Monday, January 9, 2017
With Overnight Parenting Time Comes Responsibility
The NJ Superior Court addressed mid-week overnight parenting time with a non-custodial parent when there were allegations that the children’s performance in school was being hampered by the arrangement in M.C. v. P.C. The court held that the best interests of the child include the child’s educational interests. The court reasoned that when there is sufficient evidence to conclude that overnight midweek parenting time must be eliminated in furtherance of the child’s education, parenting time will be modified. There is an obligation for parents, held the court, to oversee the child’s performance of schoolwork and class preparation. The court also noted that when the parent of alternate residence lives a substantial distance from the parent of primary residence, travel time may also be reason for caution in establishing midweek overnight parenting time during the school year.
When establishing custody, the best interests of your children are always paramount. It is critical that you seek an experienced family law attorney who will assist you in setting up a plan that works best for your family’s needs in order to ensure that during what can be a very difficult time for any child, they have continuity and support to the fullest extent possible. For more information about custody and parenting time, divorce, child support and other family law matters, visit DarlingFirm.com.
This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of counsel.
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Friday, January 6, 2017
Cohabitation Excluded From Property Settlement Agreement Fails To End Alimony
Frick v. Frick was a post-judgment application to terminate alimony based on co-habitation. The parties divorced in 2009 with the court making no findings with regard to alimony, equitable distribution or other matters. The terms of the divorce were set forth within a Property Settlement Agreement (PSA) which both parties testified they entered into freely and voluntarily. Beginning in 2013, Shari Frick began co-habitating with another man and Glen Frick sought termination of his 10-year alimony obligation. The New Jersey Superior Court judge hearing the case terminated alimony, with certain exceptions.
The NJ Appellate Division reversed the decision of the trial court finding that co-habitation is a forseeable occurrence after divorce and the parties failed to include it as a reason to terminate alimony under their Agreement. In light of the fact that the parties included death and remarriage as events which would serve to terminate alimony, the NJ Appellate Division found that, had they intended it to be a trigger for termination of alimony, the parties would have included co-habitation in their PSA.
When divorcing, by way of agreement or trial, it is critical that the agreement or judgment be as detailed as possible in order to avoid misunderstandings or misinterpretations. If you are seeking a reduction of alimony based on co-habitation of your former spouse, it is critical that you obtain an experienced divorce attorney to assist you with your matter. For more information about alimony termination, co-habitation, divorce, property settlement agreements or other family law matters visit DarlingFirm.com.
This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Saturday, December 31, 2016
Thursday, November 24, 2016
Friday, November 11, 2016
Mistake Of Party Does Not Prejudice Child's Right To Child Support
In an appeal of a decision setting the retroactive date for child support, Plaintiff, Jacqueline Kelly, sought to establish child support as of the date set forth in the parties' Property Settlement Agreement (PSA), which was the date that Plaintiff and the child vacated the marital residence. The New Jersey Superior Court, Family Part, Camden County established a retroactive date for payment of child support by Defendant, Vincent Kelly, among other relief. In September 2012, the parties were divorced and the terms of their PSA were incorporated into the final judgment of divorce. Child support was to begin at the time the parties moved to separate residences and the Plaintiff assumed the role of parent of primary residence. Upon vacating the marital residence in December 2012, the Plaintiff failed to complete certain required forms in order to allow the court to establish child support. In August 2013, the Plaintiff filed a motion to enforce the provisions of the PSA pertaining to child support. Relying on N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.23a, the trial judge established child support retroactive to August 2013 when the Plaintiff filed her motion. The Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied.
The Plaintiff appealed in Kelly v. Kelly. The Defendant claimed that (1) the Plaintiff's failure to complete requisite forms delayed the establishment of child support; (2) the Plaintiff sat on her rights by waiting to file the motion; and (3) N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.23a does not provide for establishment of retroactive child support beyond the date the Plaintiff's motion was filed. The N.J. Appellate Division held that N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.23a applied to retroactive modification of an established child support order per Kakstys v. Stevens, 442 N.J. Super. 501 (Ch. Div. 2015) and Mallamo v. Mallamo, 280 N.J. Super. 8 (App. Div. 1995) rather than the establishment of an initial support order as Kelly v. Kelly required. Further, the N.J. Appellate Division held that the Plaintiff's failure to act does not serve to deprive the child of the right to support which was negotiated to begin at the time the parties moved to separate residences. The Appellate Division restated the principal that child support is the right of the child, not the custodial parent. Gottlib v. Gottlib, 399 N.J. Super. 295 (App. Div. 2008). The Appellate Division reversed as to the matter of the retroactive date of child support and directed that child support be established as of the date the Plaintiff and child vacated the marital residence.
The decisions made in divorce, by either the parties or the court in the event of trial, are long lasting and have significant consequences to both parties' and their children. If you are seeking child support or a modification of your present child support order, it is critical that you discuss your situation with an experienced divorce attorney before taking action. For more information about child support, divorce, parenting time, visitation, alimony or other family law matters in NJ visit DarlingFirm.com.
This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Monday, November 7, 2016
Alimony Modification Denied For Lack Of Changed Circumstances
Jill Bier was seeking an increase in the monthly alimony of $25,000 she was receiving from her former husband Robert Bier. Ms. Bier appealed the denial of her application for upward modification of alimony payments by Robert Bier. The couple's final judgment of divorce, which occurred in 2003, made it clear that Jill Bier's monthly medical expenses would increase.
The New Jersey Superior Court, Somerset County, Family Part judge hearing the motion for reconsideration noted the substantial discrepancy between Jill Bier's Case Information Statement (CIS), indicating $17,194 monthly in medical expenses and the certification she submitted in support of her motion which indicated $6,000 per month in medical expenses. Jill Bier provided no documentation of her claimed expenses, her condition or any change therein since the divorce. The judge found Jill Bier's credibility to be questionable in light of conflicting claims of being nearly bed ridden yet purchasing a Mercedes E550 and incurring commuting expenses of $5,500 monthly.
In Bier v. Bier, the New Jersey Appellate Division determined that no as there was no prima facie showing of changed circumstances, as required under Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139 (1980), no evidentiary hearing was required. The Appellate Division followed Larbig v. Larbig, 384 N.J. Super. 17 (App. Div. 2006) in holding that the decision to modify an alimony obligation based on claims of changed circumstances rests with the family part judge. Finding no reason to disturb the decision, the N.J. Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the trial judge.
If you are facing divorce, alimony can have lasting and substantial consequences upon your future whether you are the obligee or the obligor. It is imperative that you obtain an experienced divorce attorney for your divorce or motion for modification in order to ensure that your rights are protected. For more information about divorce, alimony, child support and other family law matters visit DarlingFirm.com.
This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Tuesday, November 1, 2016
Final Restraining Order (FRO) Cannot Be Granted Without Factual Findings
L.S. sought a final restraining order against J.P. under the Protection of Domestic Violence Act (N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -34). L.S. and J.P. were both married to others but had an affair with each other for approximately 1 year before their spouses became aware. L.S. attempted to terminate the relationship in approximately May 2013 and J.P. continued to contact her. L.S. sought a final restraining order (FRO) against J.P. The FRO was granted in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Bergen County.
In L.S. v. J.P., J.P. appealed focusing on the court's finding that he had committed the act of harassment (N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4). J.P. maintained that the relationship continued, in a pattern of arguments and reconciliations, up until the time L.S. filed the charges against him. The court below focused only on the messages from L.S. to J.P. did not make findings regarding messages J.P sent to L.S. The court below made no findings about the credibility of the parties. Most importantly for J.P., the court failed to make the required finding that J.P. intended to harass or annoy L.S.
In Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112, 127 (App. Div. 2006), the court set forth a two step inquiry. First it must be established by the Plaintiff that a predicate act of domestic violence occurred against a person protected by the act. Thereafter, it must be determined that a restraining order is necessary to protect the victim from immediate danger or further abuse. The Appellate Division reversed and remanded for factual findings supporting the decision.
If you are charged with domestic violence or you are seeking a final restraining order against an abuser, there are specific burdens of proof for both parties in proving or disproving the charges making it critical that you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to represent you in such matters. For more information regarding domestic violence, restraining orders, assault, battery and other criminal law issues in NJ visit DarlingFirm.com.
This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
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