Post-Judgment Relief Repeatedly Denied

In Walsh v. Walsh, a post-judgment modification case out of Morris County, the Defendant appealed from three (3) prior Court Orders that directed him to (1) liquidate his assets to pay a money judgment and finding that he failed to fully disclose financial information; (2) denied his relief to pay alimony and other fees; (3) granting the Plaintiff's Motion for enforcement of prior Orders. The parties in this case were married in 1976 and formally divorced in 2003. Their final divorce judgment has been the subject of multiple Motions and appeals. In 2008, the Defendant appealed an Order that modified his alimony obligation and denied his request to recuse the Family Court judge. The Appellate Division reversed and remanded the alimony Order but denied the recusal request. In 2011, the Defendant submitted an application for a reconsideration of the previous Order because he disagreed with the retroactive date that the alimony modification was set to. The court denied all of the relief sought. In 2013, the Defendant filed another Motion for relief from the prior three (3) Orders and the court denied the Defendant's Motion. In 2012, the Plaintiff filed a Motion in aid of litigant's rights to enforce outstanding judgments against the Defendant. In 2013, the court directed the Defendant to liquidate some of his assets to satisfy the money judgments against him. The Defendant filed a Motion for reconsideration which was denied. A subsequent Motion to reconsider the reconsideration was also denied. The Defendant appealed and argued that the court abused its discretion by denying him relief from all of his previous Motions under N.J. Court Rule 4:50-1(f) and N.J. Court Rule 1:7-4(a). The Appellate Division affirmed all of the prior Family Court decisions holding that the Defendant was barred from relief under res judicata. The doctrine of res judicata prevents the repeated litigation of an issue that has been fully and fairly litigated provided that there is 1) a final judgment by a court or competent jurisdiction, 2) identity of issues, 3) identity of parties and 4) identity of the cause of action. Selective Ins. v. McAllister, 327 N.J. Super. 168, 172-73 (App. Div), certif. denied, 164 N.J. 188 (2000). In this case, the Defendant clearly sought to re-litigate issues from previous Court Orders which were affirmed or dismissed on appeal. The repetitiveness of the Defendant's Motions were underscored by his continued reassertion of issues and allegations after the court had ruled on them. The court cannot permit frivolous matters which are fueled by personal revenge to deplete judicial resources. Kozak v. Kozak, 280 N.J. Super. 272, 278 (Ch. Div. 1994), certif. denied, 151 N.J. 73 (1997). Therefore, the Appellate court affirmed the decisions of Family Court. If you anticipate that you may want to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your divorce judgment it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modification, alimony, child support, parenting time, divorce, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Post-Judgment Attorney Fees Awarded

In Lind v. Lind, the Defendant Thomas Lind appealed from a 2012 Family Court post-judgment order stemming from his divorce that directed him to indemnify the Plaintiff, Marita Lind, for legal fees that she incurred to reach a settlement regarding their marital residence and because she was forced to file enforcement Motions. The Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the Family Division. The Plaintiff and Defendant were married on January 4, 1992. They were divorced in 2010 and their final divorce judgment contained partial judgment orders that pertained to specific issues in the case. One in particular, pertained to the disposition of the couple's marital residence through equitable distribution. The parties, at first, financed the home through a mortgage held by Chase Bank and later took out an additional mortgage through Wilmington Trust Company (WTC). In 2005, M&T Bank extended the couple a line of credit, secured by the second mortgage, to them for $107,800. After the parties separated in 2009, the trial court ordered the Defendant who was living in the home, to maintain all recurring costs pending the sale of the residence. The Defendant defaulted on the loan payments and M&T accelerated the sum due on the line of credit. Pursuant to the parties' equitable distribution negotiations and agreement the sale of the home was to be divided equally among them. In 2011, M&T filed a complaint against the Plaintiff and Defendant to recover the money due for the line of credit. Soon thereafter, the Defendant filed for bankruptcy and therefore the M&T and foreclosure actions were stayed for him. The Plaintiff actively defended the actions with her counsel. In 2012, the Plaintiff settled with M&T at a legal cost to her of $15,000 that she borrowed from her sick father. Plaintiff then filed Motions with the court seeking indemnification from the Defendant for the $15,000 she expended to reach a settlement with M&T as well as for attorney's fees she incurred to enforce prior orders issued against him. The trial court ordered the Defendant to repay the Plaintiff for a portion of the Plaintiff's counsel fees involved in reaching the settlement with M&T and for the Court Order Enforcement Motions because her attorney's efforts protected his interests in regard to the settlement and his dismissal of the court orders necessitated her filing of the Motions. The Defendant appealed from this decision. In its holding the Appellate Division found that "an allowance for counsel fees is permitted to any party accorded relief following the filing of a motion in aid of litigant's rights, R. 1:10-3, or to any party in a divorce action, R. 5:3-5(c)." Barr v. Barr, 418 N.J. Super. 18, 46 (App. Div. 2011). In this case, the Appellate Court found that an award of counsel fees to the Plaintiff was proper because the Defendant repeatedly failed to comply with court orders and because the fees were reasonably incurred in efforts to secure the Defendant's compliance with the orders mandating him to pay for the expenses involved with the marital home. The Appellate Division also agreed with the lower court that the Plaintiff should be partially indemnified for the legal costs she incurred to settle with M&T because the Defendant received a benefit from the efforts. If you anticipate that you may want to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your divorce judgment it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modification, attorney's fees, alimony, child support, equitable distribution, divorce, uncontested divorce, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.