Psychological Parent Seeks Rights

In A.O. v. N.D., the court determined whether the plaintiff, designated the "psychological parent" of defendant's biological child was entitled to a plenary hearing with regard to an alleged agreement granting joint custody and ordering the parties to attend co-parenting therapy. The parties and the child lived together until the child was four. Plaintiff sought parenting time, custody and a designation as the child's psychological parent and the parties agreed in some regard. The parties agreed to designate an expert to produce a parenting schedule but there was continued conflict in regard to the parenting issue and plaintiff sought joint legal custody and mandatory co-parenting therapy. Defendant refused to sign a consent order giving effect to plaintiff's wishes. Plaintiff filed an application to enforce the unsigned consent order or for the court to order the same relief plaintiff sought in the consent order and defendant opposed. Defendant also acknowledged making his fiancee', not the plaintiff, the child's emergency contact. The judge denied the plaintiff's motion to enforce an unsigned consent order or grant a plenary hearing in light of the lack of evidence an agreement had been reached. The judge found no change in circumstances on which to grant plaintiff's relied but did order the parties to attend a co-parenting class. Plaintiff appealed, arguing the court erred in failing to order a plenary hearing to determine whether a verbal agreement had been reached. The NJ Appellate Division cited to numerous cases in rendering their judgment that the party seeking to enforce an agreement bears the burden of first showing some evidence of the existence of an agreement. The Appellate Division determined that, as per Harrington v. Harrington, 281 N.J. Super. 39 (1995), the agreement need not be reduced to writing to be enforceable. However, the Appellate Division also cited to the fact that an attorney's negotiations are not binding on a client unless the attorney has specific or apparent authority to enter into the settlement. U.S. Plywood Corp. v. Neidlinger, 41 N.J. 66 (1963). No matter the representations of defendant's counsel during negotiations, defendant's refusal to sign was evidence that an agreement did not exist. A designation as "pyschological parent" does not necessarily afford one the rights of a biological parent. Psychological parent is term used in many matters, from the case at hand to same-sex relationships where the non-biological parent failed to adopt to grandparents rights. If you are seeking, or trying to prevent, a designation of "psychological parent", it is critical that you obtain the advice of counsel. For more information about custody, parenting time, child support or other issues relative to children, visit DarlingFirm.com or call to schedule a consultation. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Contributing to Your Children's Education

In Fanelli v. Hnatowski, Plaintiff Daria Fanelli filed a post-judgment motion seeking contribution from her former husband, Kenneth Hnatowski, for 50% of their two children’s private school tuition as was agreed upon in the parties’ property settlement agreement. Fanelli paid the tuition for both children for 9 years without contribution by the Defendant. The parties divorced in 2005 and Plaintiff was the primary caregiver to the children, ages 15 and 16 at the time of the post-judgment motion. At the time of their divorce, the parties entered into a property settlement agreement containing, among other things, that each would pay 50% of the children’s school costs. The children have attended private school since kindergarten. In 2016, the Plaintiff sought a contribution from the Defendant in the amount of 50% of the children’s tuition or a contribution in proportion to the parties’ respective incomes. The Union County Family Part judge hearing the matter ordered the Defendant to pay 50% of the children’s tuition and Defendant appealed on the grounds that the Plaintiff’s failure to seek contribution for 9 years barred her from doing so and that the term “school costs” does not mean tuition. The Defendant directed the court to Hoefers v. Jones, 288 N.J. Super. 590, 611-12 (Ch. Div. 1994), aff’d, 288 N.J. Super. 478 (App. Div. 1996) which sets forth 14 enumerated factors which the court must evaluate when ordering payment. The factors include the ability of parents to pay, the continuity of the children’s education, the contemplation that they would participate in the program for which contribution is sought, whether enrollment was reasonable, the benefit to the child of the program, whether the party enrolling the child had the right to do so, the child’s best interests and other factors. The NJ Appellate Division held that the term “school costs” was not ambiguous and that the Defendant was required to contribute to the children’s tuition under the parties’ agreement. Thereafter, the appellate division stressed the importance of upholding resolutions negotiated by the parties in citing to Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34, 44 (2016), Konzelman v. Konzelman, 158 N.J. 185, 193-94 (1999). The trial court determined that Defendant’s failure to object to the children’s attendance in private school for 9 years operated as implied consent. On appeal, the court found the issue of consent to be of no consequence as the Plaintiff was not seeking contribution for the 9 prior years of private school tuition and the Defendant did not seek relief compelling the children to attend public school. If you need post-judgment relief to enforce litigant’s rights in a family law case, please visit DarlingFirm.com for more information or call us now at 973-584-6200 to schedule a consultation. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of counsel.

Final Restraining Order Trial Requires Opportunity to Cross-Examine

V.M. v. A.M., involved petition for a Final Restraining Order (FRO), under the Prevention of Domestic Violence act (N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35), based on an amended Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). Plaintiff initially claimed her husband committed the crimes of sexual assault, harassment and stalking against her but then dismissed all but the sexual assault claims prior to the parties' hearing. Both parties offered testimony but the court gave neither the opportunity to cross-examine the other. While the plaintiff claimed sexual assault, the defendant maintained that the parties had consensual sex multiple times over the course of the weekend in question in spite of ongoing marital difficulties. The trial judge's ruling found both parties credible but found that the plaintiff failed to prove her allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. Plaintiff appealed on the basis that the judge must find one party credible and the other not credible, rather than finding both credible, and that the judge did not give the parties the opportunity for cross-examination. The Appellate Division held that a court can find both credible but that the opportunity for cross-examination is required in order for the trial court to fully assess the credibility of the parties. The matter was reversed and remanded for a new hearing. In a domestic violence hearing, in order to obtain a FRO, the alleged victim must demonstrate the following factors as set forth in Silver v. Silver , 387 N.J. Super. 112 (2006) before a FRO may issue: 1. The parties' were involved in a domestic or dating relationship; 2. The defendant committed a predicate act of domestic violence under N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19; and 3. A restraining order is needed to protect the alleged victim from the defendant. For more information about domestic violence or restraining orders, visit DarlingFirm.com or, if you are a victim or accused of domestic violence, call now to schedule a consultation. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of counsel.