Contributing to Your Children's Education

In Fanelli v. Hnatowski, Plaintiff Daria Fanelli filed a post-judgment motion seeking contribution from her former husband, Kenneth Hnatowski, for 50% of their two children’s private school tuition as was agreed upon in the parties’ property settlement agreement. Fanelli paid the tuition for both children for 9 years without contribution by the Defendant. The parties divorced in 2005 and Plaintiff was the primary caregiver to the children, ages 15 and 16 at the time of the post-judgment motion. At the time of their divorce, the parties entered into a property settlement agreement containing, among other things, that each would pay 50% of the children’s school costs. The children have attended private school since kindergarten. In 2016, the Plaintiff sought a contribution from the Defendant in the amount of 50% of the children’s tuition or a contribution in proportion to the parties’ respective incomes. The Union County Family Part judge hearing the matter ordered the Defendant to pay 50% of the children’s tuition and Defendant appealed on the grounds that the Plaintiff’s failure to seek contribution for 9 years barred her from doing so and that the term “school costs” does not mean tuition. The Defendant directed the court to Hoefers v. Jones, 288 N.J. Super. 590, 611-12 (Ch. Div. 1994), aff’d, 288 N.J. Super. 478 (App. Div. 1996) which sets forth 14 enumerated factors which the court must evaluate when ordering payment. The factors include the ability of parents to pay, the continuity of the children’s education, the contemplation that they would participate in the program for which contribution is sought, whether enrollment was reasonable, the benefit to the child of the program, whether the party enrolling the child had the right to do so, the child’s best interests and other factors. The NJ Appellate Division held that the term “school costs” was not ambiguous and that the Defendant was required to contribute to the children’s tuition under the parties’ agreement. Thereafter, the appellate division stressed the importance of upholding resolutions negotiated by the parties in citing to Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34, 44 (2016), Konzelman v. Konzelman, 158 N.J. 185, 193-94 (1999). The trial court determined that Defendant’s failure to object to the children’s attendance in private school for 9 years operated as implied consent. On appeal, the court found the issue of consent to be of no consequence as the Plaintiff was not seeking contribution for the 9 prior years of private school tuition and the Defendant did not seek relief compelling the children to attend public school. If you need post-judgment relief to enforce litigant’s rights in a family law case, please visit DarlingFirm.com for more information or call us now at 973-584-6200 to schedule a consultation. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of counsel.

Life Insurance Proceeds After Divorce

When going through the divorce process, the spouses may come to an agreement regarding support for a dependent spouse and/or a dependent child or children. A subsequent issue that has to be addressed is how to ensure the dependent spouse and/or dependent child or children are taken care of in the event of the death of the obligor spouse. Often, the obligor spouse agrees to maintain life insurance naming the dependent or dependents as beneficiaries for as long as the financial support obligation exists. The terms of the agreement can then be put into a formal written Property Settlement Agreement referred to as a PSA. What happens if the beneficiary designation on the policy does not comport with the Agreement? In the recent case of Thomas v. Thomas, the Appellate Court in its unpublished opinion considered the distribution of a life insurance policy where the named beneficiaries on the policy did not mirror the terms of the Property Settlement Agreement (PSA). The Appellate Division looked to the language of the Property Settlement Agreement (PSA) between the decedent and his ex-wife which was incorporated into their Judgment of Divorce when determining how the proceeds of the decedent's life insurance policy should be paid out. The Property Settlement Agreement contained spousal and child support provisions as well as a provision requiring the Decedent to maintain a life insurance policy naming the ex-wife as an irrevocable beneficiary for $500,000 so long as there is an alimony obligation and for each child of $125,000 until each child was emancipated. Subsequent to the divorce and prior to the decedent's passing, the decedent's two children were deemed emancipated therefore eliminating his obligation under the PSA to maintain the life insurance for the them. The obligor spouse passed away leaving a one million dollar life insurance policy. The decedent remarried and subsequently changed the beneficiaries on the policy so that his second wife would receive 60% of the proceeds while his ex-wife would receive 15% and his two children from the first marriage would receive 12.5% each. Problems arose when the ex-wife sought to claim $500,000 she believed she was entitled to pursuant to the terms of the Property Settlement Agreement (PSA) and the second wife sought to claim 60% ($600,000). The ex-wife filed a complaint with the court to ensure her claim. The second wife filed a counterclaim to ensure hers and subsequently filed a motion to reduce decedent's alimony obligation under the Property Settlement Agreement (PSA) which was later withdrawn. The second wife further claimed that the term of $500,000 was too much considering the amount of alimony decedent owed at death was less than when the Agreement was created and that the terms of the life insurance provision were automatically effective. She asked that alternatively she be awarded 71% of the 50% of the remainder of the proceeds if 50% was awarded to the ex-wife. She claimed that it reflected the decedent's intent that the children and her would share proportionally in the proceeds. The ex-wife claimed the ex-wife's motion was without merit and filed a cross motion which sought to enforce the terms of the Property Settlement Agreement (PSA) and requested that a constructive trust be utilized to protect her rights to the insurance proceeds. The two children cross-moved to enforce the decedent's beneficiary designation leaving them 12.5% of proceeds to each of them which would only leave the second wife with 25% of the 50% rather than the 71% she sought. The Trial Court ruled in favor of the ex-wife and denied the second wife's motion for reconsideration. The Appellate Court upheld the Trial Court's decision with regard to the ex-wife receiving her $500,000 as reflected in the Property Settlement Agreement (PSA) but reversed its decision as to the distribution to the second wife and the children. It held the remaining $500,000 had to be awarded in accordance with the decedent's intent per his beneficiary designation on the policy. For more information on divorce, alimony, child support, property settlement agreements and post judgment matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and in no way intended to replace the advice of an attorney regarding your specific matter.