Appointment Of Retired Judge As Parenting Coordinator In Custody Matter Is Appealed

In Cestone v. Cestone, the Plaintiff appealed from a series of Family Court Orders with regard to the agreement to appoint a retired New Jersey judge to serve as a parenting coordinator in a child custody dispute. The Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. The parties in this case were divorced in 2007 and at that time executed a custody agreement as part of their divorce. Three (3) children were born of the marriage and pursuant to the custody agreement that was filed with the divorce judgment, the parties were to share joint custody of the children, and the children would live primarily with the Plaintiff at her residence. As part of their agreement, the parties agreed to use the mediation services provided by a New Jersey law firm and a retired judge to resolve disputes regarding custody. In 2012, the Family Court denied the Plaintiff's Motion to disqualify the retired judge as the parent coordinator. Also in 2012, the Family Court denied the Defendant's application for sole custody of the parties' two younger children, to restrict the Plaintiff's contact with them, and to appoint various therapists for the children. The trial court held that the Plaintiff was in violation of litigant's rights for refusing to comply with the aforementioned Court Orders. On appeal the Plaintiff argued that the court erred in denying the Motion to recuse the parent coordinator because he had a conflict of interest as a mediator and retired judge in violation of Directive 5-08. According to the Appellate Division, Directive 5-08 prohibits retired judges from serving as attorneys in contested matters in New Jersey state courts, testifying as expert character witnesses, and accepting fee-generating court-initiated appointments except when both qualified through training and experience and providing the first two hours of mediation at no cost to the litigants. Further, communications and conduct during mediation are confidential, unless confidentiality is expressly waived by all parties or substantially outweighed by the need for disclosure. Lehr v. Afflitto, 382 N.J. Super. 376, 391 (App. Div. 2006); N.J.C.R. 1:40-4; N.J.S.A. 2A:23C-8. According to the Appellate Court, nowhere in her legal argument did the Plaintiff provide support for her position that the retired judge was conflicted or in violation of Directive 5-08. Although a parenting coordinator does some mediation techniques, it serves to facilitate day-to-day parenting issues that very commonly arise within the context of life. Further, the parties chose and agreed that this particular retired judge would be their parenting coordinator and there was never a suggestion that he was unqualified to do so therefore, the court did not find a basis to overturn the Family Court's decision. Child custody and parenting time cases are of the most emotional and difficult cases in all of family law. If you anticipate that you may want to petition the court for a modification of your current child custody arrangement it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about child custody, parenting time, child support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Happy New Year!

Happy New Year from all of us at The Darling Law Firm to all of you! Please remember to celebrate responsibly. HeatherDarlingLawyer.com

Mother Wins Custody Appeal After Husband Violates Order

In the recent Appellate Division case, Luyster v. Colucci, the Plaintiff, Jennifer Luyster, appealed from a 2013 Court Order denying her Motion to Enforce Litigant's Rights against the Defendant, James Colucci, to enforce a court ordered parenting time schedule. The Appellate Division reversed and remanded the decision of the lower court back for a hearing on the Motion. The parties in this case were married in 1997 and two (2) children were born of the marriage in 2000 and 2002 respectively. In 2003, the parties obtained a final divorce judgment which incorporated a Consent Order that defined custody and parenting time. The parties were to share joint custody of the children with the children living with the Plaintiff as the parent of primary residence. Further, the agreement specified that the Defendant was to have the children for two (2) weeks each summer. In 2013, the Plaintiff filed a Motion with the court requesting that it find that the Defendant was in violation of litigant's rights for interfering with the parenting time schedule because he retained the children for longer than his agreed-upon summer parenting time. The trial court issued an Order in September 2013 denying the Plaintiff's Motion as moot because the summer was over and therefore the issue of summer parenting time was no longer resolvable. The Plaintiff appealed from this decision arguing that the court erred by not making a determination as to whether or not the Defendant's conduct violated litigant's rights and the parenting time schedule. The Appellate Division held that the trial court erred in deciding that the Motion to enforce litigant's rights was moot because "summer vacations [were] over." The Appellate Court found that in addition to a Motion to enforce litigant's rights under N.J. Court Rule 1:10-3, additional remedies are available for violations of custody and parenting time Orders, including compensatory time with the children, economic sanctions, court-ordered counseling, and modification of the custodial arrangement pursuant to N.J. Court Rule 5:3-7(a). Ultimately, the fact that the summer was over when the trial court heard the Plaintiff's Motion did not prevent the court from addressing and remedying any violation that may have occured. Pasqua v. Council, 186 N.J. 127, 133 (2006); P.T. v. M.S., 325 N.J. Super. 193, 208 (App. Div. 1999). The Appellate Division agreed with the Plaintiff's argument on appeal and reversed and remanded the decision of the Family Court for a hearing on the Plaintiff's Motion to enforce litigant's rights. Child custody and parenting time cases are of the most emotional and difficult cases in all of family law. If you anticipate that you may want to petition the court for a modification of your current child custody arrangement it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about child custody, parenting time, child support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

No Extension Of Limited Duration Alimony

In the recent Appellate Division case from Morris County, Buscher v. Tully, a post-judgment matrimonial matter, the Defendant Steven Tully appealed from the Family Court's Order granting the Plaintiff, Ann Buscher's Motion to extend the period of her limited duration alimony. The parties in this case were divorced in 2007 after eighteen (18) years of marriage. The parties' final divorce judgment incorporated a property settlement agreement (PSA). There were three (3) children born of the marriage one of which was almost seventeen, other eleven, and the final emancipated at the time of the divorce. Pursuant to the PSA, the Defendant agreed to pay limited duration alimony to begin after the parties' sold their marital residence and to end in December of 2016. The parties also agreed to live together in the house after their divorce and until the home was sold. While they lived together after their divorce, the Defendant agreed to place almost all of his income in a joint account to assist with living expenses. The record indicates that the parties did not list the marital residence for sale in 2007 and the Plaintiff remained in the home until 2011, when she left with the parties' youngest child. The Defendant remained in the home with the other unemancipated child until 2012. While the Plaintiff lived in the home she worked part-time, completed her undergraduate education and eventually obtained a Master's degree. In 2013, post-judgment Motions were heard in which the Plaintiff requested that because the parties did not sell the home until 2012 she wanted her alimony end date to be extended. The Defendant argued that the court should enforce the plain language of the PSA which provided that alimony would not commence until the house was sold because when the parties entered into the PSA they did not know when the house would be sold and the agreement made sure that the Defendant would not have to pay both alimony and the carrying costs of the home at the same time. The Family Court granted the Plaintiff's Motion to compel payment of alimony though 2020 concluding that the parties intended that the Plaintiff would receive nine (9) years of alimony. The Defendant appealed arguing that the court erred in awarding nine (9) years of alimony ignoring the plain language of the PSA and that the extension of limited duration alimony violated N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. In reversing and remanding the decision of the lower court the Appellate Court held that it discerned no basis in the PSA or extrinsic circumstances for the trial court's conclusion that the parties intended to award the Plaintiff nine (9) years of alimony. The parties agreed to remain in the home for an indefinite period of time after the divorce, until the house was sold. During that time, the Defendant agreed to bear the majority of the home expenses and that these expenditures were undoubtedly a form of spousal support or alimony. Schorr v. Schorr, 341 N.J. Super. 132, 139 (App. Div. 2001); Mendell v. Mendell, 162 N.J. Super. 469, 475-76 (App. Div. 1978). If you anticipate that you may want to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your alimony obligation it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about alimony, post-judgment modification, equitable distribution, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Happy Holidays

May the warmth and cheer of the holiday season be in your hearts. From all of us at The Darling Law Firm

Child Custody Decision Reversed For Unaccepted Science

In the recent Appellate Division case, M.A. v. A.I., the Defendant, A.I., appealed from a 2011 Court Order, awarding, M.A., the Plaintiff sole legal and residential custody of the parties' children so that the Plaintiff and the children could engage in a reunification program and denying reconsideration of a prior Order. In this case, the Defendant had not had authorized contact with his children in two years and the Appellate Division reversed and remanded for a quick determination regarding his parenting time because the Family Court relied upon scientific evidence that was not widely accepted in the social science community. The Plaintiff and Defendant were married in 1989. Their marriage bore two (2) children. In 2007, their marriage began to fall apart and both children became hostile toward their mother. After the Plaintiff filed for divorce the children refused to spend time with her. A therapist was enlisted to help the children deal with the situation, but to no avail. In 2009, the Plaintiff filed a Motion with the court to compel the parties and the children to continue to attend family therapy with a therapist, to establish a parenting schedule, and to appoint a guardian at litem (GAL) for the children. In 2011, the Family Court determined that it was within the best interests of the children if they were to have relationships with both parents. The court realized that the children's relationship with the Plaintiff was in deep distress and needed instant help. The court ordered that the Plaintiff and her children participate in a family intervention program and sole legal and physical custody of the children was awarded to the Plaintiff on that date and during which the Defendant was to not have un-authorized contact with the children. In its findings, the court held that the Defendant engaged in behavior that amounted to alienation of the Plaintiff. In his appeal, the Defendant argued that the Family Court erred in awarding sole custody of the children to the Plaintiff and prohibiting him from having contact with them. The Appellate Court declined to address whether the Family Court was mistaken to award sole custody of the children to the Plaintiff. The record reflected that the determinations of the Family Court were made so that the family could secure the services of the family intervention program and the court viewed the ruling as an interim measure. However, the Appellate Division found that the Family Court erred in basing its decision in part on eight Parental Alienation Syndrome criteria that the judge drew upon from literature and testimony. Under N.J.R.E. 702, if scientific evidence will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert to testify on the specific issue is required and the science must be generally accepted in the scientific community. Dehanes v. Rothman, 158 N.J. 90, 100 (1999). At the time of the hearing, Parental Alienation Syndrome was not recognized by the DSM-IV and is not yet accepted as a scientifically accepted theory. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded the decision of the Family Court back for a parenting time and custody hearing to be conducted immediately. Child custody and parenting time cases are of the most emotional and difficult cases in all of family law. If you anticipate that you may want to petition the court for a modification of your current child custody arrangement it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about child custody, parenting time, child support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

No Modifaction Of Alimony Or Child Support For Party Failing To Appear In Divorce

In the recent Appellate Division case, Vaish v. Vaish, the Plaintiff, Rajiv Vaish, appealed from a 2012 Family Court Order that denied his Motion to vacate parts of his Judgment of Divorce as with regard to issues of equitable distribution, alimony and child support. The parties in this case were married 1986 and two (2) children were born of the marriage. The first child was born in 1990 and the second in 1994. In 2010, the Defendant, Sanmati Vaish, filed for divorce. For reasons that were unclear the court initially dismissed her Complaint and then later reinstated it, and before the reinstatement, the Plaintiff filed a Complaint for Divorce which the parties decided to proceed under. Before a scheduled Early Settlement Panel (ESP) at the court problems arose between the Plaintiff and his attorney which lead the attorney to withdraw from representation and the Plaintiff to fail to attend the ESP. The court then dismissed the Plaintiff's Complaint for failure to appear at the ESP meeting. In 2011, the Defendant filed a request for a Default Judgment to be entered against the Plaintiff followed by an application for equitable distribution of the parties' assets and property. Copies of these documents were provided to the Plaintiff's new attorneys at that time. In October of 2011, the Family Court held a hearing on the Defendant's application for equitable distribution and the Plaintiff failed to appear. Upon hearing the Defendant's testimony and considering her expert's report the court entered a Final Divorce Judgment and accepted the Defendant's uncontested submission for equitable distribution, child support, and alimony. In October of 2012, 364 days after this judgment was entered, the Plaintiff filed a Motion with the court to vacate parts of the divorce judgment with regard to child support and alimony. The judge denied the Plaintiff's Motion finding that he did not demonstrate good cause to vacate the judgment and he did not prove that there had been changed circumstances that would warrant a modification. The Plaintiff then appealed arguing that the judgment of divorce should be vacated under N.J. court Rule 4:50-1(a). According the Appellate Division, the portion of N.J. Court Rule 4:50-1(a) that was relevant to this appeal is subsection (a) which allows relief from a judgment due to "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." These categories include instances where a party "through no fault of its own, has [made] . . . a mistaken judgment on a material point at issue in the litigation. DEG, LLC v. Twp. of Fairfield, 198 N.J. 242 262 (2009). The Plaintiff's claim for relief based upon excusable neglect is based upon his argument that he did not know that a default hearing was scheduled in 2011. The Plaintiff's own attorney admitted that the Plaintiff had notice of the hearing. Therefore, the decision of the Family Court was affirmed. The equitable distribution of assets is of the most emotional and complex aspects of a divorce. If you are involved in a battle over the division of marital property, assets, or debts it is extremely important that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about equitable distribution, post-judgment modification, contested divorce, spousal support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Equitable Distribution Of Home Is Open For Argument After Ambiguous PSA

In the recent Appellate Division case, Paintsil v. Oppong-manu, a post-judgment matrimonial case, the Defendant ex-husband appealed from a 2012 Family Court Order which enforced a property settlement agreement (PSA) with regard to the Plaintiff ex-wife's right to receive $22,672.50 as a share of the equitable distribution of their former marital home because he argued the provisions of their PSA were ambiguous and open to multiple interpretations. The parties in this case were marred in 1991 and obtained a divorce in 2008. They had two (2) children born in 1993 and 1997 respectively. On the date that their judgment of divorce was issued they entered into a PSA which designated the Defendant as the parent of primary residence and upon which the Defendant waived child support in exchange for the Plaintiff's waiver of alimony. Further, a provision of the PSA specifically directed that both parties are entitled to 50% of the equity of the marital residence and the "Husband agrees to [buy out] Wife's portion of the residence" if this was not possible then the house was to be sold and the proceeds to be split evenly. Specifically, the parties agreed that the fair market value of the marital home was $435,000 with a principal mortgage of $339,655 and an equity line of credit of $80,000. Therefore, at the time the equity in the home totaled $15,345 and subsequently the Plaintiff was entitled to $7,672.50. From the $80,000 home equity line of credit the parties used $30,000 on improvements and the Plaintiff received $10,000 which resulted in $40,000 that remained. According to the PSA, the Plaintiff was entitled to 50% less the $10,000 advance that she received and should have received another $15,000 additionally from the home equity line of credit. In total, the Plaintiff then was entitled to $22,672.50 from the marital home. In 2012, the Plaintiff filed a Motion to enforce litigant's rights to force the Defendant to pay her the money she was owed under the PSA. The Defendant argued that he could not refinance the home and the value of the home had dropped significantly since the divorce and that the PSA contemplated such an event allowing for modifications to the payouts. The judge found the Defendant was in violation of litigant's rights and ordered him to pay the Plaintiff $22,672.50 plus interest within thirty (30) days of the Order without holding a plenary hearing to evaluate the language of the PSA. The Defendant appealed. According to the Appellate Court, "[I]t is a basic rule of contractual interpretation that a court must discern and implement the common intention of the parties.: Pacifico v. Pacifico, 190 N.J. 258, 266 (2007). If the meaning of a contract such as a PSA is in dispute the court role is to consider "what is written in the context of the circumstances at the time of drafting and to apply a rational meaning in keeping with the 'expressed general purpose'." Atl. N. Airlines, Inc. v. Schwimmer, 12 N.J. 293, 302 (1953). In applying these principals the Appellate Division found that the trial court mistakenly exercised its discretion by finding that the Plaintiff was entitled to the enforcement of the PSA because more than one reasonable interpretation of the provisions was presented to the court, requiring a further plenary hearing that did not occur. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded the case back for further findings. The equitable distribution of assets is of the most emotional and complex aspects of a divorce. If you are involved in a battle over the division of marital property, assets, or debts it is extremely important that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about equitable distribution, post-judgment modification, contested divorce, spousal support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Appeal Of Child Support On Due Process Grounds

In the recent Appellate Division case out of Essex County, Barreto v. Bryant, the Defendant, Juan Bryant, appealed from a 2013 Family Court Order that denied his pro se Motion to modify a prior Court Order setting child support for a child that was conceived by he and the Plaintiff, Evelyn Barreto. In 2012, the Defendant's child support obligation was set by the court at $153 a week with a $5,049 arrears. This Order further specified that the child support was calculated using the NJ Child Support Guidelines and New Jersey Court Rule 5:6A based upon the Defendant's imputed income of $57,750. In late 2012, the Defendant first sought to modify his obligation based upon changed financial circumstances. In 2013, a judge denied this requested because the Defendant failed to provide sufficient proof that he was experiencing a significant and permanent/long term change in circumstances. Soon thereafter, the Defendant filed another Motion for a downward modification of his child support obligation and this time provided his W-2 documents from 2012 which demonstrated that his annual pay was $33,470. At a hearing before a hearing officer held on the matter, the Plaintiff was present and the Defendant did not physically appear. The hearing officer denied the Defendant's Motion and noted that the Defendant only lived one hour away and that the court did not allow telephonic appearance for people who are only one hour away. An Order was issued on April 24, 2014 by a Family Court judge which indicated that the Defendant's Motion had indeed been denied for failing to show a change in circumstances and that the Defendant "lives within [ninety] minutes of the court house and he should appear for court proceedings." The Defendant filed a timely appeal arguing that he was never contacted by phone for the April 2013 hearing and therefore the merits of his Motion were never heard. The Appellate Division held that self-represented litigants are accorded the same procedural due process rights as those who are represented by counsel. Ridge at Back Brook, LLC v. Klenert, 437 N.J. Super. 90, 99 (App. Div. 2014). According to the Appellate Court, the Defendant was not offered a modicum of due process in the proceedings held in April of 2013. During prior proceedings the Defendant was specifically advised that he would have an opportunity to present his proofs to the court and he was denied that opportunity. The Appellate Division offered no conclusions as to the merits of the Defendant's Motion for a downward modification of his child support but reversed and remanded the case back to the Family Court to hold proceedings that would allow the Defendant to offer his proofs. If you anticipate that you may want to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your child support obligation it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modification, parenting time, child support, child relocation, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Court Denies Woman's Request To Reduce Alimony Obligation

In the recent Appellate Division case out of Essex County, Clark v. Pomponio, Bonnie Clark, Plaintiff, appealed from a 2013 post-judgment modification Court Order that denied her Cross Motion for a reduction in her alimony obligation owed to Defendant, Anthony Pomponio. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the lower court. The parties in this case were married in 1982 and only one child was born of the marriage. For the majority of the marriage the parties owned and operated North Jersey Diamond Wheel (NJDW). The Plaintiff filed for divorce in 2001 and the Defendant filed an Answer and Counterclaim in 2002. During the divorce proceedings the Defendant filed for Chapter 13 Bankruptcy. During his automatic bankruptcy stay under 11 U.S.C.A. 362(a) the trial court dismissed the Defendant's Answer for failure to provide discovery. After the stay was lifted the trial court entered a default judgment in 2004. In 2005, the court issued a judgment of divorce (JOD), which distributed the marital assets, set forth the Plaintiff's waiver of alimony, and awarded counsel fees to the Plaintiff. The Defendant appealed, arguing that his right to present an affirmative defense was denied because his Answer was improperly dismissed. In 2008, the Appellate Court reversed portions of the default judgment that pertained to equitable distribution, counsel fees, and alimony. After a trial was conducted on the issues, the Family Court judge rendered a decision in 2011 memorializing ownership of NJDW to the Plaintiff and required her to pay Defendant permanent alimony in the amount of $35,000 per year which was later reduced to $20,000 a year in 2012. In 2013, the Plaintiff submitted an application to reduce her alimony based upon a change in circumstances with regard to the finances of NJDW. The judge denied the Plaintiff's Motion for an alimony reduction because her Motion failed to attach all prior Case Information Statements (CIS) according to New Jersey Court Rule 5:5-4(a), as well as a lack of a prima facie showing of a change in circumstances. Larbig v. Larbig, 384 N.J. Super. 17, 23 (App. Div. 2006). The Plaintiff appealed. The Appellate Division ruled that post-judgment Motions involving disputes concerning support obligations must be accompanied by both prior and current CISs according to N.J.C.R. 5:5-4(a). The rule is mandatory and not permissive. The CISs provide a way for the trial judge to get a complete picture of the finances of the movants in a modification case. Guyla v. Gulya, 251 N.J. Super. 250, 253 (App. Div. 1991) . Further, alimony awards may be modified according to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 and the "party seeking modification has the burden of demonstrating a change in circumstances warranting relief from the support or maintenance obligations." Innes v. Innes, 117, N.J. 496, 504 (1990). In this case, the Plaintiff was unable to show that the reduction in her income was not merely temporary and therefore her Motion was properly denied. If you anticipate that you may want to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your alimony obligation it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about alimony, post-judgment modification , equitable distribution, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlinglawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Father Obtains Permission To Relocate With Children

In the recent Appellate Division case out of Morris County, Valedofsky v. Valedofsky, the Defendant, Jennifer Valedofsky, appealed from a post-judgment 2013 Court Order that allowed the Plaintiff, David Valedofsky, to relocate with their children from New Jersey to Rhode Island. The Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the Family Division. The parties in this case were married in 2000 and subsequently had two (2) children, born in 2004 and 2006 respectively. They obtained a divorce in Pennsylvania in 2010 and the Defendant was directed to be the custodial parent for the children. In 2011, the Plaintiff, who was living in New Jersey applied to the court to gain custody of his children. The Plaintiff was granted primary custody of the children. After this, the Defendant relocated to New Jersey to be closer to her family and her children. She then moved before the court in New Jersey for a 50/50 custody share. In 2012, the judge denied her Motion due to no change in circumstances. In 2013, the Plaintiff filed a Motion with the court to relocate with the children to Rhode Island because he received a promotion in his job that included a raise and expanded his opportunities to further advance within his company. Further, his entire extended family lived in Rhode Island. The Defendant opposed the Motion contesting that the Defendant's application for relocation was not made in good faith and cross moved for custody of the children. The Motion judge granted the Plaintiff's Motion to relocate after applying the factors found in Baures v. Lewis, 167 N.J. 91 (2001), and finding that the request was made in good faith that included benefits for the children. The Defendant appealed from this judgment. The Appellate Division held that when the physical custodial relationship among a set of parents is such that one parent serves as the primary caretaker and the other parent as secondary caretaker, then the custodial parent's request to relocate is governed by the two-part test found in the Baures case. Id. at 122. The test requires that removal be permitted where the preponderance of the evidence demonstrates the custodial parent has a good faith reason for the move and the move will not be inimical to the children's interests (the children will not suffer from the move). This standard ensures that the custodial parent has the right to seek happiness and fulfillment and guarantees regular communication and contact between the non-custodial parent and the child and incorporates a variation on a best interests analysis by requiring proof that a child will not suffer from the move. MacKinnon v. MacKinnon, 191 N.J. 240, 257 (2007). In this case, the judge that ruled on the Plaintiff's Motion analyzed all applicable factors and found that the Plaintiff made a prima facie case that the move was in good faith and would not be inimical to the children. The Defendant did not provide the court with any proof that the move was not requested in good faith or that it would be harmful to the children. Therefore, the court affirmed the decision of the Family Division. Disputes regarding child relocation can be of the most important in family law because of the substantial impact that decisions regarding these issues will have upon the lives of the parties and their children. If you are involved in a child relocation dispute it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before proceeding. For more information on child relocation, custody and visitation, parenting time, divorce, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and is in no way intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Motion For Reconsideration of Equitable Distribution Of Home Denied

In the recent Appellate Division case out of Morris County, Abdalla v. Assadourian, the Plaintiff, Fatima Abdalla, appealed from a 2013 Court Order that denied reconsideration of the part of the Order dealing with the equitable distribution of the parties' former marital residence. The previous Court Order directed that the proceeds received upon the sale of the home were to be divided equally amongst the parties, after the Defendant, Hovsep Assadourian, remitted $15,600 to Plaintiff in alimony arrears from his share of the proceeds. The Appellate Court affirmed the lower court's denial of the Plaintiff's request. The parties in this case were married in 1973 and subsequently obtained a divorce in 2003. The parties did not memorialize a property settlement agreement (PSA) and the Plaintiff's attorney retired and destroyed her file. The parties did not agree on the substance of their settlement so a hearing was held to discern the specifics. The Plaintiff testified that she did not understand her divorce proceedings because she is Arabic and did not have an interpreter at the time of her divorce. She claimed that she was unaware who was supposed to pay the mortgage, taxes, and insurance on the marital home but that she never made such payments since her divorce yet she continued to live in the home with the parties' two sons. The Defendant testified that he was under the impression that the house was to be sold immediately after the divorce and the proceeds divided equally. Both parties were in their 60's at the hearing and both were unemployed. At the conclusion of the hearing the judge ruled that the marital home was to be sold immediately. The Plaintiff refused to participate in the sale and in 2012 the judge appointed a listing agent and ordered that the parties sign the listing agreement within 10 days. Soon thereafter the judge appointed an attorney to act as a signatory to executed the listing agreement on behalf of the Plaintiff and assessed $3,000 in counsel fees against her. The Plaintiff's attorney filed a Motion for reconsideration in 2013. The Motion was filed more than five (5) months after the judge first ordered the home sold, which was wall beyond the non-enlargeable twenty (20) day time period as prescribed in the court roles. N.J.C.R. 4:49-2; N.J.C.R. 1:3-4(c). The trial judge denied the Motion for reconsideration because it was untimely. A Motion for reconsideration is addressed to the "sound discretion of the [c]ourt, to be exercised in the interests of justice." Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 384 (App. Div. 1996). Reconsideration should be utilized only for those cases which fall into that narrow category in which either 1) the court has expressed its decision based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or 2) it is obvious that the court either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence. Id. The Appellate Court held that the Plaintiff sought reconsideration because she alleged she would be able to find new evidence to convince the judge to change the decision. The judge viewed her Motion as a stall tactic because the Plaintiff made clear by her behavior that her intention was to not cooperate in the sale of the home. The trial judge exercised sound discretion in denying the Plaintiff's Motion for reconsideration. The equitable distribution of assets is of the most emotional and complex aspects of a divorce. If you are involved in a battle over the division of marital property, assets, or debts it is extremely important that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about equitable distribution, post-judgment modification, contested divorce, spousal support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Alimony Reduction As Ex-Wife Cohabitates

In the recent Appellate Division case on appeal from Morris County, Clayton v. Clayton, the Plaintiff William Clayton appealed from a post-judgment Order arguing that the Defendant, Susan Clayton's cohabitant's financial support and her earned income represent a change in circumstances to modify his alimony obligation. This case returned to the Appellate Court after the court remanded it back to the trial court for additional evidence based upon the Plaintiff's application to terminate his alimony obligation upon a change in circumstances. On remand, a new judge took the testimony of the parties and lowered the monthly reduction of alimony from $874 a month to $47. The Plaintiff then filed another appeal making the same arguments that he previously made. The parties in this case were married in 1970 and had four (4) children. They divorce in 1997 and the Defendant moved in with her cohabitant, a man named Stuart Vreeland in 2002. Initially the court found that "Cohabitation alone is not justification to terminate spousal support," and the true test for alimony is the financial needs of the dependant spouse. Gayet v. Gayet, 92 N.J. 149 (1983). The question becomes whether or not the relationship had reduced the needs of the former spouse. Ozolins v. Ozolins, 308 N.J. Super. 243, 247 (App. Div. 1998). The remand judge found that the Defendant's job, which paid her $28,000 a year, did not represent a change of circumstances because she had been employed at the time of the divorce and that her income had remained approximately steady over the intervening years. The judge found that Mr. Vreeland contributed $47 less than his half of the shared expenses and the Plaintiff was in part supporting Vreeland with alimony and therefore the judge reduced the Plaintiff's alimony by $47. The Appellate Division held that the decision whether to modify or terminate alimony based upon a claim of changed circumstances "rests within a Family Part judge's sound discretion." Larbig v. Larbig, 384 N.J. Super. 17, 21 (App. Div. 2006). In this case, the remand judge held a hearing where each party offered his and her testimony on the issues. The court found that if the Defendant's shared expenses represented fixed expenses that the Defendant would incur regardless of whether or not Mr. Vreeland lived with her, then it can be said that his contribution is being used to partly support the Defendant. Using the Defendant's Case Information Statement as well as documents reflecting Mr. Vreeland's contribution the Appellate Court recalculated that the Plaintiff's reduction in monthly alimony should be $934 and not $47. Therefore, the case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to enter a correct Order noting the change. If you anticipate that you may want to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your alimony obligation it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about alimony, divorce, child support, equitable distribution, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlinglawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Mother Compelled To Secure Passport And Pay Counsel Fees

In the recent Appellate Division case out of Union County, Lamb v. Lamb, the Defendant, Jill Lamb appealed from a portion of a 2013 post-judgment Court Order dealing with her child custody, specifically ordering her to 1) comply with obtaining a passport for the parties' 14 year old daughter so that she could accompany her father, the Plaintiff, Lucas Lamb, to the Bahamas, and 2) awarding the Plaintiff's attorney fees of $3,385. The parties in this case were married in 1999. They obtained a divorce in 2002, pursuant to a final divorce judgment that awarded them joint custody of A.L., their daughter. The Defendant is the parent of primary residence and the Plaintiff is the parent of alternate residence. The issue that gave rise to this appeal arose out of a Disney cruise trip to the Bahamas that the Plaintiff planned to go on with the parties' daughter in 2013. The trip was to include the Plaintiff's new wife and their two children as well as A.L. In 2013, the Plaintiff e-mailed the trip details to the Defendant and explicitly asked the Defendant to confirm that she agreed to allow A.L. to attend the trip. The Defendant responded that she agreed as long as the trip did not cause any conflicts with A.L.'s school schedule. In these e-mails, the Plaintiff asked whether A.L.'s passport was current and told the Defendant that if the passport was expired he would take her during his parenting time to update it. The Plaintiff argued that the trip did not require A.L. to secure a passport and an altercation ensued. The Defendant argued that Disney suggested that passengers have a passport in case he or she got sick and needed immediate health care. In June of 2013, the Plaintiff filed an Order to Show Cause (OTSC) because the passport issue remained unresolved. The court found that there was not material facts in dispute and ordered the Defendant to cooperate in obtaining a passport for A.L. and ordered that the Defendant pay the Plaintiff's legal fees to bring the action totaling $3,385. The Defendant appealed from this decision. In her papers, the Defendant admitted that the passport issue was a moot point because she had agreed to allow the parties' daughter to go on the cruise and she executed the passport documents and the trip took place but argued that she did not act in bad faith with regard to the passport and the court erred in directing her to pay the Plaintiff's legal fees. The Appellate Division agreed that the passport issue was moot holding that an issue becomes moot when "when the original issue presented has been resolved, at least concerning the parties who initiated the litigation." De Vesa v. Dorsey, 134 N.J. 420, 428 (1993). With regard to the award of counsel fees, the Defendant argues that the motion judge failed to consider the required factors under N.J.C.R. 5:3-5(c) and only focused on the bad faith factor. According to the Appellate Court, a judge in a matrimonial action may award a party reasonable attorney's fees and to make that determination shall "consider . . . the good or bad faith of either party." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23; N.J.C.R. 5:3-5(c). The court held that the motion judge's analysis of the factors could have been more detailed but the record indicated that the counsel fees were awarded to Plaintiff as a direct result of his efforts to compel the Defendant's compliance with an already agreed upon visitation and therefore the award was not unreasonable. Child custody and parenting time cases are of the most emotional and difficult cases in all of family law. If you anticipate that you may want to petition the court for a modification of your current child custody arrangement it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about child custody, parenting time, child support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Same-Sex Divorce Law Lags Behind Same-Sex Marriage Law in NJ

It has been over one year since same-sex marriage has become legal in New Jersey and since October 21, 2013 and the decision in Garden State Equality v. Dow, N.J. 216, 314 (2013) hundreds of homosexual couples from New Jersey and beyond have applied in this state for marriage licenses, but obtaining a same-sex divorce may prove to be a trickier ordeal. Twenty states in America still have legislation that prohibits homosexual couples from legally marrying each other. For many residents of these particular states, New Jersey has proven to be viable destination to travel to for the purposes of marrying. Many same-sex couples living in states that still ban gay and lesbian marriage routinely travel to other states to get married. The velocity with which same-sex marriage laws have been changing throughout the county have provided people in this predicament with many potential wedding destinations. The problem is, same-sex divorce laws have not adapted to accommodate this practice. It stands to reason that the majority of states that do not recognize gay or lesbian marriages also do not recognize same-sex divorce. Therefore, if a LGBT married couple desires to get a divorce there may be logistical obstacles that may impede the process. For instance, in New Jersey a gay or lesbian married couple who may live in another state but traveled to New Jersey to get married will most likely have difficulty obtaining a legal divorce in this state because of New Jersey's residency requirement. According to the laws of this state, either or both of the spouses in a legal marriage must be a bona fide resident of New Jersey and if a couple wants to obtain a divorce on any grounds other than adultery, this residence requirement must have been established for one full year before the divorce papers are filed. The status of this aspect of the law may make it difficult for out of state residents who marred in New Jersey to get a divorce if they did not relocate to the state following their marriage - which indicates that thousands of people throughout the country may be affected by this. If you are a gay or lesbian couple who plan on seeking a legal marriage or filing for a same-sex divorce or would like more information regarding same-sex divorce it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before proceeding. For more information about same-sex marriage, same-sex divorce, equitable distribution, alimony, custody and visitation, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and it is in no way intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Court Denies Man's Request To Lower Alimony For Temporary Change in Circumstances

In the recent Appellate Division case, Lax v. Lax, a post-judgment matrimonial matter, the Plaintiff, David Lax, appealed from a 2013 Family Court Order that denied his Motion to reduce his alimony obligation. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the lower court. The parties in this case were married in 1986 and obtained a legal divorce in 2008. Their final divorce judgment incorporated a Property Settlement Agreement (PSA) in which the Plaintiff agreed to pay the Defendant permanent alimony in the amount of $7,000 per month. In 2011, the Plaintiff filed an application with the court to modify his spousal support obligation. A series of Cross-Motions followed that resulted in a plenary hearing in which the Plaintiff sought to prove changed circumstances based upon a change in his financial situation and the Defendant's co-habitation with another person. The judge determined that no co-habitation existed but that the Plaintiff had proven a change in circumstances warranting a modification of his obligation. Subsequently, the Plaintiff's alimony obligation was reduced to $2,000 a month. Following this ruling, the Defendant filed a Motion for reconsideration and the Plaintiff once again filed for another downward modification of his obligation. This time the court denied his request for another modification and he appealed. The Appellate Court held that its review of the Family Court's decision is limited stating that "Whether an alimony obligation should be modified based upon a claim of changed circumstances rests within a Family Part judge's sound discretion." Larbig v. Larbig, 384 N.J. Super. 17, 21 (App. Div. 2006). Further, it stated that "Courts have consistently rejected requests for modification based on circumstances which are only temporary." Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 145-46 (1980). In this case, the Plaintiff filed his second Motion for another downward modification of his spousal support obligation only three (3) months after the previous order modifying his obligation was issued. The Family Court properly found that there was no evidence in the record to prove that the Plaintiff's financial situation was anything other than temporary. The Appellate Division agreed with the decision of the Family Court and for the aforementioned reasons affirmed the lower court's denial of the Plaintiff's request. If you anticipate that you may want to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your alimony obligation it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about alimony, divorce, child support, equitable distribution, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Court Modifies Child Support And Custody Based on Father's Mental Instability

In the recent Appellate Division case, Cowie v. Cowie, the Plaintiff, in a post-judgment matrimonial matter, appealed from a 2013 court order denying her Motion to reconsider and modify the Defendant's child support obligation retroactively after his custody was diminished due to mental illness. The Appellate Court reversed the decision of the Family Court and remanded the case back to that court for reconsideration. The parties in this case were married in 1999 and the marriage bore two (2) children, a son born in 2001 and another son born in 2003. In 2011, the parties obtained a divorce and entered into a property settlement agreement (PSA) on the same date. The PSA specified that the parties were to share joint legal and residential custody of their children and were to share equal parenting time. Child support was calculated using the NJ Child Support Guidelines based upon the shared parenting worksheet. Subsequently, the Defendant began to suffer from mental health problems and in 2012 the Plaintiff sought temporary sole legal and residential custody of their children as well as a suspension of the Defendant's parenting time. Shortly thereafter, the Family Court granted the Plaintiff's request for temporary sole legal and residential custody of the parties' children and established supervised visitation with the Defendant without over nights. In 2013, the Plaintiff submitted a Motion for a modification of the Defendant's child support obligation because the custody arrangement had been drastically modified. The judge denied her request because the arrangement was deemed to be "temporary." The Plaintiff appealed from this decision. The Appellate Division found that the Plaintiff's application to modify the Defendant's child support was governed by well-settled legal principles. Specifically, a party seeking to modify a child support obligation has the burden of presenting a prima facie case of change circumstances. Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J.139, 157-59 (1980); Innes v. Innes, 117 N.J. 496, 504 (1990); N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. The Appellate Division held that in this case there has been a changed circumstance in the parties' parenting time and that the change in custody was due to the Defendant's incapacity and lack of ability to provide adequate care for his children. Although the modification to the original custody arrangement was deemed to be "temporary," there was no contemplation in the record as to the duration of the Defendant's incapacity. Although courts can reject requests for modification based upon temporary changed circumstances, there is no bright line rule to measure changed circumstances and therefore any determination is left to the discretion of the court. In this case, there has been a "reasonable" time period of the changed circumstance and the children should not be denied appropriate support to meet their needs. Therefore, the Appellate Division reversed the decision of the lower court and remanded the case back to the court for an Order consistent with its decision. If you anticipate that you may want to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your child support obligation it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modification, parenting time, child support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Child Support Modification Sought As Father's Income Decreased And Mother's Increased

In the recent post judgment Appellate Division case, Bigge v. Walker, the Plaintiff appealed from a 2013 Family Court Order that denied his Motion to modify his child support and life insurance obligations. The Appellate Division reversed the decision of the lower court. The parties involved in this case were married in 1987 and subsequently divorced in 1999. One child was born of the marriage in 1991. The parties' divorce judgment directed that the Plaintiff was to pay $105 a week in child support plus an additional $45 a week toward an arrears that had accumulated after they separated. The amount was determined by the parties without using the NJ Child Support Guidelines. In addition, the divorce judgment required that the Plaintiff maintain $100,000 in life insurance to secure his child support obligation. In 2013, the Plaintiff filed a Motion to modify his child support obligation because his work was not steady and he was often unemployed and as a result he fell into arrears. He further asserted that he was suffering from severe health problems and had recently undergone a triple bypass heart surgery which impeded his ability to work. In 2010, he had got a job working in a mail room an earned $26,955 a year as of 2012. In 2013, the Family Court denied the Plaintiff's Motion to modify his child support. The Plaintiff appealed. According to the Appellate Court, child support orders are subject to modification pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 and based upon a showing of changed circumstances. Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 157 (1980). A Family Court motion judge may modify a child support obligation when the party seeking the alteration satisfies the burden of showing a change in circumstances. Dramatic changes in the income or earning capacity of either party, or in the circumstances of their children due to events such as attending college, may result in a finding of a changed circumstance. Colca v. Anson, 413 N.J. 405, 415-16 (App. Div. 2010). In this case, the Appellate Division found that the Family Court judge mistakenly exercised his discretion when he denied the Plaintiff's Motion to modify his child support as his income had been significantly reduced while the Defendant's income had increased. Therefore, the Appellate Division was satisfied that the Family judge did not make adequate findings with respect to the Plaintiff's child support obligation and life insurance requirement and the decision was reversed and remanded back to the Family Court for further proceedings. If you anticipate that you may want to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your child support obligation it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modification, divorce, child support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Father Contests College Tuition Obligations In Post-Judgment Divorce Filing

In the recent Appellate Division case, Gropper v. Gropper, the Defendant, Cy Gropper, appealed from two post-judgment Orders of the Morris County Family Court concerning his obligation to contribute to his son's college expenses based upon his final divorce judgment. The Defendant appealed from two (2) Family Court Orders, one filed on March 20, 2013 that directed him to pay $50 a week directly to the parties' son in child support and 58% of the child's college costs and expenses. The second Order, which was filed on May 21, 2013, denied the Defendant's Motion to reconsider the relief ordered in the previous Court Order. The Defendant claimed that his Motion for reconsideration was not properly considered by the court and that he should not have been ordered to pay his son's private school tuition when "the same education can be obtained a reputable public [state sponsored] schools" for a much lower cost. The Appellate Court ordered a limited remand to review the Defendant's Motion. The parties in this case were divorced in 1995. Their marriage yielded two children and pursuant to the property settlement agreement (PSA) which was incorporated into their final divorce judgment they were to share joint legal custody of their children and were to share their children's college education costs 52% by the Defendant and 48% by the Plaintiff. After the divorce, the Defendant moved to North Carolina. The parties' younger son applied and was accepted to attend an online private college, the University of Advancing Technology (UAT) as well as the University of North Carolina-Charlotte (UNC). Since he had to have spinal surgery, the child did not immediately attend college and subsequently moved to North Carolina. Based upon the child's move and his representation to UNC that his primary residence was the Defendant's address, the Defendant filed a Motion to modify his child support obligation asserting that any child support should be paid directly to the child and that the parties agreed that the child would attend UNC. The Plaintiff filed a Cross-Motion arguing that she agreed that the child support could be sent by Probation directly to the child, but disagreed that an amount adjustment was warranted. Further, she sought a review of each party's college expense contribution amount because the Defendant's income had increased from the time of the divorce. The Plaintiff also asserted that the parties' son had reluctantly agreed to attend UNC and planned on finishing his coursework at UAT because that school offered a major not found at UNC. In a 2013 Court Order, the judge modified the parties' child support obligations. In addition, with regard to the college expenses, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a), the judge ordered that the UAT tuition "after all loans, grants, and scholarships have been obtained" shall be paid 58% by the Defendant and 42% by the Plaintiff. The Defendant appealed. The Appellate Division found that the Family Court judge's statement of reasons supporting the Order at issue regarding the parties' respective college tuition obligations was premised on analysis of the child support statute, but did not mention any consideration of the factors outlined in Newburg v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529 (1982). Further, the Defendant, in his papers, also accurately indentified the need to consider whether the child is enrolled on a full-time basis. Khalaf v. Khalaf, 58 N.J. 63, 71-72 (1971). Therefore, the Appellate Division remanded the case back to the Family Court for an re-evaluation consistent with its opinion. If you anticipate that you may want to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your divorce judgment regarding issues such as your obligation to pay your child's college expenses it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modification, child support, parenting time, divorce, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

FMLA Could Be Extended to Couples in Same-Sex Marriages Throughout Nation

Gay and lesbian couples who were joined in same-sex marriages are now entitled to the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) in states that recognize marriage equality, but the FMLA could also be extended throughout the nation to include common law spouses even in states that currently do not recognize same-sex marriage as well. The U.S. Department of Labor recently proposed a new rule that would extend the effect and benefits of the FMLA to same-sex couples and common law spouses throughout the country. Employers had until August 11, 2014 to submit their comments and suggestions regarding the new proposed rule change. The FMLA covers employers with fifty (50) or more employees within seventy-five (75) miles of each other. As it is written, the law permits any eligible employee to apply for and take up to twelve (12) weeks of unpaid leave within a 12-month period of time if and when a member of his or her family has a serious health condition. The FMLA designates a family member as a parent or child under the age or 18 or a spouse. Previously, only legally married heterosexual couples qualified as spouses under the law. In 2014, the United States Supreme Court struck down parts of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) which defined "marriage" and "spouse" to be limited to heterosexual partners. This ruling changed the definition of "spouse" with regard to the FMLA to include a legally married same-sex spouse, if that person worked in a state that recognized marriage equality but not in states that did not recognize same-sex marriages. The current proposed rule would expand FMLA to the spouses of gay and lesbian individuals as long as the marriage was legal in the state where it was entered into even if they work in a state where same-sex marriage is not legal. The new rule would also expand the FMLA to common law spouses in all fifty (50) U.S. states, provided that the relationship is recognized in at least one state. If you are a gay or lesbian couple who plan on seeking a legal marriage or filing for a same-sex divorce or would like more information regarding same-sex divorce it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before proceeding. For more information about same-sex marriage, same-sex divorce, same-sex relationship dissolution, equitable distribution, alimony, custody and visitation, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and it is in no way intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Release of Escrow Funds To pay Legal Fees

In the recent Appellate Division case, Meyers v. Meyers, the Defendant Andrew Meyers, appealed from a post-judgment Order that denied the release of funds held in escrow to pay his attorney fees and for personal use pursuant to his Final Divorce Judgment. The Appellate Division affirmed. The parties in this case were married in 1968, separated in 2005, and officially divorced in 2009. The parties have three children, of which have been emancipated. At the end of the marriage the husband earned approximately $140,000 a year and the wife $84,000. Their assets included a marital residence, a vacation home, and bank and retirement accounts. In 2007, while the parties' divorce was proceeding, Mr. Meyers withdrew the entire balance of his 401K, totaling $335,000, which resulted in tax liabilities. It was also discovered at that time that the husband had not filed a tax return since 2004. The parties' marital residence was sold before the completion of the divorce so that the proceeds could be used to pay certain debts. In addition, equal shares of $25,000 were distributed to each party to assist in the divorce expenses with the remainder being placed in escrow for equitable distribution. After a divorce trial, the Family Court ruled that the parties were to share equally in the proceeds resulting from the sale of the marital property. The court also ruled that Mr. Meyers' was also responsible for all income tax and interest, as well as, all penalties that were due because he liquidated his retirement assets. Following this, the court created an escrow account in the amount of 40% of Mr. Meyers' income in the years that he did not pay taxes in order to protect his ex-wife from being charged with tax liabilities. The court judgment provided for Mr. Meyers' full portion of the escrow funds resulting from the sale of the marital home, totaling $94,921.47, to be transferred directly to another account held by his attorney for the sole purposing of paying for his income tax penalties. Subsequently, Mr. Meyers applied for a release of the escrowed funds to pay for $32,000 of his attorney's fees and $43,000 for her personal use. The Family Court denied his Motion for these funds stating that the amount of taxes that he owed exceeded the amount held in escrow. Mr. Meyers appealed. The Appellate Division held the parties' final divorce judgment specifically ordered the creation of the escrow account to pay for the tax debt that Mr. Meyers owed to the IRS and therefore the Family Court had the proper basis to order that the escrow account remain undisturbed until the tax issues were resolved. Mr. Meyers also argued that the escrowed funds should be released because his attorney had a valid lien against those funds according to N.J.S.A. 2A:13-5 and that the attorney's lien took precedence over the tax lien. According to the Appellate Court, the New Jersey Attorney's Lien Act, states that any attorney representing a party in an action "shall have a lien for compensation . . . which shall contain and attach to a verdict, report, decision, award, judgment or final order in his client's favor, and the proceeds thereof in whose hands they may come." Musikoff v. Jay Parrino's The Mint, L.L.C., 172 N.J. 133, 139 (2002). In this case, the escrow funds were not part of a judgment or Order in Mr. Meyers' favor. They were a conditional award as part of equitable distribution. Therefore, the Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the Family Court. If you anticipate that you may want to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your divorce judgment it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modification, divorce, custody, parenting time, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Reimbursement of Child Support and Legal Fees Awarded post-Judgment

The recent Appellate Division case, Dickson v. Hansson, is a post-judgment dissolution case in which the Plaintiff, Abra Dickson, appealed from a 2013 Family Court order awarding her ex-husband, the Defendant Peter Hansson, counsel fees totaling $3,200 stemming from his successful Motion to enforce an earlier court order involving his over payment of child support. On appeal, the Plaintiff asserts that the counsel fees were not warranted because she did not "act in bad faith," and the court failed to properly apply Rule 5:3-5(c). The Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. in 2012, the Family Court ordered a modification of the Defendant's child support obligation to recognize the parties' daughter's college expenses. In the order, the court terminated the Defendant's child support obligation affective August 2012, based upon provisions in the parties' Property Settlement Agreement (PSA) regarding the Defendant's obligation to pay 100% of his daughter's college expenses. After the order was issued, the Defendant's attorney asked the Plaintiff for a refund of a few months of child support payments that the Defendant made prior to the issuance of the court order in the amount of $2,826. The Plaintiff responded by stating that the money was gone because she gave it to their daughter who spent it on expenses. In 2013, the Defendant filed a Motion to enforce the prior court order to get back the money that he over paid in child support and requested counsel fees. The Family Court judge ordered that the Plaintiff refund the Defendant $2,826 in child support that he paid and awarded the Defendant $3,200 in counsel fees. The Plaintiff appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the lower court and held that "an allowance of counsel fees and costs in a family action id discretionary" but requires the court to consider the factors set forth in Rule 5:3-5(c). Eaton v. Grau, 368 N.J. Super. 215, 225 (App. Div. 2004). The Appellate Division did not receive any information provided to the trial court when it calculated the attorney's fee award from the Plaintiff and therefore the court was in no position to overturn that portion of the Family Court's ruling. Further, the court found no abuse of discretion in the Family Court's ruling. It found that the Plaintiff intentionally failed to comply with the court's order directing repayment to the Defendant, and taking the unreasonable position that the child support should be reimbursed by her daughter and not the Plaintiff herself. The court determined that the Plaintiff's decision to give the child support money to her daughter did not relieve her of the obligation to refund the overpayment. If you anticipate that you may want to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your child support obligation it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modification, divorce, child support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Equitable Distribution of Pension Reversed on Appeal

In the recent Appellate Division case, Krupinski v. Krupinski, the Court reversed the Family Court's decision denying Mr. Krupinski's Motion to terminate his alimony and directed the trial court to provide an order for an exchange of discovery in a post-divorce equitable distribution dispute over a party's pension. Mr. Krupinski appealed from the lower court's decision because his ex-wife, whom he divorced in 1990, was continuing to receive a large portion of his teacher's pension through a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO), which entitled his ex-spouse to the marital portion of his pension. When the parties divorced, Mr. Krupinski was earning $45,000 a year. After the divorce, he acquired advanced degrees and eventually got a job working for the school administration. When he retired his pension was based upon a yearly salary of $132,000. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b), "when a share of a retirement benefit is treated as an asset for purposes of equitable distribution, the court shall not consider income generated thereafter by that share for the purposes of determining alimony." D'Oro v. D'Oro, 187 N.J. Super. 377, 454 (Ch. Div. 1982). In the current case, the Appellate Court found that the Family Court erred in denying Mr. Krupinksi's Motion to terminate his alimony obligation without making an initial determination that his pension benefit had increased because of his post-divorce education and training. According to the court, the Motion judge was required to identify which portion of Mr. Krupinksi's pension shared by his ex-spouse was a joint effort of the parties during their marriage and which part was due to his post-divorce efforts. Based upon this determination, the post-divorce increase in Mr. Krupinski's salary should be excluded from the equitable distribution of the marital asset. The Appellate Division ultimately held that the case should be remanded to the Family Court for the establishment of a discovery schedule to determine whether or not there are material issues of fact in dispute warranting an evidence hearing with regard the distribution of the marital asset. The equitable distribution of assets and alimony are of the most emotional and complex aspects of a divorce. If you are involved in a battle over the division of marital property, assets, or debts or alimony it is extremely important that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about equitable distribution, alimony, contested divorce, spousal support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Limited Duration Alimony Award Appealed By Husband

In the recent post-judgment case, Manduley v. Perez-Manduley, Jesus Manduley, appealed from a Family Court award of four years of limited duration alimony totaling $3640 a year to his ex-wife, Defendant Ana Perez-Manduley. The Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the Family Division. The parties in this case were married in 2005 in the Dominican Republic. After their nuptials, the Plaintiff returned to New Jersey where he found work as a trash collector. The Defendant remained in the Dominican Republic to work as a nurse's assistant because she was not an American citizen. During that time, the Plaintiff sent money to the Defendant to assist her with her living costs. Eventually, she moved to the United States where the parties lived in New Jersey. The marriage never bore any children. The Defendant was dependent on her husband when she lived in the Dominican Republic and although she worked as a home aid in America, the Plaintiff paid the vast majority of the household expenses. At the divorce trial, the Defendant requested an award of four years of limited duration alimony at $500 per month totaling $6,000 a year. The Plaintiff stated that he would agree to pay some alimony if the city that employed him agreed to allow him to work overtime, but otherwise alimony should not be awarded. The Family Judge ruled that the Plaintiff was to pay the Defendant limited duration alimony in the amount of $3640 per year and that she would receive her marital share of his pension. The Plaintiff appealed from this judgment. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the Family Court. The Appellate Court found that the trial judge's decision regarding alimony was consistent with the proofs that were presented at trial and properly made pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(c). Both parties are parties of limited means and because the Plaintiff provided primary support for the family during the marriage he should have to pay modest alimony. Further, the four year term of the alimony award was considered to be fair for a seven year marriage. The award equitably served the purposes of limited duration alimony under the law. Gnall v. Gnall, 432 N.J. Super. 129, 150 (App. Div. 2013). If you anticipate that you may want to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your alimony or child support obligation it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about alimony, divorce, child support, equitable distribution, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Oral Palimony Agreements Enforceable If Made Before 2010

Last week, in the case of Maeker v. Ross, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that any oral agreements or promises to provide lifetime financial support to a non-married long term paramour prior to the year 2010 may give rise to an action for palimony. In 2010, the New Jersey legislature changed the law to amend the statute of frauds, N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h), which prohibited the enforcement of oral palimony agreements. The law directs that "a promise by one party to a non-marital personal relationship to provide support or other consideration for the other party, either during the course of such relationship or after its termination" must be in writing, signed by the parties and with the advice of independent counsel. In the aforementioned case, the Supreme Court of New Jersey had to render a decision as to whether or not the statue applies retroactively to palimony agreements made before the statute was amended. In Maeker, William Ross moved to rely on the language of N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h) to dismiss Beverly Maeker's action to compel the enforcement of an oral palimony agreement between the parties. The parties' relationship lasted for thirteen (13) years and although they never married, they lived together for the vast majority of that time. During the duration of their relationship, Ross paid for all of Maeker's living expenses and made many promises that he would continue to take care of her. Based upon these promises, Maeker left her 20-year career in architectural glass. In 2011, Ross dissolved the parties' relationship and ceased his financial support of Maeker. Subsequently, Maeker filed a Complaint to enforce the parties' oral palimony agreement. Ross argued that because the agreement was never reduced to writing or signed by the parties, the statute of frauds prevented the agreement from being enforceable in court. The trial court denied Ross's motion to dismiss, but the Appellate Division reversed the decision of the lower court holding that the statute of frauds prevented Maeker's claim from being successful. This month, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the 2010 amendment to the statute of frauds was not designed to make oral palimony agreements created before 2010 unenforceable because the state legislature understands that the court system does not retroactively apply statutes and because there was no discernible legislative intent that the amendment was to be applied retroactively, therefore the Court declined to apply the statute in this case. Written agreements are an important way to protect your security and assets in the event that a relationship dissolves. Due to the potentially complex nature of such agreements, if you would like to enforce or establish a palimony agreement to protect your rights it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before proceeding. For more information about palimony agreements, prenuptial agreements, divorce, alimony, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and is in no way intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Collaborative Law Act Directs NJ Toward Mediation

Most recently, the headlines have been cluttered with news about New Jersey alimony reform, but on September 10, 2014 Governor Christie also signed the New Jersey Family Collaborative Law Act into law which allows parties to engage a process very similar to mediation. Collaborative law is a derivation of mediation and/or other alternative dispute resolutions where a lawyer is hired to assist a client in solving family issues in a non-adversarial manner without utilizing the court system. In these types of situations the goal of both parties is to reach a resolution to their family law problems without resorting to litigation. Participants must enter into a collaborative law participation agreement which must be signed by the parties, include the parties' intention to resolve their issues using the collaborative law method, mention the confidentiality of the communications and evidence involved, establish the scope of the dispute, and detail how everything will begin and end. The agreement must also contain the identity of the collaborative lawyer representing the parties and define/limit that lawyer's role in the process. The process is concluded when there is a signed settlement agreement or a formal termination of the process. A party may terminate the process if and when: 1) giving notice in a record that the process has ended, with or without cause; 2) if and when a party files a document without the agreement of all parties; 3) if either party obtains or becomes subject to a temporary or final restraining order; 4) an action being initiated asking a tribunal issue a form of emergency relief to protect the health, safety, welfare, or interests of a party; 5) firing their collaborative law attorney; 6) a party does not provide all of the necessary information to properly resolves a dispute; or 7) the collaborative law attorney ceases further representation of a party. Utilizing alternative dispute resolution methods such as collaborative law or mediation can provide parties with a cost saving and emotionally softer approach to revolving their family law issues while avoiding the complex and expensive route of litigation. Collaborative law can be very powerful in theory but it requires that both parties act with reason and possess the motivation to resolve issues voluntarily and with good intentions. If you are thinking about filing for divorce or utilizing collaborative law, mediation, or any other alternative dispute resolution method during your divorce proceeding it is advisable that consult with an attorney who has experience in his area of the law. For more information about mediation, divorce, uncontested divorce, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

NJ Alimony Reform

On September 10, 2014, after three (3) years of political and legislative back and forth, New Jersey Governor Chris Christie signed into law an alimony reform a bill that went into immediate effect and alters the state's existing alimony law, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. The new law creates durational limits and enumerates particular factors that concern the modification process and termination of alimony. It is important to note that the new reform law does not apply to alimony awards that have already been established and will only affect alimony awards proactively. Specifically, the law "shall not be construed either to modify the duration or alimony ordered or agreed upon or other specifically bargained for contractual provisions that have been incorporated into: 1) a final judgment of divorce or dissolution; 2) a final order that has concluded post-judgment litigation; or 3) any enforceable written agreement between the parties." Therefore, the new law will only apply to divorces that are currently in proceedings and all future divorces. The law will also apply to all future applications for the modification of alimony obligations based upon changed circumstances. First, the most significant alteration to the current laws regarding alimony is that the term "permanent alimony" has been replaced by "open durational alimony." From now on, for any marriage which lasted less than twenty (20) years, the total duration of alimony shall not exceed the length of the marriage, except for situations of "exceptional circumstances." Some of these circumstances include: the ages of the parties at the time of the marriage and at the time of the alimony award; the degree and duration of dependency of one party on the other party during the marriage; whether a spouse has a chronic illness; whether a spouse has given up a career or a career opportunity or otherwise supported the career of the other spouse; and others. This change to the law garnered additional support following the 2013 decision of Gnall v. Gnall, 432 N.J. Super. 129 (App. Div. 2013), which a marriage of fifteen (15) years was considered a long term marriage warranting permanent alimony. The new law effectively erases the legal import of that decision because it directs that a marriage of less than twenty (20) years is not a "permanent" alimony situation. Next, the court is required to consider how long interim or pendente lite support was paid during the proceedings in determining a final alimony award. This may deter a payee spouse from causing delays in divorce proceedings as a means of continuing to receive interim monthly support because he or she believes it will not have an impact on the final alimony obligation. With respect to retirement age, "full retirement age" is now defined as the age at "which a person is eligible to receive full retirement benefits" from Social Security. The new alimony reform law contains other more complex changes to the ways in which alimony will be awarded in the future. If you anticipate that you will be filing for divorce or may want to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your alimony it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about alimony, post-judgment modification, divorce, child support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com or click here to e-mail us. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Post-Judgment Attorney Fees Awarded

In Lind v. Lind, the Defendant Thomas Lind appealed from a 2012 Family Court post-judgment order stemming from his divorce that directed him to indemnify the Plaintiff, Marita Lind, for legal fees that she incurred to reach a settlement regarding their marital residence and because she was forced to file enforcement Motions. The Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the Family Division. The Plaintiff and Defendant were married on January 4, 1992. They were divorced in 2010 and their final divorce judgment contained partial judgment orders that pertained to specific issues in the case. One in particular, pertained to the disposition of the couple's marital residence through equitable distribution. The parties, at first, financed the home through a mortgage held by Chase Bank and later took out an additional mortgage through Wilmington Trust Company (WTC). In 2005, M&T Bank extended the couple a line of credit, secured by the second mortgage, to them for $107,800. After the parties separated in 2009, the trial court ordered the Defendant who was living in the home, to maintain all recurring costs pending the sale of the residence. The Defendant defaulted on the loan payments and M&T accelerated the sum due on the line of credit. Pursuant to the parties' equitable distribution negotiations and agreement the sale of the home was to be divided equally among them. In 2011, M&T filed a complaint against the Plaintiff and Defendant to recover the money due for the line of credit. Soon thereafter, the Defendant filed for bankruptcy and therefore the M&T and foreclosure actions were stayed for him. The Plaintiff actively defended the actions with her counsel. In 2012, the Plaintiff settled with M&T at a legal cost to her of $15,000 that she borrowed from her sick father. Plaintiff then filed Motions with the court seeking indemnification from the Defendant for the $15,000 she expended to reach a settlement with M&T as well as for attorney's fees she incurred to enforce prior orders issued against him. The trial court ordered the Defendant to repay the Plaintiff for a portion of the Plaintiff's counsel fees involved in reaching the settlement with M&T and for the Court Order Enforcement Motions because her attorney's efforts protected his interests in regard to the settlement and his dismissal of the court orders necessitated her filing of the Motions. The Defendant appealed from this decision. In its holding the Appellate Division found that "an allowance for counsel fees is permitted to any party accorded relief following the filing of a motion in aid of litigant's rights, R. 1:10-3, or to any party in a divorce action, R. 5:3-5(c)." Barr v. Barr, 418 N.J. Super. 18, 46 (App. Div. 2011). In this case, the Appellate Court found that an award of counsel fees to the Plaintiff was proper because the Defendant repeatedly failed to comply with court orders and because the fees were reasonably incurred in efforts to secure the Defendant's compliance with the orders mandating him to pay for the expenses involved with the marital home. The Appellate Division also agreed with the lower court that the Plaintiff should be partially indemnified for the legal costs she incurred to settle with M&T because the Defendant received a benefit from the efforts. If you anticipate that you may want to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your divorce judgment it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modification, attorney's fees, alimony, child support, equitable distribution, divorce, uncontested divorce, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Wife's Failure to Cooperate With Parenting Time Results In Transfer Of Custody To Father

In the recent Appellate Division case, I.O. v. M.C., the Defendant M.C. appealed from a 2013 Family Court Order that transferred legal and residential custody of her son Mark, to his father, the Plaintiff, and temporarily restricted her parenting time to one hour of supervised parenting time a week because she failed to cooperate with prior Court Orders. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the Family Court. The parties in this case were never legally married. After dating the Plaintiff for a couple of years, the Defendant gave birth to Mark in 2003. The Plaintiff contends that from the moment of Mark's birth he and the Defendant have engaged in routine disagreements about his role in Mark's life. The Plaintiff claims that the Defendant always believed that he should not participate in Mark's life and therefore she attempted to control every aspect of the child's life by herself. In 2005, the Plaintiff made an application to the court to determine custody and child support because the Defendant would not allow him any parenting time. Subsequently, the parties entered into a consent order that included a parenting time schedule and an agreement to attend family counseling. The Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant disregarded the agreement soon thereafter. Due to this, the Family Court appointed Marcy Pasternak, Psy.D. to be a parenting coordinator in the case. In 2006, the Plaintiff filed a Motion to enforce the parenting time order and require the Defendant to attend parenting sessions with Dr. Pasternak. Years of unsuccessful efforts by more than one Family Court judge to maintain residential custody with the Defendant while allowing the Plaintiff to successfully co-parent ensued. The Defendant signed many Consent Orders that directed that she would cooperate in co-parenting with the Plaintiff, but she failed to follow through with anything. In 2013, based upon an application by the Plaintiff, a Family Court judge found that the Plaintiff had proved a change in circumstances that were detrimental to Mark's best interests. The judge analyzed the applicable factors of N.J.S.A. 9:2-4 in arriving at his decision to transfer custody to the Plaintiff. The current appeal followed. On appeal, the Defendant argued that the Family Court judge erred in transferring sole custody to the Plaintiff because he based his opinion on erroneous facts that she refused to co-parent. According to the Appellate Court, a party who seeks modification of a judgment or order regarding custody or visitation "must meet the burden of showing changed circumstances and that the agreement is [no longer] in the best interests of the child." Abouzahr v. Matera-Abouzahr, 361 N.J. Super. 135, 152 (App. Div. 2003). This issue of such a modification is two-fold and sequential. Faucett v. Vasquez, 411 N.J. Super. 108, 127 (App. Div. 2009). The party who seeks modification of a custody arrangement must "first make a prima facie showing . . . that a genuine issue of fact exists bearing upon a critical question such as the best interests of the child . . . Once a prima facie showing is made, [the party] is entitled to a plenary hearing to resolve the disputed facts." Faucett, 411 N.J. Super. at 127. The trier of fact also must consider the factors found in N.J.S.A. 9:2-4. The Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the lower court citing that the goal is to "assure [the Plaintiff] frequent and continuing contact with both parents." N.J.S.A. 9:2-4. Nevertheless, that goal can only be achieved if both parents understand that the other has a fundamental right to the care of their child and the Defendant has consistently ignored orders of the court that allow the Plaintiff access to the parties' child. Child custody and parenting time cases are of the most emotional and difficult cases in all of family law. If you anticipate that you may want to petition the court for a modification of your current child custody arrangement it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about child custody, parenting time, child support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Equitable Distribution Impacts Alimony Calculation

In the recent Appellate Division case, Overbay v. Overbay, the Defendant Mary Ellen Overbay appealed from a 2013 Family Court Order that reduced her alimony award and the amount of life insurance that her ex-husband, the Plaintiff Bruce Overbay, must maintain for her benefit as part of the process of equitable distribution. The parties in this case were divorced in 2002 following a thirty-one year marriage. All three (3) of their children were emancipated at the time of their divorce. The Plaintiff is currently seventy years old and the Defendant is sixty-seven. At the time of their divorce, the Plaintiff was working for ExxonMobil earning $132,000 per year. The Defendant was not in good health at the time of the divorce and was teaching two classes at Seton Hall University and earned $12,000 a year. Given her significant medical problems, the judge found that her "future employability [was] uncertain." The court ordered equitable distribution and determined that the Plaintiff should pay to the Defendant $3,000 a month in alimony. Both parties appealed and the Appellate Court affirmed on all issues regarding equitable distribution but remanded for a re-calculation of alimony. Following a hearing, the Family Court judge ordered the Plaintiff to pay $3,750 a month in alimony and again the parties appealed. Again, the Appellate Court reversed the lower court's decision and reinstituted the Defendant's monthly budget to reflect $8,000, according to Rule 2:10-5. The Appellate Court then remanded back to the Family Court to modify the alimony award consistent with its ruling. Shortly thereafter, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for a downward modification of his alimony obligation based upon a reduction in his salary. The judge found that the Plaintiff had "proven a substantial and permanent change in circumstances based upon a change in employment at a reduced salary" and that the Defendant had a "decrease in the amount of alimony needed due to an increase in her income." In 2013, the Plaintiff's alimony obligation was reduced to $1050 a month and reduced the amount of life insurance that the Plaintiff had to maintain to $150,000. This appeal followed. The Appellate Court found that in determining an award of alimony, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b) directs that a court should consider a set of statutorily defined factors to determine the obligation amount. The goal of an alimony award is to help the supported spouse to achieve a reasonably comparable lifestyle to what was enjoyed during the marriage. Crews v. Crews, 164 N.J. 11, 16 (2000). A judge may modify alimony based upon a showing of changed circumstances. Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139 (1980). "In an application brought by a supporting spouse for a downward modification in alimony . . . the central issue is the supporting spouse's ability to pay." Miller v. Miller, 160 N.J. 408, 420 (1999). However, this is only one factor that is considered and other factors such as personal assets and capacity to earn should also be considered. The Appellate Division then re-calculated the Plaintiff's alimony obligation retroactively to compensate for the slow decline in his salary and ordered that from 2013 forward he pay $2,000 a month in alimony and have to pay arrearage amounts pursuant to an established schedule. The equitable distribution of assets and alimony are of the most emotional and complex aspects of a divorce. If you are involved in a battle over the division of marital property, assets, or debts or alimony it is extremely important that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about equitable distribution, alimony contested divorce, uncontested divorce, spousal support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way intended to replace the advice of an attorney.