Thursday, May 29, 2014

Same-Sex Marriage Is In State Courts Across The Country

Over the past few months and especially over the past few weeks states across the nation have seen a great deal of action and activity with regard to the legalization of same-sex marriage. Since the United States Supreme Court decided United States v. Windsor 570 U.S. 13 (2013) many states have seen action taken by either their legislatures or their judiciaries to legalize same-sex marriage. In addition to this, some federal judges are in the process of moving numerous other states in this very same direction. There are currently approximately 70 marriage equality cases being considered throughout judicial systems in the United States and more district court judges may issue their own opinions which could change the laws in other states just like Judge Mary Jacobson in Mercer County Superior Court did in Garden State Equality v. Dow in September of 2013 to allow gay and lesbian couples in New Jersey to marry. Since that time many other states have followed suit. Just this week, the same-sex marriage ban which was incorporated into Oregon's state constitution was overturned by U.S. District Judge Michael McShane, and although an appeal to this decision has already been filed, Oregon state officials have not indicated that they will not move to disturb Judge McShane's ruling. In addition, this week also saw Pennsylvania's gay marriage ban struck down by U.S. District Judge John E. Jones. The Pennsylvania state Attorney General immediately announced that she would not be challenging the ruling and the state's governor, Tom Corbett, has already stated that he would not appeal the decision because such an appeal would be extremely unlikely to succeed. Assuming this trend continues, homosexual individuals will be permitted to legally marry in the majority of the U.S. states within a few years. As marriage equality continues to spread across the nation it is very important that LGBT couples who decide to obtain a legal marriage license understand the rights, benefits, and privileges that their legal union bestows upon them based on their state's laws. It is also imperative that in the event their relationship dissolves and they decide to seek a divorce to end their marriage each party is aware of their property and child custody rights as these issues will be in the forefront of the divorce proceedings - just as they are for heterosexual couples who are divorcing. If you are a gay or lesbian couple who plans on seeking a legal marriage or filing for a same-sex divorce or would like more information regarding the divorce process it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before proceeding. For more information about same-sex marriage, same-sex divorce, same-sex relationship dissolution, custody and visitation, equitable distribution or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and it is in no way intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Tuesday, May 27, 2014

Psychological Parents Awarded Custody Over Great Grandparent's Objection

In the recent child custody case involving grandparent's rights, E.B.S. v. K.M., the Defendant appealed from a judgment issued by the Family Court determining that the Plaintiff is the psychological parent of a 3 year old little girl and directing that the Plaintiff shall be the joint legal custodian of the little girl with the Plaintiff as the parent of primary residence and the Defendant the parent of alternate residence. The Defendant argues in his appeal that the ruling is against the evidence that was presented at trial. The Appellate Court affirmed the Family Court's ruling. The Defendant's sixteen year old daughter gave birth to Pamela, the child at issue in this case, in 2009. The child's natural father remains unknown. The Defendant was informed by the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services that unless she agreed to take custody of Pamela, it would start the process to remove the child from her granddaughter's custody and place the child in another home. The Defendant immediately travelled to Texas to take custody of Pamela and bring her to New Jersey. The Defendant's granddaughter, Pamela's mother, then executed a voluntary surrender of her parental rights and consented to the Defendant adopting Pamela. E.B.S. is the Plaintiff and is the daughter of the Defendant's long-time friend. E.B.S. and her husband had experienced great difficulty conceiving a child of their own, and the Defendant discussed the possibility that perhaps they could adopt Pamela. In fact, the Defendant brought Pamela to meet with the Plaintiffs nine days after retrieving her from Texas and encourage the possible adoption. Thereafter, the Plaintiffs spent a great deal of time with Pamela, bought her a crib, and even hired a nanny in anticipation of adopting her. The Defendant realized from the very beginning of the process that the Plaintiffs assumed that they would be adopting Pamela and were not just temporary caretakers. Pamela lived with the Plaintiffs for the majority of 2010 and most of 2011 and became part of their family. The Defendant suffered from many health issues during this time and was unable to care for Pamela alone. Soon the Plaintiffs realized that the Defendant, who was recovering, no longer wanted to help them adopt Pamela and therefore they brought an action in the Family Court seeking permanent custody of Pamela. During the trial, a doctor testified that Pamela had bonded with the Plaintiffs and the judge found the Plaintiffs to be the psychological parents of Pamela. The judge also noted that he was certain, based upon testimony, that during the time that Pamela was living with the Plaintiffs the Defendant encouraged the relationship between the child and the Plaintiffs. Further, it was determined that the Plaintiffs has assumed the "financial obligations of parenthood." Next, the judge found that the Plaintiff's satisfied the four-prong test for finding a third party to be a psychological parent that was established in V.C. v. M.J.B., 163 N.J. 200 (2000). Then, the judge applied the criteria for custody under N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c), and declared that the parties were joint custodians of Pamela, with the Plaintiffs being the parents of primary residence and the Defendant as the parent of alternate residence. The Defendant appealed from this decision. The Appellate Division, affirmed the lower court's finding that for child custody matters the "conclusions of a trial judge are entitled to great weight and will not be lightly disturbed on appeal." DeVita v. DeVita, 145 N.J. Super. 120, 123 (App. Div 1976). In its holding, the Appellate Court found that the Family Court judge's reasoning and decision were supported by credible evidence and should not be disturbed. Child custody cases are of the most emotional and difficult cases in all of family law. If you anticipate that you may want to petition the court for to establish custody or modify your current child custody arrangement it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about child custody, parenting time, divorce, alimony, child support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Sunday, May 25, 2014

Judge May Correct $40,000 Equitable Distribution Error in Judgment of Divorce

In the 2014 case, Lee v. Lee, the Appellate court allowed the lower Family Court judge to fix a miscalculation regarding the equitable distribution of the parties' home contained in their divorce judgment. As the parties calculated the equitable distributions that were required under their Final Judgment of Divorce, the Plaintiff's attorney found a mathematical error in the lower court judge's final opinion. In particular, the total credits due to the Plaintiff as the result of the Defendant's personal use of a home equity line of credit on the home was miscalculated by the judge in the amount of $40,195.00. Apparently, the judge failed to carry over this line item amount from one page of the judgment to another and therefore it was not considered in the final accounting. Following the discovery of this miscalculation, the Plaintiff's attorneys filed a Motion before the court under Rule 1:13-1 to correct the miscalculation so that the distribution would happen as the judge originally intended. During oral argument on the Motion, the Defendant argued that no one knew what "was in the judge's mind" when he made the calculations and refused to concede that any mistake was made by the Family Court judge. Further, the Defendant argued that the mistake was not a "clerical" error which would be correctable under Rule 1:13-1 but that Rule 4:50 should have been applied instead. The Family Court judge issued an order correcting the miscalculation and ordering the receiver to distribute according to the corrected accounting. The Defendant appeals from this decision. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the lower court lacked the jurisdiction to correct the mistake and that it was not a "clerical" error. In addition, according to the Defendant the Plaintiff is out of time to seek relief under Rule 4:50. The Appellate Court disagreed. According to the Appellate Court, even careful judges make mistakes from time to time in drafting orders or opinions. Rule 1:13-1 was created to permit judges to correct minor errors either by their own initiation or on Motion from a party. The court held that the mathematical error at issue in this case is exactly the sort of mistake that the rule was designed to fix. Kiernan v. Keirnan, 355 N.J. Super. 89, 92 (App. Div. 2002). In affirming the lower court's action, the Appellate Division noted that the Family Court judge was within his authority to correct the error. The equitable distribution of assets and debts are of the most emotional and complex aspects of a divorce. If you are involved in a battle over the division of marital property, assets, or debts it is extremely important that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about equitable distribution, contested divorce, uncontested divorce, spousal support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Friday, May 23, 2014

Lesbian Widow to Receive Death Benefits After Wife Dies While Serving in U.S. Military

Tracy Dice Johnson, a lesbian widow of an Afghanistan war soldier who was killed on duty, announced this week that the Department of Veterans Affairs has completed a review of her case and has determined that she is entitled to death benefits of her same-sex spouse. Tracy Dice Johnson is a member of the National Guard stationed in North Carolina and she has also served her country in Iraq. She married Sgt. Donna Johnson, who was killed in October 2012 when a suicide bomber attacked a checkpoint in Afghanistan. Tracy Johnson has been an advocate for the repeal of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which had defined marriage as being between a man and a woman in the eyes of the federal government. Under DOMA, Tracy Johnson and other gay and lesbian war widows and widowers were not permitted to receive federal benefits from the government in the event that their spouse was killed on duty. In fact, when her wife was killed, Tracy was not even notified by the military, even though she was listed as Donna Johnson's "next of kin," because the military did not recognize her marriage as a valid marriage. As such, Donna's mother was first notified about her daughter's passing. In June of 2013, the United States Supreme Court struck down DOMA in United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 12 (2013). Since DOMA was overturned, the federal government and the military will now recognize same-sex marriages as being equal to those of heterosexual marriages and therefore gay and lesbian widows and widowers will not receive death benefits and all other benefits that were previously only available to heterosexual married couples serving in the military. Tracy Dice Johnson's benefits will be retroactive to the date that her wife was killed on duty - even though her untimely death occurred before the Supreme Court struck down DOMA. This is a significant event in the progression of same-sex marriages across the country and reflects a giant victory for those who support marriage equality. If you are a gay or lesbian couple who plan on seeking a legal marriage or filing for a same-sex divorce or would like more information regarding same-sex divorce it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before proceeding. For more information about same-sex marriage, same-sex divorce, same-sex relationship dissolution, postnuptial agreements, prenuptial agreements or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com This blog is for informational purposes and it is in no way intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Monday, May 19, 2014

Child Support Arrears PLUS Interest for Essex County Man

In recent Essex County case, Harrison v. Gordon, on appeal the Defendant, Anthony Gordon, argued that the Family Court judge erred in making him pay child support arrears and interest upon them because Probation has made a miscalculation on the amount. The parties in this case were married in 1989 and had a child one year later. In 1995, they decided to obtain a divorce. A property settlement agreement (PSA) was incorporated into their final judgment of divorce which included a provision that specified that the Defendant would pay $4,500 a month in child support which was to be reduced to $2,500 a month when the parties' marital residence was sold. This home was sold in 1997. The Defendant failed to pay his full child support obligation for many years afterward. In 2003, the Defendant submitted a motion to reduce his obligation and a court order was issued reducing his obligation to $1,250 which equaled $750 in continuing child support and $500 toward his overall arrearage, but the judge at that time did not set forth the full amount of child support arrears that was due. In 2004, the judge determined, by court order, that $264,000 was the arrearage amount. The Defendant appealed the 2003 and 2004 court orders. The Appellate Court at that time reversed and remanded the case back to the Family Court for "reconsideration of the current child support obligation." Harrison v. Gordon, No. A-2193-03 (App. Div. 2005). In 2005, the Family Court judge issued another order which reallocated the $1,250 a month child support obligation to reflect $500 for continuing child support and $750 toward the Defendant's arrears. Once again, the Defendant argued that he was not credited for $55,000 in unaccounted payments toward his arrearage. The judge gave the Defendant 90 days to provide proof of his claim and directed that in the event that the proof was not forthcoming, the judgment of $209,000 set forth in that order shall be increased automatically to $264,000. The Defendant failed to provide such proof. The matter came before the court again in 2008 upon the Plaintiff's application to accelerate the Defendant's child support obligation by doubling his monthly amount so that she and he could meet their daughter's college education expenses. The parties agreed that the obligation would be increased but that the Defendant would receive an additional credit against his total arrears for doing so - he would get $6,000 a year off of his arrearage for agreeing to the double payments. An order to this affect was issued and things proceeded well for the next four years. In 2012, when the parties' daughter graduated college the Defendant quickly moved to establish her emancipation and the Plaintiff cross moved to establish the Defendants total arrearage amount. A new judge heard the case and ordered that the Defendant owed $81,810.17 in arrears and discovered that the Probation Department never added the $55,000 required by the 2005 order and therefore the judge ordered that the Defendant pay $1,500 a month against the arrears. The Defendant appealed this order arguing that the court improperly upheld the parties' agreement for arrears as ordered in 2008 and the court erred by ordering the Defendant to pay $55,000 additional arrears because of Probation's mistake. Further, he argued that the court erred in ordering him to pay interest on the outstanding judgment for child support because collection on any outstanding judgment was denied and its enforcement denied in a 2004 court order. The Appellate Court found insufficient merit to warrant a lengthy discussion in a written opinion on the Defendant's first argument, except for citing that as revealed by the history of the case, a long dispute existed regarding the $55,000 for which the Family Court judge gave the Defendant two chances to prove, and both times he failed to do so and therefore the Defendant should not receive the benefit of a Probation error. N.J.C.R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). Further, the Appellate Division dismissed the Defendant's second argument as there was no equitable reason why interest should not have begun to accrue on the arrears that existed at the time of the child's emancipation. Disputes regarding child support can be of the most important in family law because child support money is critical for the welfare of the children of divorced parents. If you are involved in a child support dispute it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before proceeding. For more information on child support, post judgment modification, alimony, divorce, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Sunday, May 18, 2014

Battle Over Grandparent Visitation Rights

In the recent NJ Appellate Division case, Major v. Maguire, grandparent visitation rights were sought pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1, but the case was dismissed by the Family Court because the Plaintiff's failed to make a prima facie case. The Plaintiffs, Anthony and Suzanne Major are the paternal grandparents of a 6 year old girl who was referred to as "Jane" for the purposes of the court's opinion to protect her privacy. The Defendant, Julie Di Liberto is Jane's biological mother and unfortunately, Jane's father died two months before the Plaintiff's filed their complaint seeking visitation with their grandchild under a New Jersey statute, N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1. The Family Court dismissed the Plaintiff's complaint without conducting an evidentiary hearing or allowing the parties to engage in discovery. In addition, the court did not hold a case management conference or otherwise make any effort to indentify the issues in the case or attempt any mediation or settlement offers. In the appeal, the Plaintiff's argued that the Family Court erred in dismissing their complaint because they believed that they established a prima facie case to obtain the relief they were seeking as required by N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1 and Moriarty v. Bradt, 177 N.J. 84 (2003). Further, the Plaintiff claimed that the court abused its discretion in not allowing discovery or testimony on the issue. The Defendant argued that the trial court properly dismissed the complaint because the Plaintiff's failed to overcome her valid objections to visitation being that she is Jane's mother. Also, Defendant argued that the court did not abuse its discretion under Rule 5:5-4(a) in denying discovery or conducting a case management conference because the nature of the action required an expedited resolution. The Appellate Court remanded the case back to the Family Court to adjudicate the grandparent visitation issue under the procedural guidelines held in R.K. v. D.L., 434 N.J. Super. 113, 137-40 (App. Div. 2014). The Appellate Division directed that the lower court apply the statutory standards that were established in N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1 and the procedural and substantive approach that the Family Court must use in adjudicating grandparent visitation complaints, as this approach is grounded in the constitutional concerns expressed in the Moriarty decision and in N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1. According to the statute, the court must consider the following factors in making its decision to award visitation to a grandparent: • The relationship between the child and the grandparent seeking visitation rights • The amount of time since the child had contact with the grandparent • The relationship between each of the child's parents or the person with whom the child is living and the grandparent • The effect that such visitation will have on the relationship between the child and the child's parents or the person with whom the child is living • The good faith of the grandparent who is seeking visitation • If the parents are divorced or separated, the parenting time arrangement that exists between the child and his or her parents • Any history of physical, emotional, or sexual abuse or neglect by the applicant • Any additional factor relevant to the best interest of the child If you anticipate that you would like to petition the court to obtain grandparent's visitation rights it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney who can evaluate your case and advise you on your rights and obligations. For more information about grandparent visitation rights, custody and visitation, parenting time, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Thursday, May 15, 2014

Appellate Court Upholds Parties' Agreement Regarding Alimony Waiver

In a recent Appellate Division case, Degilio v. Degilio, the Plaintiff, Julianne Degilio appealed from a Family Court order arguing that the judge erred by not allowing her to petition for alimony despite a term contained in a property settlement agreement (PSA) between her and the Defendant, James Degilio, in which both parties agreed to forever waive alimony. The parties in this case were married in 1990. In 2005, they were divorced pursuant to a Final Divorce Judgment which included a PSA that specified the equitable distribution of their marital property. One particular term contained in the PSA stated that both parties “now and forever waive any and all claims for alimony and support, past, present and future, that they have or may have against the other party.” Further, the language of the PSA specified that “but for this waiver of rights to request alimony, the Husband would not have agreed to the equitable distribution arrangement set forth herein.” After the parties were divorced, the Defendant failed to make payments to the Plaintiff as he was directed under the terms of the PSA. The Plaintiff submitted a motion to the court to enforce the terms of the agreement. Once again, the parties engaged in negotiations and reached an agreement that modified their existing PSA by consent order. One of the modifications specified that the Defendant was to pay $300,000, in tax-free equitable distribution . . .” on a monthly basis until the obligation was satisfied. In addition, the consent order directed that “the parties specifically preserve all provisions set forth” in the previous PSA. Over time, the Defendant began to default on his obligation again and the Plaintiff filed multiple motions to compel him to pay. In 2011, the Plaintiff filed an unopposed motion to reopen the parties’ Judgment of Divorce seeking an alimony award because the Defendant continued to default on his obligation. The Family Court denied her motion. The Defendant continued to neglect his obligation and the Plaintiff yet again filed a motion to enforce the terms of the agreement and to reopen the Judgment of Divorce seeking alimony. This time, the Family Court found the Defendant in violation of litigant’s rights but did not reopen the Judgment of Divorce. The Plaintiff appealed from this order. In its opinion the Appellate Division first notes that it typically affords substantial deference to the decisions of Family Court judges. Donnelly v. Donnelly, 405 N.J. Super 117, 127 (App. Div. 2009); Larbig v. Larbig, 384 N.J. Super. 17, 21 (App. Div. 2006). Next, in affirming the Family Court’s decision, the Appellate Court holds that with regard to the Plaintiff’s argument that the Family Court judge erred in denying her motion to reopen her Judgment of Divorce – the courts are courts of equity and as such they strive to uphold settlement agreements whenever possible. Massar v. Massar, 279 N.J. Super. 89 (App. Div. 1995). With regard to this case, the Defendant had substantially complied with the terms of the PSA because he had “made payments for a number of years before he got into default,” and therefore the Appellate Court was unwilling to disturb the terms of their PSA as a matter of public policy. Further, with regard to the Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, the Appellate Court also found that the Plaintiff’s challenge to the initial opinion and order under Rule 1:7-4 was without merit because the judge’s decision adequately set forth the findings and legal grounds for denying her application. If you anticipate that you may want to file an application with the court to modify an existing alimony award or for a modification of your Final Judgment of divorce it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about alimony, divorce, equitable distribution, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and in no way is it intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Friday, May 9, 2014

No Vacating A Child Custody Agreement Based on Party's Mistake

In a recent, Morris County New Jersey case, Alexin v. Raiter, the Plaintiff, Alexander Alexin and the Defendant, Irena Raiter, established a consent agreement to provide solutions to child custody issues in their relationship dissolution and the Appellate Division ruled that the Plaintiff could not vacate the agreement after it was signed when he claimed that he thought it was temporary and could be changed. The Plaintiff and Defendant had been dating when they discovered that the Defendant was pregnant. In 2010, a son was born to the couple but their relationship ended soon thereafter. In October of 2012, the Defendant filed a domestic violence complaint against the Plaintiff and was awarded a temporary restraining order. The restraining order granted the Defendant temporary custody of the parties' son and provided no parenting time for the Plaintiff. The parties then filed criminal complaints against each other. In late October 2012, the parties and their attorneys negotiated a civil consent agreement and the Plaintiff and his attorney made handwritten changes to the agreement at that time. The agreement indicated that the parties, through their attorneys, had resolved their issues in consideration of the promises that were made in the agreement. On the issue of child custody, the agreement specified that that Defendant shall have full physical custody of the parties' son and the Plaintiff shall have parenting time on Sundays from 11:00 a.m. until 6:00 p.m. Barely three months after the agreement was signed by the parties and their attorneys, the Plaintiff filed another complaint with the Family Court requesting joint legal and physical custody of the parties' child, arguing that he did not need to show a change in circumstances because he did not enter into the agreement voluntarily. In February 2013, the Family Court conducted a hearing at which the judge issued a written opinion denying the Plaintiff's request to vacate the agreement because the Plaintiff was represented by counsel, had be questioned under oath, and affirmed his understanding of the agreement and his willingness to sign it. The Plaintiff appealed this decision to the Appellate Court and the Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. According to the Appellate Division, although the Plaintiff offered two certifications to support his motion to vacate the agreement, his arguments do not raise a genuine, material issue of fact given the explicit terms of the agreement. The Plaintiff contended that he signed the agreement believing that the terms were temporary and could be changed, and that he only had 10-15 minutes to review the agreement with his attorney. The Appellate Court reasoned that settlement agreements are contracts and therefore "should be enforced according to the intent of the parties." J.B. v. W.B., 215 N.J. 305, 326 (2013). A contracting party to an agreement is "bound by the apparent intention he or she outwardly manifests to the other party. It is immaterial that he or she has a different, secret intention from that outwardly manifested." Brawer v. Brawer, 329 N.J. Super. 213, 283 (App. Div. 2000). Disputes regarding child custody can be of the most important and emotional in family law. If you are involved in a child custody or child support dispute it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before proceeding. For more information on custody, parenting time, post judgment modification, child support, divorce, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit Darlingfirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Monday, May 5, 2014

Party's Successive Post-Judgment Motions To Change Divorce Agreement Are Denied

In a recent New Jersey case, Dunbar v. Woods, the parties entered into a property settlement agreement ("PSA") and a custody and parenting time agreement when they divorced in 2010, and since that time the Plaintiff (husband) has made multiple, successive post-judgment motions to modify the terms of the agreement. All of the Plaintiff's motions to change the terms of the PSA have been denied by the court because they require a showing of a change in circumstances that the Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate. The Plaintiff appealed from the last Family Court order denying his request for a modification. The parties in his case were married in 2008, one day after executing a prenuptial agreement. The Plaintiff filed for a divorce in 2009 upon moving from New Jersey to Louisiana. The Defendant gave birth to the couple's twin children in 2009. In 2010, the the parties entered into the original PSA that is at issue in this case. At that time they were represented by legal counsel and the Plaintiff was unemployed. In Plaintiff's numerous post-judgment motions to significantly modify the agreement, he has requested multiple forms of relief. He has asserted that the PSA was the product of fraud and deception because the Defendant overstated her child care expenses in her case information statement (CIS). He sought to have the PSA vacated and his child support obligation reduced. The Defendant submitted cross motions indicating the Plaintiff had violated litigant's rights for not abiding by the terms of the PSA and seeking court orders denying his motions to modify the agreement. In the final order, for which the Defendant appealed to the Appellate Division, the court order denied all of the Plaintiff's requests and awarded the Defendant counsel fees in the amount of $2,100. In a statement attached to the final order the Judge specified that in order to modify the terms of the PSA the Plaintiff would have to show "a substantial change in circumstances . . . that renders the agreement no longer fair or equitable to enforce." Further, the judge specified that claims for relief requesting modification of child support under Court Rule 5:5-4 require a copy of both prior case information statements (CIS) and updated versions of the document reflecting current tax returns and other financial statements to support any claim that there is a substantial change in circumstances. In this case, the Plaintiff has failed to provide any of these documents. Finally, the court opined that the Plaintiff should be aware of the consequences under Court Rule 1:4-8 of filing multiple frivolous law suits. The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court's decision and order and noted that the Plaintiff's argument lacked any merit. If you anticipate that you may want to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your property settlement agreement, divorce judgment, or child support obligation it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modifications, divorce, prenuptial agreements, property settlement agreements, visitation & custody, child support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Friday, May 2, 2014

First New Jersey High Profile Same-Sex Divorce Could End in Reconciliation Agreement

What most likely would have been New Jersey's first high profile same-sex divorce appears to be heading toward a reconciliation and a legal agreement. Last month, world famous Olympic figure skater Johnny Weir and his husband, Victor Voronov, were all over the news with reports that they had announced that following a physical altercation they had decided to seek a divorce. In the days that followed the announcement there were reports that the two were already fighting over marital property, most notably their beloved pet dog. Lawyers were running to court to battle over the immediate division of property. If Weir and Voronov proceed to a divorce, New Jersey would be witness to its first high profile divorce since gay and lesbian citizens gained the right to legally marry in October of 2013. Although, most recently, Weir and his husband are reportedly attempting to make their marriage work through the use of a legal agreement that would specify how each is to behave in the marriage. The media has initially been referring to such an agreement as a postnuptial agreement, but this would be incorrect, and the agreement that Weir and Voronov may be contemplating would be called a reconciliation agreement. In the Garden State, such an agreement is a legal exchange of promises between spouses made during the pendency of the marriage to protect property and rights if a divorce were ever to occur in the future. The primary distinction between a postnuptial agreement and a reconciliation agreement is that a reconciliation agreement is drafted and executed during a marriage after problems have surfaced to the point that the couple has considered seeking a divorce. On the other hand, a postnuptial agreement is an agreement made by spouses during the marriage to protect property upon a significant change in the assets or income of one party - before there is a marital rift or disintegration. A reconciliation agreement's purpose is to compel each party to make certain promises or concessions as a means to attempt to fix an already broken marriage and encourage a peaceful reconciliation. Reconciliation agreements are typically enforceable in court as long as they are fair to each party at the time they are executed and when they are to be enforced. Nicholson v. Nicholson, 199 N.J. Super. 525 (App. Div. 1985). If you are a gay or lesbian couple who plans on seeking a legal marriage or filing for a same-sex divorce or would like more information regarding postnuptial or reconciliation agreements it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before proceeding. For more information about same-sex marriage, same-sex divorce, same-sex relationship dissolution, postnuptial agreements, prenuptial agreements or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and it is in no way intended to replace the advice of an attorney.