Celebrate Wisely

The Darling Law Firm wishes you a Happy New Year! We would like to remind you to celebrate responsibly tonight. If you are driving, there will be others on the road who may have been celebrating less responsibly than you so please drive defensively. Also, remember that it only takes 2 drinks to put you over the legal limit in New Jersey and the police will be looking for those who may be driving under the influence tonight. Although you may stop drinking after the champagne toast at midnight, your blood alcohol level (BAC) only decreases by only .015% per hour while one standard drink, defined as one 12-ounce beer, one five-ounce glass of wine, and one 1.5-ounce shot of distilled spirits, will add .05% to your BAC each hour. This means that it will take much longer for your BAC to decrease than to increase. As it is difficult to tell when you have had too many, driving after consuming alcohol should be avoided. Please be safe so that you and your loved ones can enjoy a Happy New Year! DarlingFirm.com

Child Support Arrears Effect Income Tax Deductions

Although child support arrears are do not result in a prohibition of a parent enjoying visitation or parenting time with their child, child support arrears can result in suspension of a parent's right to claim a child as a child support deduction. In Zeitlin v. Zeitlin, the New Jersey Family part refused to modify the property settlement agreement to the extent that each parent was entitled to claim one child as an exemption on their income tax returns. However, on appeal, the N.J. Appellate Division held that a parent's failure to pay child support breached their duty of good faith and fair dealing and could result in the suspension of that parent's right to claim a child as an income tax deduction. Based on the notion of good faith and fair dealing, the court suspended the father's right, under the property settlement agreement, to claim one of the children as a tax exemption. The decisions made in divorce, by either the parties or the court in the event of trial, are long lasting and have significant consequences to both parties' and their children. If you are considering divorce or seeking a modification of your present child support, it is critical that you discuss your situation with an experienced divorce attorney before taking action. For more information about child support, custody, divorce, parenting time, visitation, alimony or other family law matters in NJ visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Divorcing With A Small Business

Business partner disputes can become so contentious as to lead to dissolution of the business or expulsion of a partner, and things can become even more complicated in the event the business partners are divorcing spouses. Many small businesses are started by one spouse and ultimately, as the business grows, both spouses become full-time employees. With these businesses starting as a simple idea that grows, it is rare to find an operating agreement in place. During divorce it often becomes impracticable for the parties to cooperate on any level as a result hurt feelings and the raw emotions which arise thereafter. Limited Liability Company (LLC) is one of the most common forms of business today. Formerly governed by the Ne w Jersey Limited Liability Company Act (LLCA), partners could be removed from the business for enumerated reasons including wrongful conduct, significant breach of the LLC's operating agreement or it unreasonable to expect the business to continue with the member involved. The LLCA was replaced by the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (RULLCA) in 2013, leaving the expulsion provisions substantially intact as can be seen by review of N.J.S.A. 42:2C-46(e). The unpublished case, IE Test LLC v. Carroll, A-6159-12T4, 2015 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 567 (Mar. 17, 2015), heard in the Essex County Chancery Division, was a case of first impression in New Jersey regarding removal of a member of an ongoing and viable LLC that the other members wished to continue. The members failed to enter into an operating agreement upon formation of the business, leaving the N.J. Appellate Division to interpret N.J.S.A. 42:2B-24(b)(3)(c) noting that expulsion of a member does not require past wrongful conduct but rather charges the court with determining whether it is feasible for the business to continue with any viability if the member is not expelled. The court found that the it need not find it impossible for the business to continue but rather that the business cannot carry out its purpose without substantial dysfunction if the member remains. The NJ Appellate Division also looked to Gagne v. Gagne, 338 P.3d 1152 (Colo. Ct. App. 2014), wherein the Colorado Court of Appeals interpreted the same factors as wet forth in RULLCA resulting in a 7 factor test for determining whether expulsion is appropriate. The factors set forth in Gagne include 1) whether management is unwilling or unable to reasonably promote the reasons for which the company was formed; 2) whether there was misconduct on the part of the member the others are seeking to expel; 3) whether the members are clearly unable to work together for the benefit of the company; 4) whether there is a deadlock between the members; 5) whether there are provisions in the operating agreement that can resolve a deadlock; 6) whether the business remains viable; and 7) whether it will be financially feasible to continue the company after any harm from the dispute and payment to the expelled member. After considering the language of N.J.S.A. 42:2B-24(b)(3)(c), the factors set forth by the Colorado Court of Appeals in Gagne and the fact that the members had failed to prepare an operating agreement to govern their acts, the N.J. Appellate Division upheld the decision of the Essex County Chancery Division Judge that the minority member should be expelled. If you are involved in, or considering, divorce and own a small business with your spouse, it is critical that you speak with an experienced attorney to ensure you are aware of your rights. Whether you will be paying or receiving alimony or child support, the continued viability of the business will likely be critical to your and your family's economic future. For more information about small business divorce, high net worth divorce, partner and shareholder agreements or other matters involving divorce or business in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Child Custody Transfer To Father Stands While Awaiting Plenary Hearing

Custody of a 13 year old child was transferred from the mother to the father in Skinner v. Cole. The parties were never married and the mother, Janice Skinner, Plaintiff, was Noah's primary caregiver since birth as before he was 2 years old she and Noah moved to Pennsylvania while the father remained in New Jersey. When Noah was 13, the Defendant, Bruce Cole, Noah's father, filed a petition for custody claiming Noah desired to live with him, Plaintiff's relatives used drugs in the residence, the Plaintiff worked long hours and rarely gave him attention, and Noah was frequently subject to assaults in the school he attended at his mother's residence. Alternatively, the Defendant claimed to enjoy a good relationship with Noah and live in a drug-free environment with a good school district. Plaintiff's reply maintained that she enjoyed a good relationship with Noah, he had a glucose problem that the mother was used to managing properly while the father mismanaged the problem while Noah was visiting with him, the father's house offered inadequate quarters for Noah , and Noah was an honor roll student in his current school yet she was still seeking a better school system for him. The Plaintiff further added that the Defendant frequently lied to Noah to destroy his faith in his mother, that her family members did not use drugs, and the only reason for the Defendant's motion was to terminate child support. The trial judge interviewed Noah who expressed a desire to live with his father and offered positive reasons for the change and negative reasons for wishing to leave his mother's residence. The trial judge took no testimony from the parties and only briefly addressed some of the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c), which are required considerations in making custody decisions, then rendered the decision that custody of Noah would be transferred to the Defendant. The mother, Plaintiff, appealed the transfer of custody on the basis of the trial court's failure to hold a plenary hearing before rendering its decision. The NJ Appellate Decision considered the requirement of Hand v. Hand, 391 N.J. Super. 102, 105 (App. Div. 2007) that a party seeking a modification of child custody must first demonstrate a change in circumstances substantial enough to affect the welfare of the child, especially when there are material issues of fact in dispute. Further, Faucett v. Vasquez, 411 N.J. Super. 108, 119 (App. Div. 2009) wherein the court set forth that custody should only be modified after a full hearing unless exigent circumstances evidencing extreme danger are present. The NJ Appellate Division reversed and remanded the matter for a plenary hearing to resolve the issues in dispute between the parties. It should be noted that, pending the plenary hearing following appeal, custody of Noah remained with the Defendant as the parent of primary residence rather than being returned to the mother. If you are seeking a modification in child custody or defending a motion filed by your child's other parent, it is critical that you are aware of the factors and procedures involved. For more information regarding child custody, child support, divorce, emancipation, relocation of a child or other family law matters in New Jersey, visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Emancipation Requires Oral Argument

Thomas Mynes sought the emancipation of his 22-year old daughter and the concomitant termination of child support to Mary Mynes, his former spouse. The application for emancipation was terminated without a hearing and Plaintiff appealed. The parties divorce included a property settlement agreement (PSA) which addressed the termination of child support. In 2012, the Plaintiff sought emancipation of the parties two children and the Defendant did not oppose the motion but the Family Part judge determined that only the parties' son need be emancipated and no oral argument was needed. In 2014, the Plaintiff again filed for emancipation of the parties' daughter claiming that she would have been done with school had she attended full-time and the Defendant filed papers in opposition claiming the parties' daughter was still in school and seeking counsel fees. The court again did not hear oral argument, as required by N.J.C.R. 5:5-4 which requires oral argument "when significant substantive issues are raised and argument is requested." Palombi v. Palombi, 414 N.J. Super. 274 (App. Div. 2010). The judge denied the motion and denied both parties' requests for counsel fees. The judge determined that R.M. remained in school due to a time off for a medical hiatus which is not an emancipation event. The judge held that emancipation of the parties' daughter should occur in 2016. On appeal in Mynes v. Mynes, the Plaintiff claimed that a hearing was required. The N.J. Appellate Division looked to Patetta v. Patetta, 358 N.J. Super. 90 (App. Div. 2003), Keegan v. Keegan, 326 N.J. Super. 289 (App. Div. 1999) and Llewelyn v. Shewchuk, 440 N.J. Super. 207 (App. Div. 2015) in review of standards and presumptions relating to emancipation. The Family Part judge failed to address whether R.M. had moved beyond the sphere of parental influence. The judge's denial of oral argument based on the conclusion that no evidence outside the motion papers existed was misplaced as there was a question regarding the extent and reason for any interruption of the daughter's education. In light of the discrepancies in the parties' positions, the N.J. Appellate Division reversed and remanded the matter for a plenary hearing regarding the contested issues. If you are seeking or fighting the emancipation of a child, you should consult an experienced family law attorney immediately in order to protect your rights and ensure your request is viable. For more information on child support, custody, parenting time/visitation, divorce, alimony, palimony, modification of a family court order or other family or juvenile law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and in no way intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Pendente Lite Support Pending Divorce

Pendente lite support is temporary support, established during the pendency of a divorce, intended to preserve the financial status quo, or marital standard, of the parties until equitable distribution and alimony are resolved, between the parties or by a judge, and a final judgment of divorce is obtained. The span of time between separation or the filing of a divorce complaint and actually obtaining a divorce can sometimes take years making pendente lite support a critical issue for both parties. Although the intent is to continue the status quo existing prior to the marriage and ensure an economically dependent party is not left destitute, pendente lite support often leaves both parties lacking. Expenses often increase during this time as there is typically another residence to support and, if there are children, the party vacating the residence must have adequate housing for themselves and the children or they will be in an inferior position when it comes to parenting time. Often, parties will separate but make efforts at resolution for long periods of time prior to filing for divorce. During this time, if things are amicable, the party who vacates the marital residence may simply obtain quarters adequate for sleeping and little more such as a spare room at a friend's residence, their old bedroom at their parent's house or similar. They will continue to provide the bulk of their income to the family for household expenses and be comfortable "getting by" for the interim. Unfortunately, this period of time can establish a precedent and, if a divorce complaint is filed, either the supported or supporting spouse can find themselves in a very difficult financial situation without enough assets for themselves if a judge decides a motion for pendente lite support using this period of separation as the model for the "marital standard." If you are considering divorce, prior to leaving your residence, you should consult with an experienced divorce attorney in order to discuss your needs, your family's needs and your financial situation. An experienced family law attorney can protect you from finding yourself with a pendente lite support order which will leave you financially destitute. For more information about divorce, child support, custody, emancipation and other family law issues in NJ visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Post-Judgment Action To Enforce PSA Over College Expenses

Daley v. Daley, is a post-judgment matrimonial matter in which the Defendant appealed from a 2013 Family Court Order that granted the Plaintiff's Motion to enforce and amended a provision of the parties' Property Settlement Agreement (PSA) dealing with the funding of their children's college education. The parties in this case were married in 1995 and got divorced in 2007. Two (2) children were born during their marriage and a PSA was incorporated into their divorce judgment in 2007. In 2013, the Plaintiff filed a Motion to enforce and amend a provision of the PSA that required the Defendant to provide her with annual fund balances and make required monthly payments to the children's college savings accounts for their education. In response to the Plaintiff's Motion the Defendant admitted that between 2009 and 2013 he had withdrawn $33,000 from the college accounts but he had repaid the sum prior to the 2013 filing of the Plaintiff's Motion. The Defendant also admitted that in 2008 he withdrew $29,100 from the accounts to pay his federal and state taxes and he had not yet repaid that amount and he claimed that although the accounts should remain an asset for the children's benefit, he was not prevented from making necessary withdrawals from this accounts under the PSA. The Family Court judge ordered that the Plaintiff be named the custodian of the children's college savings accounts and that the defendant repay the $29,100 within thirty (30) days. The Defendant appealed claiming that the Family Court judge erred in making the Plaintiff the custodian of the college accounts, amending the PSA concerning the use of the account funds, amongst other prayers for relief. According to the Appellate Division, with regard to the enforcement of the PSA, New Jersey Court Rule 1:10-3 "provide[s] a mechanism, coercive in nature, to afford relief to a litigant who has not received what a Court Order or Judgment entitles that litigant to receive." D'Atria v. D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 407 (Ch. Div. 1990). "The particular manner in which compliance may be sought is left to the court's sound discretion." Bd. of Educ. of Middletown v. Middletown Twp. Educ. Ass'n., 352 N.J. Super. 501, 509 (Ch. Div. 2001). According to these standards, the Appellate Division found no basis to disturb the Family Court judge's decision to place the Plaintiff in control of the children's college savings accounts. Although the Defendant was an "owner" of the account, the PSA required him to make regular monthly payments into the accounts. Nothing in the PSA indicated that the parties ever intended that the Defendant would or could periodically withdraw funds from the accounts to pay his personal expenses. If you believe that a post-judgment modification to your settlement agreement regarding the provisions of the agreement may be beneficial to you to you should seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modification, equitable distribution, alimony, child support or other family law matters in New Jersey visit the DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice if an attorney.

Alimony Not Terminated In Spite Of Cohabitation

In Coshland v. Coshland, the Defendant appealed from a Family Court Order that denied his Motion to terminate his alimony payments because he claimed that the Plaintiff was cohabitating with her boyfriend. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the Family Court finding that the Plaintiff's boyfriend did not cohabitate but was a frequent visitor who did not economically benefit the Plaintiff. Following a twenty-seven (27) year marriage that yielded two (2) children, the parties divorced in 2011 pursuant to a Property Settlement and Support Agreement (PSSA). The agreement directed that the Defendant would pay $230 a week in alimony but stated that the obligation would terminate if the Plaintiff were to begin "residing with an unrelated person, or vice versa, where [the Plaintiff] is receiving and economic benefit, for a period of not less than 30 consecutive days." After the divorce the Plaintiff moved to a townhouse that was recently vacated by two of the Plaintiff's friends, K.C. and her brother J.C. The townhouse was individually owned by K.C. After the Plaintiff moved in, J.C. began to spend two to five nights a week at the townhouse. The Plaintiff and J.C. "attempted" a romantic relationship but both claimed at the time of the hearing that the relationship was platonic. When the Defendant suspected the Plaintiff of cohabitating with J.C. he hired a private investigator to gather information about the relationship. Between March and April 2013, the investigator observed the Plaintiff and J.C. arriving home from work together (they both worked at Shop-Rite) and the Plaintiff visited the residence seventeen (17) times in that time frame. The Defendant filed a Motion to terminate his alimony. The Family Court Judge denied the Motion and scheduled a plenary hearing to take place. At the hearing, the judge heard testimony from the private investigator, a real-estate expert, and the Plaintiff. After hearing the testimony, the judge issued an oral opinion denying the Defendant's Motion to terminate alimony finding that J.C. did not live at the townhouse and that the Plaintiff was not receiving economic benefit from his visits. The Defendant appealed. According to the Appellate Division, alimony can be modified if a party demonstrates a significant financial change since the alimony was first awarded. Reese v. Weis, 430 N.J. Super. 552, 572, 66 A.3d 157 (App. Div. 2013). One type of changed circumstance is cohabitation by a former spouse. Gayet v. Gayet, 92 N.J. 149, 155, 456 A.2d 102 (1983). Cohabitation is typified by a showing of a relationship "shown to have stability, permanency, and mutual interdependence." Konzelman v. Konzelman, 158 N.J. 185, 202, 729 A.2d 7 (1999). Therefore, a former spouse residing with a significant other is not, by itself, enough to terminate alimony, further, there must be additional proof that the cohabitating spouse received some form of economic benefit from the cohabitation or the supported cohabitant "supports or subsidizes the other under circumstances sufficient to entitle the supporting spouse to relief. Reese, supra, 430 N.J. Super. at 557-58, 576; Gayet, supra, 92 N.J. at 153-54. Proving cohabitation creates a rebuttable presumption of changed circumstances. Ozolins v. Ozolins, 308 N.J. Super. 243, 248, 705 A.2d 1230 (App. Div. 1998). Accordingly, the burden of proof which is ordinarily on the party seeking modification, shifts to the dependant spouse to prove the lack of economic benefit and continued need for support. Id. at 248-49. In this case, the Appellate Division found that apart from proving J.C.'s frequent overnight stays at the Plaintiff's residence, the Defendant failed to present any evidence in support of an intimate relationship or economic benefit. Therefore, the Family Court's denial of the Defendant's Motion was affirmed. Being that the laws governing the issues involving alimony and cohabitation have recently been changed, it is very important that you seek out the advice of an attorney to protect your rights an entitlements. If you think that it may be beneficial for you to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your alimony obligation based upon your ex-spouse's cohabitation with another person or for any other reason it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about alimony, divorce, post-judgment modification, child support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Appeal Of Default Divorce By Pro Se Party Unsuccessful

In Dippel v. Dippel, the Plaintiff appealed from a 2013 Final Divorce Judgment that was entered by default on the Defendant's Counterclaim because the Plaintiff failed to comply with the Rules of the Court. The Plaintiff instituted divorce proceedings in 2010 and in 2012 the court dismissed his pleadings without prejudice for failure to comply with discovery requests. In 2012, the court denied the Plaintiff's application to vacate the default judgment and allow him additional time to provide discovery. Later that year, the Plaintiff once again made an application to vacate his divorce judgment, which was denied. The court had advised the Defendant that she could proceed with default proceedings based upon her Counterclaim because the Plaintiff did not comply with discovery. A trial was held in 2013, at which, the trial judge thoroughly placed on the record the history of the Plaintiff's failure to comply with discovery. The court then proceeded to adjudicate custody, parenting time, alimony, and child support. The court did not address equitable distribution, determining that any proceeds from the sale of assets shall be held in escrow. A Final Divorce Judgment was issued on June 13, 2013. The Plaintiff filed a pro se brief with the Appellate Court which did not comply with the Rules of the Court. N.J. Court Rule 2:5-4; N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 278, 914 A.2d 1265 (2007). Further, the contents of the Plaintiff's brief did not comply with N.J. Court Rule 2:6-2. In essence, the Plaintiff asked the Appellate Court to review the entire divorce proceedings in totem. According to the Appellate Division, the Defendant's request mischaracterizes its role in the proceedings, as it is to give considerable discretionary decision to the Family Court. Donnelly v. Donnelly, 405 N.J. Super. 117, 127, 963 A.2d 855 (App. Div. 2009). When a Family Part judge has made findings of fact after considering the testimony and documents the parties have presented during a non-jury trial, the judge's findings are generally "binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12, 713 A.2d 390 (1998). Further, "parties are required to make adequate legal argument." 700 Highway 33 LLC v. Pollio, 421N.J. Super. 231, 238, 23 A3d 446 (App. Div. 2011). Conclusory assertions that a judge committed error, devoid of reference to the judge's decision or the trial record, and further devoid of any attempt to apply the applicable precedent of the factual underpinnings of such conclusory assertions, do not satisfy the requirement. Therefore, the decision of the Family Court was affirmed. If you are considering and appeal of your final divorce judgment or you would like more information regarding divorce it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about divorce, uncontested divorce, equitable distribution, child support, alimony or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Equitable Distribution Award Survives Challenge

In DeLong v. DeLong, the Plaintiff appealed from a final divorce judgment entered in 2014 awarding alimony, equitable distribution, and counsel fees. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the Family Court. The parties in this case were married for thirty-three (33) years. They owned a home together. In 1996, they sold the home when the Plaintiff's mother conveyed her house to them for one (1) dollar, making them joint tenants with a right of survivorship. The Plaintiff's mother received $500 per month which was characterized by the Plaintiff as rent. In 2008, the parties separated and the Plaintiff conveyed the house back to his mother for one (1) dollar. In 2009, the Plaintiff filed a Complaint for divorce which was voluntarily dismissed when the parties attempted to reconcile. In 2013, the Plaintiff once again filed for divorce and the Defendant filed an Answer and a Counterclaim for alimony and equitable distribution. In 2014, the court conducted a trial and heard testimony from the Plaintiff and Defendant about their marital history, work history, and assets acquired during their marriage. The judge decided that the Defendant was entitled to permanent alimony in the amount of $275 a week, $17,688 in equitable distribution representing the return of proceeds from the sale of their home in 1996, 50% of the marital portion of the Plaintiff's retirement funds, and ordered the Plaintiff to pay the Defendant's counsel fees. The Plaintiff appealed challenging the court's award of permanent alimony, equitable distribution, and attorney's fees. The Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the lower court for all the reasons contained in the Family Court's judgment, but added commentary regarding the Plaintiff's challenge to the equitable distribution award. According to the Appellate Division, property subject to equitable distribution includes property that was obtained during the marriage due to efforts by either spouse. Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583, 609, 660 A.2d 485 (1995). "Although the trial court is permitted to recognize that the acquisition of certain property may be traced more directly to one partner than the other, the court is not compelled to distribute property to accommodate that origin." Id. at 638. The Appellate Court noted that in this case, the Family Court judge appropriately weighed the financial contributions of both parties as well as the benefits received by each, including improvements to the martial home. If you believe that a post-judgment modification to the equitable distribution of your property may be beneficial to you it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modification, equitable distribution, alimony, divorce or other family law matters in New Jersey visit the DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney

Child Support Modification Denied

In Markey v. Melazzo, the Defendant appealed from a 2013 Family Court Order that denied his Motion to terminate his child support obligation and force a recalculation of his arrearage. The Appellate Division affirmed the ruling of the Family Court. In 1995, the Plaintiff and Defendant had a son together but never married. In 2005, a Court Order directed the Defendant to pay $129 a week in child support. In 2012, the Defendant was injured at work and has since claimed that he is unable to work because he is disabled. Later that year, a hearing officer denied the Defendant's Motion for modification of support, without prejudice, because the Defendant failed to provide proof of his income or the validity of his disability. In 2013, the Defendant filed the application which was the subject of this appeal, wherein he sought the termination of his child support and the elimination of his arrears. The Defendant claimed that the Plaintiff has not permitted him to visit with the child and has changed the child's last name without his consent. In 2013, the Family Court denied the Defendant's Motion because the Defendant failed to provide a valid basis for relief. The Defendant appealed. According to the Appellate Division, child support is necessary to ensure that parents provide for the basic needs of their children. Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583, 590, 660 A.2d 485 (1995). A party who seeks modification of his or her child support obligation has the burden of demonstrating a change in circumstances warranting such an adjustment. Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 157, 416 A.2d 45 (1980). The decision must be made in accordance with the N.J. Child Support Guidelines when applicable. Caplan v. Caplan, 182 N.J. 250, 266, 864 A.2d 1108 (2005); Terry v. Terry, 270 N.J. Super. 105, 121, 636 A.2d 579 (App. Div. 1994). In this case, the Defendant sought the termination of his child support obligation and the elimination of his arrears dating back to 2002 when the child's name was changed, arguing that the name change was a de facto termination of his parental rights, yet the Defendant cites no authority of his position. According to the Appellate Court, the Family Court correctly determined that the Defendant's parental rights were never terminated and thus found no basis for vacating the Defendant's arrears. With respect to the Defendant's claim of disability, he did not submit any medical information. Therefore, the Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the Family Court. If you anticipate that it may be beneficial to you to seek a post-judgment modification of a Court Order regarding a child support obligation it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modification, child support, divorce, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Emancipation Granted And Alimony Increase Denied

Dripps v. Dripps, is an appeal from a Family Court Order issued pursuant to the parties post-judgment divorce Motions with regard to alimony and emancipation. The Defendant, ex-wife, moved before the court for an increase in her alimony. The Plaintiff, ex-husband, brought a Cross-Motion for relief which included the emancipation of the parties' two (2) children. The Family Court issued an Order denying an increase in alimony, granting the emancipation of the children, and denying the Motion for reconsideration. The Defendant appealed. The Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the Family Division. On appeal, the Defendant essentially sought to re-litigate the property settlement agreement (PSA) that was incorporated into the parties' final judgment of divorce. Specifically, the Defendant contested the Family Court's failure to increase her alimony and the grant of emancipation of her children. According to the Appellate Court, on appeal, legal issues involving the interpretation of a contract are subject to plenary review. Vosough v. Kierce,437 N.J. Super. 218, 241, 97 A.3d 1150 (App. Div. 2014), certif. denied, 221 N.J. 218, 110 A.3d 931 (2015). "A trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts" are not entitled to "special deference" on appeal. Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Twp. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378, 658 A.2d 1230 (1995). However, the Family Court's findings of fact should be upheld "if they are supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence on the record" and they are not "so wide of the mark that a mistake must have been made." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279, 914 A.2d 1265 (2007). When a Motion or a Cross Motion is brought for enforcement or modification of a prior Order or Judgment, a copy of the Order or Judgment sought to be enforced or modified shall be appended to the pleading filed in support of the Motion. N.J. Court Rule 5:5-4. Further, when a Motion is brought for the entry or modification of an Order or Judgment for alimony or child support based upon a showing of changed circumstances, the pleading filed in support of that Motion shall have appended to it a copy of the prior Case Information Statements (CIS). Id. The Defendant failed to submit the prior Judgement of Divorce (JOD) and PSA and failed to submit the requisite CIS, and therefore the Appellate Division found that the court properly denied her Motion. With regard to the emancipation, one of the children was twenty-three (23) and the other twenty-two (22), working and had not attended college for three (3) semesters. According to the Appellate Court, the circumstances of the children at the time of the hearing clearly met the parties' PSA definition of emancipation and public policy favors settlement of litigation. Bistricer v. Bistricer, 231 N.J. Super. 143, 151, 555 A.2d 45 (Ch. Div. 1987). An agreement to settle litigation is a contract, which like all contracts freely entered into, should be honored and enforced absent fraud or other compelling circumstances. Brundage v Estate of Carambio, 195 N.J. 575, 601, 951 A.2d 947 (2008). Therefore, the decisions of the Family Court were affirmed. Being that the laws governing alimony have recently been changed, it is very important that you seek out the advice of an attorney to protect your rights an entitlements. If you think that it may be beneficial for you to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your alimony or emancipation status of your children or for any other reason it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about alimony, divorce, post-judgment modification, child support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit the DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Alimony Arrearage Modification Denied By Court

In Herman v. Herman, the Defendant argued that because he was not provided with an accounting of the Plaintiff's received alimony payments and how same were used to reduce the marital debt, his alimony payments should have been reduced and that the judge failed to order the Plaintiff to provide such an accounting. The parties were married in 1992 and the Plaintiff gave birth to a son in 1995. The parties divorced in 1999 pursuant to a final divorce judgment which incorporated a property settlement agreement (PSA). The agreement required that the Defendant pay permanent alimony of $527.90 a week to the Plaintiff with the amount decreasing thereafter upon the occasion of certain events, eventually becoming $268.00 a week. The PSA also directed that the Defendant would be fully responsible for the post-secondary educational expenses of the parties' son. In addition, a separate article of the PSA specified that the Plaintiff would pay off existing credit card debts, which amounted to $36,100.00 and that $169.00 a week of the alimony that the Plaintiff received was "intended to be paid by [plaintiff] toward [defendant's] credit card liabilities." When the accounts were paid in full, the Defendant's alimony obligations were to be reduced by $169.00 a week. The agreement also permitted either party to pay off the debt with their "own funds," and receive either a deduction or credit of $169.00 per week toward the alimony amount. After their divorce, the parties engaged in Motion practice over disputes that inevitably arose from the agreement. In 2005, the Family Court issued an Order setting the Defendant's alimony arrears and ordering that he continue to pay $268.00 a week in alimony. By 2007, the Plaintiff's attorney calculated the Defendant's total arrears to be $57,325.00. In 2008, after more Motion practice, the Defendant's alimony, child support, and counsel fees were memorialized in a judgment in the amount of $76,606.00. In 2012, the Defendant filed a Motion seeking a downward modification of his child support and the termination of his alimony due to the Plaintiff's remarriage and an adjustment of his support obligations retroactively based upon his overpayment toward marital debts. The judge terminated the Defendant's alimony obligation based upon the Plaintiff's remarriage but denied his request for a retroactive adjustment. In 2012, the Defendant's total arrears had risen to $111,735.86. In 2013, the Defendant submitted yet another Motion for a retroactive reduction in his alimony in the amount of $169.00 a week dating back to 2004. The judge issued an Order denying the Motion. In 2013, the judge granted the Plaintiff's request to compel the Defendant t pay for their son's college expenses. In 2014, the Defendant again moved for an Order compelling the Plaintiff to account for her payments of all martial debut under the provisions of the PSA and for a reduction in his support arrears. The Judge denied the Defendant's request for an accounting and denied his request for a reduction in his arrears, but granted the Plaintiff's request for Defendant to pay college expenses. The Defendant appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the Family Court. According to the Appellate Division none of the Defendant's arguments had sufficient merit to warrant a discussion pursuant to N.J. Court Rule 2:1-3(e)(1)(E). The court found that the Defendant sought an adjustment of his alimony arrears in 2012, which was denied. He never appealed that decision he simply submitted another Motion seeking the same relief in 2013 and 2014. In addition, the Order that was under review enforced the Defendant's obligations to pay college expenses which was ordered by the Family Court in 2013, from which the Defendant failed to appeal. When the Defendant continued to submit Motions for other relief, the Plaintiff cross-moved to enforce the 2013 Order. The Defendant then raised belated challenges to that Order and the Court has the right to refuse to consider his request. Gac v. Gac, 186 N.J. 535, 546-47, 897 A.2d 1018 (2006). Being that the laws governing alimony have recently been changed, it is very important that you seek out the advice of an attorney to protect your rights an entitlements. If you think that it may be beneficial for you to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your alimony or for any other reason it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about alimony, divorce, post-judgment modification, child support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit the DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Oral Equitable Distribution Agreement Enforced By Court

In Ahlstrom v. Monteferrario, a case coming out of Bergen County, the Plaintiff appealed from a dual judgment of divorce with regard to the parties' oral agreement concerning the equitable distribution of their marital home. The Appellate Division affirmed the Family Court's judgment. In 2007, prior to the parties' 2008 marriage, they purchased a house for $759,000. The deed of the home stated that the parties were owners as tenants in common, "each owner with a 50% ownership share." The Plaintiff advanced $314,559.20 as a down payment. The balance of the purchase price was covered by a mortgage on which both parties were the borrowers, but only the Plaintiff was on the note due to the Defendant's credit issues. After the house was purchased the parties entered into a Co-Ownership Agreement (COA) in 2007, which was prepared by the Defendant's attorney. This agreement detailed the parties' ownership and provided that if the house was sold each party would receive 50% of the net profits. The marriage fell apart and by 2011, the parties reached an oral agreement resolving all issues related to the divorce, alimony, and equitable distribution. The Plaintiff's lawyer sent a draft PSA to the Defendant's lawyer that provided that "[e]ffective with the date [defendant] vacated the martial residence, he has had and shall not have any obligation for the mortgage," and that the Plaintiff would hold the Defendant harmless in connection with the mortgage. In the end, the parties failed to mutually execute the PSA. Soon thereafter, the Plaintiff filed a Complaint for Divorce and subsequently filed a Motion to enforce the COA, demanding that the Defendant repay her the $37,652.40 mortgage payments she made and to repay the mortgage in the future. The Family Court Judge held a ten day trial and a plenary hearing under Harrington v. Harrington, 281 N.J. Super. 39, 656 A.2d 456 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 142 N.J. 455 663 A.2d 1361 (1995). In the 2013, dual judgment of divorce, the trial court discredited the Plaintiff, credited the Defendant, and found that the parties had reached a binding oral agreement. The Plaintiff appealed arguing that the parties' discussions never resulted in a binding verbal agreement. According to the Appellate Division, New Jersey courts strain "to give effect to the terms of a settlement agreement wherever possible." Brundage v. Estate of Carambio, 195 N.J. 575, 601, 951 A.2d 947 (2008). An agreement to settle "is a contract, which like all contracts, may be freely entered into and which a court, absent a demonstration of 'fraud or other compelling circumstances,' should honor and enforce." Pascarella v. Bruck, 190 N.J. Super. 118, 124-25, 462 A.2d 186 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 94 N.J. 600, 468 A.2d (1983). The Appellate Court in Harrington, held that "to be enforceable, matrimonial agreements, as any other agreements, need not necessarily be reduced to writing or placed on the record." Harringon, 281 N.J. Super. 39 at 46. "Where the parties agree upon the essential terms of settlement, so that the mechanics can be 'fleshed out' in a writing to be thereafter executed, the settlement will be enforced notwithstanding the fact that the writing does not materialize because a party later reneges." Id. In this case, the Appellate Court found that the parties entered into a binding oral agreement based upon the evidence submitted into the record and therefore the Family Court's judgment was correct. If you believe that a post-judgment modification to your settlement agreement or divorce judgment regarding the equitable distribution of your property may be beneficial to you it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modification, equitable distribution, alimony, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit the DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice if an attorney.

Grandparent Visitation Denied Without Showing Of Harm To Grandchildren

In Loser v. Witt, the Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their Complaint seeking grandparent visitation. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the Family Court. In 2005, the Defendants, Melissa Witt and Eric Loser were living together along with Melissa's son from a previous relationship, when Melissa gave birth to their son. The Plaintiffs in this case are Eric's parents. In 2007, Melissa and Eric split up which resulted in litigation with regard to child custody, upon which the relationship between Melissa and the Plaintiffs, Eric's parents, deteriorated. Eventually Melissa and Eric resolved their differences but the relationship between Melissa and the Plaintiffs never recovered. In 2013, Eric disallowed the Plaintiffs from having any contact with the children. Eric believed, at the time, that his father was harassing Melissa and attempting to undermine her relationships with the children. In August of that year, the Plaintiffs filed a Complaint in the Family Court seeking visitation with their grandchildren. The Plaintiffs requested a plenary hearing and the opportunity to conduct a psychological evaluation of the children. The Plaintiffs contended that they had a very close relationship with the children - seeing them two to three times a week and had taken them on annual vacations. They admitted though that they were never full time care-takers. After oral argument, the Family Court judge dismissed the Plaintiff's Complaint concluding that the Plaintiffs "failed to meet the required threshold showing of [particularized] harm to subject the parents and the children to further litigation." The Plaintiffs appealed. According to the Appellate Division, parents have a fundamental right to "make decisions regarding the care and custody of their children." Moriarty v. Bradt, 177 N.J. 84,88, 827 A.2d 203 (2003). Ordinarily, courts do not interfere with a fit parent's decision to prevent contact between his or her child and the child's grandparents. Rente v. Rente, 390 N.J. Super. 487, 493, 915 A.2d 1099 (App. Div. 2007). Grandparents can force "grandparent visitation over the wishes of a fit parent" if they can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that visitation is necessary to avoid harm to the child. Moriarty, supra, 177 N.J. at 115, 117. To persuade the court that a child will be harmed by the absence of visitation, grandparents may present either expert or factual evidence. First, grandparents must make a "clear and specific allegation of concrete harm to the children." Daniels v. Daniels, 381 N.J. Super. 286, 294, 885 A.2d 524 (App. Div. 2005). In this case, the Appellate Court found that the Plaintiffs have not alleged concrete facts demonstrating that the Defendant's parental decision to prohibit contact will cause significant harm to the children. Therefore, the decision of the Family Court was affirmed. Child custody and grandparent's rights cases are of the most emotional and difficult cases in all of family law. If you anticipate that you may want to petition the court for a modification of your current child custody arrangement it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about child custody, parenting time, child support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit the DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Child Custody Modified After Parties Failed To Abide By Agreement

In Myers v. Myers, the Defendant appealed from the child custody and child support provisions issued in a 2013 final divorce judgment following a trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the lower court after a careful review of the issues and the record. The parties in this case participated in a three day divorce trial in 2013. The final divorce judgment incorporated a partial stipulation of settlement which was filed in 2013. This partial settlement resolved many issues between the parties but left the issue of custody of their child and child support unresolved. Prior to the trial, in 2009, the parties executed a Consent Order that addressed the custody of their son. The child resided with each party on alternating weeks and on the weeks that each parent did not have the child they exercised parenting time on Tuesday and Thursday evenings. At trial, the Defendant proposed the same parenting time arrangement as was negotiated in the Consent Order. The Plaintiff sought a different schedule and requested that she be named the parent of primary residence. Her argument was that the prior arrangement never really took effect because after one month the Defendant moved back into the house with her and her son and that she had always been the one to take care of their son. She contended that the Defendant did very little with their son except to take him to practices and games. After the trial, the Court noted that after reviewing the relevant case law, it was guided by N.J.S.A. 9:2-4 in making a custody determination. The judge found the Plaintiff's testimony to be credible and found that the Defendant did not cooperate in the Plaintiff's attempt to negotiate an agreed upon parenting time schedule. The judge determined that from the "defendant's own testimony and his own demeanor" that a shared custody arrangement would not be appropriate. The judge awarded primary residential custody to the Plaintiff. The Defendant was given 104 overnights a year with his son and from this determination the court established that the Defendant's child support obligation would be $143 a week. N.J. Court Rule 5:6A. The Defendant appealed. According to the Appellate Division, regarding custody, the statute requires that the court consider multiple factors in determining the best interests of the child. N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c). A court is required to place on the record the factors it considers consequential in reaching a custody decision, as the judge in this case had done. Monte v. Monte, 212 N.J. Super. 557, 565, 515 A.2d 1233 (App. Div. 1986). In this case the judge expressed a concern in the lack of cooperation between the parties mostly due to the Defendant's "problematic" behavior. The Appellate Division found that the Family Court judge clearly had the child's best interests in mind when he made the custody decision and subsequently the child support award. Therefore, the Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the lower court. Child custody and parenting time cases are of the most emotional and difficult cases in all of family law. If you feel that it may be beneficial to you to submit an application to the court for a modification of your current child custody or parenting time arrangement it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about child custody, parenting time, child support, divorce or other family law matters in New Jersey visit the DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Emancipation and Child Support Provisions Of PSA Not Enforced

Cosco v. Cosco, is a post-judgment dissolution matter in which the court addressed the issue of a child's emancipation in the context of a parent who sought to terminate his child support obligations based upon a settlement agreement that specified that the support would terminate when the child turned eighteen years old. The Plaintiff appealed from the Family Court's Order that denied the emancipation of the parties' sons and the termination of child support, amongst other requests for relief. He argued that the court erred in not enforcing the parties' property settlement agreement (PSA) that set the termination date for the child support because the provisions were "fair and equitable" and the "public policy against waiver of child support [did] not apply . . . ." The Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the Family Court. According to the Appellate Division, any agreement attempting to abrogate a child's right to support is not enforceable. The courts have consistently held that an agreement between parents purporting to waive child support does not affect the child's right to those benefits. Kopak v. Polzer, 4 N.J. 327, 332-33 (195); Martinetti v. Hickman, 261 N.J. Super. 508, 512 (App. Div. 1993); Ryan v. Ryan, 246 N.J. Super. 376, 383 (Ch. Div. 1990). Applying these principles, the Appellate Division determined that the Family Court correctly determined that, based upon the parties' Certifications confirming the children were still in school and reliant upon their parents for support, neither child was emancipated and neither their turning eighteen nor the PSA altered their entitlement to support. Gac v. Gac, 186 N.J. 535, 543 (2006); Moehring v. Maute, 268 N.J. Super. 477, 480-81 (Ch. Div. 1993). Child emancipation and child support cases are of the most emotional and difficult cases in all of family law. If you feel that it may be beneficial to you to submit an application to the court for a modification of your current child support obligation or with regard to the emancipation of your children it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about child custody, child support, post-judgment modification, emancipation, divorce or other family law matters in New Jersey visit the DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Emancipation Does Not Eliminate Child Support Arrearage

Berthoumieux-Egas v. Berthoumieux, is a post-judgment dissolution matter in which the Defendant, father, appealed from a 2013 Family Court Order that denied his Motion for reconsideration regarding the emancipation of the parties' daughter and subsequently his child support obligation. The Family Court judge stated in his statement of reasons for denying the Defendant's Motion that the Order from which the Defendant appealed was the result of the undisputed emancipation of the parties' only child. The Order was the result of the exchange of Motions in which the Defendant sought his daughter's emancipation and requested to pay $25 a week towards his support arrears. The Plaintiff sought an Order that directed the Defendant to pay to her $8,000 as reimbursement for payments she made for the child's college and medical expenses. The Family Court granted the Defendant's request to emancipate the child, granted the Plaintiff's request to increase the Defendant's arrears and denied the Defendant's request to maintain his current arrears payment of $25 a week. The amount of increase in the Defendant's arrears payments to $191 a week was equal to his total weekly support obligation for his daughter. The Defendant submitted a Motion for reconsideration which was denied. The Family Court stated that it denied his Motion because it failed to meet the standards for consideration as defined by Court Rule 4:49-2 because the Defendant failed to show where the court erred and failed to provide any case law or statute that was contrary to the court's decision. The Defendant appealed. According to the Appellate Division, it could not perform its appellate function because the Defendant failed to provide a complete appendix which should have included copies of the Motions he filed with the supporting financial documents. Lacking those documents, the court could not determine if the Family Court improperly denied the reconsideration Motion. The Defendant's failure to provide these documents breached his "oblig[ation] to provide the court with 'such other parts of the record . . . as are essential to the proper considerations of the issues.'" Soc'y Hill Condo. Ass'n v. Soc'y Hill Assocs., 347 N.J. Super. 163, 177, 789 A.2d 138 (App. Div. 2002); N.J. Court Rules 2:6-1(a)(1)([I]) and 2:6-3. Therefore, the Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the Family Court. If you are considering action in the NJ Family Court, the process can be complicated. Often the results litigants seek are postponed or denied due to lack of knowledge regarding court procedure or filing requirements making it essential that you consider retaining a family law attorney to represent your interests. For more information about post-judgment modification, emancipation, divorce, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Father Ordered To Participate In Parenting Time With Daughter

R.R. v. L.A.C., is a matrimonial divorce action focusing on parenting time in which the Plaintiff (the non-custodial parent) did not answer the Complaint but attended the default divorce hearing and asked to voice his apprehensions about having parenting time with his daughter. The Plaintiff, the father, worked full-time and the Defendant, mother, worked part time earning minimum wage and lived with the parties' daughter. At the default divorce hearing the Plaintiff requested a divorce with the possibility of future parenting time "when [he] [was] ready." The Defendant requested that the Plaintiff be available to help raise their child. The Plaintiff emigrated from Peru to the United States in 1987. He returned to Peru years later and the parties married there in 1993. They lived separate and apart for the majority of their marriage after he returned to the United States in 1997. Although he returned to Peru a few times he did not see his wife and daughter from 2002 through 2013 when he sponsored their emigration from Peru in 2013. The parties' daughter had no recollection of her father. Difficulties within this family emerged immediately because the Plaintiff desired to live separate and apart from his family with little involvement in their lives. Further, the child, who was thirteen years old, was having extreme difficulties assimilating into the American school system. She was constantly bullied due to her cleft palate, hearing loss, and impaired speech. Seeing no way out, the Defendant sent the child back to Peru to live with her maternal grandmother. Within a few months, the child returned to the United States to be with her mother. During the default hearing, the judge noticed the child sitting in the back of the courtroom and with the aid of an interpreter asked her questions about her relationship with her father. She meekly asked the court ". . . if it [was] possible for him [her father] to see [her] once a week," and then hesitated and requested that she would like "to give him a hug." The court then questioned the father who explained that he was very uncomfortable about seeing his daughter and that he was not ready to spend time with her without the aid of therapists. According to the court, a custodial parent is entitled to the non-custodial parent's assistance. Non-custodial parents should assist custodial parents in raising and nurturing their children unless there is a Court Order prohibiting them from doing so. Further, the court has the equitable authority to facilitate parenting time between children and absent parents, to order counseling, and to require parents to complete parenting programs and "in promoting the child's welfare, the Court should [make] every effort to attain for the child the affection of both parents." In re Jackson, 13 N.J. Super. 144, 147-48, 80 A.2d 306 (App. Div. 1951). "The Family Court possesses broad equitable powers to accomplish substantial justice." Finger v. Zenn, 335 N.J. Super. 438, 446, 762 A.2d 702 (App. Div. 2000). In this case, the court entered an Order requiring the Plaintiff to call his daughter and see her weekly and identified low cost counseling and programs that promoted fathering skills. If you believe that a modification to your parenting time schedule or plan may be beneficial to you it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modification, parenting time, equitable distribution, divorce, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit the DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice if an attorney.

Decision To Award Sold Custody of Children Appealed

In Wu v. Liu, the Defendant appealed the decision of the New Jersey Family Court awarding sole child custody to his ex-wife and other issues. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the Family Court. The Plaintiff and Defendant were married in 1995 and emigrated to the United States from China shortly after that. They were married and divorced once before when they lived in China. In 1996, the Plaintiff gave birth to a daughter and a son was born in 2001. In 2011, the Plaintiff filed a Complaint for divorce. The parties represented themselves in the divorce and the matter was tried as to all issues in the Family Court. In 2014, the judge issued the final judgment of divorce and awarded the Plaintiff with sole legal and residential custody of the children, ordered the Defendant to pay $297 a week in permanent alimony, and equitably distributed the parties' real property in Belle Mead and Princeton. The Defendant hired an attorney and an appeal was filed. The Defendant supplied transcripts of the divorce proceedings and his brief referenced the proceedings, but the Family Court judge's finding of fact and conclusions of law were not contained in the brief. Further, no statement of reasons were included with the divorce judgment. The Plaintiff, who represented herself in the appeal, filed her brief in opposition, the Appellate Court became aware that the Family Court judge had forwarded the judgment to the parties on the day it was filed along with a recording of his statement of reasons which were orally placed on the record. The Appellate Division, exercised its discretion not to dismiss the appeal, although the Defendant clearly violated the court rules. N.J. Court Rule 2:5-3(b), requires, with limited exception, that the "transcript shall include the entire proceedings in the court . . . from which the appeal is taken." Instead, the court ordered the Defendant to provide transcripts of the Family Court judge's findings and conclusions - which the Defendant complied with. The Defendant argued that the Family Court judge erred in denying his request for legal and physical custody of the children, amongst other issues. The Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the Family Court, citing that it applied the deferential standard that "[T]he decision concerning the type of custody arrangement [is left] to the sound discretion of the trial court[.] Nufrio v. Nufrio, 341 N.J. Super. 548, 555, 775 A.2d 637 (App. Div. 2001); Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. Super. 583, 611, 660 A.2d 485 (1995). Further, "Custody issues are resolved using a best interests analysis that gives weight to the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c)." Hand v. Hand, 391 N.J. Super. 102, 105, 917 A.2d 269 (App. Div. 2007). The Defendant claimed that the judge ignored his evidence and relied "primarily" on the report of a psychologist who was appointed to evaluate the case by the judge pursuant to Court Rule 5:3-3. The expert's report cited the Defendant's repeated belief that a person in China whom the Defendant was calling "Mawei" was directing witchcraft at the family which caused all of the problems between he and his wife and children. The expert recommended that the Plaintiff have custody of the children, subject to supervised parenting time with the Defendant. According to the Appellate Division, the judge did much more than simply rely on the report as a basis for his custody decision in that the judge addressed all of the relevant statutory factors in detail, as well as, cited to the testimony of the parties and making credibility determinations as a result. The Appellate Division affirmed the judge's decision finding no reason to disturb the ruling. Child custody and parenting time cases are of the most emotional and difficult cases in all of family law. If you feel that it may be beneficial to you to submit an application to the court for a modification of your current child custody or parenting time arrangement it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about child custody, parenting time, equitable distribution, divorce or other family law matters in New Jersey visit the DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Party To Small Business Divorce Seeks Post-Judgment Modification

In Fiorenza v. Fiorenza, the Defendant appealed from the denial of a post-judgment Motion to modify his alimony obligation following a divorce including a small business. The Family Court judge initially ruled that alimony is not modifiable based upon anti-Lepis language in a negotiated Consent Order which set an amount below which the Defendant's alimony obligation could not be reduced. The parties in this case were married in 1986 and divorced in 2010. Three (3) children were born of the marriage. Only one child still remained at home at the time of the proceedings. During the marriage, the Defendant owned an MRI facility in addition to holding an interest in an accounting practice. The Defendant sold his interest in the MRI facility during the divorce because the business was failing. The marital settlement agreement (MSA) which was incorporated into the judgment of divorce directed that "the husband is self-employed and has average earnings of $250,000 per year" and the Plaintiff can reasonably earn "$25,000 per year." The parties agreed that in 2011 the Defendant would pay to the Plaintiff permanent alimony of $100,000 per year in monthly installments of $8,333. Within a few months the Defendant stopped paying support based upon his business suffering some financial hardships. The Plaintiff then petitioned the court to enforce the parties' agreement, resulting in Orders reducing the Defendant's six months' arrears and sending the parties to mediation. Mediation proved to be unsuccessful and the Defendant subsequently filed a Motion to reduce his support and the Plaintiff submitted a Cross-Motion to enforce litigant's rights. These Motions were resolved by the Consent Order that was at issue in the appeal. The exact provision at issue stated that "No matter defendant's annual gross income, at no time shall monthly support be lower than $5,000, except after the emancipation of [the parties' youngest child] when the child support component may be reduced . . . ." The Defendant then made $5,000 monthly payments to the Plaintiff for one year until he unilaterally reduced his payment to $2,000 and then the following month he paid nothing. The Plaintiff immediately moved to enforce the Consent Order to reinstate the support to $8,333, the amount negotiated in the MSA. The Defendant cross moved to reduce his alimony in accordance with Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139 (1980) or Morris v. Morris, 263 N.J. Super 237 (App. Div. 1993). After hearing oral argument, the Family Court judge enforced the Consent Order holding the critical clause to operate as an anti-Lepis provision in accordance with the Morris decision. The judge noted that the Defendant did not dispute that both parties bargained for the agreement and each party got the expected benefit and burden of the contract. Although enforcing the Consent Order the judge ordered a plenary hearing to determine his ability to pay both alimony and arrears. After the hearing, the judge ordered the Defendant to pay $2,500 in alimony and child support with the difference between that sum and the required $8,333 under the agreement to accrue. Then the court ordered a nominal arrears payment of $100 per month. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the Family Court finding that the trial court was correct in holding that the parties had anticipated the decline in the Defendant's income when they negotiated the Consent Order and agreed that notwithstanding any such decline, his alimony obligation to the Plaintiff would never drop below $5,000 except upon the child's emancipation. Crespo v. Crespo, 395 N.J. Super. 190, 194 (App. Div. 2007). No explicit reference to Lepis was required. Savarese v. Corcoran, 311 N.J. Super. 240, 243 (Ch. Div. 1997). Being that the laws governing alimony have recently been changed, it is very important that you seek out the advice of an attorney to protect your rights an entitlements. If you think that it may be beneficial for you to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your alimony obligation or for any other reason it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about alimony, divorce, post-judgment modification, child support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit the DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Motion For Alimony Reconsideration Not A Matter Of Right

In Ackerman v. Freitag, the Plaintiff appealed from a Court Order issued in 2014 that denied her unopposed Motion for reconsideration regarding her request for an award of alimony based upon changed circumstances and an increase in child support. The Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the Family Court in holding that a Motion for reconsideration is not a matter of right. The parties in this case divorced in 1999. At that time, they executed a property settlement agreement (PSA) that included a waiver of "any and all rights for alimony which either may have against the other, now and in the future." In 2012, the Plaintiff's license to practice medicine was suspended and she could no longer work in her field. She filed numerous Motions seeking relief based upon this life event and the negative financial impact that it had on her life. All requests for relief were denied. The judge based his denial on the fact that the medical board had concerns regarding the Plaintiff's mental health and required her to submit reports from mental health professionals attesting to her ability to continue to work. The Plaintiff failed to submit any documentation. Due to this, the judge ruled that the Plaintiff was voluntarily unemployed and denied her requests for relief. The Plaintiff then filed two subsequent Motions for reconsideration, both of which were denied for the same reasons. The Plaintiff appealed. According to the Appellate Division, the Orders that the Plaintiff appealed from sought reconsideration of prior Orders entered by the court. A Motion for reconsideration is governed by Court Rule 4:49-2 and is a matter to be exercised in the trial court's discretion. Capital Fin. Co. of Del. Valley, Inc. v. Asterbadi, 398 N.J. Super. 299, 310 (App Div.) certif. denied, 195 N.J. 521 (2008). It is not appropriate merely because a litigant is not happy with a decision of the court that he or she should be able to reargue a Motion, instead such relief "should be utilized only for those cases which fall into that narrow corridor in which either 1) the Court has expressed its decision based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or 2) it is obvious that the Court either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence." D'Atria v. D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401 (Ch. Div. 1990). The Appellate Division found that the Family Court judge provided thoughtful consideration to the Plaintiff's Motions and properly denied them. Being that the laws governing alimony have recently been changed, it is very important that you seek out the advice of an attorney to protect your rights an entitlements. If you think that it may be beneficial for you to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your alimony or child support obligation or for any other reason it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about alimony, divorce, post-judgment modification, child support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit the DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Equitable Fraud: Family Law Case Of First Impression

In Easton v. Mercer, a case of first impression in New Jersey family law, a judge has ruled that a marriage can be annulled on the grounds of equitable fraud when the evidence presented suggests that annulment, as opposed to a traditional divorce, presents the most equitable remedy for the parties. According to Ocean County Superior Court Judge Lawrence Jones, his ruling allows judges to nullify marriages without evidence of actual fraud. "[E]quitable fraud is a concept that permits a court of equity to act in the name of fairness," Judge Jones was quoted as saying. "The doctrine does not require an intent to deceive, and the granting of relief is designed not to punish a defendant for intentional fraud or wrongdoing, but rather to assist an innocent plaintiff and render him or her whole through applicable equitable relief." In the instant case, the couple married but never lived together, never consummated the marriage, and never financially supported each other. Directly after their marriage the Defendant continued to live in her parents' house. Four years later, the Plaintiff sought an annulment based upon the doctrine of equitable fraud, but did not claim that there was actual fraud or deceit on the part of his wife. The Plaintiff claimed that the Defendant committed fraud by bowing to her parents pressure to abandon him. He argued that if he had known that the Defendant was going to change her mind directly after the wedding, he never would have married her. The Defendant never challenged the Plaintiff's request for an annulment, but Judge Jones could not automatically grant such relief. He could simply have granted a divorce, but granting an annulment presented a more complicated situation because the ruling essentially makes it as if the marriage never happened. According to Judge Jones, the nullity statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-1, provides for grounds in which a marriage can be annulled. The language of the law allows for annulment when there has been "fraud to the essentials of the marriage," although this phrase has never been defined. Ultimately, Judge Jones granted the annulment based upon the fact that the parties did not have any children, they never lived together, and had no financial interdependence. In fact, they never held themselves out to be married. Therefore, the case had few issues or impediments and the equitable result dictated that the annulment be granted. If that facts had been different perhaps the result would have been as well. If you are contemplating divorce, annulment, post-judgment modification or you would like more information regarding a family law issue you should seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about divorce, uncontested divorce, equitable distribution, child support, alimony or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Parenting Time Plan Upheld By NJ Appellate Division

In N.S. v. D.O., the Defendant appealed from a Court Order which set forth a parenting time schedule because he felt that the Order did not provide him with the "full measure of his parental rights" by denying him liberal and reasonable parenting time. In 2010, the Plaintiff obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO) against the Defendant under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. At the same time she filed a Complaint for Divorce against him. The Family Court judge assigned to the case referred the matter to the Bergen Family Center (BFC) for the purpose of conducting a custody/parenting time evaluation. In 2011, the BFC issued a very detailed written report documenting its evaluation and recommendations. The evaluator interviewed the parties, the children, the grandparents, the Defendant's treating psychologist, the treating pediatrician of the children, a DYFS worker who investigated a prior claim that the Defendant made (after losing parental rights) that the parties' daughter was sexually abused by her maternal grandfather, and many others. The evaluator acknowledged that the case was "a highly charged situation for everyone involved," and although the Defendant had not had access to his children since the FRO was issued, the evaluator recommended that the prohibition against him having parenting time with his children should "be modified at this time," and that reunification with his children should proceed under the guidance of the son's therapist. Finally, it was recommended that after at least six (6) sessions without contradictions the Defendant should be permitted supervised visitation which should continue for at least six (6) months. After this, the Defendant could petition the court for the supervision to be lifted. The parties executed a Consent Order on May of 2011 that tracked the recommendations of the BFC evaluator. It was later ordered that both parties submit to the court proposed parenting time plans. Upon the submission of both parenting time plans, the judge observed that there was "not that much of a difference" between their proposed plans and described their argument regarding holidays as "minor." The judge then indicated that she would prepare an Order that blended their two proposals providing them with "something [they] both [could] live with . . . that allows both of [them] to continue to work together." Subsequently, the judge prepared a very detailed Order concerning custody and parenting time that provided that the Defendant receive unsupervised visitation on alternate weekends, without overnights, until the 2014 school year when the weekend visitations were to become overnights. The Defendant appealed arguing that the schedule was unreasonably restrictive without providing any reasons for being so. The Appellate Division disagreed. According to the Appellate Court, in reviewing the Order of the Family Court, it "defer[ed] to the factual findings of the trial court," N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104, 952 A.2d 436 (2008). In doing so it recognized the "family court's special jurisdiction and expertise in family matters." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.C. III, 201 N.J. 328, 343, 990 A.2d 1097 (2010); Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413, 713 A.2d 390 (1998). It is only when the Family Court's conclusions are ". . . so 'clearly mistaken' or 'wide of the mark'" that the Appellate Division will intervene and make its own findings. In this case, the court found that the Family Court judge held that the parenting plans submitted by the parties were not that different and the differences that did exist were minor. The judge's stated goal of blending the proposals to create an equitable Order that each party could live with was achieved and therefore there was no reason to disturb the Family Court's Order. Custody and Visitation are extremely sensitive issues wherein an appropriate balance between the needs of the child with the existing situation of each parent. If you believe that a modification to your custody or parenting time may be beneficial to you it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modification, parenting time, equitable distribution, divorce, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit the DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice if an attorney.

Application Of Child Support From Social Security Disability Challenged

In Watson v. Chamberlain, the Defendant appealed from a Court Order entered in 2014 with regard to the Plaintiff's child support obligation for their daughter. The parties in this case were never married. They had a daughter together in 1998. In 1999, the Family Court issued an Order requiring the Plaintiff to pay to the Defendant $88.00 a week in child support. By 2014, when the Motions in this case were filed, the Plaintiff's child support obligation had increased to $117.00 a week due to cost of living adjustments. The Plaintiff had gone on and off Social Security Disability (SSD) throughout his daughter's life, and as a result, received multiple lump SSD dependency checks on the child's behalf. He received $8,329.00 in 2005, $13,820.00 in 2009, and $11,297.00 in 2013. With regard to the 2005 and 2009 SSD checks, the Family Court first applied the money to the Plaintiff's arrears with the remaining amounts being put in a trust fund for the child's future education. Each time, though, the Defendant claimed that she had already spent the money on the child's behalf. Due to this, the court amended its Orders to credit the balance from each check against the Plaintiff's future support obligations. The 2013 SSD was the main issue of this appeal. When the Defendant received this check, she preemptively acted to prevent the Plaintiff from receiving a credit against his future child support obligations, arguing to the court that the previous credits provided the Plaintiff with windfalls. The Plaintiff cross-moved to have the full amount credited to his child support obligation. The Motion judge seemed to ignore the credit from the 2009 SSD check in his calculations and found that prior to the 2013 SSD check the Plaintiff had an existing arrears of $11,921.00. After applying the 2013 SSD check, the court found that the Plaintiff still owed $625.00 in arrears and the court applied the entire 2013 SSD check to the Plaintiff's arrears instructing probation to "verify and adjust accounts accordingly." Unfortunately, the court's Order did not direct the probation department to disregard to credit from the 2009 SSD check and it simply credited the 2013 SSD check to the Plaintiff's account. Therefore, the Plaintiff netted a credit of $10,935.97 toward future child support payments. The Defendant appealed. According to the Appellate Division, the propriety of a child support credit for SSD benefits paid to a child depends upon the equities of the case. Diehl v. Diehl, 389 N.J. Super. 443, 449, 913 A.2d 803 (App. Div. 2006). The source and purpose of SSD benefits for dependents are relevant to the equities. Id. The courts have generally credited SSD benefit payments against child support where the "credit is sought against support obligations contemporaneous with benefit payments." Id. SSD benefits that exceed the rate of child support are gratuity to the child and should not be credited. Id. at 450. However, the supporting parent does not need to carry an arrears balance to receive a credit for retroactive SSD payments. Id. In this case, the benefits paid to the child never exceeded the Plaintiff's child support obligation over the periods of time at issue. Therefore, the court could discern no error in crediting of any SSD payments against the child support obligation. Therefore, this part of the Order was affirmed. If you anticipate that it may be beneficial to you to seek a modification of your child support obligation it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about child support, alimony, divorce, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Mediated Agreement Without Party Signatures Was Held To Be Binding

In Campbell v. Campbell, the Defendant appealed from the incorporation unsigned parenting time agreement into the parties' final divorce judgment after a failed attempt at mediation. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the Family Court. The parties in this case have two (2) sons who were aged six and ten at the time of the agreement. The younger son has special needs and has suffered from epilepsy. The terms of the agreement in question were reached during a mediation which was held in 2012. The agreement was written down by the mediator. The resulting Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was unsigned, but the case was reported to the court as settled concerning all parenting time issues. The Defendant filed an Answer to the divorce Complaint, before the mediation, containing a parenting time plan that gave him the same schedule with the children that was reached in the MOU except rather than two week night dinner visits, he would have had one weekly dinner and one weekly overnight visit. In the MOU the parties agreed to joint legal custody along with the parenting time designation for each parent including summer vacations and holidays. The reasons for the delay in signing the MOU were disputed, but in the interim, the Defendant rejected the terms of the MOU unless the Plaintiff agreed to modify it to include two (2) weekly overnights with his children along with some other changes. The Plaintiff agreed to make some of the changes but not all. Two months after the mediation session and after the continued negotiation the Defendant rejected the MOU. In 2013, the Plaintiff filed a Motion seeking to incorporate the MOU into the parties' divorce decree. The Family Court judge granted the Plaintiff's Motion after observing that the children substantially benefited from the parties' agreement and that the MOU could be modified slightly for the best interests of the children. According to the Appellate Division, it is well established that our judicial system encourages and supports negotiated agreements between divorcing parties. Weishaus v. Weishaus, 180 N.J. 131, 143 (2004); Konzelman v. Konzelman, 158 N.J. 185, 193 (1999). Mediation is an alternative means of resolving parenting conflicts and is also available to "resolve aspects of family law matters." Court Rule 1:405(b)(2). The statutory source for mediation is the Mediation Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:23C-1 to -13. The court found that in this case, after the parties reached an agreement, the Defendant had a gradual change of heart and that triggered a new round of litigation . Under the circumstances, the Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the Family Court holding that the Family Court judge's ultimate decision to incorporate the MOU into the divorce decree was based upon weighty equitable considerations that warrant the enforcement of the document. If you believe that mediation is possible in your divorce or family law matter be sure to contact an attorney experienced in mediation and proper drafting and execution of Memorandums of Understanding. For more information about mediation, post-judgment modification, parenting time, equitable distribution, divorce, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit the DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice if an attorney.

Post-Judgment Alimony Dispute Leads To Appeals

In Dondona v. Dondona, a case appealed out of Morris County, the Defendant appealed from a 2014 Court Order that denied her post-judgment cross-motion to increase the alimony payments being made to her by the Plaintiff. The Appellate Court reversed the decision of the lower court. The parties in this case were married in 1984 and obtained a divorce in 2008. One child was born during the marriage. The parties executed a property settlement agreement (PSA) that was incorporated into their final divorce judgment which required the Plaintiff to pay $600 a month in alimony to the Defendant until their child was emancipated, and then the alimony was to increase to $950 a month. The PSA also specified that if the circumstances between the parties changed, they would come to an agreement with respect to the change or make an application to the court to resolve the dispute. In 2009, the Defendant began living with another man and the Plaintiff stopped making his alimony payments. In 2010, the Plaintiff filed a motion to terminate his alimony obligation altogether. In 2012, the parties executed a Consent Order in which the Plaintiff agreed to pay $375 a month for alimony until further Order of the court or consent of the parties. In 2014, the Plaintiff filed a Motion to emancipate the parties' daughter and for the termination of his alimony obligation due to the Defendant's six (6) years of cohabitation. The Defendant filed a cross-motion for alimony payments of $950 as was originally set forth in the PSA. The Plaintiff also claimed that his financial circumstances had changed and he was making much less than money than when the parties divorced. The Family Court judge granted the request to emancipate the parties' daughter but denied the motion to terminate alimony. Further, the Defendant's motion for an increase in alimony to $950 was also denied, and the Plaintiff was required to continue paying $375 a month. According to the Appellate Division, it needed to determine if each party presented a prima facie case of changed circumstances to warrant a termination or modification of alimony. Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 146 (1980). Both parties were seeking a change in alimony. The PSA provided that if the circumstances between the parties were to change, they could come to an agreement or request that the court make a determination. The Consent Order was an agreement between the parties to change the alimony amount at that specific time until they either came to a new agreement or a Court Order modified the amount. The Appellate Division held that both parties had provided sufficient financial information for the Family Court to order appropriate discovery and make detailed findings of fact as to a new alimony determination. Therefore, it reversed the decision of the Family Court and remanded the case back there for further proceedings to determine an appropriate alimony obligation. Being that the laws governing alimony have recently been changed, it is very important that you seek out the advice of an attorney to protect your rights an entitlements. If you think that it may be beneficial for you to petition the court for a post-judgment modification of your alimony obligation or for any other reason it is imperative that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about alimony, divorce, post-judgment modification, child support, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit the DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Reduction In Child Support After Incarceration For Arrears

In Solomon v. Solomon, the Defendant appealed from a 2013 Family Court post-judgment Order that granted the Plaintiff's Motion for reconsideration to compel the Defendant to pay substantial child support arrears from his 50% share of his 401(k) or IRA and the proceeds from the sale of a timeshare property. The parties in this case were married in 1996 and had three (3) children. They executed a property settlement agreement (PSA) in 2006 which was incorporated into their final dual judgment of divorce on the same day. The PSA required the Defendant 1) to pay the Plaintiff $300 a week in child support, and $325 per week in alimony for five (5) years; 2) divide the Defendant's 401(k) equally between the parties; and (3) divide the parties' ownership and usage of their timeshare property equally. In 2007, the court assigned to the Plaintiff an amount equal to 50% of the value of the Defendant's IRA and found that the Defendant violated the Plaintiff's rights by willfully failing to turn over to her half of the 401(k) in accordance with the provisions of their PSA. In 2009, the Defendant was sentenced to seven (7) years in prison. Subsequent to his entering into the PSA but before his incarceration, he was required to pay $35 per week toward support arrears. While he was incarcerated, the Defendant submitted an application to reduce his child support payments to $5 a week, to terminate his alimony, and to terminate his payment towards arrears. He argued that his incarceration amounted to a change in circumstances. In 2011, a Family Court judge denied the Defendant's request to decrease his child support payments, but suspended the enforcement of his support obligations pending his release. By consent, the Defendant's alimony obligation was terminated retroactive to 2008. In 2011, the Defendant was released to a work house. In 2013, the Family Court issued an Order pertaining to his child support obligation to which the Defendant moved for reconsideration. The judge who heard the Motion arguments, granted the Defendant's Motion for reconsideration and ordered that 1) the Defendant maintain his 50% interest in the 401(k); 2) the parties continue to share ownership of the timeshare, 3) the parties submit current case information statements, and 4) denied the Defendant's request to stay his existing child support obligation. In the interim, the Defendant's child support obligation was increased due to a cost of living increase and another judge ordered that the Defendant pay $35 a week towards his $90,358.64 arrears. In response, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for reconsideration which was granted and the Defendant was ordered to pay half of his 401(k) or IRA toward his child support arrears and to convey his interest in the parties' time share to the Plaintiff to put towards his arrears. This Order also reduced the Defendant's child support from $366 week to $66 and ordered that he pay an additional $100 per week ward his arrears. The Defendant appealed arguing for a strict enforcement of the terms of the PSA. According to the Appellate Division, "Marital agreements are essentially consensual and voluntary and as a result, they are approached with a predisposition in favor of their validity and enforceability." Massar v. Massar, 279 N.J. Super. 89, 93 (App. Div. 1995). Yet, in this case, the court was guided by its long-standing view that the " . . . obligation to provide child support 'is engrained in our common law, statutory, and rule-based jurisprudence.'" Colca v. Anson, 413 N.J. Super. 405, 414 (App. Div. 2010). "Child support is the right of the child and responsibility of both parents, not a child won or lost by the custodial parent from the non-custodial parent." Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583, 591 (1995). When considering all guiding principles that inform child support decisions and its standard of review, the court was satisfied that the lower court enforced the parties' PSA to the children's best interests and therefore affirmed the decision of the Family Court. If you anticipate that it may be beneficial to you to seek a post-judgment modification of your child support obligation it is critical that you seek out the advice of an experienced attorney before moving forward. For more information about post-judgment modification, child support, alimony, divorce, or other family law matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way is intended to replace the advice of an attorney.