Friday, June 26, 2015

US Supreme Court Rules In Favor Of Marriage Equality

On June 26, 2015, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Obergefell v. Hodges that under the 14th Amendment all of the states are required to license a marriage between same-sex couples as well as recognize a legally valid same-sex marriage performed in other states. In a 5-4 decision that was argued as a consolidated case to same-sex marriage bans in Michigan, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Ohio. The Court held that the United States Constitution's guarantees of due process and equal protection under the law mean that states cannot ban same-sex marriages which effectively makes gay marriage legal in all 50 states. The opinion was written by Justice Anthony Kennedy who has delivered some of the most important rulings in this nation's history concerning gay rights including Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) and the United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. ___ (2013). This ruling also represents the most important extension of matrimonial rights since Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) that struck down state laws that banned inter-racial marriages. In his opinion, Justice Kennedy wrote that that hope of gay people intending to marry "is not to be condemned to live in loneliness, excluded from one of civilizations oldest institutions. They ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The Constitution grants them that right." Same-Sex marriage became legal in New Jersey on October 21, 2013 following the decision in Garden State Equality v. Dow, N.J. 216, 314 (2013). If you are a gay or lesbian couple who plan on seeking a legal marriage or filing for a same-sex divorce or are simply someone who would like more information regarding the issue there are important factors that you should consider before doing so it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before proceeding. For more information about same-sex marriage, same-sex divorce, same-sex relationship dissolution, equitable distribution, alimony, custody and visitation, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit the DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and it is in no way intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Business Asset Distribution Under Property Settlement Agreement Upheld

In Ramirez v. Ramirez, the Plaintiff appealed from trial court Orders that granted the Defendant's Motion to enforce provisions of the parties' property settlement agreement (PSA) regarding the equitable distribution of a business that was operated by the Plaintiff during the marriage. The parties in this case were married in 1995 and had two (2) daughters. They obtained a divorce in 2007 and executed a PSA that was incorporated into their final divorce judgment. According to a provision contained in the PSA the parties acknowledged that they owned a note for the sale of a laundry business that each agreed to monthly payments of $1,743 which was to be divided into three (3) equal parts between the Plaintiff, the Defendant , and the Plaintiff's brother. The Plaintiff also agreed to pay one third of this amount or $581 to the Defendant on a monthly basis for the duration of the life of the note. The business had been sold before the divorce and payments had been made on a note for over two (2) years by the purchaser of the business. The Defendant was unable to vacate the marital property at the time she had agreed to leave therefore the Plaintiff kept the first three (3) $581 payments to compensate him for rent charged to the Defendant. Then he made two (2) payments to her. During this time, the buyer of the business defaulted on his purchase and stopped paying on the note held by the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff demanded that the Defendant return his last two (2) payments because he was not being paid by the defaulting purchaser. The Defendant did not return the money. The Plaintiff responded by offering the Plaintiff one third of the business if she agreed to contribute to the debts and repairs of the business. The Defendant responded that she would simply sell her share of the business. Neither party ever made an attempt to modify or enforce their PSA for seven (7) years. According to the Plaintiff, during that time, he and his brother fixed and operated the business and then leased it to a tenant. Then the Defendant moved to enforce the provisions of the PSA demanding payment of her $581 monthly payments. The Plaintiff never offered her any portion of the rent he was receiving from the new tenant. In response to the Defendant's Motion, the Plaintiff claimed that the agreement only required him to pay the Defendant if he received payments from the purchaser on the note. According to the Appellate Division, a settlement is essentially a contract which is to be enforced as written, absent a demonstration of fraud or other compelling circumstances. Honeywell v. Bubb, 130 N.J. Super. 130, 136, 325 A.2d 832 (App. Div. 1974). Further, New Jersey has a strong public policy favoring settlement of litigation. Borough of Haledon v. Borough of N. Haledon, 358 N.J. Super. 289, 305 817 A.2d 965 (App. Div. 2003). This policy is especially strong in family disputes. Puder v. Buechel, 362 N.J. Super. 479, 488, 828 A.2d 957 (App. Div. 2003). The Family Court judge who ruled on the Motion found the Plaintiff's argument to be weak and held that the PSA was an integrated document that reflected the negotiations of the parties, where each had given up rights and compromised claims in return for other benefits and therefore its provisions should be enforced against the Plaintiff. The Appellate Court found nothing in the record to contradict the Family Court judge's ruling and it affirmed the lower court's decision. If you believe that a post-judgment modification to your settlement agreement regarding the equitable distribution of a business that you and your spouse owned it may be beneficial to you to seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modification, equitable distribution, alimony, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit the DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice if an attorney.

Tuesday, June 23, 2015

Mother Appeals Downward Modification Of Child Support

In Litvinenko v. Ter-Saakov, the Plaintiff appealed from a Court Order with regard to adjustments that were made to the Defendant's child support obligation, as well as, an award of attorney's fees that was granted in the Defendant's favor. The Plaintiff and Defendant have one (1) child together, a son born in 2008. The Defendant relocated to the Ukraine in 2012, when the parties' son was four (4) years old. Subsequently, a Family Court judge issued an Order granting sole custody of the child to the Plaintiff and requiring the Defendant to pay child support in the amount of $463 a week. A few months later the Defendant returned from the Ukraine to attend a Motion hearing with his attorney at which the Plaintiff represented herself. Halfway through the hearing the Plaintiff requested an adjournment to seek counsel, the judge denied her request during the hearing. The Plaintiff then stated, in the courtroom, that she was going to walk out of courtroom and not participate in the proceeding. The judge warned her that doing so would result in her requested relief being denied. She walked out of the courtroom anyway. The judge proceeded with the hearing and entered an Order granting the parties shared custody of their child. The Defendant was provided with Skype parenting time three (3) times a week and one (1) week overnight vacation per year. Further, the Defendant's child support obligation was reduced to $268 a week and he was awarded $11,805 in counsel fees. The Plaintiff appealed. On appeal the Plaintiff argued that the judge abused her discretion by awarding counsel fees to the Defendant because the Defendant was a successful businessman earning a seven (7) figure salary and she further claimed that the judge erred in reducing the Defendant's child support obligation. According to the Appellate Court, a judge in a matrimonial action may award reasonable attorney's fees and shall "consider the factors set forth in the court rule on counsel fees, the financial circumstances of the parties, and the good or bad faith of either party." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23; N.J. Court Rule 5:3-5(c). The decision to award counsel fees "in a matrimonial action rests in the discretion of the trial court[,]" Addesa v. Addesa, 392 N.J. Super. 58, 78, 919 A.2d 885 (App. Div. 2007), and will be disturbed "only on the 'rarest occasion,' and then only because of [a] clear abuse of discretion." Strahan v. Strahan, 402 N.J. Super. 298, 317, 953 A.2d 1219 (App. Div. 2008). In this case, the judge based the attorney fee award on the Plaintiff's bad faith in leaving the proceeding against the direct order of the judge. The Appellate Court held that the trial judge aptly explained her reasons for the award and the decision was well within her discretion, therefore, the award of attorney fees was affirmed. However, the Appellate Court found that the trial judge's modification of the Defendant's child support obligation was in error because the judge did not attach a copy a NJ Child Support Guidelines Worksheet or explain her reasoning for the downward modification, which is required. Capaccio v. Capaccio, 321 N.J. Super. 46, 54 n.11, 729 A.2d 253 (App. Div. 1999); N.J. Court Rule 5:6A. Therefore, the decision of the lower court was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded back to the Family Court. If you believe that it may be beneficial to you to seek a post-judgment modification of your child support obligation it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modification, child support, parenting time, child relocation, divorce, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Monday, June 22, 2015

Equitable Distribution Of A Residence 'Underwater'

In Grella v. Rumer, the Defendant appealed from a provision in a 2014 Family Court Order that denied his Motion to modify the parties' property settlement agreement (PSA) regarding the equitable distribution of the parties' marital home. The Plaintiff moved out of the marital residence in 2007. According to a provision in the parties' PSA which was incorporated into their divorce judgment in 2009 the husband was to have exclusive possession of the home, and the home was to be listed for sale or the husband was to buy out the Plaintiff's portion within five (5) years of their divorce. Further, it was stated that the wife was not entitled to any equity the Defendant paid into the home after the parties separated. Five (5) years after the parties were divorced the home was appraised at $190,000 and the outstanding mortgage indebtedness at that time was $231,561 therefore the parties' mortgage was $41,000 more than the home's value. The Defendant argued that the parties were mutually mistaken in believing the home had equity when they divorced. The Plaintiff claimed that the Defendant unilaterally increased the debt on the home. Further, the fact that a particular value was not agreed upon when the parties' divorced did not mean that the parties were mistaken with regard to any equity the home may have had. According to the Appellate Court, "the doctrine of mutual mistake applies when a 'mistake was mutual in that both parties were laboring under the same misapprehension as to [a] particular, essential fact.'" Bonnco Petrol, Inc. v. Epstein, 115 N.J. 599, 608, 560 A.2d 655 (1989); Beachcomber Coins, Inc. v. Boskett, 166 N.J. Super. 442, 446, 400 A.2d 78 (App. Div. 1979). In this case, the Defendant had fallen woefully short of demonstrating the clear and convincing evidence necessary to demonstrate that the parties were mistaken. Although he may have had evidence of a current lack of equity, he had not demonstrated any lack of equity in the residence in 2009 when the PSA was executed. Therefore, the Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the lower court. If you believe that a post-judgment modification to your settlement agreement regarding the equitable distribution of your property may be beneficial to you it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modification, equitable distribution, alimony, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit the DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice if an attorney.

Wednesday, June 17, 2015

Equitable Distribution In Small Business Divorce Is Contested

In Hetherington v. Molinaro, a divorce involving a small businesss, the Defendant appealed from a trial court's confirmation of two arbitration awards, one setting the termination date of the marriage in the parties' divorce and the other one setting value and equitable distribution of a business formed and operated by the Plaintiff. The Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. The parties in his case were married in 1996. In 1999, the Plaintiff established Hetherington Information Services, LLC ("HIS") and was the sole owner. In 2006, she stopped working at this company and started working for a company called AON. After the parties separated in 2008, the Plaintiff returned to HIS and expanded the business. In 2010, the Plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce that did not go anywhere following a series of adjourned case management conferences. The parties both retained the services of forensic accountants to assess the value of HIS. The parties mutually dismissed the first complaint for divorce after deciding not to proceed in 2011. Later that year, the Plaintiff filed a second complaint for divorce and in 2012 the parties agreed to binding arbitration on the termination date of their marriage for equitable distribution purposes as well as the value of HIS. In 2013, in a written decision, the arbitrator made detailed factual and legal findings regarding the issues in his case. Pursuant to Portner v. Portner, 93 N.J. 215, 460 A.2d 115 (1983) and Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 218, 320 A.2d 484 (1974), a divorce complaint generally marks the end of a marriage for equitable distribution purposes when the proceeding culminates in a final judgment of divorce. However, the arbitrator relied on Genovese v. Genovese, 392 N.J. Super. 215, 920 A.2d 660 (App. Div. 2007), which held that a marriage is deemed ended for equitable distribution purposes prior to the filing of a divorce complaint where the facts "provide incontrovertible evidence that the marital partnership terminated prior to the filing of the . . . complaint" . . . and where the "facts evidence more than a mere physical separation . . . ." Id. at 226-27. The arbitrator determined, by the parties' own admissions, the marriage ended by February 11, 2010 and set the termination of the marriage to that date for equitable distribution purposes. The arbitrator also awarded the Defendant with 25% interest in the value of HIS as of February 11, 2010 or $18,750. The Defendant appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court's decision to uphold the arbitrator's decision. According to the court, an arbitrator may "conduct an arbitration in such a manner as the arbitrator considers appropriate for a fair and expeditious disposition of the proceeding." N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-15(a). The arbitrator's authority includes the power of "determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality, and weight of any evidence." N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-15(a). The court concluded that it found no basis to disturb the arbitrator's award as it was consistent with the arbitrator's broad authority to conduct the proceeding and the record sufficiently supported the final award. The equitable distribution of assets is of the most emotional and complex aspects of a divorce. If you are involved in a battle over the pre- or post-judgment division of marital property, assets, or debts it is extremely important that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about divorce where a party owns a business, high net-worth divorce, equitable distribution, post-judgment modification, contested divorce, alimony, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Monday, June 15, 2015

Child Support Award Affirmed In Deference To Trial Court

Kummarapurugo v. Thota, is a post-judgment matrimonial action wherein the Plaintiff appealed from a Family Court Order, issued in 2014 that recalculated his child support obligation to $272 per week, arguing that the court was mistaken in its calculation. The Family Court is afforded substantial discretion to determine child support awards and other support obligations. Foust v. Glaser, 340 N.J. Super. 312, 315 (App. Div. 2001). A child support order is always "subject to review and modification on a showing of changed circumstances." Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 146 (1980). "If consistent with the law, such an award will not be disturbed unless it is manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary, or clearly contrary to reason or to other evidence, or the result of whim or caprice." Foust, supra, 340 N.J. Super. at 315-16. "When reviewing decisions granting or denying applications to modify child support, we examine whether, given the facts, the trial judge abused his or her discretion." J.B. v. W.B., 215 N.J. 305, 325-26 (2013). The Plaintiff argued that the Family Court's determination of his child support obligation was unfair as modified because the court failed to consider the appropriate child support guidelines factors. The Defendant claimed that the judge made sufficient findings of fact to justify the support award. The Appellate Court agreed with the Defendant and affirmed the decision of the Family Court. In this case, the Appellate Court found that although the Family Court judge's findings were not a "paradigm of the findings required by N.J.C.R. 1:7-4," the facts on the record were sufficient to support the child support award. Further, the Family Court judge appropriately addressed the recalculation of child support through the application of the statutory factors. If you believe that a post-judgment modification to your child support obligation may be beneficial to you it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modification, child support, child relocation, child custody, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice if an attorney.

Wednesday, June 10, 2015

Motion To Enforce Equitable Distribution Of Tax Liability

In Lewis v. Lewis, a post-judgment case to enforce of litigant's rights, the Plaintiff appealed from a Court Order that required her to pay debt owed to the IRS when it was unclear whether the court was provided with the IRS's determination that granted her innocent spouse relief. The Appellate Court remanded the case back to the Family Court for reconsideration. The parties were married in 1996 and divorced in 2006. Their property settlement agreement (PSA) submitted with their final divorce judgment included the following language: "With respect to certain outstanding Internal Revenue Service debt, on account of 2004 income, the parties agree . . . each shall be responsible and pay, when as due, fifty (50% of this debt . . . ." In 2014, the Family Court held that the Plaintiff was in violation of litigants' rights for failure to pay her portion, including interest and penalties. The Plaintiff filed an appeal. A ruling on enforcement Motions in matrimonial actions must be "reviewed for abuse of discretion, with deference to the expertise of Family Part judges." Costa v. Costa, 440 N.J. Super. 1, 4, 111 A.3d 97 (App. Div. 2015). According to the Appellate Court, spouses who file joint federal income tax returns are held jointly and severally liable for any amounts due. 26 U.S.C.A. § 6013(d)(3). "Innocent Spouse" relief provisions in the IRS Code offer a narrow exception to this, under 26 U.S.C.A. § 6015(b), a spouse may seek relief if the spouse establishes that in signing the tax return the spouse did not know, and had no reason to know, there was an understatement of tax attributable to erroneous items of the other spouse, and that it would be inequitable to hold the spouse liable. On appeal, the Plaintiff attached IRS documents that indicate that she was granted innocent spouse relief by the IRS. She claims that the Defendant filed his Motion to enforce the PSA even though he knew she had been granted innocent spouse relief. The Appellate Division remanded the case back to the Family court solely to allow the Plaintiff the opportunity to file a Motion for reconsideration in the court consistent with Court Rule 4:49-2, and holding that such a Motion shall be considered timely if it is filed within twenty (20) days after service of the opinion on the Defendant. If you believe that a post-judgment modification to settlement agreement regarding equitable distribution, alimony, or any other issue may be beneficial to you it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modification, equitable distribution, child relocation, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice if an attorney.

Sunday, June 7, 2015

Equitable Distribution Dictates Payment Of Mortgage

In Murphy v. Murphy, a New Jersey Appellate Division case out of Morris County, the Defendant appealed from a 2014 Family Court Order that denied his post-judgment Motion to compel the Plaintiff, his ex-wife, to make mortgage payments on the parties' martial residence under the terms they agreed to regarding equitable distribution. The Court also granted her request to compel him to reimburse her for unreimbursed medical expenses and insurance. The parties in this case were married in 1987 and had three (3) children together. They were divorced in 2013, at which time two (2) of their children were emancipated and they shared joint custody of their daughter. Their divorce judgment incorporated a marital settlement agreement (MSA). In the agreement, the Defendant agreed to paying the carrying charges on the marital home until "the house [was] sold, or through January 1, 2014, whichever [was] sooner." Also, the agreement specified that the Defendant was obligated to maintain medical insurance for the Plaintiff and pay for her uncovered or unreimbursed health care expenses until a certain date. The parties assumed that the marital residence would sell before January 1, 2014, but unfortunately it did not and there was no provision in the agreement that provided for mortgage payments beyond that date. The Defendant stopped paying the mortgage after December of 2013. At the end of January 2014, the Defendant filed a Motion to compel the Plaintiff to start paying the mortgage payments. The Plaintiff filed a Cross-Motion for an Order compelling the Defendant to pay the mortgage and for unreimbursed medical bills. A Family Court judge denied the Defendant's Motion finding that the parties had previously agreed that there was no equity in the marital residence and therefore continuing to pay the mortgage would not produce a positive result. Therefore, the judge held that neither party would have to pay the mortgage. In addition, the judge granted the Plaintiff's request to compel the Defendant to pay for unreimbursed medical expenses. The Defendant appealed and on appeal the Defendant argued that the parties' MSA did not obligate him to pay the mortgage after January 1, 2014 and he was also not obligated to reimburse the Plaintiff for unreimbursed medical insurance expenses. The Appellate Division agreed with the Defendant's first argument but disagreed with his second. According to the Appellate Division, "An agreement to settle a lawsuit is a contract which, like all contracts, may be freely entered into and which a court, absent a demonstration of 'fraud or other compelling circumstances,' should honor and enforce as it does other contracts." Pascarella v. Bruck, 190 N.J Super. 118, 124-5 (App Div) certif. denied, 94 N.J. 600 (1983). "Settlement agreements in matrimonial matters, being 'essentially consensual and voluntary in character, ... [are] entitled to considerable weight with respect to their validity and enforceability' in equity, provided they are fair and just." Dolce v. Dolce, 383 N.J. Super. 11, 20 (App. Div. 2006). In this case, the Defendant sought to compel the Plaintiff to pay the mortgage after January 1, 2014 when either the MSA or the divorce judgment specified that she was to do so. The court held that if the Defendant had wanted the Plaintiff to pay the mortgage for as long as she lived in the home he should have negotiated that when the parties were creating their MSA. Therefore, the Appellate Court affirmed the lower court's denial of this request. However, the court found that the Plaintiff was not entitled to unreimbursed medical expenses from the Defendant because she incurred those costs after the date contemplated in their divorce judgment and therefore reversed the lower court's ruling with regard to this issue. The equitable distribution of assets is of the most emotional and complex aspects of a divorce. If you are involved in a battle over the pre- or post-judgment division of marital property, assets, or debts it is extremely important that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about equitable distribution, post-judgment modification, contested divorce, alimony, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Friday, June 5, 2015

Fiance's Drinking Does Not Affect Father's Parenting Time

In Santos v. Yanez, the Defendant appealed from a post-judgment Family Court Order that denied her Motion for Reconsideration with regard to the custody of her daughter and the Plaintiff's parenting time. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the Family Court. The parties in this case were divorced in 2011. They only have one (1) child, a daughter, who was nine years old at the time of the appeal. In 2012, the parties entered into a Consent Order that directed that they share joint legal custody of their daughter but specified that the Defendant was to be the parent of primary residence. A year and a half later, the Plaintiff's fiancé picked up the parties' child from school because he was unable to. Upon leaving the school, the fiancé's car lost control and struck a tree. She was charged with careless driving, driving while intoxicated, and refusal to provide a breath sample. The parties' daughter was severely injured. A month following the accident, the Defendant filed an Order to Show Cause (OTSC) seeking temporary sole custody of the child and a drastic restriction on the Plaintiff's parenting time. The Defendant also sought to have the Plaintiff's fiancé barred from ever being in the presence of the child again. The Family Court denied the Defendant's application for emergent relief but barred the Plaintiff's fiancé from having any contact with the child. The OTSC was converted to a Motion and scheduled for a return date. The court found that the Defendant failed to establish a prima facie case that their daughter was suffering from a genuine and substantial harm from remaining in the Plaintiff's custody as none of the injuries suffered by the child could be attributed to the Plaintiff's conduct. The Defendant filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The court denied the Motion and the Defendant appealed. The Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the lower court finding that motion reconsideration is appropriate when a court's previous decision was "based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis," or failed to consider or appreciate "probative, competent evidence [,]" or where a "litigant wishes to bring new or additional information to the [c]ourt's attention which it could not have provided on the first application [.]" D'Atria v. D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401 (Ch. Div. 1990). In this case, the Appellate Court held that the record fully supported the Family Court's decision based upon the facts presented and upon the observation "that [d]efendant's motion [was] almost identical" to a prior motion that she submitted and therefore there was no abuse of discretion in the court denial of her request. Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 384-85 (App. Div. 1996). If you believe that a post-judgment modification to your child custody or parenting time arrangement may be beneficial to you it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modification, child custody, parenting time, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice if an attorney.

Tuesday, June 2, 2015

Court Affirms Child's Emancipation Over Mother's Protests

In Almeida v. Dykhouse, the parties have been engaged in repetitive litigation with regard to financial issues concerning the custody and emancipation of their son. The parties were never married and their son was 23 years old at the time of this appeal. The issues that were the result of the appeal arose out of a Family Court judge's opinion issued in 2014. In that opinion, the judge emancipated the parties' son as of 2012 and granted the father a child support credit from 2008 through the date of emancipation in 2012. Further, the father was ordered to pay certain arrears on child support and college costs upon an audit that was to be conducted by the Probation Department. The audit determined that the father owed $414 to the mother after considering other credits. The mother appealed from the Family Court's ruling challenging the retroactive medical credits awarded to the father and the Court Order emancipating the son as of 2012. She argued that the court should have delayed the date of her son's emancipation until the end of 2013 when he stopped taking courses at a community college. The Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the lower court determining that the son had attained the age of majority and had sufficiently moved beyond the sphere of influence and responsibility of his parents to be emancipated. Filippone v. Lee, 304 N.J. Super. 301, 308, 700 A.2d 284 (App. Div. 1997); Llewelyn v. Shewchuck, Super. LEXIS 60 (App. Div. 2015) (slip op. at 7). Therefore, even though he may have still been taking some classes at a community college he was no longer being supported by his parents and was able to support himself outside the home. The Appellate Division saw no reason to disturb the judge's rulings, including the retroactive credits awarded to the father for past health insurance premiums. The court also noted that although the parties continued to disagree over the court's calculations regarding the credits and arrears, the Appellate Court was satisfied that the remaining issues were de minimis in nature and did not require it to make any further rulings with regard to them. N.J. Court Rule 2:10-2. In New Jersey child emancipation does not automatically occur once a child reaches the age of majority and a party wishing to seek the legal emancipation of a child much petition the court to do so. If you have questions regarding the legal standard for emancipation or how a child's emancipation affects a parent's child support obligation it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about emancipation, child custody, divorce, alimony, child support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way intended to replace the advice of an attorney.