Child Support Award Affirmed In Deference To Trial Court

Kummarapurugo v. Thota, is a post-judgment matrimonial action wherein the Plaintiff appealed from a Family Court Order, issued in 2014 that recalculated his child support obligation to $272 per week, arguing that the court was mistaken in its calculation. The Family Court is afforded substantial discretion to determine child support awards and other support obligations. Foust v. Glaser, 340 N.J. Super. 312, 315 (App. Div. 2001). A child support order is always "subject to review and modification on a showing of changed circumstances." Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 146 (1980). "If consistent with the law, such an award will not be disturbed unless it is manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary, or clearly contrary to reason or to other evidence, or the result of whim or caprice." Foust, supra, 340 N.J. Super. at 315-16. "When reviewing decisions granting or denying applications to modify child support, we examine whether, given the facts, the trial judge abused his or her discretion." J.B. v. W.B., 215 N.J. 305, 325-26 (2013). The Plaintiff argued that the Family Court's determination of his child support obligation was unfair as modified because the court failed to consider the appropriate child support guidelines factors. The Defendant claimed that the judge made sufficient findings of fact to justify the support award. The Appellate Court agreed with the Defendant and affirmed the decision of the Family Court. In this case, the Appellate Court found that although the Family Court judge's findings were not a "paradigm of the findings required by N.J.C.R. 1:7-4," the facts on the record were sufficient to support the child support award. Further, the Family Court judge appropriately addressed the recalculation of child support through the application of the statutory factors. If you believe that a post-judgment modification to your child support obligation may be beneficial to you it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modification, child support, child relocation, child custody, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice if an attorney.

Court Denies Wife's Appeal After Downward Modification Of Husband's Child Support

In Licciardi v. Licciardi, an Appellate Division case out of Morris County, the Plaintiff appealed a post-judgment Family Court Order that reduced the Defendant's child support payments, increased his responsibility to pay for their children's extracurricular expenses, and denied her Motion to compel the Defendant to produce documents. After being married for over ten (10) years and having two (2) children together the parties divorced. Rather than a trial on all issues, they entered into a property settlement agreement (PSA) weherin the Defendant agreed to pay child support in the amount of $3,300 a month based upon his gross income of $175,000. Further, the PSA acknowledged that the Defendant was paying child support in excess of the NJ Child Support Guidelines found in Rule 5:6A. The Defendant also agreed not to seek a reduction in his child support obligation for "three years regardless of any change in circumstances . . . . and the child support may be reviewed at the expiration of three years . . . and every two years thereafter until both children are emancipated." In 2010, the Defendant was granted a reduction in his child support obligation. In 2012, two and half years later, the Defendant once again filed for a reduction in his child support. The Plaintiff opposed the Motion seeking an upward adjustment in child support citing that her financial circumstances had taken a down turn and claiming the Defendant's financial information was deceitful. The court again reduced the Defendant's child support and increased his obligation to pay for the children's extracurricular activities. The court found that the parties had established substantial and permanent changed circumstances based upon the Defendant paying monthly child support for a third child that was born from a second wife that he had since divorced. The Plaintiff appealed the Order. According to the Appellate Division, courts are authorized by statute to "revise[] and alter[]" child support Orders "from time to time as circumstances may require." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. The party moving for the modification bears the burden of making a prima facie showing of changed circumstances." Miller v. Miller, 160 N.J. 408, 420, 734 A.2d 752 (1999). Changed circumstances "include an increase in the cost of living, an increase or decrease in the income of the supporting or supported spouse, cohabitation of the dependent spouse, illness or disability arising after the entry of the judgment, and changes in federal tax law." J.B. v. W.B., 215 N.J. 305, 327,73 A.3d 405 (2013). In this case, the Plaintiff argued that the Defendant was not entitled to a reduction in child support because his financial disclosures were incomplete and deceitful. The Appellate Court rejected this argument because the Plaintiff's claims were simply bare assertions that were not supported by any competent, documentary evidence. Therefore, the court affirmed the decision of the Family Court. If you anticipate that you may want to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your child support obligation it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about child support, post-judgment modification, alimony, divorce or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Post-Judgment Modification Of Alimony Denied Upon Lack Of Changed Circumstances

In the recent Appellate Division case, Stratthaus v. Stratthaus, the Plaintiff, Gerard Stratthaus appealed from 2013 Family Court Orders which denied his request for a post-judgment modification of his alimony obligation and a reduction in the amount of life insurance he had to take out for the benefit of his ex-spouse. The Plaintiff argued that the court was wrong to deny him the relief that he sought, specifically, 1) a decrease in his alimony payments, 2) a reduction in his obligation to obtain a $150,000 life insurance policy, 3) a reversal of the requirement that he have to name his wife as both the beneficiary and owner of his life insurance policy, 4) and awarding his ex-wife, Defendant, Mary Stratthaus, half of the gross accounts receivable from his business. The Defendant did not file a response to the Plaintiff's Motion. The parties in this case obtained a divorce in 2008 following a thirty-five (35) year marriage. The Defendant gave birth to three children during their marriage, two of which were emancipated at the time of their divorce and one was still attending college. The parties incorporated a property settlement agreement (PSA) into the Final Judgment of Divorce which stipulated that the Plaintiff was to pay $3,500 a month in permanent alimony which was to be satisfied from the Plaintiff's half of the sale of his business. The parties agreed at that that in 2011 they would revisit the issue of alimony and could modify the amount if circumstances had changed. The PSA also obligated the Plaintiff to maintain a $150,000 life insurance policy for as long as he was required to pay child support and alimony. The Family Court judge who heard the parties' Motions found that the Defendant's actual wages were higher than when the Plaintiff filed his Cross-Motion seeking a reduction than when the obligation was set, therefore, she denied his application without making the Defendant file financial information again and concluded that the Plaintiff did not establish a change in circumstances warranting a modification of his obligation. The Appellate Division held that "The basic contractual nature of matrimonial agreements has long been recognized." Pacifico v. Pacifico, 190 N.J. 258, 265 (2007). "Matrimonial agreements between spouses relating to alimony . . . , which are fair and just, fall within the category of contracts enforceable in equity." Peterson v. Peterson, 85 N.J. 638, 642 (1981). The court further notes that when a party to a comprehensive and mutually negotiated PSA seeks to modify any support obligation, that party must meet the threshold of changed circumstances. J.B. v. W.B., 215 N.J. 305, 327 (2013). According to the Appellate Court, the language in the parties' PSA does not guarantee a modification, it only notes that the parties had the right to seek a modification from the court at a specific time. The court agreed with the Family Court that the Plaintiff had not established a legitimate reduction in his earnings to constitute a changed circumstance. In addition, with regard to the Plaintiff's obligation to take out a life insurance policy in the amount of $150,000, it appeared to the court that the Plaintiff already owned a policy for $75,000 that was provided by his employer and according to the court it did not seem reasonable to compel him to purchase an additional $75,000 policy if he current coverage was available through his employer at no cost. Therefore, as long as the Defendant remains named as the beneficiary for the policy, the Plaintiff does not have to purchase another policy. In all, the Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the Family Court except for the part of the order dealing with the insurance policy. If you anticipate that you may want to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your alimony obligation or any other court mandated legal obligation it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modification, alimony, divorce, child support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

No Vacating A Child Custody Agreement Based on Party's Mistake

In a recent, Morris County New Jersey case, Alexin v. Raiter, the Plaintiff, Alexander Alexin and the Defendant, Irena Raiter, established a consent agreement to provide solutions to child custody issues in their relationship dissolution and the Appellate Division ruled that the Plaintiff could not vacate the agreement after it was signed when he claimed that he thought it was temporary and could be changed. The Plaintiff and Defendant had been dating when they discovered that the Defendant was pregnant. In 2010, a son was born to the couple but their relationship ended soon thereafter. In October of 2012, the Defendant filed a domestic violence complaint against the Plaintiff and was awarded a temporary restraining order. The restraining order granted the Defendant temporary custody of the parties' son and provided no parenting time for the Plaintiff. The parties then filed criminal complaints against each other. In late October 2012, the parties and their attorneys negotiated a civil consent agreement and the Plaintiff and his attorney made handwritten changes to the agreement at that time. The agreement indicated that the parties, through their attorneys, had resolved their issues in consideration of the promises that were made in the agreement. On the issue of child custody, the agreement specified that that Defendant shall have full physical custody of the parties' son and the Plaintiff shall have parenting time on Sundays from 11:00 a.m. until 6:00 p.m. Barely three months after the agreement was signed by the parties and their attorneys, the Plaintiff filed another complaint with the Family Court requesting joint legal and physical custody of the parties' child, arguing that he did not need to show a change in circumstances because he did not enter into the agreement voluntarily. In February 2013, the Family Court conducted a hearing at which the judge issued a written opinion denying the Plaintiff's request to vacate the agreement because the Plaintiff was represented by counsel, had be questioned under oath, and affirmed his understanding of the agreement and his willingness to sign it. The Plaintiff appealed this decision to the Appellate Court and the Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. According to the Appellate Division, although the Plaintiff offered two certifications to support his motion to vacate the agreement, his arguments do not raise a genuine, material issue of fact given the explicit terms of the agreement. The Plaintiff contended that he signed the agreement believing that the terms were temporary and could be changed, and that he only had 10-15 minutes to review the agreement with his attorney. The Appellate Court reasoned that settlement agreements are contracts and therefore "should be enforced according to the intent of the parties." J.B. v. W.B., 215 N.J. 305, 326 (2013). A contracting party to an agreement is "bound by the apparent intention he or she outwardly manifests to the other party. It is immaterial that he or she has a different, secret intention from that outwardly manifested." Brawer v. Brawer, 329 N.J. Super. 213, 283 (App. Div. 2000). Disputes regarding child custody can be of the most important and emotional in family law. If you are involved in a child custody or child support dispute it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before proceeding. For more information on custody, parenting time, post judgment modification, child support, divorce, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit Darlingfirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way intended to replace the advice of an attorney.