Monday, March 25, 2019

The Parties' Own Knowing Agreement, Absent Fraud, Prevails In Emancipation

In Longer v. Nace, Robert Nace sought to emancipate the parties’ daughter, as the parties’ separation agreement entered at the time of their divorce, defined emancipation as attaining the age of 18 years or completing college. Plaintiff, Nina Longer, opposed the motion based on N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.67 providing for child support until the age of 23 years. The daughter was enrolled full-time in a master’s degree program and living at home at the time. Plaintiff was not seeking contribution to the daughter’s tuition, only that child support continue. Under Newburgh v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529 (1982) the court denied the motion for emancipation. Robert Nace and Nina Longer divorced in 2002 with a property settlement agreement after eleven years of marriage. The children were ten and seven at the time of the divorce. The parties agreed to share equally the cost of all post-secondary education for the children. The parties further agreed that child support would terminate upon each child’s attaining the age of 18 years or completing college, the last of which occurs. The parties shared the costs of college for the children and the Defendant moved to emancipate the daughter upon her completing college, in accordance with the property settlement agreement. On appeal, the appellate division determined that the court below failed to properly apply Newburgh, which is to be applied only when tuition for the child is being sought and that the court should have enforced the property settlement agreement that the parties knowingly and voluntarily entered into which, on its face did not have any appearance of impropriety and therefore reversed the decision of the trial court with regard to the motion. If you are interested in emancipating a minor or preventing a minor from being emancipated early, visit DarlingFirm.com or call 973-584-6200 now to schedule a consultation. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of counsel.

Thursday, March 21, 2019

Final Restraining Order Issues Upon Multiple Acts of Harassment

C.L.H. v. T.F.H. is about Defendant’s appeal of a final restraining order (FRO) entered against him upon his estranged wife’s request that the Court enter and order for same under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. Defendant appealed on four points: (1) Ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) allegations of trial court error in allowing “authentication” of a perceived no contact order; (3) a conflict between testimony and the checked “No previous acts of Domestic Violence” section; and (4) lack of evidence regarding intent or predicate acts. Under the PDVA, Plaintiff was entitled to protections, as long as the other criteria were met, based on her marriage to the Defendant. The remaining criteria, set forth in Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112 (App. Div. 2006), were also satisfied. First, the evidence demonstrated, by the requisite preponderance of the evidence standard, three acts that constituted harassment, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c), a predicate act under N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a). Specifically, (1) the Defendant entered Plaintiff’s car while she was in church and removed an item; (2) the Defendant sent Plaintiff a text asking when she would return from a trip that he had never been notified she was taking; and (3) discovered and drove to the location Plaintiff was staying to see whether she was there. During questioning in this regard, the trial judge found the Defendant’s explanations to amount to admissions of guilt committed with the clear intent to harass the Plaintiff. With regard to the second prong of Silver, the trial judge determined that, in light of confrontations between the parties, the Plaintiff’s fear of the Defendant was reasonable and a FRO was required to protect the Plaintiff from the Defendant. The Appellate Division determined the trial judge exercised sound discretion in rendering the opinion below and affirmed, also noting that ineffective assistance of counsel is inapplicable to the matter at hand. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Monday, March 18, 2019

Grandparents' Rights Follow Specific Facts

In the grandparent rights case of C.C. v. M.H., Plaintiffs C.C. and D.C. sought visitation under the Grandparent Visitation Act, N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1.2. The Plaintiffs based their case on the claim they were “psychological parents” to their grandchildren. Defendants have two children, ages 2 and 3. In 2013, Plaintiffs began caring for their grandchildren two days per week and they were being cared for by a nanny, and later in pre-school, three days per week. The parties dispute whether the Plaintiffs contributed some financial support to the grandchildren but do not dispute that Plaintiffs took the entire family on a vacation to Disney World. During the vacation, Plaintiffs and Defendants had a serious falling out over M.H.’s relationship with S.H. Thereafter, the grandchildren were enrolled in full-time pre-school and the Defendants relocated to a new community which Plaintiffs considered too far to visit. By September 2016, there was no contact between the Plaintiffs and grandchildren. The Plaintiffs complaint for visitation included that they “enjoyed a loving and caring relationship with their grandchildren since their birth on a daily basis”, “seeing them multiple times per week”, overnights as needed when the Defendants wanted to go out, family vacations and the like. Plaintiffs also contended that it would be likely the children would suffer irreparable harm if contact between the grandchildren and Plaintiffs was not restored. In support of their argument, Grandparents submitted a report from a psychologist that never met the grandchildren which provided generalizations in favor of the Plaintiffs’ case. Defendants filed replies and a cross-motion for restraints to keep the Plaintiffs away from the children. Defendants described the way Plaintiffs would start arguments with the Defendants in front of the children and the fact that the Defendants feared that the children would be exposed to similar treatment. The Defendants greatly disputed the amount of time with and care from the Plaintiffs. Defendants also filed a statement from M.H.’s sister indicating the Plaintiffs were often verbally abusive to family members and went for extended periods of time without seeing members of the family for that reason. The trial court determined that the grandparents failed to meet the burden of demonstrating that the children would suffer harm without the visitation and denied the grandparents relief, specifically because the grandparents did not indicate that they lived with the children. Plaintiffs appealed. The appellate division determined that Plaintiffs failed to establish “concrete harm” as set forth in Daniels v. Daniels, 381 N.J. Super. 286, 294 (App. Div. 2005). Further, pursuant to Morairty v. Bradt, 177 N.J. 84, 103 (2003), there is a fundamental right to parental autonomy in decisions affecting the “care, custody and control” of one’s own children which right shall yield only to a compelling state interest. Finding that the trial judge correctly decided that the Plaintiffs did not meet the burden of demonstrating irreparable harm, the appellate division affirmed the decision of the court below. If you are a grandparent seeking to obtain visitation or a parent fighting to prevent grandparent visitation, you should discuss your case with an experienced family law attorney in order to learn your rights. For more information about custody or grandparent visitation, visit DarlingFirm.com or call 973-584-6200 now to set up a consultation. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.