Alimony Not Terminated In Spite Of Cohabitation

In Coshland v. Coshland, the Defendant appealed from a Family Court Order that denied his Motion to terminate his alimony payments because he claimed that the Plaintiff was cohabitating with her boyfriend. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the Family Court finding that the Plaintiff's boyfriend did not cohabitate but was a frequent visitor who did not economically benefit the Plaintiff. Following a twenty-seven (27) year marriage that yielded two (2) children, the parties divorced in 2011 pursuant to a Property Settlement and Support Agreement (PSSA). The agreement directed that the Defendant would pay $230 a week in alimony but stated that the obligation would terminate if the Plaintiff were to begin "residing with an unrelated person, or vice versa, where [the Plaintiff] is receiving and economic benefit, for a period of not less than 30 consecutive days." After the divorce the Plaintiff moved to a townhouse that was recently vacated by two of the Plaintiff's friends, K.C. and her brother J.C. The townhouse was individually owned by K.C. After the Plaintiff moved in, J.C. began to spend two to five nights a week at the townhouse. The Plaintiff and J.C. "attempted" a romantic relationship but both claimed at the time of the hearing that the relationship was platonic. When the Defendant suspected the Plaintiff of cohabitating with J.C. he hired a private investigator to gather information about the relationship. Between March and April 2013, the investigator observed the Plaintiff and J.C. arriving home from work together (they both worked at Shop-Rite) and the Plaintiff visited the residence seventeen (17) times in that time frame. The Defendant filed a Motion to terminate his alimony. The Family Court Judge denied the Motion and scheduled a plenary hearing to take place. At the hearing, the judge heard testimony from the private investigator, a real-estate expert, and the Plaintiff. After hearing the testimony, the judge issued an oral opinion denying the Defendant's Motion to terminate alimony finding that J.C. did not live at the townhouse and that the Plaintiff was not receiving economic benefit from his visits. The Defendant appealed. According to the Appellate Division, alimony can be modified if a party demonstrates a significant financial change since the alimony was first awarded. Reese v. Weis, 430 N.J. Super. 552, 572, 66 A.3d 157 (App. Div. 2013). One type of changed circumstance is cohabitation by a former spouse. Gayet v. Gayet, 92 N.J. 149, 155, 456 A.2d 102 (1983). Cohabitation is typified by a showing of a relationship "shown to have stability, permanency, and mutual interdependence." Konzelman v. Konzelman, 158 N.J. 185, 202, 729 A.2d 7 (1999). Therefore, a former spouse residing with a significant other is not, by itself, enough to terminate alimony, further, there must be additional proof that the cohabitating spouse received some form of economic benefit from the cohabitation or the supported cohabitant "supports or subsidizes the other under circumstances sufficient to entitle the supporting spouse to relief. Reese, supra, 430 N.J. Super. at 557-58, 576; Gayet, supra, 92 N.J. at 153-54. Proving cohabitation creates a rebuttable presumption of changed circumstances. Ozolins v. Ozolins, 308 N.J. Super. 243, 248, 705 A.2d 1230 (App. Div. 1998). Accordingly, the burden of proof which is ordinarily on the party seeking modification, shifts to the dependant spouse to prove the lack of economic benefit and continued need for support. Id. at 248-49. In this case, the Appellate Division found that apart from proving J.C.'s frequent overnight stays at the Plaintiff's residence, the Defendant failed to present any evidence in support of an intimate relationship or economic benefit. Therefore, the Family Court's denial of the Defendant's Motion was affirmed. Being that the laws governing the issues involving alimony and cohabitation have recently been changed, it is very important that you seek out the advice of an attorney to protect your rights an entitlements. If you think that it may be beneficial for you to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your alimony obligation based upon your ex-spouse's cohabitation with another person or for any other reason it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about alimony, divorce, post-judgment modification, child support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Appeal Of Default Divorce By Pro Se Party Unsuccessful

In Dippel v. Dippel, the Plaintiff appealed from a 2013 Final Divorce Judgment that was entered by default on the Defendant's Counterclaim because the Plaintiff failed to comply with the Rules of the Court. The Plaintiff instituted divorce proceedings in 2010 and in 2012 the court dismissed his pleadings without prejudice for failure to comply with discovery requests. In 2012, the court denied the Plaintiff's application to vacate the default judgment and allow him additional time to provide discovery. Later that year, the Plaintiff once again made an application to vacate his divorce judgment, which was denied. The court had advised the Defendant that she could proceed with default proceedings based upon her Counterclaim because the Plaintiff did not comply with discovery. A trial was held in 2013, at which, the trial judge thoroughly placed on the record the history of the Plaintiff's failure to comply with discovery. The court then proceeded to adjudicate custody, parenting time, alimony, and child support. The court did not address equitable distribution, determining that any proceeds from the sale of assets shall be held in escrow. A Final Divorce Judgment was issued on June 13, 2013. The Plaintiff filed a pro se brief with the Appellate Court which did not comply with the Rules of the Court. N.J. Court Rule 2:5-4; N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 278, 914 A.2d 1265 (2007). Further, the contents of the Plaintiff's brief did not comply with N.J. Court Rule 2:6-2. In essence, the Plaintiff asked the Appellate Court to review the entire divorce proceedings in totem. According to the Appellate Division, the Defendant's request mischaracterizes its role in the proceedings, as it is to give considerable discretionary decision to the Family Court. Donnelly v. Donnelly, 405 N.J. Super. 117, 127, 963 A.2d 855 (App. Div. 2009). When a Family Part judge has made findings of fact after considering the testimony and documents the parties have presented during a non-jury trial, the judge's findings are generally "binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12, 713 A.2d 390 (1998). Further, "parties are required to make adequate legal argument." 700 Highway 33 LLC v. Pollio, 421N.J. Super. 231, 238, 23 A3d 446 (App. Div. 2011). Conclusory assertions that a judge committed error, devoid of reference to the judge's decision or the trial record, and further devoid of any attempt to apply the applicable precedent of the factual underpinnings of such conclusory assertions, do not satisfy the requirement. Therefore, the decision of the Family Court was affirmed. If you are considering and appeal of your final divorce judgment or you would like more information regarding divorce it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about divorce, uncontested divorce, equitable distribution, child support, alimony or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Equitable Distribution Award Survives Challenge

In DeLong v. DeLong, the Plaintiff appealed from a final divorce judgment entered in 2014 awarding alimony, equitable distribution, and counsel fees. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the Family Court. The parties in this case were married for thirty-three (33) years. They owned a home together. In 1996, they sold the home when the Plaintiff's mother conveyed her house to them for one (1) dollar, making them joint tenants with a right of survivorship. The Plaintiff's mother received $500 per month which was characterized by the Plaintiff as rent. In 2008, the parties separated and the Plaintiff conveyed the house back to his mother for one (1) dollar. In 2009, the Plaintiff filed a Complaint for divorce which was voluntarily dismissed when the parties attempted to reconcile. In 2013, the Plaintiff once again filed for divorce and the Defendant filed an Answer and a Counterclaim for alimony and equitable distribution. In 2014, the court conducted a trial and heard testimony from the Plaintiff and Defendant about their marital history, work history, and assets acquired during their marriage. The judge decided that the Defendant was entitled to permanent alimony in the amount of $275 a week, $17,688 in equitable distribution representing the return of proceeds from the sale of their home in 1996, 50% of the marital portion of the Plaintiff's retirement funds, and ordered the Plaintiff to pay the Defendant's counsel fees. The Plaintiff appealed challenging the court's award of permanent alimony, equitable distribution, and attorney's fees. The Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the lower court for all the reasons contained in the Family Court's judgment, but added commentary regarding the Plaintiff's challenge to the equitable distribution award. According to the Appellate Division, property subject to equitable distribution includes property that was obtained during the marriage due to efforts by either spouse. Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583, 609, 660 A.2d 485 (1995). "Although the trial court is permitted to recognize that the acquisition of certain property may be traced more directly to one partner than the other, the court is not compelled to distribute property to accommodate that origin." Id. at 638. The Appellate Court noted that in this case, the Family Court judge appropriately weighed the financial contributions of both parties as well as the benefits received by each, including improvements to the martial home. If you believe that a post-judgment modification to the equitable distribution of your property may be beneficial to you it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modification, equitable distribution, alimony, divorce or other family law matters in New Jersey visit the DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney

Child Support Modification Denied

In Markey v. Melazzo, the Defendant appealed from a 2013 Family Court Order that denied his Motion to terminate his child support obligation and force a recalculation of his arrearage. The Appellate Division affirmed the ruling of the Family Court. In 1995, the Plaintiff and Defendant had a son together but never married. In 2005, a Court Order directed the Defendant to pay $129 a week in child support. In 2012, the Defendant was injured at work and has since claimed that he is unable to work because he is disabled. Later that year, a hearing officer denied the Defendant's Motion for modification of support, without prejudice, because the Defendant failed to provide proof of his income or the validity of his disability. In 2013, the Defendant filed the application which was the subject of this appeal, wherein he sought the termination of his child support and the elimination of his arrears. The Defendant claimed that the Plaintiff has not permitted him to visit with the child and has changed the child's last name without his consent. In 2013, the Family Court denied the Defendant's Motion because the Defendant failed to provide a valid basis for relief. The Defendant appealed. According to the Appellate Division, child support is necessary to ensure that parents provide for the basic needs of their children. Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583, 590, 660 A.2d 485 (1995). A party who seeks modification of his or her child support obligation has the burden of demonstrating a change in circumstances warranting such an adjustment. Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 157, 416 A.2d 45 (1980). The decision must be made in accordance with the N.J. Child Support Guidelines when applicable. Caplan v. Caplan, 182 N.J. 250, 266, 864 A.2d 1108 (2005); Terry v. Terry, 270 N.J. Super. 105, 121, 636 A.2d 579 (App. Div. 1994). In this case, the Defendant sought the termination of his child support obligation and the elimination of his arrears dating back to 2002 when the child's name was changed, arguing that the name change was a de facto termination of his parental rights, yet the Defendant cites no authority of his position. According to the Appellate Court, the Family Court correctly determined that the Defendant's parental rights were never terminated and thus found no basis for vacating the Defendant's arrears. With respect to the Defendant's claim of disability, he did not submit any medical information. Therefore, the Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the Family Court. If you anticipate that it may be beneficial to you to seek a post-judgment modification of a Court Order regarding a child support obligation it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modification, child support, divorce, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Emancipation Granted And Alimony Increase Denied

Dripps v. Dripps, is an appeal from a Family Court Order issued pursuant to the parties post-judgment divorce Motions with regard to alimony and emancipation. The Defendant, ex-wife, moved before the court for an increase in her alimony. The Plaintiff, ex-husband, brought a Cross-Motion for relief which included the emancipation of the parties' two (2) children. The Family Court issued an Order denying an increase in alimony, granting the emancipation of the children, and denying the Motion for reconsideration. The Defendant appealed. The Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the Family Division. On appeal, the Defendant essentially sought to re-litigate the property settlement agreement (PSA) that was incorporated into the parties' final judgment of divorce. Specifically, the Defendant contested the Family Court's failure to increase her alimony and the grant of emancipation of her children. According to the Appellate Court, on appeal, legal issues involving the interpretation of a contract are subject to plenary review. Vosough v. Kierce,437 N.J. Super. 218, 241, 97 A.3d 1150 (App. Div. 2014), certif. denied, 221 N.J. 218, 110 A.3d 931 (2015). "A trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts" are not entitled to "special deference" on appeal. Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Twp. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378, 658 A.2d 1230 (1995). However, the Family Court's findings of fact should be upheld "if they are supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence on the record" and they are not "so wide of the mark that a mistake must have been made." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279, 914 A.2d 1265 (2007). When a Motion or a Cross Motion is brought for enforcement or modification of a prior Order or Judgment, a copy of the Order or Judgment sought to be enforced or modified shall be appended to the pleading filed in support of the Motion. N.J. Court Rule 5:5-4. Further, when a Motion is brought for the entry or modification of an Order or Judgment for alimony or child support based upon a showing of changed circumstances, the pleading filed in support of that Motion shall have appended to it a copy of the prior Case Information Statements (CIS). Id. The Defendant failed to submit the prior Judgement of Divorce (JOD) and PSA and failed to submit the requisite CIS, and therefore the Appellate Division found that the court properly denied her Motion. With regard to the emancipation, one of the children was twenty-three (23) and the other twenty-two (22), working and had not attended college for three (3) semesters. According to the Appellate Court, the circumstances of the children at the time of the hearing clearly met the parties' PSA definition of emancipation and public policy favors settlement of litigation. Bistricer v. Bistricer, 231 N.J. Super. 143, 151, 555 A.2d 45 (Ch. Div. 1987). An agreement to settle litigation is a contract, which like all contracts freely entered into, should be honored and enforced absent fraud or other compelling circumstances. Brundage v Estate of Carambio, 195 N.J. 575, 601, 951 A.2d 947 (2008). Therefore, the decisions of the Family Court were affirmed. Being that the laws governing alimony have recently been changed, it is very important that you seek out the advice of an attorney to protect your rights an entitlements. If you think that it may be beneficial for you to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your alimony or emancipation status of your children or for any other reason it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about alimony, divorce, post-judgment modification, child support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit the DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Alimony Arrearage Modification Denied By Court

In Herman v. Herman, the Defendant argued that because he was not provided with an accounting of the Plaintiff's received alimony payments and how same were used to reduce the marital debt, his alimony payments should have been reduced and that the judge failed to order the Plaintiff to provide such an accounting. The parties were married in 1992 and the Plaintiff gave birth to a son in 1995. The parties divorced in 1999 pursuant to a final divorce judgment which incorporated a property settlement agreement (PSA). The agreement required that the Defendant pay permanent alimony of $527.90 a week to the Plaintiff with the amount decreasing thereafter upon the occasion of certain events, eventually becoming $268.00 a week. The PSA also directed that the Defendant would be fully responsible for the post-secondary educational expenses of the parties' son. In addition, a separate article of the PSA specified that the Plaintiff would pay off existing credit card debts, which amounted to $36,100.00 and that $169.00 a week of the alimony that the Plaintiff received was "intended to be paid by [plaintiff] toward [defendant's] credit card liabilities." When the accounts were paid in full, the Defendant's alimony obligations were to be reduced by $169.00 a week. The agreement also permitted either party to pay off the debt with their "own funds," and receive either a deduction or credit of $169.00 per week toward the alimony amount. After their divorce, the parties engaged in Motion practice over disputes that inevitably arose from the agreement. In 2005, the Family Court issued an Order setting the Defendant's alimony arrears and ordering that he continue to pay $268.00 a week in alimony. By 2007, the Plaintiff's attorney calculated the Defendant's total arrears to be $57,325.00. In 2008, after more Motion practice, the Defendant's alimony, child support, and counsel fees were memorialized in a judgment in the amount of $76,606.00. In 2012, the Defendant filed a Motion seeking a downward modification of his child support and the termination of his alimony due to the Plaintiff's remarriage and an adjustment of his support obligations retroactively based upon his overpayment toward marital debts. The judge terminated the Defendant's alimony obligation based upon the Plaintiff's remarriage but denied his request for a retroactive adjustment. In 2012, the Defendant's total arrears had risen to $111,735.86. In 2013, the Defendant submitted yet another Motion for a retroactive reduction in his alimony in the amount of $169.00 a week dating back to 2004. The judge issued an Order denying the Motion. In 2013, the judge granted the Plaintiff's request to compel the Defendant t pay for their son's college expenses. In 2014, the Defendant again moved for an Order compelling the Plaintiff to account for her payments of all martial debut under the provisions of the PSA and for a reduction in his support arrears. The Judge denied the Defendant's request for an accounting and denied his request for a reduction in his arrears, but granted the Plaintiff's request for Defendant to pay college expenses. The Defendant appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the Family Court. According to the Appellate Division none of the Defendant's arguments had sufficient merit to warrant a discussion pursuant to N.J. Court Rule 2:1-3(e)(1)(E). The court found that the Defendant sought an adjustment of his alimony arrears in 2012, which was denied. He never appealed that decision he simply submitted another Motion seeking the same relief in 2013 and 2014. In addition, the Order that was under review enforced the Defendant's obligations to pay college expenses which was ordered by the Family Court in 2013, from which the Defendant failed to appeal. When the Defendant continued to submit Motions for other relief, the Plaintiff cross-moved to enforce the 2013 Order. The Defendant then raised belated challenges to that Order and the Court has the right to refuse to consider his request. Gac v. Gac, 186 N.J. 535, 546-47, 897 A.2d 1018 (2006). Being that the laws governing alimony have recently been changed, it is very important that you seek out the advice of an attorney to protect your rights an entitlements. If you think that it may be beneficial for you to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your alimony or for any other reason it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about alimony, divorce, post-judgment modification, child support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit the DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Oral Equitable Distribution Agreement Enforced By Court

In Ahlstrom v. Monteferrario, a case coming out of Bergen County, the Plaintiff appealed from a dual judgment of divorce with regard to the parties' oral agreement concerning the equitable distribution of their marital home. The Appellate Division affirmed the Family Court's judgment. In 2007, prior to the parties' 2008 marriage, they purchased a house for $759,000. The deed of the home stated that the parties were owners as tenants in common, "each owner with a 50% ownership share." The Plaintiff advanced $314,559.20 as a down payment. The balance of the purchase price was covered by a mortgage on which both parties were the borrowers, but only the Plaintiff was on the note due to the Defendant's credit issues. After the house was purchased the parties entered into a Co-Ownership Agreement (COA) in 2007, which was prepared by the Defendant's attorney. This agreement detailed the parties' ownership and provided that if the house was sold each party would receive 50% of the net profits. The marriage fell apart and by 2011, the parties reached an oral agreement resolving all issues related to the divorce, alimony, and equitable distribution. The Plaintiff's lawyer sent a draft PSA to the Defendant's lawyer that provided that "[e]ffective with the date [defendant] vacated the martial residence, he has had and shall not have any obligation for the mortgage," and that the Plaintiff would hold the Defendant harmless in connection with the mortgage. In the end, the parties failed to mutually execute the PSA. Soon thereafter, the Plaintiff filed a Complaint for Divorce and subsequently filed a Motion to enforce the COA, demanding that the Defendant repay her the $37,652.40 mortgage payments she made and to repay the mortgage in the future. The Family Court Judge held a ten day trial and a plenary hearing under Harrington v. Harrington, 281 N.J. Super. 39, 656 A.2d 456 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 142 N.J. 455 663 A.2d 1361 (1995). In the 2013, dual judgment of divorce, the trial court discredited the Plaintiff, credited the Defendant, and found that the parties had reached a binding oral agreement. The Plaintiff appealed arguing that the parties' discussions never resulted in a binding verbal agreement. According to the Appellate Division, New Jersey courts strain "to give effect to the terms of a settlement agreement wherever possible." Brundage v. Estate of Carambio, 195 N.J. 575, 601, 951 A.2d 947 (2008). An agreement to settle "is a contract, which like all contracts, may be freely entered into and which a court, absent a demonstration of 'fraud or other compelling circumstances,' should honor and enforce." Pascarella v. Bruck, 190 N.J. Super. 118, 124-25, 462 A.2d 186 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 94 N.J. 600, 468 A.2d (1983). The Appellate Court in Harrington, held that "to be enforceable, matrimonial agreements, as any other agreements, need not necessarily be reduced to writing or placed on the record." Harringon, 281 N.J. Super. 39 at 46. "Where the parties agree upon the essential terms of settlement, so that the mechanics can be 'fleshed out' in a writing to be thereafter executed, the settlement will be enforced notwithstanding the fact that the writing does not materialize because a party later reneges." Id. In this case, the Appellate Court found that the parties entered into a binding oral agreement based upon the evidence submitted into the record and therefore the Family Court's judgment was correct. If you believe that a post-judgment modification to your settlement agreement or divorce judgment regarding the equitable distribution of your property may be beneficial to you it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modification, equitable distribution, alimony, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit the DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice if an attorney.

Grandparent Visitation Denied Without Showing Of Harm To Grandchildren

In Loser v. Witt, the Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their Complaint seeking grandparent visitation. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the Family Court. In 2005, the Defendants, Melissa Witt and Eric Loser were living together along with Melissa's son from a previous relationship, when Melissa gave birth to their son. The Plaintiffs in this case are Eric's parents. In 2007, Melissa and Eric split up which resulted in litigation with regard to child custody, upon which the relationship between Melissa and the Plaintiffs, Eric's parents, deteriorated. Eventually Melissa and Eric resolved their differences but the relationship between Melissa and the Plaintiffs never recovered. In 2013, Eric disallowed the Plaintiffs from having any contact with the children. Eric believed, at the time, that his father was harassing Melissa and attempting to undermine her relationships with the children. In August of that year, the Plaintiffs filed a Complaint in the Family Court seeking visitation with their grandchildren. The Plaintiffs requested a plenary hearing and the opportunity to conduct a psychological evaluation of the children. The Plaintiffs contended that they had a very close relationship with the children - seeing them two to three times a week and had taken them on annual vacations. They admitted though that they were never full time care-takers. After oral argument, the Family Court judge dismissed the Plaintiff's Complaint concluding that the Plaintiffs "failed to meet the required threshold showing of [particularized] harm to subject the parents and the children to further litigation." The Plaintiffs appealed. According to the Appellate Division, parents have a fundamental right to "make decisions regarding the care and custody of their children." Moriarty v. Bradt, 177 N.J. 84,88, 827 A.2d 203 (2003). Ordinarily, courts do not interfere with a fit parent's decision to prevent contact between his or her child and the child's grandparents. Rente v. Rente, 390 N.J. Super. 487, 493, 915 A.2d 1099 (App. Div. 2007). Grandparents can force "grandparent visitation over the wishes of a fit parent" if they can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that visitation is necessary to avoid harm to the child. Moriarty, supra, 177 N.J. at 115, 117. To persuade the court that a child will be harmed by the absence of visitation, grandparents may present either expert or factual evidence. First, grandparents must make a "clear and specific allegation of concrete harm to the children." Daniels v. Daniels, 381 N.J. Super. 286, 294, 885 A.2d 524 (App. Div. 2005). In this case, the Appellate Court found that the Plaintiffs have not alleged concrete facts demonstrating that the Defendant's parental decision to prohibit contact will cause significant harm to the children. Therefore, the decision of the Family Court was affirmed. Child custody and grandparent's rights cases are of the most emotional and difficult cases in all of family law. If you anticipate that you may want to petition the court for a modification of your current child custody arrangement it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about child custody, parenting time, child support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit the DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.