Same-Sex Divorce Law Lags Behind Same-Sex Marriage Law in NJ

It has been over one year since same-sex marriage has become legal in New Jersey and since October 21, 2013 and the decision in Garden State Equality v. Dow, N.J. 216, 314 (2013) hundreds of homosexual couples from New Jersey and beyond have applied in this state for marriage licenses, but obtaining a same-sex divorce may prove to be a trickier ordeal. Twenty states in America still have legislation that prohibits homosexual couples from legally marrying each other. For many residents of these particular states, New Jersey has proven to be viable destination to travel to for the purposes of marrying. Many same-sex couples living in states that still ban gay and lesbian marriage routinely travel to other states to get married. The velocity with which same-sex marriage laws have been changing throughout the county have provided people in this predicament with many potential wedding destinations. The problem is, same-sex divorce laws have not adapted to accommodate this practice. It stands to reason that the majority of states that do not recognize gay or lesbian marriages also do not recognize same-sex divorce. Therefore, if a LGBT married couple desires to get a divorce there may be logistical obstacles that may impede the process. For instance, in New Jersey a gay or lesbian married couple who may live in another state but traveled to New Jersey to get married will most likely have difficulty obtaining a legal divorce in this state because of New Jersey's residency requirement. According to the laws of this state, either or both of the spouses in a legal marriage must be a bona fide resident of New Jersey and if a couple wants to obtain a divorce on any grounds other than adultery, this residence requirement must have been established for one full year before the divorce papers are filed. The status of this aspect of the law may make it difficult for out of state residents who marred in New Jersey to get a divorce if they did not relocate to the state following their marriage - which indicates that thousands of people throughout the country may be affected by this. If you are a gay or lesbian couple who plan on seeking a legal marriage or filing for a same-sex divorce or would like more information regarding same-sex divorce it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before proceeding. For more information about same-sex marriage, same-sex divorce, equitable distribution, alimony, custody and visitation, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and it is in no way intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Court Denies Man's Request To Lower Alimony For Temporary Change in Circumstances

In the recent Appellate Division case, Lax v. Lax, a post-judgment matrimonial matter, the Plaintiff, David Lax, appealed from a 2013 Family Court Order that denied his Motion to reduce his alimony obligation. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the lower court. The parties in this case were married in 1986 and obtained a legal divorce in 2008. Their final divorce judgment incorporated a Property Settlement Agreement (PSA) in which the Plaintiff agreed to pay the Defendant permanent alimony in the amount of $7,000 per month. In 2011, the Plaintiff filed an application with the court to modify his spousal support obligation. A series of Cross-Motions followed that resulted in a plenary hearing in which the Plaintiff sought to prove changed circumstances based upon a change in his financial situation and the Defendant's co-habitation with another person. The judge determined that no co-habitation existed but that the Plaintiff had proven a change in circumstances warranting a modification of his obligation. Subsequently, the Plaintiff's alimony obligation was reduced to $2,000 a month. Following this ruling, the Defendant filed a Motion for reconsideration and the Plaintiff once again filed for another downward modification of his obligation. This time the court denied his request for another modification and he appealed. The Appellate Court held that its review of the Family Court's decision is limited stating that "Whether an alimony obligation should be modified based upon a claim of changed circumstances rests within a Family Part judge's sound discretion." Larbig v. Larbig, 384 N.J. Super. 17, 21 (App. Div. 2006). Further, it stated that "Courts have consistently rejected requests for modification based on circumstances which are only temporary." Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 145-46 (1980). In this case, the Plaintiff filed his second Motion for another downward modification of his spousal support obligation only three (3) months after the previous order modifying his obligation was issued. The Family Court properly found that there was no evidence in the record to prove that the Plaintiff's financial situation was anything other than temporary. The Appellate Division agreed with the decision of the Family Court and for the aforementioned reasons affirmed the lower court's denial of the Plaintiff's request. If you anticipate that you may want to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your alimony obligation it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about alimony, divorce, child support, equitable distribution, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Court Modifies Child Support And Custody Based on Father's Mental Instability

In the recent Appellate Division case, Cowie v. Cowie, the Plaintiff, in a post-judgment matrimonial matter, appealed from a 2013 court order denying her Motion to reconsider and modify the Defendant's child support obligation retroactively after his custody was diminished due to mental illness. The Appellate Court reversed the decision of the Family Court and remanded the case back to that court for reconsideration. The parties in this case were married in 1999 and the marriage bore two (2) children, a son born in 2001 and another son born in 2003. In 2011, the parties obtained a divorce and entered into a property settlement agreement (PSA) on the same date. The PSA specified that the parties were to share joint legal and residential custody of their children and were to share equal parenting time. Child support was calculated using the NJ Child Support Guidelines based upon the shared parenting worksheet. Subsequently, the Defendant began to suffer from mental health problems and in 2012 the Plaintiff sought temporary sole legal and residential custody of their children as well as a suspension of the Defendant's parenting time. Shortly thereafter, the Family Court granted the Plaintiff's request for temporary sole legal and residential custody of the parties' children and established supervised visitation with the Defendant without over nights. In 2013, the Plaintiff submitted a Motion for a modification of the Defendant's child support obligation because the custody arrangement had been drastically modified. The judge denied her request because the arrangement was deemed to be "temporary." The Plaintiff appealed from this decision. The Appellate Division found that the Plaintiff's application to modify the Defendant's child support was governed by well-settled legal principles. Specifically, a party seeking to modify a child support obligation has the burden of presenting a prima facie case of change circumstances. Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J.139, 157-59 (1980); Innes v. Innes, 117 N.J. 496, 504 (1990); N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. The Appellate Division held that in this case there has been a changed circumstance in the parties' parenting time and that the change in custody was due to the Defendant's incapacity and lack of ability to provide adequate care for his children. Although the modification to the original custody arrangement was deemed to be "temporary," there was no contemplation in the record as to the duration of the Defendant's incapacity. Although courts can reject requests for modification based upon temporary changed circumstances, there is no bright line rule to measure changed circumstances and therefore any determination is left to the discretion of the court. In this case, there has been a "reasonable" time period of the changed circumstance and the children should not be denied appropriate support to meet their needs. Therefore, the Appellate Division reversed the decision of the lower court and remanded the case back to the court for an Order consistent with its decision. If you anticipate that you may want to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your child support obligation it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modification, parenting time, child support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Child Support Modification Sought As Father's Income Decreased And Mother's Increased

In the recent post judgment Appellate Division case, Bigge v. Walker, the Plaintiff appealed from a 2013 Family Court Order that denied his Motion to modify his child support and life insurance obligations. The Appellate Division reversed the decision of the lower court. The parties involved in this case were married in 1987 and subsequently divorced in 1999. One child was born of the marriage in 1991. The parties' divorce judgment directed that the Plaintiff was to pay $105 a week in child support plus an additional $45 a week toward an arrears that had accumulated after they separated. The amount was determined by the parties without using the NJ Child Support Guidelines. In addition, the divorce judgment required that the Plaintiff maintain $100,000 in life insurance to secure his child support obligation. In 2013, the Plaintiff filed a Motion to modify his child support obligation because his work was not steady and he was often unemployed and as a result he fell into arrears. He further asserted that he was suffering from severe health problems and had recently undergone a triple bypass heart surgery which impeded his ability to work. In 2010, he had got a job working in a mail room an earned $26,955 a year as of 2012. In 2013, the Family Court denied the Plaintiff's Motion to modify his child support. The Plaintiff appealed. According to the Appellate Court, child support orders are subject to modification pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 and based upon a showing of changed circumstances. Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 157 (1980). A Family Court motion judge may modify a child support obligation when the party seeking the alteration satisfies the burden of showing a change in circumstances. Dramatic changes in the income or earning capacity of either party, or in the circumstances of their children due to events such as attending college, may result in a finding of a changed circumstance. Colca v. Anson, 413 N.J. 405, 415-16 (App. Div. 2010). In this case, the Appellate Division found that the Family Court judge mistakenly exercised his discretion when he denied the Plaintiff's Motion to modify his child support as his income had been significantly reduced while the Defendant's income had increased. Therefore, the Appellate Division was satisfied that the Family judge did not make adequate findings with respect to the Plaintiff's child support obligation and life insurance requirement and the decision was reversed and remanded back to the Family Court for further proceedings. If you anticipate that you may want to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your child support obligation it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modification, divorce, child support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Father Contests College Tuition Obligations In Post-Judgment Divorce Filing

In the recent Appellate Division case, Gropper v. Gropper, the Defendant, Cy Gropper, appealed from two post-judgment Orders of the Morris County Family Court concerning his obligation to contribute to his son's college expenses based upon his final divorce judgment. The Defendant appealed from two (2) Family Court Orders, one filed on March 20, 2013 that directed him to pay $50 a week directly to the parties' son in child support and 58% of the child's college costs and expenses. The second Order, which was filed on May 21, 2013, denied the Defendant's Motion to reconsider the relief ordered in the previous Court Order. The Defendant claimed that his Motion for reconsideration was not properly considered by the court and that he should not have been ordered to pay his son's private school tuition when "the same education can be obtained a reputable public [state sponsored] schools" for a much lower cost. The Appellate Court ordered a limited remand to review the Defendant's Motion. The parties in this case were divorced in 1995. Their marriage yielded two children and pursuant to the property settlement agreement (PSA) which was incorporated into their final divorce judgment they were to share joint legal custody of their children and were to share their children's college education costs 52% by the Defendant and 48% by the Plaintiff. After the divorce, the Defendant moved to North Carolina. The parties' younger son applied and was accepted to attend an online private college, the University of Advancing Technology (UAT) as well as the University of North Carolina-Charlotte (UNC). Since he had to have spinal surgery, the child did not immediately attend college and subsequently moved to North Carolina. Based upon the child's move and his representation to UNC that his primary residence was the Defendant's address, the Defendant filed a Motion to modify his child support obligation asserting that any child support should be paid directly to the child and that the parties agreed that the child would attend UNC. The Plaintiff filed a Cross-Motion arguing that she agreed that the child support could be sent by Probation directly to the child, but disagreed that an amount adjustment was warranted. Further, she sought a review of each party's college expense contribution amount because the Defendant's income had increased from the time of the divorce. The Plaintiff also asserted that the parties' son had reluctantly agreed to attend UNC and planned on finishing his coursework at UAT because that school offered a major not found at UNC. In a 2013 Court Order, the judge modified the parties' child support obligations. In addition, with regard to the college expenses, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a), the judge ordered that the UAT tuition "after all loans, grants, and scholarships have been obtained" shall be paid 58% by the Defendant and 42% by the Plaintiff. The Defendant appealed. The Appellate Division found that the Family Court judge's statement of reasons supporting the Order at issue regarding the parties' respective college tuition obligations was premised on analysis of the child support statute, but did not mention any consideration of the factors outlined in Newburg v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529 (1982). Further, the Defendant, in his papers, also accurately indentified the need to consider whether the child is enrolled on a full-time basis. Khalaf v. Khalaf, 58 N.J. 63, 71-72 (1971). Therefore, the Appellate Division remanded the case back to the Family Court for an re-evaluation consistent with its opinion. If you anticipate that you may want to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your divorce judgment regarding issues such as your obligation to pay your child's college expenses it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modification, child support, parenting time, divorce, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

FMLA Could Be Extended to Couples in Same-Sex Marriages Throughout Nation

Gay and lesbian couples who were joined in same-sex marriages are now entitled to the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) in states that recognize marriage equality, but the FMLA could also be extended throughout the nation to include common law spouses even in states that currently do not recognize same-sex marriage as well. The U.S. Department of Labor recently proposed a new rule that would extend the effect and benefits of the FMLA to same-sex couples and common law spouses throughout the country. Employers had until August 11, 2014 to submit their comments and suggestions regarding the new proposed rule change. The FMLA covers employers with fifty (50) or more employees within seventy-five (75) miles of each other. As it is written, the law permits any eligible employee to apply for and take up to twelve (12) weeks of unpaid leave within a 12-month period of time if and when a member of his or her family has a serious health condition. The FMLA designates a family member as a parent or child under the age or 18 or a spouse. Previously, only legally married heterosexual couples qualified as spouses under the law. In 2014, the United States Supreme Court struck down parts of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) which defined "marriage" and "spouse" to be limited to heterosexual partners. This ruling changed the definition of "spouse" with regard to the FMLA to include a legally married same-sex spouse, if that person worked in a state that recognized marriage equality but not in states that did not recognize same-sex marriages. The current proposed rule would expand FMLA to the spouses of gay and lesbian individuals as long as the marriage was legal in the state where it was entered into even if they work in a state where same-sex marriage is not legal. The new rule would also expand the FMLA to common law spouses in all fifty (50) U.S. states, provided that the relationship is recognized in at least one state. If you are a gay or lesbian couple who plan on seeking a legal marriage or filing for a same-sex divorce or would like more information regarding same-sex divorce it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before proceeding. For more information about same-sex marriage, same-sex divorce, same-sex relationship dissolution, equitable distribution, alimony, custody and visitation, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and it is in no way intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Release of Escrow Funds To pay Legal Fees

In the recent Appellate Division case, Meyers v. Meyers, the Defendant Andrew Meyers, appealed from a post-judgment Order that denied the release of funds held in escrow to pay his attorney fees and for personal use pursuant to his Final Divorce Judgment. The Appellate Division affirmed. The parties in this case were married in 1968, separated in 2005, and officially divorced in 2009. The parties have three children, of which have been emancipated. At the end of the marriage the husband earned approximately $140,000 a year and the wife $84,000. Their assets included a marital residence, a vacation home, and bank and retirement accounts. In 2007, while the parties' divorce was proceeding, Mr. Meyers withdrew the entire balance of his 401K, totaling $335,000, which resulted in tax liabilities. It was also discovered at that time that the husband had not filed a tax return since 2004. The parties' marital residence was sold before the completion of the divorce so that the proceeds could be used to pay certain debts. In addition, equal shares of $25,000 were distributed to each party to assist in the divorce expenses with the remainder being placed in escrow for equitable distribution. After a divorce trial, the Family Court ruled that the parties were to share equally in the proceeds resulting from the sale of the marital property. The court also ruled that Mr. Meyers' was also responsible for all income tax and interest, as well as, all penalties that were due because he liquidated his retirement assets. Following this, the court created an escrow account in the amount of 40% of Mr. Meyers' income in the years that he did not pay taxes in order to protect his ex-wife from being charged with tax liabilities. The court judgment provided for Mr. Meyers' full portion of the escrow funds resulting from the sale of the marital home, totaling $94,921.47, to be transferred directly to another account held by his attorney for the sole purposing of paying for his income tax penalties. Subsequently, Mr. Meyers applied for a release of the escrowed funds to pay for $32,000 of his attorney's fees and $43,000 for her personal use. The Family Court denied his Motion for these funds stating that the amount of taxes that he owed exceeded the amount held in escrow. Mr. Meyers appealed. The Appellate Division held the parties' final divorce judgment specifically ordered the creation of the escrow account to pay for the tax debt that Mr. Meyers owed to the IRS and therefore the Family Court had the proper basis to order that the escrow account remain undisturbed until the tax issues were resolved. Mr. Meyers also argued that the escrowed funds should be released because his attorney had a valid lien against those funds according to N.J.S.A. 2A:13-5 and that the attorney's lien took precedence over the tax lien. According to the Appellate Court, the New Jersey Attorney's Lien Act, states that any attorney representing a party in an action "shall have a lien for compensation . . . which shall contain and attach to a verdict, report, decision, award, judgment or final order in his client's favor, and the proceeds thereof in whose hands they may come." Musikoff v. Jay Parrino's The Mint, L.L.C., 172 N.J. 133, 139 (2002). In this case, the escrow funds were not part of a judgment or Order in Mr. Meyers' favor. They were a conditional award as part of equitable distribution. Therefore, the Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the Family Court. If you anticipate that you may want to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your divorce judgment it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modification, divorce, custody, parenting time, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.