Alimony Modification Denied For Lack Of Changed Circumstances

Jill Bier was seeking an increase in the monthly alimony of $25,000 she was receiving from her former husband Robert Bier. Ms. Bier appealed the denial of her application for upward modification of alimony payments by Robert Bier. The couple's final judgment of divorce, which occurred in 2003, made it clear that Jill Bier's monthly medical expenses would increase. The New Jersey Superior Court, Somerset County, Family Part judge hearing the motion for reconsideration noted the substantial discrepancy between Jill Bier's Case Information Statement (CIS), indicating $17,194 monthly in medical expenses and the certification she submitted in support of her motion which indicated $6,000 per month in medical expenses. Jill Bier provided no documentation of her claimed expenses, her condition or any change therein since the divorce. The judge found Jill Bier's credibility to be questionable in light of conflicting claims of being nearly bed ridden yet purchasing a Mercedes E550 and incurring commuting expenses of $5,500 monthly. In Bier v. Bier, the New Jersey Appellate Division determined that no as there was no prima facie showing of changed circumstances, as required under Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139 (1980), no evidentiary hearing was required. The Appellate Division followed Larbig v. Larbig, 384 N.J. Super. 17 (App. Div. 2006) in holding that the decision to modify an alimony obligation based on claims of changed circumstances rests with the family part judge. Finding no reason to disturb the decision, the N.J. Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the trial judge. If you are facing divorce, alimony can have lasting and substantial consequences upon your future whether you are the obligee or the obligor. It is imperative that you obtain an experienced divorce attorney for your divorce or motion for modification in order to ensure that your rights are protected. For more information about divorce, alimony, child support and other family law matters visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Man's Appeal To Terminate Alimony After He Retires Is Denied

In Baker v. Baker, the Defendant appealed from a 2013 Family Court Order that denied his Motion to terminate his alimony obligation. After review, the Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the Family Court. The parties in this case were married in 1975 and obtained their divorce in 1998. Their final divorce judgment incorporated a property settlement agreement (PSA) in which the Defendant agreed to pay $10,000 a month in permanent alimony to the Plaintiff. In 2005, the Defendant's job was terminated and at the time he was fired he was earning $900,000 per year. Shortly thereafter, the Defendant got another job as the CEO of a smaller company where he expected to receive a salary of $120,000 with the potential for bonuses that would be commensurate with his previous job. However, the Defendant did not receive a salary or bonuses at this new position as the company was in dire financial straits. In 2008, the Defendant filed a Motion for a reduction in his alimony obligation. The Family Court denied his application. The Defendant appealed and while his appeal was pending he filed two additional Motions for interim relief, which the court also denied. At the time, the Plaintiff voluntarily agreed to accept a decrease to $8,000 a month in her alimony award. The Family Court held a plenary hearing on the issue in 2010 at the conclusion of which the Defendant's alimony was temporarily reduced to $6,666 a month. The Defendant appealed this decision. In 2011, the Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. In 2012, the Defendant resigned from the company as it was allegedly about to close its doors and he immediately filed a Motion to terminate his alimony obligation. A plenary hearing was held at which both parties testified about their financial troubles and difficulties securing appropriate work. At the conclusion of the hearing the court denied the Defendant's request. According to the court, there had been "no substantial change in circumstances since the last motion on the [d]efendant's side of the equation" and that termination of alimony was not warranted because the Defendant voluntarily retired from his position. Moreover, when employed as his last company, the Defendant had not acted in good faith as he voluntarily went several years without receiving any income while at the same time loaning the company $138,000. Finally, the court found that instead of seeking a position that would enable him to pay alimony, the Defendant was only "interested in high paying jobs. . . ." Therefore, the court imputed $120,000 a year in income to him which was similar to what he could earn as the base salary at his previous job. The court also noted that the Defendant earned about $170,000 a year in unearned income. In the end, the court ordered the Defendant to pay $5,166 per month in alimony. He appealed. According to the Appellate Division, alimony "may be revised and altered by the court from time to time as circumstances may require." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. In order to make such a modification a party must show "changed circumstances." Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 146 (1980); Weishaus v. Weishaus, 180 N.J. 131, 140-41 (2004). The ". . . party seeking modification has the burden of showing such 'changed circumstances' as would warrant relief from the support or maintenance provisions involved." Martindell v. Martindell, 21 N.J. 341, 353 (1956). There is no " . . . bright line rule by which to measure when a changed circumstance has endured long enough to warrant a modification of a support obligation, instead, such matters turn on the discretionary determinations of Family Part judges, based upon their experience." Donnelly v. Donnelly, 405 N.J. Super. 117, 128 (App. Div. 2009); Larbig v. Larbig, 384 N.J. Super. 17, 23 (App. Div. 2006). Retirement may constitute a change in circumstances warranting a modification or elimination of alimony. Silvan v.Sylvan, 267 N.J. Super. 578, 581 (App. Div. 1993); Deegan v. Deegan, 254 N.J. Super. 350, 358-59 (App. Div. 1992). The analysis turns to whether or not the retirement was voluntary or involuntary. If the change in involuntary, all that is required of the analysis is the parties' financial circumstances. If the change was voluntary the court must consider a list of factors such as whether or not the retirement was made in good faith. In this case, the Appellate Division found that the Family Court did not abuse its discretion in finding no changed circumstances and affirmed the decision of the lower court. Being that the laws governing alimony have recently been changed, it is very important that you seek out the advice of an attorney to protect your rights an entitlements. If you think that it may be beneficial for you to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your alimony obligation or for any other reason it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about alimony, divorce, post-judgment modification, child support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Alimony Suspended For 9 Months Based Upon Cohabitation

In Fringo v. Fringo, the Plaintiff appealed from a Family Court post-judgment Order issued in 2013 that suspended her entitlement to alimony for nine (9) months because of the Plaintiff's cohabitation with her significant other. In her appeal the Plaintiff argued that the Family Court erred because the Defendant failed to prove a prima facie case of cohabitation and even if he had rebutted the presumption. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the lower court. The parties were married in 1993 and divorced in 2011 pursuant to a final judgment of divorce and an incorporated marital settlement agreement (MSA). The MSA stated that the "...parties agree that cohabitation by wife shall constitute a substantial change in circumstance in accordance with NJ law." In 2013, the Defendant filed a Motion seeking the modification or termination of his alimony obligation because the Plaintiff was cohabitating with another person. The Defendant submitted with his Certification the Certification of a private investigator who prepared a report detailing that the Plaintiff's boyfriend began to live in her apartment in December of 2012. After hearing oral argument in 2013, a Family Court judge granted the Defendant's Motion for a modification of alimony based upon the Plaintiff's cohabitation relying on Ozolins v. Ozolins, 308 N.J. Super. 243 (App Div. 1998) and Reese v. Weis, 430 N.J. Super. 552 (App. Div. 2013), and based upon the Plaintiff and her boyfriend's admission that he lived with her for nine (9) months in 2012. Therefore, the court terminated the Defendant's alimony for nine (9) months and credited the Defendant's overpayment against eighteen (18) of future alimony payments. Subsequently, an appeal was filed. According to the Appellate Court, alimony awards are not set in stone and can be modified if a party demonstrates a significant financial change since the alimony was first awarded. Reese v. Weis, 430 N.J. Super. at 569. Further, an alimony award can be modified based upon a changed circumstance which rests with the discretion of the judge. Larbig v. Larbig, 384 N.J. Super. 17, 21 (App. Div. 2006). Cohabitation constitutes a change in circumstances. Gayet v. Gayet, 92 N.J. 149, 155 (1983). The Appellate Court's review of the record displayed that the Plaintiff and her boyfriend admitted in their prior Certifications to the court that they lived together and failed to rebut that presumption therefore the Defendant was able to establish a prima facie case of changed circumstances for the time period that the Plaintiff's boyfriend was living with her, which was nine (9) months in 2012. As a result, the Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. The laws governing alimony and cohabitation have recently been changed. It is very important that you seek out the advice of an experienced family law attorney to protect your rights an entitlements if you are considering a post-judgment modification of your alimony obligation based upon your ex-spouse's cohabitation with another person or for any other reason. For more information about alimony, divorce, post-judgment modification, child support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Man's End-Of-Life Situation Did Not Give Rise To Alimony Termination

Rizzolo v. Jones is a New Jersey Appellate Division case in which the Plaintiff appealed from a Family Court denial of his post-judgment Motion to modify or terminate his alimony obligation to the Defendant due to his severely ill health. The Appellate Court reversed the decision of the Family Court. Whether or not an alimony award can be modified is "based upon a claim of changed circumstances . . . . " Larbig v. Larbig, 384 N.J. Super. 17, 21 (App. Div. 2006). Such determinations will not be overturned "unless the court abused its discretion, failed to consider controlling legal principles or made findings inconsistent with or unsupported by competent evidence." Storey v. Storey, 373 N.J. Super. 464, 479 (App. Div. 2004). The parties in this case were married in 1982, were separated in 1989, and divorced in 2006. The Plaintiff was 58 years old and the Defendant was 38 years old when they got married. The judge who heard their divorce trial concluded that the Plaintiff, who was "in remarkably good health" at 84, had worked as an attorney for 50 years and was entitled to retire. Although the parties had not lived together for many years at the time of their divorce, the Plaintiff had continued to support the Defendant. The judge concluded that based upon this fact that the parties had a long term marriage and the Defendant was entitled to permanent alimony. The judge awarded the Defendant $300 a week in alimony. The Plaintiff was 89 years old and in ill health when he submitted a Motion to the court to terminate his alimony obligation. He was suffering from prostate cancer, renal failure, and a bone infection at the time. The Family Court found that the Plaintiff had established a prima facie case of changed circumstances and ordered discovery. Miller v. Miller, 160 N.J. 408, 420 (1999). Relying on Miller, Donnelly v. Donnelly, 405 N.J. Super 117, 130-31 (App. Div. 2009), and Aronson v. Aronson, 245 N.J. Super. 354, 361 (App. Div. 1991), all which stand for the proposition that a supporting spouse cannot choose to remain in a position of diminished earning capacity and ignore the obligations of support to one's family, the court found that the Plaintiff did not do enough to meet his alimony obligation because he was a veteran entitled to veteran's benefits and he could have entered himself into a VA facility to address his health needs instead of paying for a relative to care for him at home. The Plaintiff appealed. The Appellate Court agreed with the Plaintiff's argument that no evidence was presented by the Defendant that a bed was ready and available at the VA facility or that the quality of care at the facility compared in any way to the care he was already receiving. The court held that it was not aware of any published cases suggesting that the Plaintiff should have prepared to justify his choice to remain at home receiving end-of-life care instead of entering into a VA facility so that he could maintain his alimony obligation. Further, the analysis in the Miller, Donnelly, and Aronson cases do not deal with end-of-life care questions as was pivotal in this case. Therefore, the decision to modify alimony turns on what is equitable and fair upon consideration of all circumstances of both parties. Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 158 (1980). Therefore, the court reversed the decision of the Family Court. This being the case, the court held that the Family Court, on remand, may conclude that it is equitable to require the Plaintiff to enter a VA facility against his will to ensure that he meets his alimony obligation until his death. Deegan v. Deegan, 254 N.J. Super. 350, 355 (App. Div. 1992). Being that the laws governing the issues involving alimony have recently been changed, it is very important that you seek out the advice of an attorney to protect your rights an entitlements. If you think that it may be beneficial for you to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your alimony obligation it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about alimony, child support, post-judgment modification , or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Alimony Terminates On Date Cohabitation Begins Absent Proof Of Delay In Economic Benefit

Schlumpf v. Schlumpf, is a New Jersey Appellate Division case in which the Defendant appealed from two (2) post-judgment Family Court Orders filed in 2013 regarding his alimony obligation following the Plaintiff's admitted cohabitation with her significant other. The Defendant claims that the date terminating his alimony obligation should be adjusted by four (4) months (earlier), to when the Plaintiff admitted her cohabitation. The Plaintiff argued that when she began cohabitating with her significant other she did not, at first, receive an economic benefit from the arrangement and therefore the Order terminating the Defendant's obligation at a certain date should not be modified. According to the Appellate Division, its review of the termination of alimony was "limited to whether the court made findings inconsistent with the evidence or unsupported by the record, or erred as a matter of law." Reese v. Weis, 430 N.J. Super. 552, 572 (App. Div. 2013). A Motion requesting the modification of an "alimony obligation 'rests upon its own particular footing and the appellate court must give due recognition to the wide discretion which our law rightly affords to the trial judges who deal with these matters." Donnelly v. Donnelly, 405 N.J. Super. 117, 127 (App. Div. 2009). Typically, alimony can be altered based upon a changed circumstance which rests with the discretion of a Family Court Judge. Larbig v. Larbig, 384 N.J. Super. 17, 21 (App Div. 2006). A type of changed circumstance would be the cohabitation of a spouse. Gayet v. Gayet, 92 N.J. 149 (1983). The parties in this case expressly acknowledged in their Marital Settlement Agreement (MSA) that such an event would constitute a changed circumstance which would warrant the modification of the Defendant's alimony obligation. Beyond cohabitation, there must be proof that a cohabitating spouse is receiving some form of economic benefit from the cohabitation. Reese, supra, 430 N.J. Super. at 557-8, 576. A spouse's proof of cohabitation establishes a rebuttable presumption of changed circumstances that once established shifts the burden of proof to the dependant spouse. Ozolins v. Ozolins, 308 N.J. Super. 243, 248 (App. Div. 1998). In this case, the Appellate Division found that there was no evidence to support the Family Court judge's selection of a particular date for the termination of the Defendant's alimony based only on the Plaintiff's suggested date. A review of the record, indicated to the Appellate Court that the Plaintiff failed to rebut the presumption that she began to get an economic benefit from cohabitating when she moved into her boyfriend's house. Therefore, the court concluded that it was an abuse of the court's discretion to fix the termination date at the date agreed to by the Plaintiff instead of terminating alimony when the Plaintiff and her children relocated to the residence of her boyfriend. The laws governing alimony have recently been changed, making it very important that you seek out the advice of an attorney to protect your rights an entitlements. If you are seeking post-judgment modification of your alimony obligation based upon your ex-spouse's cohabitation it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about alimony, child support, post-judgment modification , or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Court Refuses To Terminate Alimony Due To Job Loss

In the 2015 case, Lodge v. Lodge, the Plaintiff appealed from a Court Order issued in 2012 that denied his Motion to terminate alimony but instead reduced his support obligation after he lost his job and became disabled. The court's reasoning was based primarily upon the fact that the Defendant, the Plaintiff's ex-wife, did not have any other income other than her alimony. In New Jersey, whether or not a party's alimony obligation should be terminated, reduced, or modified in any way is based upon a claim and showing of changed circumstances. Larbig v. Larbig, 384 N.J. Super. 17, 21 (App Div. 2006). A Family Court judge is empowered with the ability to determine whether a change in circumstance has occurred based upon the individual facts of each case. Id. In this case, the Plaintiff argued that his circumstances had changed because he was laid off from his job and could not find another one, therefore his alimony obligation to his ex-wife should be terminated. Further, he added that since he was laid off he had become physically disabled. The Plaintiff also was receiving eighty (80) weeks of severance from his former employer. In 2011, he filed a Motion to terminate his alimony obligation based upon these changed circumstances. The Family Court recognized the Plaintiff's financial difficulties but because the Defendant did not have any income beyond her alimony, in the interests of equity, the court temporarily reduced the Plaintiff's obligation to a progressively decreasing amount beginning in 2012 and ending with $81 a week to be effective in 2014. This determination was based upon the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b) and the fact that the parties would be receiving Social Security benefits. On Appeal, the Plaintiff argued that the Family Court's reluctance to terminate his alimony obligation was inequitable. The Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the Family Court holding that the judge's decision was supported by sufficient credible evidence and did not constitute an abuse of the court's discretion. Harte v. Hand, 433 N.J. Super. 457, 461 (App. Div. 2013); Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998); Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139 (1980). Although the laws regarding duration of alimony have recently been changed, many people will still be required to pay or receive spousal support for many years. This can be a substantial financial burden or benefit to you depending upon your circumstances. If you anticipate that you may want to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your alimony obligation it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about alimony, child support, post-judgment modification , or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Alimony Modification Denied For Lack Of Changed Circumstances

In the case of Monico v. Monico, the Plaintiff appealed from a 2014 Family Court Order that denied his Motion to modify his alimony obligation based upon changed circumstances. The New Jersey Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the Family Court. Each "and every motion to modify an alimony obligation 'rests upon its own particular footing'" and the Appellate Court "must give due recognition to the wide discretion" that is given to trial judges who adjudicate these matters. Larbig v. Larbig, 384 N.J. Super. 17, 21 (App. Div. 2006); Martindell v. Martindell, 21 N.J. 341, 355 (1956). Ultimately, this standard conveys that a trial judge's findings in regard to alimony should not be vacated unless the court clearly abused its discretion, failed to consider all of the controlling legal principles, made mistaken findings, or reached a conclusion that could not reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence. Gnall v. Gnall, 432 N.J. Super. 129, 148 (App. Div. 2013). Court Orders concerning alimony "may be revised and altered by the court from time to time as circumstances may require." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. Therefore, alimony obligations are "always subject to review and modification on a showing of 'changed circumstances.'" Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 146 (1980). The law regarding what constitutes a change of circumstances is well established. Examples of changed circumstances that may warrant support modifications include an increase or decrease in the paying spouse's income or disability or illness which arises after the divorce judgment is issued. In this case, the Plaintiff argued that the Family Court judge who denied his request to modify his alimony amount was mistaken in considering his 2012 tax return instead of his projected earnings for 2013, when determining if a change in circumstances had existed. The judge noted how the Plaintiff's income had increased since signing his property settlement agreement (the parties were divorced in 2007) based upon multiple sources of income. According to the Appellate Division, as the Plaintiff's 2013 financial information from his primary business, a towing company that he owned, had not been finalized it discerned no reason to disturb the Family Court's ruling to deny the Plaintiff's request based upon insufficient evidence of changed financial circumstances. Being that the laws governing the issues involving alimony have recently been changed, it is very important that you seek out the advice of an attorney to protect your rights an entitlements. If you anticipate that you may want to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your alimony obligation it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about alimony, child support, post-judgment modification , or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Reluctance To Terminate Alimony Appealed

In Bechtold v. Clauss, the Defendant, Robert Clauss, appealed from a 2013 Superior Court of New Jersey, Family Part Order from Union County that reduced his alimony obligation and re-adjusted his child support obligation. The Defendant contends that the court should have terminated his alimony and applied any reduction in his alimony amount retroactively. The parties in this case were married in 1988 and had two (2) children. They sought and obtained a divorce in 2008. After the parties' children were born, the Plaintiff did not work outside of their home. Their final divorce judgment incorporated a property settlement agreement (PSA). The PSA specified that the Plaintiff would continue pursuing a degree to become a registered nurse and that "it [wa]s hoped that the [Plaintiff]'s anticipated vocation as a Registered Nurse would substantially impact [Defendant]'s ongoing alimony obligation to [Plaintiff]." In fact, the Defendant funded, through a dedicated interest bearing trust account, $35,000 toward the Plaintiff's schooling from his share of the marital residence. Further, the PSA stipulated that the alimony obligation shall be subject to modification based upon either party's ability to show "changed circumstances." The Plaintiff became a registered nurse in 2012 and started to work as a school nurse. In July of 2012, the Defendant filed a notice of his intention to file a Motion to modify child support within 45 days pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.23(a). After another five (5) months and unsuccessful mediation attempts, the Defendant filed a Motion to terminate his alimony and reduce his child support based upon changed circumstances now that his wife was employed as a school nurse. After a hearing with regard to the issues, the Family Court judge entered an Order reducing the Defendant's alimony obligation to $350 a week ($18,200 per year) and awarded the Plaintiff with $260 per week in child support. The Defendant appealed from this decision. The Defendant argued that the Family Court judge should have terminated his alimony obligation because he did not make sufficient findings with regard to the parties' marital lifestyle. According to the Appellate Division, "Whether an alimony obligation should be modified based upon a claim of changed circumstances rests within a Family Part judge's sound discretion." Larbig v. Larbig, 384 N.J. Super. 17, 21 (App. Div. 2006). The Appellate Court found that the judge wrote a detailed and thorough opinion on the matter in which he found that the Defendant was not a credible witness. The judge found that the Plaintiff's testimony was credible and noted that although she received $35,000 for her education, it cost over $90,000. The judge then analyzed all of the alimony factors found in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b) in rendering his decision to alter the alimony obligation instead of terminating it. If you anticipate that you may want to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your alimony or child support obligations it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about alimony, child support, post-judgment modification, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Alimony Reduction As Ex-Wife Cohabitates

In the recent Appellate Division case on appeal from Morris County, Clayton v. Clayton, the Plaintiff William Clayton appealed from a post-judgment Order arguing that the Defendant, Susan Clayton's cohabitant's financial support and her earned income represent a change in circumstances to modify his alimony obligation. This case returned to the Appellate Court after the court remanded it back to the trial court for additional evidence based upon the Plaintiff's application to terminate his alimony obligation upon a change in circumstances. On remand, a new judge took the testimony of the parties and lowered the monthly reduction of alimony from $874 a month to $47. The Plaintiff then filed another appeal making the same arguments that he previously made. The parties in this case were married in 1970 and had four (4) children. They divorce in 1997 and the Defendant moved in with her cohabitant, a man named Stuart Vreeland in 2002. Initially the court found that "Cohabitation alone is not justification to terminate spousal support," and the true test for alimony is the financial needs of the dependant spouse. Gayet v. Gayet, 92 N.J. 149 (1983). The question becomes whether or not the relationship had reduced the needs of the former spouse. Ozolins v. Ozolins, 308 N.J. Super. 243, 247 (App. Div. 1998). The remand judge found that the Defendant's job, which paid her $28,000 a year, did not represent a change of circumstances because she had been employed at the time of the divorce and that her income had remained approximately steady over the intervening years. The judge found that Mr. Vreeland contributed $47 less than his half of the shared expenses and the Plaintiff was in part supporting Vreeland with alimony and therefore the judge reduced the Plaintiff's alimony by $47. The Appellate Division held that the decision whether to modify or terminate alimony based upon a claim of changed circumstances "rests within a Family Part judge's sound discretion." Larbig v. Larbig, 384 N.J. Super. 17, 21 (App. Div. 2006). In this case, the remand judge held a hearing where each party offered his and her testimony on the issues. The court found that if the Defendant's shared expenses represented fixed expenses that the Defendant would incur regardless of whether or not Mr. Vreeland lived with her, then it can be said that his contribution is being used to partly support the Defendant. Using the Defendant's Case Information Statement as well as documents reflecting Mr. Vreeland's contribution the Appellate Court recalculated that the Plaintiff's reduction in monthly alimony should be $934 and not $47. Therefore, the case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to enter a correct Order noting the change. If you anticipate that you may want to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your alimony obligation it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about alimony, divorce, child support, equitable distribution, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlinglawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Court Denies Man's Request To Lower Alimony For Temporary Change in Circumstances

In the recent Appellate Division case, Lax v. Lax, a post-judgment matrimonial matter, the Plaintiff, David Lax, appealed from a 2013 Family Court Order that denied his Motion to reduce his alimony obligation. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the lower court. The parties in this case were married in 1986 and obtained a legal divorce in 2008. Their final divorce judgment incorporated a Property Settlement Agreement (PSA) in which the Plaintiff agreed to pay the Defendant permanent alimony in the amount of $7,000 per month. In 2011, the Plaintiff filed an application with the court to modify his spousal support obligation. A series of Cross-Motions followed that resulted in a plenary hearing in which the Plaintiff sought to prove changed circumstances based upon a change in his financial situation and the Defendant's co-habitation with another person. The judge determined that no co-habitation existed but that the Plaintiff had proven a change in circumstances warranting a modification of his obligation. Subsequently, the Plaintiff's alimony obligation was reduced to $2,000 a month. Following this ruling, the Defendant filed a Motion for reconsideration and the Plaintiff once again filed for another downward modification of his obligation. This time the court denied his request for another modification and he appealed. The Appellate Court held that its review of the Family Court's decision is limited stating that "Whether an alimony obligation should be modified based upon a claim of changed circumstances rests within a Family Part judge's sound discretion." Larbig v. Larbig, 384 N.J. Super. 17, 21 (App. Div. 2006). Further, it stated that "Courts have consistently rejected requests for modification based on circumstances which are only temporary." Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 145-46 (1980). In this case, the Plaintiff filed his second Motion for another downward modification of his spousal support obligation only three (3) months after the previous order modifying his obligation was issued. The Family Court properly found that there was no evidence in the record to prove that the Plaintiff's financial situation was anything other than temporary. The Appellate Division agreed with the decision of the Family Court and for the aforementioned reasons affirmed the lower court's denial of the Plaintiff's request. If you anticipate that you may want to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your alimony obligation it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about alimony, divorce, child support, equitable distribution, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

NJ Child Support Guidelines Do Not Control For College Students

In Ferrer v. Reynaldo, the New Jersey Appellate Division ruled that the NJ Child Support Guidelines are not always an automatic calculation for college students. The Defendant, Carlos Reynaldo, appealed from part of a Family Court Order issued in 2013 setting his child support obligation at $139 per week arguing that the court mistakenly calculated the amount of his obligation by using the NJ Child Support Guidelines. The Appellate Court agreed with the Defendant and remanded the case back to the Family Court to recalculate his child support amount under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a). In this case, the Defendant and the Plaintiff, Miriam Ferrer, were divorced. While the parties were married the Plaintiff gave birth to two children, Janessa born in 1985 and Gabriella, born in 1992. Janessa was legally emancipated in 2004. Gabriella was 20 years old at the time these proceedings began and was a full-time student at Rutgers University. In 2012, the Defendant filed a Motion with the court to terminate or reduce his child support payments with regard to Gabriella asserting that she was of legal age for emancipation. The Plaintiff opposed this Motion, arguing that Gabriella was not emancipated because she was a full-time college student. The Family Court heard arguments at a hearing held in early 2013 at which Gabriella testified that she was a full-time college student. The court found Gabriella's testimony to be credible and it determined that because she was a full-time student she was not emancipated based on her age. The court also ordered the Defendant to pay 50% of Gabriella's college tuition pursuant to the parties' property settlement agreement. The Defendant argued that his $139 a week child support obligation was "double dipping" because Gabriella lived on the Rutger's campus and thus her education expenses included room and board. The court declined to alter his obligation. The Defendant appealed from the portion of the Order that sets his child support amount. The Appellate Division held that when reviewing decisions granting applications to modify child support it examines whether the trial judge abused his or her discretion. Larbig v. Larbig, 384 N.J. Super. 17, 21 (App. Div. 2006). The Appellate Court may reverse a trial court's decision if it was "made without a rational explanation, inexplicably depart[s] from established policies, or rest[s] on an impermissible basis." Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002). In general, child support awards are computed using the NJ Child Support Guidelines under Rule 5:6A. Appendix IX-A to Rule 5:6A makes it very clear that the child support schedule provided by the Guidelines shall not be used to determine parental contributions for college or other post-secondary education expenses. However, the NJ Child Support Guidelines "may be applied in the court's discretion to support for students over [eighteen] years of age who commute to college." The Appellate Court previously held that child support calculations for unemancipated college students who live on-campus, or away from the custodial parent's home, should instead be made "in light of all the financial circumstances of the parties and children." Raynor v. Raynor, 319 N.J. Super. 591, 614 (App. Div. 1999). In this case, the Family Court explicitly used the child support guidelines to calculate the support obligation, which the Appellate Court determined to be incorrect because in using an automatic calculation and not considering other factors the Family Court allowed for the kind of double dipping that the Appellate Division has specifically prohibited. Therefore, the decision of the Family Court was reversed and remanded for consideration under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a). Disputes regarding child support can be of the most important in family law because child support money is critical for the welfare of the children of divorced parents. If you are involved in a child support dispute it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before proceeding. For more information on child support, emancipation, post judgment modification, alimony, divorce, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way intended to replace the advice of an attorney.