Equitable Distribution Will Not Be Enforced Against Equity

In Rubino v. Rubino, the Defendant appealed from a Family Court Order which denied his request to enforce a provision of a property settlement agreement (PSA) that he entered into with the Plaintiff concerning equitable distribution and denied his application to modify his child support obligation. The Plaintiff and Defendant were married in 1988 and had two (2) children. In 2004, the parties separated and were officially divorced in 2006. A PSA was incorporated into the parties' final divorce judgment. The PSA directed that the parties were to share joint legal and physical custody of the children until they were emancipated and that neither party was to be required to pay child support since they had equal incomes and would share the children equally. In 2007, the Defendant was arrested and charged with three (3) counts of endangering the welfare of a child, and three (3) counts of criminal sexual contact. Custody of the children was immediately transferred to the Plaintiff. Shortly thereafter, the court granted the Defendant supervised visitation with the children and required that he pay $254 per week in child support. In 2008, the Family Court issued another Order denying the Defendant's Motion for shared custody and to reduce his child support obligation. In 2013, the Defendant filed another Motion to enforce his rights to $40,000 under an equitable distribution provision in the parties' PSA, to retroactively reduce his child support obligation, to vacate all cost of living (COLA) increases to his obligation, and for an award of all retroactive credits based upon the vacated COLAs. The Family Court denied all of the relief sought in the Defendant's Motion. The Defendant appealed. The Appellate Division found that it would be inappropriate to require the Plaintiff to make a $40,000 payment to the Defendant pursuant to the PSA considering the very significant amount of money that the Defendant owed to the Plaintiff in child support arrears and other expenses related to the children. Regarding the reduction in his child support obligation, the court determined that the Motion judge reasonably determined that the request should be denied because it was not accompanied by sufficient information. Halliwell v. Halliwell, 326 N.J. Super. 442, 741 A.2d 638 (App. Div. 1999). Finally, the court denied the Defendant's argument that the Family Court judge erred by affirming two (2) Orders granting COLA increases to his child support obligation because he never received notice. The Appellate Division noted that the record supported the Family Court judge's decision and the Defendant's requests were without sufficient merit to warrant a full comment. Rule 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). Although the court did note that the Defendant had an obligation to inform the Probation Department of any change to his address. Property Settlement Agreements (PSA) are very common today. If you have questions regarding how an agreement should be drafted to best protect your interests with regard to alimony, equitable distribution, child support or any other disputed issue it is extremely important that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about equitable distribution, child support, alimony, post-judgment modification, parenting time or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way intended to replace the advice of an attorney

Even If Mother Interferes With Visitation, Father Gets No Reduction In Child Care Costs

Goni v. Tchistiakova, is a case that came out of Sussex County, in which the Defendant appealed from a post-judgment Order denying her application to compel the Plaintiff to contribute to their son's after school care expenses and that before the Defendant could file another application the Plaintiff's parenting time had to be significantly expanded. The Appellate Division reversed the decision of the Family Court. The Defendant filed a summary action with the Family Court, pursuant to Rule 5:6-1, to modify an existing child support Order in the hopes of compelling the Plaintiff to contribute to their son's after school care expenses. The court instructed the parties to attempt to solve the issue themselves. At that time the court heard the Plaintiff's request for additional parenting time and noted that the Defendant should "expand" the Plaintiff's parenting time, as well as that of his extended family, before she should get any additional expenses from him. The Defendant appealed. The Appellate Court reversed the decision of the Family Court holding that the lower court failed to provide a reasonable basis for denying the Defendant's request. Unless there are circumstances that excuse a parent from paying child support, a parent must contribute to work-related day care expenses. See NJ Child Support Guidelines. In this case, there was no evidence presented indicating that the Plaintiff was relieved of his duty to contribute. Next, even if the Defendant interfered with the Plaintiff's parenting time, his obligation to pay support would not be relieved because a "parent's responsibility to support [his] child financially cannot be lessened by the other parent's interference 'with rights of custody or visitation granted by a court.'" Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583, 592 (1995); Ross v. McNasby, 259 N.J. Super 410, 414 (App. Div. 1992). Finally, there was no application submitted to the court requesting an expansion of the Plaintiff's parenting time. Beyond that, unless a grandparent or sibling has filed an application and a court has issued an Order directing visitation with them pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1, then family members are not entitled to visitation. If you are considering a post-judgment modification of your child custody or parenting time arrangement or financial obligations it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modification , divorce, alimony, child custody, parenting time, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Alimony Suspended For 9 Months Based Upon Cohabitation

In Fringo v. Fringo, the Plaintiff appealed from a Family Court post-judgment Order issued in 2013 that suspended her entitlement to alimony for nine (9) months because of the Plaintiff's cohabitation with her significant other. In her appeal the Plaintiff argued that the Family Court erred because the Defendant failed to prove a prima facie case of cohabitation and even if he had rebutted the presumption. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the lower court. The parties were married in 1993 and divorced in 2011 pursuant to a final judgment of divorce and an incorporated marital settlement agreement (MSA). The MSA stated that the "...parties agree that cohabitation by wife shall constitute a substantial change in circumstance in accordance with NJ law." In 2013, the Defendant filed a Motion seeking the modification or termination of his alimony obligation because the Plaintiff was cohabitating with another person. The Defendant submitted with his Certification the Certification of a private investigator who prepared a report detailing that the Plaintiff's boyfriend began to live in her apartment in December of 2012. After hearing oral argument in 2013, a Family Court judge granted the Defendant's Motion for a modification of alimony based upon the Plaintiff's cohabitation relying on Ozolins v. Ozolins, 308 N.J. Super. 243 (App Div. 1998) and Reese v. Weis, 430 N.J. Super. 552 (App. Div. 2013), and based upon the Plaintiff and her boyfriend's admission that he lived with her for nine (9) months in 2012. Therefore, the court terminated the Defendant's alimony for nine (9) months and credited the Defendant's overpayment against eighteen (18) of future alimony payments. Subsequently, an appeal was filed. According to the Appellate Court, alimony awards are not set in stone and can be modified if a party demonstrates a significant financial change since the alimony was first awarded. Reese v. Weis, 430 N.J. Super. at 569. Further, an alimony award can be modified based upon a changed circumstance which rests with the discretion of the judge. Larbig v. Larbig, 384 N.J. Super. 17, 21 (App. Div. 2006). Cohabitation constitutes a change in circumstances. Gayet v. Gayet, 92 N.J. 149, 155 (1983). The Appellate Court's review of the record displayed that the Plaintiff and her boyfriend admitted in their prior Certifications to the court that they lived together and failed to rebut that presumption therefore the Defendant was able to establish a prima facie case of changed circumstances for the time period that the Plaintiff's boyfriend was living with her, which was nine (9) months in 2012. As a result, the Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. The laws governing alimony and cohabitation have recently been changed. It is very important that you seek out the advice of an experienced family law attorney to protect your rights an entitlements if you are considering a post-judgment modification of your alimony obligation based upon your ex-spouse's cohabitation with another person or for any other reason. For more information about alimony, divorce, post-judgment modification, child support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Cohabitation Criteria For Alimony Termination

In Wachtell v. Wachtell, a Morris County case, the Family Court terminated alimony based upon a finding of cohabitation. The Appellate Court vacated the alimony termination order and remanded the case back to the Family Court for a plenary hearing to focus on the disputed facts with regard to the alleged cohabitation. The legal threshold to prove cohabitation for the purposes of terminating alimony has been established through case law. In Konzelman v. Konzelman, 158 N.J. 185 (1999), cohabitation was defined by the existence of a relationship shown "to have stability, permanency, and mutual interdependence." See also Reese v. Weis, 430 N.J. Super. 552, 570 (App. Div. 2013). Although, "living together, intertwined finances such as joint bank accounts, shared living expenses and household chores" may support a determination of cohabitation, such examples should not be considered in a vacuum. Konzelman, supra, 158 N.J. at 202. With regard to procedure, a party who pays alimony and who alleges cohabitation must first present prima facie evidence that his or her ex-spouse is in such a relationship that is tantamount to marriage. Gayet v. Gayet, 92 N.J. 149, 154-55 (1983). If this initial threshold is met then the parties may engage in a discovery process. Further, it is customary for factual disputes involving alleged cohabitation to be resolved at a plenary hearing where a Family Court judge can determine the credibility of competing witnesses. Winegarden v. Winegarden, 316 N.J. Super. 52, 56 n.1 (App. Div. 1998). A hearing may be avoided if there are no disputed issues of material fact and the matter is otherwise suited for disposition on the papers. Segal v. Lynch, 417 N.J. Super. 627, 642-43 (App. Div. 2011). In this case, the Appellate Division agreed with the ex-husband that his Motion papers set forth a prima facie case of cohabitation. The Appellate Court disagreed with the findings of the Family Court, terminating alimony based upon cohabitation, because a key factual dispute was raised by the ex-wife regarding the amount of overnights that her paramour spend with her during the week. The Appellate Court reasoned that although not completely dispositive, an important factor in any cohabitation analysis is that people must cohabit to a substantial agree in order for a determination of cohabitation to be made. Therefore, because the parties disagreed over the number of nights that the ex-wife's paramour was spending with her, the Appellate Court vacated the termination of alimony Court Order and remanded the case back to the Family Court for a plenary hearing on the issue. The laws governing the issues involving alimony and cohabitation have recently been changed and it is very important that you seek out the advice of an attorney to protect your rights and entitlements. If you are considering post-judgment modification of your alimony obligation based upon your ex-spouse's cohabitation with another person or for any other reason it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about alimony, divorce, post-judgment modification , emancipation, child support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Divorce Via Facebook?

We live in an age where social media seems to be invading every aspect of our daily lives, therefore is it possible that social media sites such as Facebook can become a medium through which people can serve divorce documents? According to a recent ruling from Manhattan Supreme Court Justice Matthew Cooper perhaps divorce law may begin to work through social media, after all. Ellanora Baidoo and Victor Sena Blood-Dzraku were Ghanian and were married in a civil ceremony in 2009. Blood-Dzraku failed to honor his promise to follow up the civil ceremony with a traditional Ghanian wedding and therefore according to custom, this meant that the wedding was never consummated. Further, they never actually lived together despite being legally married. Shortly after their civil ceremony, Blood-Dzraku disappeared and Baidoo had no idea where he was. Initially, Baidoo hired a private investigator and submitted queries to the DMV in attempts to locate him, but in vain. Every once and a while Blood-Dzraku would send messages to Baidoo using Facebook. Baidoo soon realized that she wanted a divorce, but the only address that she had for him was for an apartment that he had moved out of in 2011 and therefore she could not properly serve him with the divorce papers. In a potential legal game changer, Judge Cooper in Manhattan allowed Baidoo to notify Blood-Dzraku of their impending divorce once a week for three (3) weeks using Facebook. According to the judge's ruling, if he did not respond within that time, the divorce would be processed without him. This ruling may have potential implications for people who want to obtain divorces but whose spouses are unable or unwilling to participate in a divorce because they cannot be properly personally served with the required documents. Although this ruling is presently restricted to New York, the prevalence and ubiquity of social media is felt throughout the entire country and there is no doubt that the option may gain favor in New Jersey and in many of the other states. Choosing to seek a divorce can be one of the most emotional and difficult decisions that a person can make in their lifetime. If you feel that it may be beneficial to you to obtain divorce it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about divorce, uncontested divorce, equitable distribution, child custody, non dissolution cases, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Extended Parenting Time, Child Custody And Name Change Award Appealed

In Ferriola v. Chiarulli, the Defendant appealed from a Family Court Order that expanded the Plaintiff's parenting time and restored the parties' child's name to that appearing on her birth certificate. The Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. The parties in this case share a four (4) year old girl. They were never married and they do not get along with each other. During their lives, both have battled addictions to drugs or alcohol and their daughter tested positive for drugs when she was born in 2010. As a result, she suffered severe and lasting withdrawal symptoms which caused there to be a finding of abuse and neglect against the parents. In 2011, the Defendant was awarded sole legal and physical custody of the girl and the Plaintiff was allowed only weekly supervised visitation while she underwent drug treatment. The Plaintiff completed court ordered parenting classes and began drug treatment as recommended by the Division of Child Protection and Permanency (DCP&P) in 2011. After completing a one (1) year drug treatment program the Plaintiff was awarded ten (10) hours a week of unsupervised parenting time with her child with the plan to re-evaluate parenting time in the future. Six months later the judge found that the Plaintiff's parenting time visits were successful and she was still sober, therefore she expanded her parenting time to include overnight visits. The judge also granted the Plaintiff's request to change the child's name to add her last name as an additional middle name to allow the child to carry the Plaintiff's family name without hyphenating her surname. The Defendant appealed arguing that the court should not have expanded the Plaintiff's overnight parenting time or changed the child's name without a plenary hearing. The Appellate Court held that the Defendant's arguments were without merit pursuant to Rule 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). The Appellate Court believed that the Family Court judge, who had overseen the case for over three (3) years carefully explained her reasons for all of the relief that the Plaintiff was awarded. Most importantly, the judge based all of her decisions on the child's best interests. Hand v. Hand, 391 N.J. Super. 102, 111-12 (App. Div 2007). Therefore, the Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the Family Court. Child custody and parenting time cases are of the most emotional and difficult cases in all of family law as are the often included issues including changing a child's name. If you feel that it may be beneficial to you to submit an application to the court to change your child's name or modify your current child custody or parenting time arrangement it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney. For more information about name change, child custody, parenting time, non dissolution cases, divorce or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Grandmother Challenges Custody Of Child's Father

Reed v. Pettiford, is an Essex County case in which the Plaintiff, a child's father, was engaged in a custody dispute with the Defendant, the child's maternal grandmother. The Defendant appealed from the Family Court's 2013 Order which denied her application for sole legal and physical custody of her grandson. The Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. The child's mother died in 2004 before he turned two years old. After his mother died, the child remained in the custody of the Plaintiff and the Defendant assumed custody of the child's half sister. Subsequently, the Family Court awarded both parties joint legal custody of the boy. In 2005, the Defendant wrote a letter to the court expressing her doubt that the Plaintiff was the child's biological father and asking the court to vacate the prior custody order. She did not legally challenge the Plaintiff's paternity at the time. Rather, she continued to allow the Plaintiff to have residential custody of the child by a private agreement. The boy had a visitation schedule with the Defendant for years. As he aged and became involved in school sports his visitation with the Defendant became sparse and in 2012 the Defendant filed an application with the court to compel the Plaintiff to present the child for visitation. The court ordered visitation. Following a N.J.S.A. 9:2-4 best interests evaluation it was determined that the Plaintiff and Defendant could no longer communicate effectively with regard to the child and it was not in the best interest of child to have both the Plaintiff and Defendant share joint legal custody of him and to compel him to attend visitations with the Defendant. The Court issued a subsequent Order reflecting this change. The Defendant appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the Family Court holding that none of the Defendant's arguments on appeal were sufficient to warrant discussion in a written opinion pursuant to Rule 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). The court did note that the Defendant never properly challenged the Plaintiff's paternity under N.J.S.A . 9:17-38, the New Jersey Parentage Act which governs the issue of paternity in New Jersey. This Act was created to "establish the principle that regardless of the marital status of the parents, all children and parents have equal rights with respect to each other and to provide a procedure to establish parentage in disputed cases. Fazilat v. Feldstein, 180 N.J. 74, 82 (2004). The Plaintiff was never married to the child's mother, but he is presumptively his father under subsections a(4) and (5) of the Parentage Act because he received the child into his home, had supported him, and had always held him out to be his natural child. N.J.S.A. 9:17-43(a)-(5). Child custody and parenting time cases are of the most emotional and difficult cases in all of family law. If you think that it may be beneficial for you to petition the court for a modification of your current child custody arrangement it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about child custody, grandparent's rights, parenting time, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Court Imputes Income For Child Support After Father's Voluntary Career Change

In Provost v. Provost, the Defendant appealed from a 2014 Court Order that imputed his income and modified his child support obligation. The Appellate Division remanded the case back to the Family Court to further develop evidence on the record with regard to the Defendant's career changes. The parties in this case were divorced in 2001. Three (3) children were born to them during their marriage. The Plaintiff has residential custody of the children based upon the parties' divorce judgment which incorporated a marital settlement agreement (MSA). The agreement directed that the Defendant would pay child support for his children until they were emancipated which was defined in the agreement as: "the completion of the child's formal education on a matriculated basis, whether it be graduation from a four year undergraduate school or high school . . . as long as the child is diligently pursuing formal education . . . and obtaining passing grades." The Defendant lost his job in 2009 as a mechanic and attempted to open up his own body shop which earned him much less income. In 2011, the Defendant petitioned the court to modify his support obligation. The Family Court determined, at that time, that the Defendant was earning much less income after he was fired from his job in 2009, but the judge found that he had failed to present evidence of "competent proof of a diminished earning capacity as a mechanic or a good faith attempt at finding another mechanic's position following his termination . . . . " Therefore, the judge imputed his income to be $68,016 which was the income that was reflected in his 2008 tax return as the best indicator of his earning capacity. On appeal, the Defendant argued that the judge made a mistake by imputing his income because he was involuntarily unemployed, he sought employment, and found an appropriate job and therefore he did not change careers as the judge had held. The Appellate Court found that in order to obtain a change in circumstance based upon current earnings a person who has selected a new, less lucrative career must establish that the benefits he or she derives from the career change substantially outweigh the disadvantages to the supported spouse. Without that showing, a judge should deny the Motion for a change in circumstance, in effect imputing prior earnings unless the obligor establishes, in the alternative, that his capacity to earn is diminished, in which case the judge should impute earnings consistent with the obligor's capacity to earn in light of the obligor's background and experience. Storey v. Storey, 373 N.J. Super. 464, 468-69 (App. Div. 2004). The court noted that it was inconsequential and not outcome-determinative whether the Defendant was previously a salaried employee and was then a proprietor for the purpose of determining whether a career change had occurred. What mattered was whether "he or she is working at capacity in employment consistent with [his or her] skills and experience." Storey, supra, 373 N.J. Super. at 472; Lynn v. Lynn, 165 N.J. Super. 328, 340-42 (App. Div. 1979). The court held that the record was devoid of the Defendant's prior work experience and therefore it was impossible to discern whether or not he was working at capacity based upon his skills and experience. Therefore, the Appellate Court remanded the case back to the Family Court to make such determinations. If you believe that a post-judgment modification to your child support obligation may be beneficial to you it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modification, child support, emancipation, child custody, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice if an attorney.

Appellate Court Upholds Arbitrator's Award of Limited Duration Alimony

In the case of Lopez v. Lopez, the Defendant appealed from a 2013 Family Court Order that denied her Motion to modify the terms of a divorce arbitration award that granted her limited duration alimony rather than permanent alimony. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the lower court. This disposition in this case comes down to the scope of review vested in the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court determined that its review of the Family Court's Order was limited. In fact, the court acknowledged that it owed substantial deference to the Family Court's findings of fact. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998). Accordingly, a "reviewing court should uphold the factual findings undergirding the trial court's decision if they are supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence on the record." MacKinnon v MacKinnon, 191 N.J. 240, 253-54 (2007) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007). Although the Appellate Court does not owe any special deference to the Family Court's legal conclusions, it "should not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judges unless . . . convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice . . . . " Parish v. Parish, 412 N.J. Super. 39, 47 (App. Div. 2010). During their divorce, the parties were able to work through all issues including equitable distribution, child custody, and parenting time, but could not agree on amount and duration of alimony. The parties agreed to submit the question of alimony to binding arbitration. In a very detailed written award, the arbitrator reviewed all of the pertinent factors for determining alimony as set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b). In the end, the arbitrator awarded the Defendant $200 per week in limited duration alimony for two (2) years. The Defendant filed a Motion to modify the arbitrator's award because she believed that because the parties were married for 29 years, permanent alimony should have been awarded. Following oral argument the Family Court judge denied the Defendant's Motion holding that a trial court may modify an arbitration award if "the rights of the party applying for the modification were prejudiced by the umpire erroneously applying [the] law to the issues and facts presented for alternative resolution." N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(e)(4), citing Borough of East Rutherford v. East Rutherford P.B.A. Local 275, 213 N.J. 190, 194 (2013). The Defendant Appealed. The Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the Family Court and in light of the record found that the Defendant's arguments were without merit as it determined that the Family Court properly determined to maintain the arbitrator's award of two (2) years of limited duration alimony. Recently, the state statute that governs alimony has recently been modified, it is very important that you seek out the advice of an attorney to protect your rights an entitlements. If you think that it may be beneficial for you to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your alimony obligation it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about alimony, spousal support, equitable distribution, child support, post-judgment modification, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Alimony Termination Motion Upon Wife's Cohabitation

G.M. v. A.M. is a case out of Sussex County, in which the Plaintiff appealed from a Court Order that denied his motion to terminate his alimony obligation to support the Defendant based upon her cohabitation with another man. The parties in this case separated in 2008 and formally divorced in 2009 after a twenty (20) year marriage. The Defendant vacated the marital home and the Plaintiff maintained physical custody of their three (3) sons. According to the parties' divorce judgment the Plaintiff was to pay the Defendant alimony in the amount of $1,154.00 per month, which was to be taxable to the Defendant and deductible to the Plaintiff . The alimony was to be permanent alimony to terminate upon the Defendant's death, Plaintiff's death, the Defendant's re-marriage, Defendant's cohabitation with an unrelated adult in a relationship similar to a marriage or any other circumstance that would constitute a change of circumstances warranting a modification or termination of spousal support based upon the laws of New Jersey. Further, the Defendant was to pay child support to the Plaintiff in the amount of $650.00 per month for the children. Therefore, the Plaintiff was to pay $504.00 a month to the Defendant which reflected the alimony minus the child support amount. About eight (8) months after the parties' were issued their divorce judgment, the Plaintiff filed a Motion to terminate his alimony obligation to Defendant and increase her child support obligation by $200 per month to address the special needs of their middle son. The Defendant responded with a Cross-Motion seeking alimony arrears and for the emancipation of the parties' youngest son. In July of 2010, the Family Court entered an Order indicating that the Plaintiff had "shown a prima facie case" with respect to his request to terminate his alimony and allowed "discovery to demonstrate cohabitation," and the parties were to exchange Interrogatories and Notice to Produce. Three (3) years later, in 2013, the court conducted a plenary hearing to adjudicate the Plaintiff's Motion to terminate alimony based upon the Defendant's cohabitation with another man. The trial court denied the Defendant's application to rely on a document purporting to contain a legally binding definition of "cohabitation" that was materially different from the definition reflected in the parties' divorce judgment. The court agreed with the Plaintiff's argument that the "eleventh hour insertion of that issue into the mix denied him due process." Therefore, the judge accepted the Plaintiff's argument to review the Motion to terminate his alimony based upon the standards set forth in Konzelman v. Konzelman, 158 N.J. 185 (1999). A mere romantic, casual or social relationship is not sufficient to justify the enforcement of a settlement agreement provision terminating alimony. A relationship of cohabitation that can be shown to have stability, permanency, and mutual interdependence must be displayed. Based upon evidence presented at the hearing, the judge found that the Plaintiff failed to establish that the Defendant was cohabitating according to the aforementioned standard. The Plaintiff appealed. On appeal, the Appellate Division found that it had no legal basis to question the Motion judge's factual findings or interfere with the legal conclusions he reached in his decision. The Plaintiff was not able to present sufficient, competent evidence to satisfy the standard to terminate his alimony obligation under Konzelman. Therefore, the Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the Family Court. The laws governing alimony and cohabitation have recently been changed. It is very important that you seek out the advice of an attorney to protect your rights an entitlements. If you think that it may be beneficial for you to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your alimony obligation based upon your ex-spouse's cohabitation with another person or for any other reason it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about alimony, divorce, post-judgment modification , emancipation, child support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.