Equitable Distribution Dictates Payment Of Mortgage

In Murphy v. Murphy, a New Jersey Appellate Division case out of Morris County, the Defendant appealed from a 2014 Family Court Order that denied his post-judgment Motion to compel the Plaintiff, his ex-wife, to make mortgage payments on the parties' martial residence under the terms they agreed to regarding equitable distribution. The Court also granted her request to compel him to reimburse her for unreimbursed medical expenses and insurance. The parties in this case were married in 1987 and had three (3) children together. They were divorced in 2013, at which time two (2) of their children were emancipated and they shared joint custody of their daughter. Their divorce judgment incorporated a marital settlement agreement (MSA). In the agreement, the Defendant agreed to paying the carrying charges on the marital home until "the house [was] sold, or through January 1, 2014, whichever [was] sooner." Also, the agreement specified that the Defendant was obligated to maintain medical insurance for the Plaintiff and pay for her uncovered or unreimbursed health care expenses until a certain date. The parties assumed that the marital residence would sell before January 1, 2014, but unfortunately it did not and there was no provision in the agreement that provided for mortgage payments beyond that date. The Defendant stopped paying the mortgage after December of 2013. At the end of January 2014, the Defendant filed a Motion to compel the Plaintiff to start paying the mortgage payments. The Plaintiff filed a Cross-Motion for an Order compelling the Defendant to pay the mortgage and for unreimbursed medical bills. A Family Court judge denied the Defendant's Motion finding that the parties had previously agreed that there was no equity in the marital residence and therefore continuing to pay the mortgage would not produce a positive result. Therefore, the judge held that neither party would have to pay the mortgage. In addition, the judge granted the Plaintiff's request to compel the Defendant to pay for unreimbursed medical expenses. The Defendant appealed and on appeal the Defendant argued that the parties' MSA did not obligate him to pay the mortgage after January 1, 2014 and he was also not obligated to reimburse the Plaintiff for unreimbursed medical insurance expenses. The Appellate Division agreed with the Defendant's first argument but disagreed with his second. According to the Appellate Division, "An agreement to settle a lawsuit is a contract which, like all contracts, may be freely entered into and which a court, absent a demonstration of 'fraud or other compelling circumstances,' should honor and enforce as it does other contracts." Pascarella v. Bruck, 190 N.J Super. 118, 124-5 (App Div) certif. denied, 94 N.J. 600 (1983). "Settlement agreements in matrimonial matters, being 'essentially consensual and voluntary in character, ... [are] entitled to considerable weight with respect to their validity and enforceability' in equity, provided they are fair and just." Dolce v. Dolce, 383 N.J. Super. 11, 20 (App. Div. 2006). In this case, the Defendant sought to compel the Plaintiff to pay the mortgage after January 1, 2014 when either the MSA or the divorce judgment specified that she was to do so. The court held that if the Defendant had wanted the Plaintiff to pay the mortgage for as long as she lived in the home he should have negotiated that when the parties were creating their MSA. Therefore, the Appellate Court affirmed the lower court's denial of this request. However, the court found that the Plaintiff was not entitled to unreimbursed medical expenses from the Defendant because she incurred those costs after the date contemplated in their divorce judgment and therefore reversed the lower court's ruling with regard to this issue. The equitable distribution of assets is of the most emotional and complex aspects of a divorce. If you are involved in a battle over the pre- or post-judgment division of marital property, assets, or debts it is extremely important that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about equitable distribution, post-judgment modification, contested divorce, alimony, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Denial Of Husband's Alimony Modification Reversed

In Galante v. Galante, the Defendant appealed from a court order that denied his Motion for a modification of his alimony obligation. The New Jersey Appellate Court reversed the decision of the Family Court and remanded the case back for reconsideration. The parties executed a marital settlement agreement (MSA) in 2011 upon getting divorced. According to the MSA, with regard to equitable distribution, the Plaintiff was to receive the parties' marital residence, the 401k account from one of the Defendant's businesses, and the parties' 2010 tax refund. The Defendant received the parties' 2009 tax refund, and his 50% interest in three businesses that were acquired during the marriage. Further, the MSA provided for a two-step alimony payment schedule because the Defendant was unable to pay off the mortgage that was securing their former marital home. Before the marital home was sold, the Defendant was to pay all of the house expenses and $400 a week in alimony to the Plaintiff. Once the home was sold, he was to pay $1,500 a week in alimony to the Plaintiff. In 2013, the Defendant filed a Motion with the court to modify his alimony obligation, amongst other things. He claimed that his financial circumstances had dramatically declined which resulted in a significant change in circumstances, which justified the modification of the MSA. Specifically, he noted that his businesses had permanently lost their client base after the economic collapse of 2008 and his annual earnings dropped from $400,000 a year to $130,000 constituting a significant change in circumstances. The Family Court denied his application citing that he had failed to establish a prima facie showing of changed circumstances because he failed to provide the court with documentation that proved his claims. The Defendant filed a Motion for reconsideration in which he included his tax returns. The court denied this Motion as well holding that the Defendant was simply trying to cure his deficient documentation with information that was readily available to him when he filed his first Motion. The Defendant appealed. On Appeal the Defendant claimed that he established a prima facie case for a change in circumstances according to Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139 (1980). According to the Appellate Court, alimony "may be revised and altered by the court from time to time as circumstances may require." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. To win on such an application, a showing of "changed circumstances" is required. Weishaus v. Weishaus, 180 N.J. 131, 140-41 (2004). The Appellate Court found that in this case the Defendant did not make broad generalizations and bare assertions that his businesses were suffering, but rather, he provided specific details about his businesses failures and his efforts to rectify his situation. Thus, at the very least, the Defendant presented a prima facie case of changed circumstances and if the Plaintiff materially disputed the Defendant's claims, a plenary hearing should have been held to consider those facts, which was not done. Therefore, the decision of the Family Court was reversed. If you believe that a post-judgment modification to your alimony obligation may be beneficial to you it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modification, alimony, equitable distribution, divorce, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice if an attorney.

Alimony Terminates On Date Cohabitation Begins Absent Proof Of Delay In Economic Benefit

Schlumpf v. Schlumpf, is a New Jersey Appellate Division case in which the Defendant appealed from two (2) post-judgment Family Court Orders filed in 2013 regarding his alimony obligation following the Plaintiff's admitted cohabitation with her significant other. The Defendant claims that the date terminating his alimony obligation should be adjusted by four (4) months (earlier), to when the Plaintiff admitted her cohabitation. The Plaintiff argued that when she began cohabitating with her significant other she did not, at first, receive an economic benefit from the arrangement and therefore the Order terminating the Defendant's obligation at a certain date should not be modified. According to the Appellate Division, its review of the termination of alimony was "limited to whether the court made findings inconsistent with the evidence or unsupported by the record, or erred as a matter of law." Reese v. Weis, 430 N.J. Super. 552, 572 (App. Div. 2013). A Motion requesting the modification of an "alimony obligation 'rests upon its own particular footing and the appellate court must give due recognition to the wide discretion which our law rightly affords to the trial judges who deal with these matters." Donnelly v. Donnelly, 405 N.J. Super. 117, 127 (App. Div. 2009). Typically, alimony can be altered based upon a changed circumstance which rests with the discretion of a Family Court Judge. Larbig v. Larbig, 384 N.J. Super. 17, 21 (App Div. 2006). A type of changed circumstance would be the cohabitation of a spouse. Gayet v. Gayet, 92 N.J. 149 (1983). The parties in this case expressly acknowledged in their Marital Settlement Agreement (MSA) that such an event would constitute a changed circumstance which would warrant the modification of the Defendant's alimony obligation. Beyond cohabitation, there must be proof that a cohabitating spouse is receiving some form of economic benefit from the cohabitation. Reese, supra, 430 N.J. Super. at 557-8, 576. A spouse's proof of cohabitation establishes a rebuttable presumption of changed circumstances that once established shifts the burden of proof to the dependant spouse. Ozolins v. Ozolins, 308 N.J. Super. 243, 248 (App. Div. 1998). In this case, the Appellate Division found that there was no evidence to support the Family Court judge's selection of a particular date for the termination of the Defendant's alimony based only on the Plaintiff's suggested date. A review of the record, indicated to the Appellate Court that the Plaintiff failed to rebut the presumption that she began to get an economic benefit from cohabitating when she moved into her boyfriend's house. Therefore, the court concluded that it was an abuse of the court's discretion to fix the termination date at the date agreed to by the Plaintiff instead of terminating alimony when the Plaintiff and her children relocated to the residence of her boyfriend. The laws governing alimony have recently been changed, making it very important that you seek out the advice of an attorney to protect your rights an entitlements. If you are seeking post-judgment modification of your alimony obligation based upon your ex-spouse's cohabitation it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about alimony, child support, post-judgment modification , or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.