case out of Morris County, the Defendant appealed from a 2014 Family Court Order that denied his post-judgment Motion to compel the Plaintiff, his ex-wife, to make mortgage payments on the parties' martial residence under the terms they agreed to regarding equitable distribution. The Court also granted her request to compel him to reimburse her for unreimbursed medical expenses and insurance. The parties in this case were married in 1987 and had three (3) children together. They were divorced in 2013, at which time two (2) of their children were emancipated and they shared joint custody of their daughter. Their divorce judgment incorporated a marital settlement agreement (MSA). In the agreement, the Defendant agreed to paying the carrying charges on the marital home until "the house [was] sold, or through January 1, 2014, whichever [was] sooner." Also, the agreement specified that the Defendant was obligated to maintain medical insurance for the Plaintiff and pay for her uncovered or unreimbursed health care expenses until a certain date. The parties assumed that the marital residence would sell before January 1, 2014, but unfortunately it did not and there was no provision in the agreement that provided for mortgage payments beyond that date. The Defendant stopped paying the mortgage after December of 2013. At the end of January 2014, the Defendant filed a Motion to compel the Plaintiff to start paying the mortgage payments. The Plaintiff filed a Cross-Motion for an Order compelling the Defendant to pay the mortgage and for unreimbursed medical bills. A Family Court judge denied the Defendant's Motion finding that the parties had previously agreed that there was no equity in the marital residence and therefore continuing to pay the mortgage would not produce a positive result. Therefore, the judge held that neither party would have to pay the mortgage. In addition, the judge granted the Plaintiff's request to compel the Defendant to pay for unreimbursed medical expenses. The Defendant appealed and on appeal the Defendant argued that the parties' MSA did not obligate him to pay the mortgage after January 1, 2014 and he was also not obligated to reimburse the Plaintiff for unreimbursed medical insurance expenses. The Appellate Division agreed with the Defendant's first argument but disagreed with his second. According to the Appellate Division, "An agreement to settle a lawsuit is a contract which, like all contracts, may be freely entered into and which a court, absent a demonstration of 'fraud or other compelling circumstances,' should honor and enforce as it does other contracts." Pascarella v. Bruck, 190 N.J Super. 118, 124-5 (App Div) certif. denied, 94 N.J. 600 (1983). "Settlement agreements in matrimonial matters, being 'essentially consensual and voluntary in character, ... [are] entitled to considerable weight with respect to their validity and enforceability' in equity, provided they are fair and just." Dolce v. Dolce, 383 N.J. Super. 11, 20 (App. Div. 2006). In this case, the Defendant sought to compel the Plaintiff to pay the mortgage after January 1, 2014 when either the MSA or the divorce judgment specified that she was to do so. The court held that if the Defendant had wanted the Plaintiff to pay the mortgage for as long as she lived in the home he should have negotiated that when the parties were creating their MSA. Therefore, the Appellate Court affirmed the lower court's denial of this request. However, the court found that the Plaintiff was not entitled to unreimbursed medical expenses from the Defendant because she incurred those costs after the date contemplated in their divorce judgment and therefore reversed the lower court's ruling with regard to this issue. The equitable distribution of assets is of the most emotional and complex aspects of a divorce. If you are involved in a battle over the pre- or post-judgment division of marital property, assets, or debts it is extremely important that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about equitable distribution, post-judgment modification, contested divorce, alimony, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Parenting Time Modification Requires Adequate Change Of Circumstances

In Tedeschi v. Ferragine, a post-judgment divorce matter, the Defendant appealed from Family Court Orders that reduced his parenting time and set his child support amount. The parties were marred in 2000 and divorced in 2008. The Plaintiff gave birth to two (2) sons during the marriage and pursuant to the parties' property settlement agreement (PSA) they agreed to share joint legal custody of the children and designated the Plaintiff as the parent of primary residence. Following their divorce, the Plaintiff married a man who lived in Massachusetts. In 2012, the court granted the Plaintiff's request to relocate with the children to Massachusetts and modified the Defendant's parenting time arrangement accordingly. After this, the court entered multiple Orders following a series of Motions filed by the parties concerning the Defendant's parenting time and child support obligation. The Defendant appealed from provisions that pertain to both arguing that the court erred by reducing his parenting time and calculation his child support. According to the Appellate Division: "Orders defining a parent's right with respect to contact with his child are subject to future revision depending on a showing of changed circumstances." Finamore v. Aronson, 382 N.J. Super. 514, 522 (App. Div. 2006); Voit v. Voit, 317 N.J. Super. 103, 121 (Ch. Div. 1998). The "Modification of the order may be appropriate if the moving party shows the modification requested is in the best interests of the child." Todd v. Sheridan, 268 N.J. Super. 287, 398 (App. Div. 1993); Mastropole v. Mastropole, 181 N.J. Super. 130, 136 (App. Div. 1981). In this case, the Family Court reduced the Defendant's parenting time because it determined that the Defendant was "keeping a scorecard to benefit himself, instead of trying to cooperate for the best interests of [the children]." The Appellate Court held that this finding does not elucidate and the record did not reveal what circumstances had changed and why it was in the best interests of the children to warrant cutting back Defendant's parenting time. Therefore, the ruling was reversed. In addition, the court directed that the Defendant pay child support in the amount of $196 a week for a period of time before it was to be raised to $188 per week. The court found that the Family Court made this ruling in error based upon evidence submitted reflecting the dates in which the Plaintiff was earning a certain salary. Therefore, the Appellate Court reversed this provision in the Order as well. If you anticipate that it may be beneficial to you to seek a post-judgment modification of your parenting time arrangement or child support obligation it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modification, child support, parenting time, child relocation, divorce, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney. ParParenting Time

Alimony Suspended For 9 Months Based Upon Cohabitation

In Fringo v. Fringo, the Plaintiff appealed from a Family Court post-judgment Order issued in 2013 that suspended her entitlement to alimony for nine (9) months because of the Plaintiff's cohabitation with her significant other. In her appeal the Plaintiff argued that the Family Court erred because the Defendant failed to prove a prima facie case of cohabitation and even if he had rebutted the presumption. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the lower court. The parties were married in 1993 and divorced in 2011 pursuant to a final judgment of divorce and an incorporated marital settlement agreement (MSA). The MSA stated that the "...parties agree that cohabitation by wife shall constitute a substantial change in circumstance in accordance with NJ law." In 2013, the Defendant filed a Motion seeking the modification or termination of his alimony obligation because the Plaintiff was cohabitating with another person. The Defendant submitted with his Certification the Certification of a private investigator who prepared a report detailing that the Plaintiff's boyfriend began to live in her apartment in December of 2012. After hearing oral argument in 2013, a Family Court judge granted the Defendant's Motion for a modification of alimony based upon the Plaintiff's cohabitation relying on Ozolins v. Ozolins, 308 N.J. Super. 243 (App Div. 1998) and Reese v. Weis, 430 N.J. Super. 552 (App. Div. 2013), and based upon the Plaintiff and her boyfriend's admission that he lived with her for nine (9) months in 2012. Therefore, the court terminated the Defendant's alimony for nine (9) months and credited the Defendant's overpayment against eighteen (18) of future alimony payments. Subsequently, an appeal was filed. According to the Appellate Court, alimony awards are not set in stone and can be modified if a party demonstrates a significant financial change since the alimony was first awarded. Reese v. Weis, 430 N.J. Super. at 569. Further, an alimony award can be modified based upon a changed circumstance which rests with the discretion of the judge. Larbig v. Larbig, 384 N.J. Super. 17, 21 (App. Div. 2006). Cohabitation constitutes a change in circumstances. Gayet v. Gayet, 92 N.J. 149, 155 (1983). The Appellate Court's review of the record displayed that the Plaintiff and her boyfriend admitted in their prior Certifications to the court that they lived together and failed to rebut that presumption therefore the Defendant was able to establish a prima facie case of changed circumstances for the time period that the Plaintiff's boyfriend was living with her, which was nine (9) months in 2012. As a result, the Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. The laws governing alimony and cohabitation have recently been changed. It is very important that you seek out the advice of an experienced family law attorney to protect your rights an entitlements if you are considering a post-judgment modification of your alimony obligation based upon your ex-spouse's cohabitation with another person or for any other reason. For more information about alimony, divorce, post-judgment modification, child support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Cohabitation Criteria For Alimony Termination

In Wachtell v. Wachtell, a Morris County case, the Family Court terminated alimony based upon a finding of cohabitation. The Appellate Court vacated the alimony termination order and remanded the case back to the Family Court for a plenary hearing to focus on the disputed facts with regard to the alleged cohabitation. The legal threshold to prove cohabitation for the purposes of terminating alimony has been established through case law. In Konzelman v. Konzelman, 158 N.J. 185 (1999), cohabitation was defined by the existence of a relationship shown "to have stability, permanency, and mutual interdependence." See also Reese v. Weis, 430 N.J. Super. 552, 570 (App. Div. 2013). Although, "living together, intertwined finances such as joint bank accounts, shared living expenses and household chores" may support a determination of cohabitation, such examples should not be considered in a vacuum. Konzelman, supra, 158 N.J. at 202. With regard to procedure, a party who pays alimony and who alleges cohabitation must first present prima facie evidence that his or her ex-spouse is in such a relationship that is tantamount to marriage. Gayet v. Gayet, 92 N.J. 149, 154-55 (1983). If this initial threshold is met then the parties may engage in a discovery process. Further, it is customary for factual disputes involving alleged cohabitation to be resolved at a plenary hearing where a Family Court judge can determine the credibility of competing witnesses. Winegarden v. Winegarden, 316 N.J. Super. 52, 56 n.1 (App. Div. 1998). A hearing may be avoided if there are no disputed issues of material fact and the matter is otherwise suited for disposition on the papers. Segal v. Lynch, 417 N.J. Super. 627, 642-43 (App. Div. 2011). In this case, the Appellate Division agreed with the ex-husband that his Motion papers set forth a prima facie case of cohabitation. The Appellate Court disagreed with the findings of the Family Court, terminating alimony based upon cohabitation, because a key factual dispute was raised by the ex-wife regarding the amount of overnights that her paramour spend with her during the week. The Appellate Court reasoned that although not completely dispositive, an important factor in any cohabitation analysis is that people must cohabit to a substantial agree in order for a determination of cohabitation to be made. Therefore, because the parties disagreed over the number of nights that the ex-wife's paramour was spending with her, the Appellate Court vacated the termination of alimony Court Order and remanded the case back to the Family Court for a plenary hearing on the issue. The laws governing the issues involving alimony and cohabitation have recently been changed and it is very important that you seek out the advice of an attorney to protect your rights and entitlements. If you are considering post-judgment modification of your alimony obligation based upon your ex-spouse's cohabitation with another person or for any other reason it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about alimony, divorce, post-judgment modification , emancipation, child support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Appellate Court Upholds Arbitrator's Award of Limited Duration Alimony

In the case of Lopez v. Lopez, the Defendant appealed from a 2013 Family Court Order that denied her Motion to modify the terms of a divorce arbitration award that granted her limited duration alimony rather than permanent alimony. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the lower court. This disposition in this case comes down to the scope of review vested in the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court determined that its review of the Family Court's Order was limited. In fact, the court acknowledged that it owed substantial deference to the Family Court's findings of fact. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998). Accordingly, a "reviewing court should uphold the factual findings undergirding the trial court's decision if they are supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence on the record." MacKinnon v MacKinnon, 191 N.J. 240, 253-54 (2007) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007). Although the Appellate Court does not owe any special deference to the Family Court's legal conclusions, it "should not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judges unless . . . convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice . . . . " Parish v. Parish, 412 N.J. Super. 39, 47 (App. Div. 2010). During their divorce, the parties were able to work through all issues including equitable distribution, child custody, and parenting time, but could not agree on amount and duration of alimony. The parties agreed to submit the question of alimony to binding arbitration. In a very detailed written award, the arbitrator reviewed all of the pertinent factors for determining alimony as set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b). In the end, the arbitrator awarded the Defendant $200 per week in limited duration alimony for two (2) years. The Defendant filed a Motion to modify the arbitrator's award because she believed that because the parties were married for 29 years, permanent alimony should have been awarded. Following oral argument the Family Court judge denied the Defendant's Motion holding that a trial court may modify an arbitration award if "the rights of the party applying for the modification were prejudiced by the umpire erroneously applying [the] law to the issues and facts presented for alternative resolution." N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(e)(4), citing Borough of East Rutherford v. East Rutherford P.B.A. Local 275, 213 N.J. 190, 194 (2013). The Defendant Appealed. The Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the Family Court and in light of the record found that the Defendant's arguments were without merit as it determined that the Family Court properly determined to maintain the arbitrator's award of two (2) years of limited duration alimony. Recently, the state statute that governs alimony has recently been modified, it is very important that you seek out the advice of an attorney to protect your rights an entitlements. If you think that it may be beneficial for you to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your alimony obligation it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about alimony, spousal support, equitable distribution, child support, post-judgment modification, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Post-Judgment Alimony Modification Remanded To Determine Income

Kaller v. Gogan, is a case out of the NJ Superior Court, Family Part, Morris County regarding Defendant's alimony obligation based upon the exchange of post-judgment modification Motions between the parties. On remand, the Family Court reduced the Defendant's alimony obligation to $164 a week. In previous proceedings, the Family Court reduced the Defendant's alimony obligation from $364 a week to $175 and then upon remand it was determined that the amount should be reduced again to $164 a week with $10 of that going towards an arrears. The net effect of this was to put the parties in equipoise with each party netting $368 per week based upon the Plaintiff's earnings of $12,000 and the Defendant's earnings of $32,000 per year. In the initial appeal the Appellate Court noted that it understood ". . . what the judge was attempting to do, [which was] to award plaintiff sufficient alimony so that each [party] 'will net $368 per week based upon Defendant's earnings of $32,000 per year'." On the second appeal, the Appellate Court was unable to understand from the testimony at the plenary hearing and the documents in the record how the Family Court judge arrived at the Plaintiff's salary of $12,000 per year. On appeal from a Motion for Reconsideration, the Defendant asserted that the court erred in making conclusions regarding the Plaintiff's salary and although the Defendant accepted the court's finding that his gross income was $32,000, he rejected that the Plaintiff's gross income, excluding alimony, was only $12,000. The Defendant believed that the Plaintiff's actual income was $21,112 based upon her reported average gross weekly income of $406 dollars for 52 weeks. According to the Appellate Court, if it could have determined the Plaintiff's earnings for the years in question from the record, it would have exercised original jurisdiction and set the amount of alimony itself in order to have brought the matter to a close. Rule 2:10-5; Accardi v. Accardi, 369 N.J. Super. 75, 91-92 (App. Div. 2004). Unfortunately, the record simply did not provide the court with enough information to do so. Therefore, the Appellate Court again remanded the case back to the Family Court so that the judge could explain the basis for how he determined the Plaintiff's salary. The Appellate Court ordered that this be done within 45-days. Being that the laws governing the issues involving alimony have recently been changed, it is very important that you seek out the advice of an attorney to protect your rights an entitlements. If you think that it may be beneficial for you to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your alimony obligation it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about alimony, divorce, post-judgment modification , or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Man's End-Of-Life Situation Did Not Give Rise To Alimony Termination

Rizzolo v. Jones is a New Jersey Appellate Division case in which the Plaintiff appealed from a Family Court denial of his post-judgment Motion to modify or terminate his alimony obligation to the Defendant due to his severely ill health. The Appellate Court reversed the decision of the Family Court. Whether or not an alimony award can be modified is "based upon a claim of changed circumstances . . . . " Larbig v. Larbig, 384 N.J. Super. 17, 21 (App. Div. 2006). Such determinations will not be overturned "unless the court abused its discretion, failed to consider controlling legal principles or made findings inconsistent with or unsupported by competent evidence." Storey v. Storey, 373 N.J. Super. 464, 479 (App. Div. 2004). The parties in this case were married in 1982, were separated in 1989, and divorced in 2006. The Plaintiff was 58 years old and the Defendant was 38 years old when they got married. The judge who heard their divorce trial concluded that the Plaintiff, who was "in remarkably good health" at 84, had worked as an attorney for 50 years and was entitled to retire. Although the parties had not lived together for many years at the time of their divorce, the Plaintiff had continued to support the Defendant. The judge concluded that based upon this fact that the parties had a long term marriage and the Defendant was entitled to permanent alimony. The judge awarded the Defendant $300 a week in alimony. The Plaintiff was 89 years old and in ill health when he submitted a Motion to the court to terminate his alimony obligation. He was suffering from prostate cancer, renal failure, and a bone infection at the time. The Family Court found that the Plaintiff had established a prima facie case of changed circumstances and ordered discovery. Miller v. Miller, 160 N.J. 408, 420 (1999). Relying on Miller, Donnelly v. Donnelly, 405 N.J. Super 117, 130-31 (App. Div. 2009), and Aronson v. Aronson, 245 N.J. Super. 354, 361 (App. Div. 1991), all which stand for the proposition that a supporting spouse cannot choose to remain in a position of diminished earning capacity and ignore the obligations of support to one's family, the court found that the Plaintiff did not do enough to meet his alimony obligation because he was a veteran entitled to veteran's benefits and he could have entered himself into a VA facility to address his health needs instead of paying for a relative to care for him at home. The Plaintiff appealed. The Appellate Court agreed with the Plaintiff's argument that no evidence was presented by the Defendant that a bed was ready and available at the VA facility or that the quality of care at the facility compared in any way to the care he was already receiving. The court held that it was not aware of any published cases suggesting that the Plaintiff should have prepared to justify his choice to remain at home receiving end-of-life care instead of entering into a VA facility so that he could maintain his alimony obligation. Further, the analysis in the Miller, Donnelly, and Aronson cases do not deal with end-of-life care questions as was pivotal in this case. Therefore, the decision to modify alimony turns on what is equitable and fair upon consideration of all circumstances of both parties. Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 158 (1980). Therefore, the court reversed the decision of the Family Court. This being the case, the court held that the Family Court, on remand, may conclude that it is equitable to require the Plaintiff to enter a VA facility against his will to ensure that he meets his alimony obligation until his death. Deegan v. Deegan, 254 N.J. Super. 350, 355 (App. Div. 1992). Being that the laws governing the issues involving alimony have recently been changed, it is very important that you seek out the advice of an attorney to protect your rights an entitlements. If you think that it may be beneficial for you to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your alimony obligation it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about alimony, child support, post-judgment modification , or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Remand Of Post-Judgment Child Custody Issue For Due Process

S.W. v. W.B., is a New Jersey Appellate Division case that was decided in 2015 in which the Defendant appealed a prior Court Order that denied his Motion for Reconsideration regarding post-judgment divorce and child custody Orders that pertained to reimbursement obligations for extra-curricular activity expenses for his children. In reviewing a Motion for Reconsideration, a court must determine if the trial court abused its discretion in rendering the decision that is disputed. Fusco v. Newark Bd. of Educ., 349 N.J. Super. 455, 462 (App. Div. 2002). "Reconsideration should be used only for those cases . . . where either (1) the [c]ourt has expressed its decision based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or (2) it is obvious that the [c]ourt either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence." Id. (quoting D'Atria v. D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401 (Ch. Div. 1990)). A Motion for Reconsideration should only be granted under very narrow circumstances. In this case, the Appellate Division agreed with the Defendant that the Family Court mistakenly viewed part of the Defendant's Motion as a Motion for Reconsideration, when it should have treated the Motion as one to vacate the prior Court Order on due process grounds and the court should have considered the merits of his argument before denying his Motion. The Plaintiff and Defendant were married in 1998 and two (2) daughters were born during the marriage. In 2009, the parties decided to divorce and their final divorce judgment incorporated a property settlement agreement (PSA). Apparently, the parties agreed to equal shared parenting time. There has been multiple post divorce disputes with regard to the sharing of the children's extra-curricular activity expenses. The agreement provided that the Defendant was to pay 48% and the Plaintiff 52% of the costs associated with the activities. Further, the agreement particularly states that "The parties shall discuss the cost of any activity and only agreed upon activities shall be so divided. Neither party shall enroll the children into an activity without discussing same and obtaining agreement from the other party." Since 2009, the litigants have come to court with disputes regarding this provision on multiple occasions. With regard to the latest exchange of Motions between the parties, the Defendant filed his Motion for Reconsideration 20 days after his receipt of the Court Order he was objecting to because he claimed that he was not properly served with previous pleadings. . . ." The Defendant filed an appeal in 2013 and referenced a number of prior Court Orders that he was dissatisfied with. For the reasons previously mentioned the Appellate Division remanded the case back to the Family Court to make determination on the issues of the case. If you believe a post-judgment modification of your child custody arrangement or obligations may be beneficial, it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modification , divorce, alimony, child custody, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Cohabitation Under New Alimony Changes

On September 10, 2014, following years of legal and legislative debate, the laws regarding alimony were amended in the state of New Jersey. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. Although the lion's share of the attention was directed at the changes to the durational aspect of alimony, there were considerable changes made that affect the modification of an existing or future alimony obligation in the event of an ex-spouse's retirement or cohabitation. An issue may arise regarding what law to apply when an existing property settlement agreement (PSA) provides that the issue of cohabitation be decided using the established case law. The language in a PSA is most commonly bargained for and negotiated amongst the parties and if it contravenes the status of the law such language could preclude the application of the amended alimony statute. To determine whether spousal support should be modified based upon cohabitation the case of Konzelman v. Konzelman, 158 N.J. 185, 202 (1999) and Gayet v. Gayet, 92 N.J. 149, 155 (1983) are most often cited and define cohabitation as an intimate, close, and enduring relationship that requires more than simply a common residence. An evaluation must look to whether or not two people were in a long term romantic relationship, shared finances, shared living expenses, and held themselves out to friends and families as a romantic couple. The amended statute's definition of cohabitation is similar but not as clearly defined. Most significant, the law requires that a trial judge consider the length of the relationship and address prior inconsistencies in the law. Being that the language of the statute is not as detailed as the case law, a question arises as to the status of the economic-based standard that was established in the Gayet case for modifying support in the event of cohabitation (whether the third-party cohabitant contributes to the dependent spouse's support or whether the third party cohabitant resides in the dependent spouse's home without contributing anything toward the expenses). A question remains as to whether or not this economic benefit test is part of the current law. The Gayet case and the cases that followed it clearly established that modification during cohabitation may mean more than simply the termination of the support obligation. Reese v. Weis, 430 N.J. Super. 552, 572-73 (2013). If there is no longer an economic benefit test, any modification that is not a suspension or termination to support is unnecessary. The new alimony statute directs that "alimony may be suspended or terminated if the payee cohabitates with another person." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. Further, the statute does not explicitly provide what facts would be necessary to warrant a suspension of support in contrast to a termination. These issues are all fact based issues that are most often decided at the discretion of the trier of fact, which is the court in these cases. Therefore, the interpretation of the new statute will be developed through future case law created by Family Court judges adjudicating these issues and remain unclear at the present time. Recent changes have been made to alimony laws making it very important that you seek the advice of an attorney to protect your rights and entitlements. If you are considering a post-judgment modification of your alimony obligation it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about alimony, child support, post-judgment modification , or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Court Denies Wife's Appeal After Downward Modification Of Husband's Child Support

In Licciardi v. Licciardi, an Appellate Division case out of Morris County, the Plaintiff appealed a post-judgment Family Court Order that reduced the Defendant's child support payments, increased his responsibility to pay for their children's extracurricular expenses, and denied her Motion to compel the Defendant to produce documents. After being married for over ten (10) years and having two (2) children together the parties divorced. Rather than a trial on all issues, they entered into a property settlement agreement (PSA) weherin the Defendant agreed to pay child support in the amount of $3,300 a month based upon his gross income of $175,000. Further, the PSA acknowledged that the Defendant was paying child support in excess of the NJ Child Support Guidelines found in Rule 5:6A. The Defendant also agreed not to seek a reduction in his child support obligation for "three years regardless of any change in circumstances . . . . and the child support may be reviewed at the expiration of three years . . . and every two years thereafter until both children are emancipated." In 2010, the Defendant was granted a reduction in his child support obligation. In 2012, two and half years later, the Defendant once again filed for a reduction in his child support. The Plaintiff opposed the Motion seeking an upward adjustment in child support citing that her financial circumstances had taken a down turn and claiming the Defendant's financial information was deceitful. The court again reduced the Defendant's child support and increased his obligation to pay for the children's extracurricular activities. The court found that the parties had established substantial and permanent changed circumstances based upon the Defendant paying monthly child support for a third child that was born from a second wife that he had since divorced. The Plaintiff appealed the Order. According to the Appellate Division, courts are authorized by statute to "revise[] and alter[]" child support Orders "from time to time as circumstances may require." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. The party moving for the modification bears the burden of making a prima facie showing of changed circumstances." Miller v. Miller, 160 N.J. 408, 420, 734 A.2d 752 (1999). Changed circumstances "include an increase in the cost of living, an increase or decrease in the income of the supporting or supported spouse, cohabitation of the dependent spouse, illness or disability arising after the entry of the judgment, and changes in federal tax law." J.B. v. W.B., 215 N.J. 305, 327,73 A.3d 405 (2013). In this case, the Plaintiff argued that the Defendant was not entitled to a reduction in child support because his financial disclosures were incomplete and deceitful. The Appellate Court rejected this argument because the Plaintiff's claims were simply bare assertions that were not supported by any competent, documentary evidence. Therefore, the court affirmed the decision of the Family Court. If you anticipate that you may want to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your child support obligation it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about child support, post-judgment modification, alimony, divorce or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.