Child Support Modification Was Intended to Benefit Defendant

Ianniello v. Pizzo involved a motion to modify child support following a high-net worth divorce. Pizzo, remarried with another child from the second marriage, sought to increase Ianniello’s monthly child support payment to her from $10,000 to $75,000 per month when Plaintiff’s income increased. Pizzo and Ianniello were married in 2000. Two sons were born of the marriage in 2004 and 2008. In April 2011, the parties divorced with a marital settlement agreement providing for a $5.5 million equitable distribution to Pizzo from Ianniello’s stock options, $10,000 per month for six years in limited durational alimony and an additional $10,000 per month in child support. Defendant is a homemaker with no employment outside of the home. Plaintiff, also remarried, is an executive in a large corporation wherein his annual income fluctuates between $14 and $31 million annually plus benefits. Plaintiff argued that the $10,000 in monthly child support more than provided for the needs of the children and that the Defendant’s request was made just as her alimony was about to end in an effort to improve her own lifestyle, not that of the children as the expenses of a 10 and 13 year old did not amount to $900,000 annually. The court ordered Defendant to file a budget as per Walton v. Wisgil, 248 N.J. Super. 642 (App. Div. 1991). The court found Defendant’s budget to be more of a wish-list of extravagances which would mainly benefit the Defendant. Pursuant to the factors of N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a), the court noted that the child support guidelines called for $508 each week in child support which was stepped up substantially already to account for the parties’ incomes and the children want for nothing. Pursuant to the child support guidelines, if the combined net income of the parents is greater than $187,200 per annum, the court shall supplement child support with a discretionary amount based on the actual family income and the factors of N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. The children vacation four times annually with their families, attend sports camps, enjoy country club memberships and live in luxurious residences. Additionally, the Plaintiff agreed to pay for the children's private school costs, college expenses and extracurricular activities. The court denied the Defendant’s request to modify child support and the N.J. Appellate Division affirmed. For more information on high net worth divorce, alimony, child support, or other family law matters, visit DarlingFirm.com or call 973-584-6200 to schedule a consultation and protect your rights. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of counsel.

Disability Claims in Alimony and Child Support Matters

Assembly Bill 1551 would serve to amend the New Jersey support statute, N.J.S. 2A:34-23 insofar as it would make a social security disability determination inadmissible in the calculation of a party’s alimony or child support receipt or obligation. The Bill, introduced by Morris County Assemblyman Michael Patrick Carroll, would affect actions in which earning capacity was in question due to a disability claim by a party in an action for child support or alimony. In making a determination of earning capacity, “a record or oral testimony on a determination of a federal social security disability benefit award or the receipt of past or on-going social security benefits shall be inadmissible for purposes of establishing the cause, or the extent or duration of the party’s disability in its impact on the earning capacity of that party.” The Bill would require genuine medical records and testimony of treating physicians in order to prove a party’s earnign capacity as it relates to need or ability to pay alimony or child support. Further, the Bill would provide for reasonable costs and attorney fees for the production of proofs by a party victorious in proving a disability limiting earning capacity and costs to a party successfully refuting the other party’s disability claim. The basis for the Bill is the lack of a meaningful adversarial process in the determination of whether an individual is afflicted with a disability in the confines of a social security administration hearing. The language in the bill would add a layer of proof serving to protect the interests of the other party in a family law matter whose interests were not represented in the social security disability matter. If you are considering divorce or post-judgment modification of alimony, you should consult an experienced divorce attorney to protect your rights. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice on an attorney. If you wish to consult with a divorce attorney, please visit DarlingFirm.com to learn more about our services and how to contact us.

Proving Cohabitation Without Access To Necessary Evidence

Using Facebook posts by his ex-wife’s significant other to support his claims, Steven Robitzski claimed cohabitation of his ex-wife with another as a reason for reduction in his alimony obligation under the 2014 revisions to the alimony statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. Robitzski sought additional discovery from the plaintiff with regard to her finances and the court held that the defendant failed to make a prima facie showing of cohabitation that would be required prior to their compelling discovery from Lorraine Robitzski. The property settlement agreement (PSA) which the parties agreed to at the time of their divorce contemplated alimony of $2,500 monthly from husband to wife and contemplated certain circumstances, including the wife’s future cohabitation, as a reason for termination of alimony. Cohabitation, as defined in Gayet v. Gayet, 92 N.J. 149 (1983), and Konzelman v. Konzelman, 158 N.J. 185 (1999), contemplates a marriage-like relationship including “stability, permanency and mutual interdependence.” The plaintiff denied that she cohabitated with her significant other claiming he spends approximately 100 nights per year at her residence and that they maintain separate finances and residences. The plaintiff provided the defendant with bank accounts showing she paid her own bills for 2013 and 2014 without deposits from unknown sources. The judge found the Facebook postings to be inadmissible and of limited probative value in any event. The judge did however order the significant other to provide certain certification with regard to his living arrangements and finances as well as ordering the plaintiff ex-wife to provide proof of her own expenses and how they are met. On appeal, in Robitzski v. Robitzski, there was consideration of Konzelman with regard to whether the cohabitation criteria existing at the time of the divorce or the amended criteria would apply. In 2014, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 was modified to reflect the following criteria for a court to use when assessing whether cohabitation exists: (1) Intertwined finances such as joint bank accounts and other joint holdings or liabilities; (2) Sharing or joint responsibilities for living expenses; (3) Recognition of the relationship in the couple's social and family circle; (4) Living together, the frequency of contact, the duration of the relationship, and other indicia of a mutually supportive intimate personal relationship; (5) Sharing household chores; (6) Whether the recipient of alimony has received an enforceable promise of support from another person within the meaning of subsection h. of [N.J.S.A.] 25:1-5; and (7) All other relevant evidence. Also to be considered is the duration of the relationship. The 2014 amendments include a provision indicating they are effective from 2014 and do not modify prior agreements or orders. The N.J. Appellate Division looked to Landers v. Landers, ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2016) and Spangenberg v. Kolakowski, 442 N.J. Super. 529 (App. Div. 2015) with regard to whether the 2014 amendments would be applied retroactively. The Appellate Division determined that it no matter which version of the statue was applied, the defendant failed to make a prima facie case for cohabitation and opined that even if the trial judge had allowed the Facebook postings regarding vacations and events the parties enjoyed together, there would not be a prima facie showing of cohabitation. The decision of the trial court was affirmed. In light of changes to the laws governing alimony and cohabitation, it is critical that you seek out the advice of an attorney to protect your rights an entitlements. If you think that it may be beneficial for you to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your alimony obligation based upon your ex-spouse's cohabitation with another person or for any other reason it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about alimony, divorce, post-judgment modification, child support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and is in no way intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Post Divorce Challenge To Alimony And Child Support Findings

In Wicker v. Wicker, James Wicker challenged the method in which his alimony and child support obligation was calculated. Specifically, Wicker challenges the court's determination of his monthly expenses and income in arriving at his available funds from which child support for the parties' 3 daughters may be paid. Wicker contended to the NJ Appellate Division that the court did not adequately consider his expenses in commuting from Virginia to New Jersey every other weekend in order to exercise his parenting time and failed to properly include his rental expenses and was inequitable in creating the need for him to remain employed in Washington, D.C. which necessitated the retention of two separate residences. Tara and James Wicker entered into a voluntary and negotiate, but not complete, property settlement agreement (PSA) leaving some remaining issues for the court to decide. From 1996, the date of the parties' marriage, until 2010, the defendant earned under $100,000. In 2010, the defendant secured an income of approximately $190,000 per year leading up to the parties' divorce in 2013. Two of the parties' 3 daughters had significant medical issues and Tara Wicker was the primary caretaker. An employability expert determined that Tara Wicker's long-term absence from the job market and need to care for the children limited her earning capacity to $35,000 per year. Both parties challenged the figures which should be used in determining income. There was also substantial question as to how the defendant arrived at his monthly expenses, including his claim of $9,000 monthly in pendente lite support. The NJ Appellate Division began the analysis with Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394 (1998), which dictates that decisions of the court below will remain undisturbed if supported by the weight of credible evidence and law, and Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414 (2015), dictating that decisions of the court below will be disturbed if the court below abused its discretion or the findings are not consistent with the credible evidence and legal principles. The Appellate Division reasoned that N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b) empowers judges with the authority to fashion individual solutions best suited to meet the needs of both parties. Randazzo v. Randazzo, 184 N.J. 101 (2005). In affirming the decision of the court below, the court found that the trial judge gave full review to the facts, including the defendant's income and expenses, and the findings were supported by the weight of credible evidence under the guiding principles of law. A divorce will likely have a considerable impact on your life, including determinations about support, custody and parenting that affect where and how you and your family will live. If you are considering divorce or modification of a prior judgment, you should first consult with an experienced family law attorney to determine the likely outcome. For more information about divorce, alimony, child support, relocation with a child and other family law matters visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Mother Appeals Downward Modification Of Child Support

In Litvinenko v. Ter-Saakov, the Plaintiff appealed from a Court Order with regard to adjustments that were made to the Defendant's child support obligation, as well as, an award of attorney's fees that was granted in the Defendant's favor. The Plaintiff and Defendant have one (1) child together, a son born in 2008. The Defendant relocated to the Ukraine in 2012, when the parties' son was four (4) years old. Subsequently, a Family Court judge issued an Order granting sole custody of the child to the Plaintiff and requiring the Defendant to pay child support in the amount of $463 a week. A few months later the Defendant returned from the Ukraine to attend a Motion hearing with his attorney at which the Plaintiff represented herself. Halfway through the hearing the Plaintiff requested an adjournment to seek counsel, the judge denied her request during the hearing. The Plaintiff then stated, in the courtroom, that she was going to walk out of courtroom and not participate in the proceeding. The judge warned her that doing so would result in her requested relief being denied. She walked out of the courtroom anyway. The judge proceeded with the hearing and entered an Order granting the parties shared custody of their child. The Defendant was provided with Skype parenting time three (3) times a week and one (1) week overnight vacation per year. Further, the Defendant's child support obligation was reduced to $268 a week and he was awarded $11,805 in counsel fees. The Plaintiff appealed. On appeal the Plaintiff argued that the judge abused her discretion by awarding counsel fees to the Defendant because the Defendant was a successful businessman earning a seven (7) figure salary and she further claimed that the judge erred in reducing the Defendant's child support obligation. According to the Appellate Court, a judge in a matrimonial action may award reasonable attorney's fees and shall "consider the factors set forth in the court rule on counsel fees, the financial circumstances of the parties, and the good or bad faith of either party." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23; N.J. Court Rule 5:3-5(c). The decision to award counsel fees "in a matrimonial action rests in the discretion of the trial court[,]" Addesa v. Addesa, 392 N.J. Super. 58, 78, 919 A.2d 885 (App. Div. 2007), and will be disturbed "only on the 'rarest occasion,' and then only because of [a] clear abuse of discretion." Strahan v. Strahan, 402 N.J. Super. 298, 317, 953 A.2d 1219 (App. Div. 2008). In this case, the judge based the attorney fee award on the Plaintiff's bad faith in leaving the proceeding against the direct order of the judge. The Appellate Court held that the trial judge aptly explained her reasons for the award and the decision was well within her discretion, therefore, the award of attorney fees was affirmed. However, the Appellate Court found that the trial judge's modification of the Defendant's child support obligation was in error because the judge did not attach a copy a NJ Child Support Guidelines Worksheet or explain her reasoning for the downward modification, which is required. Capaccio v. Capaccio, 321 N.J. Super. 46, 54 n.11, 729 A.2d 253 (App. Div. 1999); N.J. Court Rule 5:6A. Therefore, the decision of the lower court was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded back to the Family Court. If you believe that it may be beneficial to you to seek a post-judgment modification of your child support obligation it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modification, child support, parenting time, child relocation, divorce, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Man's Appeal To Terminate Alimony After He Retires Is Denied

In Baker v. Baker, the Defendant appealed from a 2013 Family Court Order that denied his Motion to terminate his alimony obligation. After review, the Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the Family Court. The parties in this case were married in 1975 and obtained their divorce in 1998. Their final divorce judgment incorporated a property settlement agreement (PSA) in which the Defendant agreed to pay $10,000 a month in permanent alimony to the Plaintiff. In 2005, the Defendant's job was terminated and at the time he was fired he was earning $900,000 per year. Shortly thereafter, the Defendant got another job as the CEO of a smaller company where he expected to receive a salary of $120,000 with the potential for bonuses that would be commensurate with his previous job. However, the Defendant did not receive a salary or bonuses at this new position as the company was in dire financial straits. In 2008, the Defendant filed a Motion for a reduction in his alimony obligation. The Family Court denied his application. The Defendant appealed and while his appeal was pending he filed two additional Motions for interim relief, which the court also denied. At the time, the Plaintiff voluntarily agreed to accept a decrease to $8,000 a month in her alimony award. The Family Court held a plenary hearing on the issue in 2010 at the conclusion of which the Defendant's alimony was temporarily reduced to $6,666 a month. The Defendant appealed this decision. In 2011, the Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. In 2012, the Defendant resigned from the company as it was allegedly about to close its doors and he immediately filed a Motion to terminate his alimony obligation. A plenary hearing was held at which both parties testified about their financial troubles and difficulties securing appropriate work. At the conclusion of the hearing the court denied the Defendant's request. According to the court, there had been "no substantial change in circumstances since the last motion on the [d]efendant's side of the equation" and that termination of alimony was not warranted because the Defendant voluntarily retired from his position. Moreover, when employed as his last company, the Defendant had not acted in good faith as he voluntarily went several years without receiving any income while at the same time loaning the company $138,000. Finally, the court found that instead of seeking a position that would enable him to pay alimony, the Defendant was only "interested in high paying jobs. . . ." Therefore, the court imputed $120,000 a year in income to him which was similar to what he could earn as the base salary at his previous job. The court also noted that the Defendant earned about $170,000 a year in unearned income. In the end, the court ordered the Defendant to pay $5,166 per month in alimony. He appealed. According to the Appellate Division, alimony "may be revised and altered by the court from time to time as circumstances may require." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. In order to make such a modification a party must show "changed circumstances." Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 146 (1980); Weishaus v. Weishaus, 180 N.J. 131, 140-41 (2004). The ". . . party seeking modification has the burden of showing such 'changed circumstances' as would warrant relief from the support or maintenance provisions involved." Martindell v. Martindell, 21 N.J. 341, 353 (1956). There is no " . . . bright line rule by which to measure when a changed circumstance has endured long enough to warrant a modification of a support obligation, instead, such matters turn on the discretionary determinations of Family Part judges, based upon their experience." Donnelly v. Donnelly, 405 N.J. Super. 117, 128 (App. Div. 2009); Larbig v. Larbig, 384 N.J. Super. 17, 23 (App. Div. 2006). Retirement may constitute a change in circumstances warranting a modification or elimination of alimony. Silvan v.Sylvan, 267 N.J. Super. 578, 581 (App. Div. 1993); Deegan v. Deegan, 254 N.J. Super. 350, 358-59 (App. Div. 1992). The analysis turns to whether or not the retirement was voluntary or involuntary. If the change in involuntary, all that is required of the analysis is the parties' financial circumstances. If the change was voluntary the court must consider a list of factors such as whether or not the retirement was made in good faith. In this case, the Appellate Division found that the Family Court did not abuse its discretion in finding no changed circumstances and affirmed the decision of the lower court. Being that the laws governing alimony have recently been changed, it is very important that you seek out the advice of an attorney to protect your rights an entitlements. If you think that it may be beneficial for you to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your alimony obligation or for any other reason it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about alimony, divorce, post-judgment modification, child support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Denial Of Husband's Alimony Modification Reversed

In Galante v. Galante, the Defendant appealed from a court order that denied his Motion for a modification of his alimony obligation. The New Jersey Appellate Court reversed the decision of the Family Court and remanded the case back for reconsideration. The parties executed a marital settlement agreement (MSA) in 2011 upon getting divorced. According to the MSA, with regard to equitable distribution, the Plaintiff was to receive the parties' marital residence, the 401k account from one of the Defendant's businesses, and the parties' 2010 tax refund. The Defendant received the parties' 2009 tax refund, and his 50% interest in three businesses that were acquired during the marriage. Further, the MSA provided for a two-step alimony payment schedule because the Defendant was unable to pay off the mortgage that was securing their former marital home. Before the marital home was sold, the Defendant was to pay all of the house expenses and $400 a week in alimony to the Plaintiff. Once the home was sold, he was to pay $1,500 a week in alimony to the Plaintiff. In 2013, the Defendant filed a Motion with the court to modify his alimony obligation, amongst other things. He claimed that his financial circumstances had dramatically declined which resulted in a significant change in circumstances, which justified the modification of the MSA. Specifically, he noted that his businesses had permanently lost their client base after the economic collapse of 2008 and his annual earnings dropped from $400,000 a year to $130,000 constituting a significant change in circumstances. The Family Court denied his application citing that he had failed to establish a prima facie showing of changed circumstances because he failed to provide the court with documentation that proved his claims. The Defendant filed a Motion for reconsideration in which he included his tax returns. The court denied this Motion as well holding that the Defendant was simply trying to cure his deficient documentation with information that was readily available to him when he filed his first Motion. The Defendant appealed. On Appeal the Defendant claimed that he established a prima facie case for a change in circumstances according to Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139 (1980). According to the Appellate Court, alimony "may be revised and altered by the court from time to time as circumstances may require." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. To win on such an application, a showing of "changed circumstances" is required. Weishaus v. Weishaus, 180 N.J. 131, 140-41 (2004). The Appellate Court found that in this case the Defendant did not make broad generalizations and bare assertions that his businesses were suffering, but rather, he provided specific details about his businesses failures and his efforts to rectify his situation. Thus, at the very least, the Defendant presented a prima facie case of changed circumstances and if the Plaintiff materially disputed the Defendant's claims, a plenary hearing should have been held to consider those facts, which was not done. Therefore, the decision of the Family Court was reversed. If you believe that a post-judgment modification to your alimony obligation may be beneficial to you it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modification, alimony, equitable distribution, divorce, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice if an attorney.

Alimony Modification Denied For Lack Of Changed Circumstances

In the case of Monico v. Monico, the Plaintiff appealed from a 2014 Family Court Order that denied his Motion to modify his alimony obligation based upon changed circumstances. The New Jersey Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the Family Court. Each "and every motion to modify an alimony obligation 'rests upon its own particular footing'" and the Appellate Court "must give due recognition to the wide discretion" that is given to trial judges who adjudicate these matters. Larbig v. Larbig, 384 N.J. Super. 17, 21 (App. Div. 2006); Martindell v. Martindell, 21 N.J. 341, 355 (1956). Ultimately, this standard conveys that a trial judge's findings in regard to alimony should not be vacated unless the court clearly abused its discretion, failed to consider all of the controlling legal principles, made mistaken findings, or reached a conclusion that could not reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence. Gnall v. Gnall, 432 N.J. Super. 129, 148 (App. Div. 2013). Court Orders concerning alimony "may be revised and altered by the court from time to time as circumstances may require." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. Therefore, alimony obligations are "always subject to review and modification on a showing of 'changed circumstances.'" Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 146 (1980). The law regarding what constitutes a change of circumstances is well established. Examples of changed circumstances that may warrant support modifications include an increase or decrease in the paying spouse's income or disability or illness which arises after the divorce judgment is issued. In this case, the Plaintiff argued that the Family Court judge who denied his request to modify his alimony amount was mistaken in considering his 2012 tax return instead of his projected earnings for 2013, when determining if a change in circumstances had existed. The judge noted how the Plaintiff's income had increased since signing his property settlement agreement (the parties were divorced in 2007) based upon multiple sources of income. According to the Appellate Division, as the Plaintiff's 2013 financial information from his primary business, a towing company that he owned, had not been finalized it discerned no reason to disturb the Family Court's ruling to deny the Plaintiff's request based upon insufficient evidence of changed financial circumstances. Being that the laws governing the issues involving alimony have recently been changed, it is very important that you seek out the advice of an attorney to protect your rights an entitlements. If you anticipate that you may want to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your alimony obligation it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about alimony, child support, post-judgment modification , or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Cohabitation Under New Alimony Changes

On September 10, 2014, following years of legal and legislative debate, the laws regarding alimony were amended in the state of New Jersey. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. Although the lion's share of the attention was directed at the changes to the durational aspect of alimony, there were considerable changes made that affect the modification of an existing or future alimony obligation in the event of an ex-spouse's retirement or cohabitation. An issue may arise regarding what law to apply when an existing property settlement agreement (PSA) provides that the issue of cohabitation be decided using the established case law. The language in a PSA is most commonly bargained for and negotiated amongst the parties and if it contravenes the status of the law such language could preclude the application of the amended alimony statute. To determine whether spousal support should be modified based upon cohabitation the case of Konzelman v. Konzelman, 158 N.J. 185, 202 (1999) and Gayet v. Gayet, 92 N.J. 149, 155 (1983) are most often cited and define cohabitation as an intimate, close, and enduring relationship that requires more than simply a common residence. An evaluation must look to whether or not two people were in a long term romantic relationship, shared finances, shared living expenses, and held themselves out to friends and families as a romantic couple. The amended statute's definition of cohabitation is similar but not as clearly defined. Most significant, the law requires that a trial judge consider the length of the relationship and address prior inconsistencies in the law. Being that the language of the statute is not as detailed as the case law, a question arises as to the status of the economic-based standard that was established in the Gayet case for modifying support in the event of cohabitation (whether the third-party cohabitant contributes to the dependent spouse's support or whether the third party cohabitant resides in the dependent spouse's home without contributing anything toward the expenses). A question remains as to whether or not this economic benefit test is part of the current law. The Gayet case and the cases that followed it clearly established that modification during cohabitation may mean more than simply the termination of the support obligation. Reese v. Weis, 430 N.J. Super. 552, 572-73 (2013). If there is no longer an economic benefit test, any modification that is not a suspension or termination to support is unnecessary. The new alimony statute directs that "alimony may be suspended or terminated if the payee cohabitates with another person." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. Further, the statute does not explicitly provide what facts would be necessary to warrant a suspension of support in contrast to a termination. These issues are all fact based issues that are most often decided at the discretion of the trier of fact, which is the court in these cases. Therefore, the interpretation of the new statute will be developed through future case law created by Family Court judges adjudicating these issues and remain unclear at the present time. Recent changes have been made to alimony laws making it very important that you seek the advice of an attorney to protect your rights and entitlements. If you are considering a post-judgment modification of your alimony obligation it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about alimony, child support, post-judgment modification , or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Court Denies Wife's Appeal After Downward Modification Of Husband's Child Support

In Licciardi v. Licciardi, an Appellate Division case out of Morris County, the Plaintiff appealed a post-judgment Family Court Order that reduced the Defendant's child support payments, increased his responsibility to pay for their children's extracurricular expenses, and denied her Motion to compel the Defendant to produce documents. After being married for over ten (10) years and having two (2) children together the parties divorced. Rather than a trial on all issues, they entered into a property settlement agreement (PSA) weherin the Defendant agreed to pay child support in the amount of $3,300 a month based upon his gross income of $175,000. Further, the PSA acknowledged that the Defendant was paying child support in excess of the NJ Child Support Guidelines found in Rule 5:6A. The Defendant also agreed not to seek a reduction in his child support obligation for "three years regardless of any change in circumstances . . . . and the child support may be reviewed at the expiration of three years . . . and every two years thereafter until both children are emancipated." In 2010, the Defendant was granted a reduction in his child support obligation. In 2012, two and half years later, the Defendant once again filed for a reduction in his child support. The Plaintiff opposed the Motion seeking an upward adjustment in child support citing that her financial circumstances had taken a down turn and claiming the Defendant's financial information was deceitful. The court again reduced the Defendant's child support and increased his obligation to pay for the children's extracurricular activities. The court found that the parties had established substantial and permanent changed circumstances based upon the Defendant paying monthly child support for a third child that was born from a second wife that he had since divorced. The Plaintiff appealed the Order. According to the Appellate Division, courts are authorized by statute to "revise[] and alter[]" child support Orders "from time to time as circumstances may require." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. The party moving for the modification bears the burden of making a prima facie showing of changed circumstances." Miller v. Miller, 160 N.J. 408, 420, 734 A.2d 752 (1999). Changed circumstances "include an increase in the cost of living, an increase or decrease in the income of the supporting or supported spouse, cohabitation of the dependent spouse, illness or disability arising after the entry of the judgment, and changes in federal tax law." J.B. v. W.B., 215 N.J. 305, 327,73 A.3d 405 (2013). In this case, the Plaintiff argued that the Defendant was not entitled to a reduction in child support because his financial disclosures were incomplete and deceitful. The Appellate Court rejected this argument because the Plaintiff's claims were simply bare assertions that were not supported by any competent, documentary evidence. Therefore, the court affirmed the decision of the Family Court. If you anticipate that you may want to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your child support obligation it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about child support, post-judgment modification, alimony, divorce or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Post-Judgment Motion For College Tuition Is Denied

White v. White, is a 2015 post-judgment modification involving a Plaintiff who petitioned the court to compel her ex-husband, the Defendant, to reimburse her and their son for loans that the Plaintiff and the child used to pay for his college education. The Plaintiff appealed the decision of the Family Court which denied her initial Motion, filed in 2012, to compel the Defendant to reimburse her and her son for the aforementioned loans. After being married for six (6) years and having two (2) sons the parties agreed to divorce. The divorce was granted pursuant to a judgment of divorce that granted custody of the children to the Plaintiff, set forth the Defendant's child support obligation, and incorporated the parties' agreement concerning the equitable distribution of their property. The record reflected that the Defendant did not have contact with either of his children from 1998 through the time the initial Motion was filed in 2012. In 2008, the parties' youngest son entered college and graduated in 2011. In 2012, nine (9) months after the parties' child graduated college the Plaintiff filed a Motion seeking retroactive child support effective May 2009 through December 2011 and an Order directing the Defendant to pay for the non-emancipated child's college education as well as a loan that the Plaintiff has used for that purpose. The court denied the relief requested. The Appellate Court found that it was required by Gac v. Gac, 186 N.J. 535, 546 (2006) to consider whether the Defendant had been involved in the college selection process at all. Further, the court noted that the Defendant was disabled and wondered whether or not it was fair to retroactively place the burden on him to inquire as to whether or not his children were entitled to any veteran benefits - as he was a veteran - to assist in the payment of college expenses. Relying on Newburgh v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529, 535 (1982), Gac v. Gac, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a) the Appellate Division ruled that waiting until the child graduated from college was fatal to the Plaintiff's application for retroactive contributions to the loan that she took out. Courts "should balance the statutory criteria of N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a) and the Newburgh factors, as well as any other relevant circumstances, to reach a fair and just decision whether, and if so, in what amount, a parent or parents must contribute to a child's educational expenses." Gac v. Gac, surpa, 186 N.J. at 543. Being that it could not be determined exactly when the Defendant first learned that his son was attending college and why the Defendant was estranged from his son (and therefore not involved in the college selection process) the court was not willing to reverse the decision of the lower court. The issue was whether a non-custodial parent can be held liable to a child for the amount of educational benefits that would have been available from a non-parental source had the parent timely notified the child or child's custodial parent. The Plaintiff cited to no authority to support the imposition of such liability and therefore the court was not prepared to impose such. If you anticipate that you may want to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your divorce judgment it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modification , equitable distribution, divorce, alimony, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

No Extension Of Limited Duration Alimony

In the recent Appellate Division case from Morris County, Buscher v. Tully, a post-judgment matrimonial matter, the Defendant Steven Tully appealed from the Family Court's Order granting the Plaintiff, Ann Buscher's Motion to extend the period of her limited duration alimony. The parties in this case were divorced in 2007 after eighteen (18) years of marriage. The parties' final divorce judgment incorporated a property settlement agreement (PSA). There were three (3) children born of the marriage one of which was almost seventeen, other eleven, and the final emancipated at the time of the divorce. Pursuant to the PSA, the Defendant agreed to pay limited duration alimony to begin after the parties' sold their marital residence and to end in December of 2016. The parties also agreed to live together in the house after their divorce and until the home was sold. While they lived together after their divorce, the Defendant agreed to place almost all of his income in a joint account to assist with living expenses. The record indicates that the parties did not list the marital residence for sale in 2007 and the Plaintiff remained in the home until 2011, when she left with the parties' youngest child. The Defendant remained in the home with the other unemancipated child until 2012. While the Plaintiff lived in the home she worked part-time, completed her undergraduate education and eventually obtained a Master's degree. In 2013, post-judgment Motions were heard in which the Plaintiff requested that because the parties did not sell the home until 2012 she wanted her alimony end date to be extended. The Defendant argued that the court should enforce the plain language of the PSA which provided that alimony would not commence until the house was sold because when the parties entered into the PSA they did not know when the house would be sold and the agreement made sure that the Defendant would not have to pay both alimony and the carrying costs of the home at the same time. The Family Court granted the Plaintiff's Motion to compel payment of alimony though 2020 concluding that the parties intended that the Plaintiff would receive nine (9) years of alimony. The Defendant appealed arguing that the court erred in awarding nine (9) years of alimony ignoring the plain language of the PSA and that the extension of limited duration alimony violated N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. In reversing and remanding the decision of the lower court the Appellate Court held that it discerned no basis in the PSA or extrinsic circumstances for the trial court's conclusion that the parties intended to award the Plaintiff nine (9) years of alimony. The parties agreed to remain in the home for an indefinite period of time after the divorce, until the house was sold. During that time, the Defendant agreed to bear the majority of the home expenses and that these expenditures were undoubtedly a form of spousal support or alimony. Schorr v. Schorr, 341 N.J. Super. 132, 139 (App. Div. 2001); Mendell v. Mendell, 162 N.J. Super. 469, 475-76 (App. Div. 1978). If you anticipate that you may want to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your alimony obligation it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about alimony, post-judgment modification, equitable distribution, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Mother Compelled To Secure Passport And Pay Counsel Fees

In the recent Appellate Division case out of Union County, Lamb v. Lamb, the Defendant, Jill Lamb appealed from a portion of a 2013 post-judgment Court Order dealing with her child custody, specifically ordering her to 1) comply with obtaining a passport for the parties' 14 year old daughter so that she could accompany her father, the Plaintiff, Lucas Lamb, to the Bahamas, and 2) awarding the Plaintiff's attorney fees of $3,385. The parties in this case were married in 1999. They obtained a divorce in 2002, pursuant to a final divorce judgment that awarded them joint custody of A.L., their daughter. The Defendant is the parent of primary residence and the Plaintiff is the parent of alternate residence. The issue that gave rise to this appeal arose out of a Disney cruise trip to the Bahamas that the Plaintiff planned to go on with the parties' daughter in 2013. The trip was to include the Plaintiff's new wife and their two children as well as A.L. In 2013, the Plaintiff e-mailed the trip details to the Defendant and explicitly asked the Defendant to confirm that she agreed to allow A.L. to attend the trip. The Defendant responded that she agreed as long as the trip did not cause any conflicts with A.L.'s school schedule. In these e-mails, the Plaintiff asked whether A.L.'s passport was current and told the Defendant that if the passport was expired he would take her during his parenting time to update it. The Plaintiff argued that the trip did not require A.L. to secure a passport and an altercation ensued. The Defendant argued that Disney suggested that passengers have a passport in case he or she got sick and needed immediate health care. In June of 2013, the Plaintiff filed an Order to Show Cause (OTSC) because the passport issue remained unresolved. The court found that there was not material facts in dispute and ordered the Defendant to cooperate in obtaining a passport for A.L. and ordered that the Defendant pay the Plaintiff's legal fees to bring the action totaling $3,385. The Defendant appealed from this decision. In her papers, the Defendant admitted that the passport issue was a moot point because she had agreed to allow the parties' daughter to go on the cruise and she executed the passport documents and the trip took place but argued that she did not act in bad faith with regard to the passport and the court erred in directing her to pay the Plaintiff's legal fees. The Appellate Division agreed that the passport issue was moot holding that an issue becomes moot when "when the original issue presented has been resolved, at least concerning the parties who initiated the litigation." De Vesa v. Dorsey, 134 N.J. 420, 428 (1993). With regard to the award of counsel fees, the Defendant argues that the motion judge failed to consider the required factors under N.J.C.R. 5:3-5(c) and only focused on the bad faith factor. According to the Appellate Court, a judge in a matrimonial action may award a party reasonable attorney's fees and to make that determination shall "consider . . . the good or bad faith of either party." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23; N.J.C.R. 5:3-5(c). The court held that the motion judge's analysis of the factors could have been more detailed but the record indicated that the counsel fees were awarded to Plaintiff as a direct result of his efforts to compel the Defendant's compliance with an already agreed upon visitation and therefore the award was not unreasonable. Child custody and parenting time cases are of the most emotional and difficult cases in all of family law. If you anticipate that you may want to petition the court for a modification of your current child custody arrangement it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about child custody, parenting time, child support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Court Modifies Child Support And Custody Based on Father's Mental Instability

In the recent Appellate Division case, Cowie v. Cowie, the Plaintiff, in a post-judgment matrimonial matter, appealed from a 2013 court order denying her Motion to reconsider and modify the Defendant's child support obligation retroactively after his custody was diminished due to mental illness. The Appellate Court reversed the decision of the Family Court and remanded the case back to that court for reconsideration. The parties in this case were married in 1999 and the marriage bore two (2) children, a son born in 2001 and another son born in 2003. In 2011, the parties obtained a divorce and entered into a property settlement agreement (PSA) on the same date. The PSA specified that the parties were to share joint legal and residential custody of their children and were to share equal parenting time. Child support was calculated using the NJ Child Support Guidelines based upon the shared parenting worksheet. Subsequently, the Defendant began to suffer from mental health problems and in 2012 the Plaintiff sought temporary sole legal and residential custody of their children as well as a suspension of the Defendant's parenting time. Shortly thereafter, the Family Court granted the Plaintiff's request for temporary sole legal and residential custody of the parties' children and established supervised visitation with the Defendant without over nights. In 2013, the Plaintiff submitted a Motion for a modification of the Defendant's child support obligation because the custody arrangement had been drastically modified. The judge denied her request because the arrangement was deemed to be "temporary." The Plaintiff appealed from this decision. The Appellate Division found that the Plaintiff's application to modify the Defendant's child support was governed by well-settled legal principles. Specifically, a party seeking to modify a child support obligation has the burden of presenting a prima facie case of change circumstances. Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J.139, 157-59 (1980); Innes v. Innes, 117 N.J. 496, 504 (1990); N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. The Appellate Division held that in this case there has been a changed circumstance in the parties' parenting time and that the change in custody was due to the Defendant's incapacity and lack of ability to provide adequate care for his children. Although the modification to the original custody arrangement was deemed to be "temporary," there was no contemplation in the record as to the duration of the Defendant's incapacity. Although courts can reject requests for modification based upon temporary changed circumstances, there is no bright line rule to measure changed circumstances and therefore any determination is left to the discretion of the court. In this case, there has been a "reasonable" time period of the changed circumstance and the children should not be denied appropriate support to meet their needs. Therefore, the Appellate Division reversed the decision of the lower court and remanded the case back to the court for an Order consistent with its decision. If you anticipate that you may want to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your child support obligation it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modification, parenting time, child support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Child Support Modification Sought As Father's Income Decreased And Mother's Increased

In the recent post judgment Appellate Division case, Bigge v. Walker, the Plaintiff appealed from a 2013 Family Court Order that denied his Motion to modify his child support and life insurance obligations. The Appellate Division reversed the decision of the lower court. The parties involved in this case were married in 1987 and subsequently divorced in 1999. One child was born of the marriage in 1991. The parties' divorce judgment directed that the Plaintiff was to pay $105 a week in child support plus an additional $45 a week toward an arrears that had accumulated after they separated. The amount was determined by the parties without using the NJ Child Support Guidelines. In addition, the divorce judgment required that the Plaintiff maintain $100,000 in life insurance to secure his child support obligation. In 2013, the Plaintiff filed a Motion to modify his child support obligation because his work was not steady and he was often unemployed and as a result he fell into arrears. He further asserted that he was suffering from severe health problems and had recently undergone a triple bypass heart surgery which impeded his ability to work. In 2010, he had got a job working in a mail room an earned $26,955 a year as of 2012. In 2013, the Family Court denied the Plaintiff's Motion to modify his child support. The Plaintiff appealed. According to the Appellate Court, child support orders are subject to modification pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 and based upon a showing of changed circumstances. Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 157 (1980). A Family Court motion judge may modify a child support obligation when the party seeking the alteration satisfies the burden of showing a change in circumstances. Dramatic changes in the income or earning capacity of either party, or in the circumstances of their children due to events such as attending college, may result in a finding of a changed circumstance. Colca v. Anson, 413 N.J. 405, 415-16 (App. Div. 2010). In this case, the Appellate Division found that the Family Court judge mistakenly exercised his discretion when he denied the Plaintiff's Motion to modify his child support as his income had been significantly reduced while the Defendant's income had increased. Therefore, the Appellate Division was satisfied that the Family judge did not make adequate findings with respect to the Plaintiff's child support obligation and life insurance requirement and the decision was reversed and remanded back to the Family Court for further proceedings. If you anticipate that you may want to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your child support obligation it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modification, divorce, child support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Father Contests College Tuition Obligations In Post-Judgment Divorce Filing

In the recent Appellate Division case, Gropper v. Gropper, the Defendant, Cy Gropper, appealed from two post-judgment Orders of the Morris County Family Court concerning his obligation to contribute to his son's college expenses based upon his final divorce judgment. The Defendant appealed from two (2) Family Court Orders, one filed on March 20, 2013 that directed him to pay $50 a week directly to the parties' son in child support and 58% of the child's college costs and expenses. The second Order, which was filed on May 21, 2013, denied the Defendant's Motion to reconsider the relief ordered in the previous Court Order. The Defendant claimed that his Motion for reconsideration was not properly considered by the court and that he should not have been ordered to pay his son's private school tuition when "the same education can be obtained a reputable public [state sponsored] schools" for a much lower cost. The Appellate Court ordered a limited remand to review the Defendant's Motion. The parties in this case were divorced in 1995. Their marriage yielded two children and pursuant to the property settlement agreement (PSA) which was incorporated into their final divorce judgment they were to share joint legal custody of their children and were to share their children's college education costs 52% by the Defendant and 48% by the Plaintiff. After the divorce, the Defendant moved to North Carolina. The parties' younger son applied and was accepted to attend an online private college, the University of Advancing Technology (UAT) as well as the University of North Carolina-Charlotte (UNC). Since he had to have spinal surgery, the child did not immediately attend college and subsequently moved to North Carolina. Based upon the child's move and his representation to UNC that his primary residence was the Defendant's address, the Defendant filed a Motion to modify his child support obligation asserting that any child support should be paid directly to the child and that the parties agreed that the child would attend UNC. The Plaintiff filed a Cross-Motion arguing that she agreed that the child support could be sent by Probation directly to the child, but disagreed that an amount adjustment was warranted. Further, she sought a review of each party's college expense contribution amount because the Defendant's income had increased from the time of the divorce. The Plaintiff also asserted that the parties' son had reluctantly agreed to attend UNC and planned on finishing his coursework at UAT because that school offered a major not found at UNC. In a 2013 Court Order, the judge modified the parties' child support obligations. In addition, with regard to the college expenses, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a), the judge ordered that the UAT tuition "after all loans, grants, and scholarships have been obtained" shall be paid 58% by the Defendant and 42% by the Plaintiff. The Defendant appealed. The Appellate Division found that the Family Court judge's statement of reasons supporting the Order at issue regarding the parties' respective college tuition obligations was premised on analysis of the child support statute, but did not mention any consideration of the factors outlined in Newburg v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529 (1982). Further, the Defendant, in his papers, also accurately indentified the need to consider whether the child is enrolled on a full-time basis. Khalaf v. Khalaf, 58 N.J. 63, 71-72 (1971). Therefore, the Appellate Division remanded the case back to the Family Court for an re-evaluation consistent with its opinion. If you anticipate that you may want to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your divorce judgment regarding issues such as your obligation to pay your child's college expenses it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modification, child support, parenting time, divorce, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Limited Duration Alimony Award Appealed By Husband

In the recent post-judgment case, Manduley v. Perez-Manduley, Jesus Manduley, appealed from a Family Court award of four years of limited duration alimony totaling $3640 a year to his ex-wife, Defendant Ana Perez-Manduley. The Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the Family Division. The parties in this case were married in 2005 in the Dominican Republic. After their nuptials, the Plaintiff returned to New Jersey where he found work as a trash collector. The Defendant remained in the Dominican Republic to work as a nurse's assistant because she was not an American citizen. During that time, the Plaintiff sent money to the Defendant to assist her with her living costs. Eventually, she moved to the United States where the parties lived in New Jersey. The marriage never bore any children. The Defendant was dependent on her husband when she lived in the Dominican Republic and although she worked as a home aid in America, the Plaintiff paid the vast majority of the household expenses. At the divorce trial, the Defendant requested an award of four years of limited duration alimony at $500 per month totaling $6,000 a year. The Plaintiff stated that he would agree to pay some alimony if the city that employed him agreed to allow him to work overtime, but otherwise alimony should not be awarded. The Family Judge ruled that the Plaintiff was to pay the Defendant limited duration alimony in the amount of $3640 per year and that she would receive her marital share of his pension. The Plaintiff appealed from this judgment. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the Family Court. The Appellate Court found that the trial judge's decision regarding alimony was consistent with the proofs that were presented at trial and properly made pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(c). Both parties are parties of limited means and because the Plaintiff provided primary support for the family during the marriage he should have to pay modest alimony. Further, the four year term of the alimony award was considered to be fair for a seven year marriage. The award equitably served the purposes of limited duration alimony under the law. Gnall v. Gnall, 432 N.J. Super. 129, 150 (App. Div. 2013). If you anticipate that you may want to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your alimony or child support obligation it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about alimony, divorce, child support, equitable distribution, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Equitable Distribution Impacts Alimony Calculation

In the recent Appellate Division case, Overbay v. Overbay, the Defendant Mary Ellen Overbay appealed from a 2013 Family Court Order that reduced her alimony award and the amount of life insurance that her ex-husband, the Plaintiff Bruce Overbay, must maintain for her benefit as part of the process of equitable distribution. The parties in this case were divorced in 2002 following a thirty-one year marriage. All three (3) of their children were emancipated at the time of their divorce. The Plaintiff is currently seventy years old and the Defendant is sixty-seven. At the time of their divorce, the Plaintiff was working for ExxonMobil earning $132,000 per year. The Defendant was not in good health at the time of the divorce and was teaching two classes at Seton Hall University and earned $12,000 a year. Given her significant medical problems, the judge found that her "future employability [was] uncertain." The court ordered equitable distribution and determined that the Plaintiff should pay to the Defendant $3,000 a month in alimony. Both parties appealed and the Appellate Court affirmed on all issues regarding equitable distribution but remanded for a re-calculation of alimony. Following a hearing, the Family Court judge ordered the Plaintiff to pay $3,750 a month in alimony and again the parties appealed. Again, the Appellate Court reversed the lower court's decision and reinstituted the Defendant's monthly budget to reflect $8,000, according to Rule 2:10-5. The Appellate Court then remanded back to the Family Court to modify the alimony award consistent with its ruling. Shortly thereafter, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for a downward modification of his alimony obligation based upon a reduction in his salary. The judge found that the Plaintiff had "proven a substantial and permanent change in circumstances based upon a change in employment at a reduced salary" and that the Defendant had a "decrease in the amount of alimony needed due to an increase in her income." In 2013, the Plaintiff's alimony obligation was reduced to $1050 a month and reduced the amount of life insurance that the Plaintiff had to maintain to $150,000. This appeal followed. The Appellate Court found that in determining an award of alimony, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b) directs that a court should consider a set of statutorily defined factors to determine the obligation amount. The goal of an alimony award is to help the supported spouse to achieve a reasonably comparable lifestyle to what was enjoyed during the marriage. Crews v. Crews, 164 N.J. 11, 16 (2000). A judge may modify alimony based upon a showing of changed circumstances. Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139 (1980). "In an application brought by a supporting spouse for a downward modification in alimony . . . the central issue is the supporting spouse's ability to pay." Miller v. Miller, 160 N.J. 408, 420 (1999). However, this is only one factor that is considered and other factors such as personal assets and capacity to earn should also be considered. The Appellate Division then re-calculated the Plaintiff's alimony obligation retroactively to compensate for the slow decline in his salary and ordered that from 2013 forward he pay $2,000 a month in alimony and have to pay arrearage amounts pursuant to an established schedule. The equitable distribution of assets and alimony are of the most emotional and complex aspects of a divorce. If you are involved in a battle over the division of marital property, assets, or debts or alimony it is extremely important that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about equitable distribution, alimony contested divorce, uncontested divorce, spousal support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Post-Judgment Modification of Child Support And College Expenses

In the recent NJ Appellate Division case, Johnson v. Johnson, the Plaintiff, David Johnson, appealed from a Family Court's post-judgment Court Order concerning issues regarding his child support and college expenses obligations. The Appellate Division remanded the case back to the lower court for a reconsideration and for additional findings of fact and law. In this case, the parties obtained a legal divorce in 1994 after five (5) years of marriage. The Plaintiff is 53 years old and the Defendant, Patricia Johnson, is 59 years old. The parties' children, Warren and Nancy, born in 1992 and 1989 respectively, are college aged. The Plaintiff remarried after his divorce and had two (2) additional children with her, one born in 2001 and another in 2005. The Plaintiff lives in South Carolina, where he works at two (2) retailers. The Defendant is an accountant with county government and remains in New Jersey where she has primary residential custody of the parties' children. In 2011, the Plaintiff sought to reduce his child support obligation because he began to make less money. At that time, he was paying $180 a week in child support. Also at that time, he requested information regarding his children's college attendance. Both children were supposedly attending college. The Defendant submitted a cross motion for continued child support and for the Plaintiff to contribute to the children's college expenses. The court reduced the Plaintiff's child support obligation to $139 a week and used the NJ Child Support Guidelines to calculate the amount. The court noted that when the Plaintiff and Defendant divorced the Plaintiff was the breadwinner of the family and then the circumstances changed when the Defendant became employed and earned more than the Plaintiff. In addition, the Family Court directed that the Plaintiff pay 38% of the children's college costs. Following an appeal at that time, the Appellate Court reversed the decision and remanded the case back for reconsideration requiring the court to apply the statutory child support factors found in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a). The Family Court lowered the child support to $100 per week and ordered the Plaintiff to pay 40% of the children's college expenses. In its opinion on these issues, the Family Court's decision recited the statutory factors found in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a) and also the factors to determine a claim for college contribution set forth in Newburgh v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529, 545 (1982). The Plaintiff appealed from this decision. In its holding the Appellate Court found that the trial court must make findings of fact and state its conclusions of law, according to Court Rule 1:7-4(a); N.J. Div. Youth & Family Servs v. M.C., 201 N.J. 328, 342-43 (2010). A motion judge must address the standards set forth in our statutes and cases to support a discretionary decision. Salch v. Salch, 240 N.J. Super. 441, 443 (App. Div. 1990). According to this standard, the Appellate Court once again remanded this case to the Family Court to make the appropriate findings, as the trial court simply recited the relevant statutory factors without explaining its conclusions of law. Child support cases are among the most emotional and difficult cases in all of family law. If you anticipate that you may want to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your current child support obligation or to seek any other relief pertaining to your divorce it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about child support, post-judgment modification, parenting time, divorce, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Woman Contests Judge's Decision To Make Her Pay Permanent Alimony

In the New Jersey case Sanchez v. Sanchez, a woman appealed from a trial court judge's issuance of a dual judgment of divorce that ordered her to pay permanent alimony to her husband. Following the parties' divorce trial, Judge Patricia A. Roe, J.S.C., entered a dual judgment of divorce ordering the Plaintiff wife to pay permanent alimony to the Defendant husband in the sum of $200 per week, each party was to retain their own retirement or investment accounts, and the Plaintiff was to pay the Defendant $2,500 in counsel fees from her share of the proceeds of the sale of the marital residence. The Plaintiff appealed from this decision and the Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the lower court. The parties were married in 1996 and had one child, a daughter born in 1998. The parties separated in 2010 and the Defendant moved from Jackson to Jersey City. The Plaintiff remained in the marital home with the parties' daughter and her elderly father. The Plaintiff had earned a bachelor's degree in nursing from a university in the Philippines and worked as a neonatal intensive care unit nurse at a hospital earning $92,000 a year. In 2009 and 2010 she filed separate tax returns and claimed her daughter and mortgage interest as deductions - which she did not share with the Defendant. Plaintiff admitted that she took a $28,000 loan from her 401K plan and $6,500 loan from a home equity line of credit to cover her living expenses. The Defendant earned a bachelor's degree in accounting from a university in the Philippines. In 2009 he earned nearly $65,000 which reflected his highest annual compensation. Soon after he became unemployed and was unable to find work. He received unemployment compensation until his benefits expired and his total income for 2011 was $20,000. In her appeal the Plaintiff argues that the judge erred in awarding the Defendant permanent alimony as both had worked throughout the marriage and that her income did not "significantly exceed" the Defendant's income. The Appellate Court held that: "the goal of a proper alimony award is to assist the supported spouse in achieving a lifestyle reasonably comparable to the one enjoyed while living with the supporting spouse during the marriage." Steneken v. Steneken, 183 N.J. 290, 299 (2005). "When determining whether an award of alimony is warranted, a trial judge must issue 'specific findings on the evidence' presented, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(c), weighing the objective standards delineated in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b)." Clark v. Clark, 429 N.J. Super. 61, 73 (App. Div. 2012). In its disposition, the Appellate Court found that the trial court judge's conclusions were amply supported by the evidence presented at trial and therefore her decision was affirmed. If you anticipate that you may want to petition the court for a modification of your alimony award or any other relief that was awarded in a final judgment of divorce it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about divorce, alimony, child support, equitable distribution, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.